


URBAN ACTION



URBAN ACTION

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URBAN ACTION

Urban Action is the product of interested San Francisco State University student authors and a dedicated student editorial board. This first journal issue would not have been possible without the encouragement of the Urban Studies faculty and the financial support of Associated Students of San Francisco State University. We hope that Urban Action will continue to receive this assistance.

The purpose of this journal is to present students with a chance to share their analysis, research and visions with other students, S.F.S.U. alumni, and Bay Area professionals who are concerned with the direction of urban life. This communication is intimately linked with the goals and objectives of the Urban Studies Program.

The Urban Studies Program at S.F.S.U. is founded upon the conviction that urban universities have a particular opportunity and responsibility to help shape the future of urban life. The program offers an inter-disciplinary policy-oriented curriculum designed to prepare students for a wide variety of public and private careers in urban life and for effective action as citizens of our urban society. Strong emphasis is placed upon concrete community involvement, through internships, research projects, and other kinds of participation in community activities; Urban Action is a new manifestation of that longstanding emphasis.

This issue of Urban Action covers a wide range of urban concerns, incorporating urban politics, policy analysis, sociology, and urban economic in the historical context of current metropolitan problems. Many of the articles point to some concrete actions which will draw upon available resources to improve existing conditions, while others describe the joys of urban living. In addition, the reader will find short pieces on statistical trends in San Francisco, job opportunities in the federal government, and the graduate program in policy administration at San Francisco State University.

ENJOY!

Debbie LeVeon
Director Urban Studies
Program S.F.S.U.

VITAL STATISTICS FOR S.F. - 1979

Population Trends

San Francisco's population has been generally declining since shortly after World War II, when it hit a peak of more than 775,000. The population has dropped every year since 1963, and at the end of 1978 was estimated at 658,100. Projections by the state Department of Finance indicate that San Francisco's population will continue to register gradual declines - the city's mid-1985 population is projected at around 645,000.

About half of the housing stock in the city is in multiple-unit buildings, best suited to single occupants and childless couples. The number of persons per family household in San Francisco is far smaller than in any other metropolitan county in California. This condition should continue to prevail as the number of dwelling units built in multiple-unit buildings during the last five years was over five times the number of single-family houses built.

Employment

The dominant characteristic of San Francisco's employment picture is the large proportion of the work force with jobs in the service-producing industries, in contrast to the small percentage of workers in manufacturing and the very small fraction in agriculture. California's Employment Development Department estimates that in 1978 there were 520,000 wage and salary workers employed in San Francisco City and County. Of this number, only 9.2 percent were engaged in manufacturing.

The "service" group of businesses was the category with the largest number of workers in San Francisco in 1978 - an estimated 132,000, or 25.4 % of the county's total wage and salary workers.

The second largest employment category in San Francisco is government (federal, state and local), which recorded an estimated 89,900 workers in 1978 - 17.3% of the total work force in the city.

Finance, insurance, and real estate is the third largest employment category in San Francisco and one of the fastest growing. In 1978, the number of workers in this category was estimated at 77,900 - 15% of the the total employment in the city.

VITAL STATISTICS FOR 1978


Retail trade, with an estimated 1978 total of 63,000 workers, is the fourth largest employment category in San Francisco. This category posted record gains in 1978, due to the city's continued importance as a Bay Area retail center as well as its booming tourist trade.

Tourism is generally considered a "basic industry," because it is a service provided to consumers who come from outside the local market. Since none of the other generally recognized basic industries (e.g. manufacturing, agriculture, and the extraction of natural resources) play a significant role in San Francisco's economy, tourism is recognized as the city's leading source of income. The San Francisco Convention & Visitors Bureau estimated that, in 1978, visitors to San Francisco - for business or pleasure - spent \$829 million in the city, 8.5% more than in 1977. Discount air fares and favorable currency rates for foreign travelers are responsible, in part, for the continued influx of visitors to the city.

Construction Activity

Downtown San Francisco is still in the midst of the high-rise office building boom that began in the early 1960s. Although the city's population has been dropping, employment has been rising, and the growth in white-collar jobs, especially in the financial group of companies, continues to support the need for office space.

Paralleling the recent slowing in the trend of home building throughout the state, housing units authorized in San Francisco in the first 7 months of 1979 totaled 913, compared with 1,228 in the corresponding period of 1978. As in prior years, multiple-family housing construction in 1978 and in the first half of 1979 far outpaced the building of single-family dwellings.



ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN SAN FRANCISCO

SCOTT DEWAR - SALLY BRUNN

Is it possible for families to choose the type of school they want for their children? Does public education actually mean that children from low-income families will be denied the discovery of their true aptitudes, interests, and abilities? Certainly when we discard such choices by reducing the supply of public education to one established system (formula?), we risk uprooting the foundation for notions like "democracy" and "freedom". Due partly to this reasoning, the educational ferment of the sixties has produced a quiet movement throughout the country to directly involve parents in running elementary schools, despite the predominance of "traditional education" and the trendy conservative mood of today. In San Francisco alone there are presently twenty-one alternative schools and programs plus a number of special bilingual programs. Can these new alternatives produce "achievers" of children who previously were not achieving? In particular, can the much maligned urban public schools be "turned around" by these alternative schools in our era of fiscal austerity?

This kind of inquiry is especially timely in California for two reasons. First, the entire financial structure for California schools has suffered in the aftermath of the passage of Proposition 13. The recent teacher's strike in the San Francisco school system can be linked to the 1,200 layoffs resulting from the constraints of Prop. 13, which has cut the S.F. school budget by \$18.5 million (out of the entire \$181 million budget).¹ Second, is the challenge the California public schools will face in June 1980 when the Family Initiative (voucher system) is scheduled to be on the ballot. This idea has been discussed seriously for the last fifteen years but has met with intense resistance from school administrators with vested interests in maintaining the status quo, and from critics who believe the voucher plan will work to the disadvantage of low-income families.² Milton Friedman has long advocated the voucher plan as a way for the free market force of competition to work its magic on the schools. And perhaps the most sophisticated argument for a voucher plan can be found in the work of John Coons and Stephen Sugarman. They see the voucher system as serving two important goals: creating the proper amount of educational diversity by type, and equalizing (at least more than presently) the educational opportunities available to different

social and economic groups. As early as 1971, Coons and Sugarman developed a model state system for vouchers, which drew a parallel between the Serrano vs. Priest decision and parental control of the education process.³

If the school districts could be given economic parity, so could any other kind of sub-unit with taxable wealth or income; the potential role of the family became obvious. If it were desirable to do so, local political units could be eliminated altogether from public education. In their place the family could, in effect, become the school district for two crucial purposes: it could fix the levels of "local" taxation and spending through its choice of rate under a variable self-selected tax on the family's income.⁴

The historical context for this movement began as early as 1954 when the landmark school segregation case was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, it was not until the early sixties, when the civil rights movement used its rising political power to demand integration in the schools, that the full force of the decision was felt. The passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965 signaled the first federal commitment to improving both the quality and quantity of educational opportunities. Title I of ESEA was written specifically for the development of compensatory education - to help children who were below grade level catch up. That same year, Head Start centers opened throughout the country to help disadvantaged children. Concurrent with this development was a quiet revolt (led primarily by liberal educators) against educational bureaucracies and the established way of doing things. John Holt in 1964 wrote How Children Fail and in 1969 The Underachieving School, claiming that the big city and sub-urban school systems were suppressing rather than stimulating children's intelligence and imagination.

A reality of inner-city life is that the attainment of economic resources is not directly related to either how hard one works or how much formal education one acquires. Witness the failure of urban public education in teaching standard English to a student population which speaks mostly nonstandard dialects, or languages other than English. The use of concepts and phenomena unrelated to the immediate experiences of urban school children leaves many with the belief that they are destined to fail no matter how hard they work. Many examples of this lack of fit between schools and inner city realities are obvious and well known, but for the most part the curriculum and instructional methods used to teach it are fundamentally no different from what they were ten or twenty years ago.

In sum, if one set out to encourage behavior patterns characterized by hopelessness and frustration, the goal would be achieved

ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

by placing young people in an inner-city environment in a large metropolitan area. It is hardly surprising that many of the people who grow up or live in the inner-city come to believe that they have little control over their environment or their futures.⁵

Parent groups in New York and Boston reacted to this depressing prognosis by taking matters into their own hands. In 1966 a famous clash occurred in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district of Brooklyn in which parents devised a plan calling for neighborhood control of eight schools in the N.Y. City education system, in the face of bitter opposition by the New York Federation of Teachers and most central administrators. From the fall of 1967 through June 1970 this demonstration district was plagued with a series of conflicts and controversies, most notably the teacher's strike of 1968. Unfortunately, like most current data on administrative-community schools, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment was not evaluated on the basis of empirical studies but rather on the basis of "soft" research. Much of the early literature was written by social and literary critics (I.F. Stone, Alfred Kazin, Dwight MacDonald), and liberal organizations (the New York Urban Coalition and the New York Civil Liberties Union), who claimed that the students in the district had achieved academic success.⁶ Thus, little can be deduced from this experiment other than the positive conclusion that it is feasible to operate a large inner-city elementary school system which is deeply rooted in the principles of parental participation and parental control.

A few empirical studies can be cited which show that involving parents (not community groups) with their children's learning correlates with increased student development in academic and attitudinal areas. For example, Herbert Schiff found that parental participation and cooperation in school affairs led to increased student achievement and school attendance and fewer discipline problems.⁷ A 1972 study by Joe L. Rempson evaluated an experimental program for increasing the participation of black and Puerto Rican parents in twenty-seven elementary schools in New York City. He established that a parent's involvement in his/her child's education helps remove the illusionary dichotomy between home and school for both the child and the parent.

Participants expressed gains in improving their ability to guide their children's growth, a strengthened self-image, and an increase in their knowledge of the school functions.⁸

In 1972 ESEA's Title I mandated councils at each school site receiving Title I funds - with the majority on the board being parents of children who receive Title I funds. This technique for creating community control through some form

CALIFORNIA STATE LAW CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS

Section 58500 of the Education Code defines alternative public schools as a school or separate class group within a school which is operated in a manner designed to:

- (a) Maximize the opportunity for students to develop the positive values of self-reliance, initiative, kindness, spontaneity, resourcefulness, courage, creativity, responsibility, and joy.
- (b) Recognize that the best learning takes place when the student learns because of his desire to learn.
- (c) Maximize the opportunity for teachers, parents and students to cooperatively develop the learning process and its subject matter. This opportunity shall be a continuous, permanent process.
- (d) Maintain a learning situation maximizing student self-motivation and encouraging the student in his own time to follow his own interests.
- (e) Maximize the opportunity for students, teachers, and parents to continuously react to the changing world, including but not limited to the community in which the school is located.

Alternative schools shall be operated in a manner to maximize the opportunity for improvement of the general school curriculum by innovative methods and ideas developed within the alternative school operation and to improve the general level of education in the State of California. Any alternative school shall be maintained and funded by the school district at the same level of support as other educational programs for children of the same age level by the district. Each Alternative school/program must maintain a racial/ethnic balance so that no racial/ethnic group exceeds 40% of enrollment.

of decentralization process is the key to understanding the fundamental resistance it encounters.

When we talk about community control, especially in the large cities. We are also talking about who will make decisions about who will be hired, discharged and promoted.⁹

In its report on School Site Councils, the Institute for Responsive Education investigated the progress being made throughout the country in granting power to school site groups. The report observed that despite the many problems of school site councils, ranging from "paper councils", to lack of minority participation and frequent turnover, to opposition from school boards and principals; the number of school site councils was growing.

In California the big push for school site decision-making was made in 1972 when Wilson Riles' Early Childhood Education Act was passed. When Riles drafted the ECE bill, he carefully wove into it the factors which he felt were most important for successful schools.¹⁰ Central to his design was the involvement of parents in all aspects of the program at each local school site, under the auspices of the district ECE councils (also run by parents). Parents at the individual school sites were responsible for writing, directing, and evaluating their programs. The district ECE councils were responsible for reviewing applications for ECE funding and monitoring and reviewing other schools' programs. All these features were later incorporated into the School Improvement Program of AB 65 (1977) with planning funds for the program to be expanded into the upper grades.

The first San Franciscan alternative elementary school was planned in the winter and spring of 1972. It was founded by several co-op nursery school parents: Mary Lou Carson, Sonia Barrington, and Diane Martinovich. Influenced by the infant schools of England and books such as Teacher by Sylvia Ashton-Warner, these parents were concerned that their efforts at encouraging the inquisitiveness and self-direction were stopped when children entered kindergarten and were told to sit still and be quiet. There was very little the parents could say about the specific styles of learning and programs, unlike the nursery school where they had directed the program and hired the staff. In January of 1972 some twenty parents gathered in the basement of Mary Lou Carson's house and wrote a proposal to the San Francisco Unified School District. They urged the S.F.U.S.D. to allow the creation of an alternative school organized and run by parents - with the parents selecting the staff and curriculum. They asked for no additional money other than the money authorized by the California Education Code for the operation of alterna-

tive public schools, and were very willing to conform to the integration plan that had been put into effect the previous autumn (See Education Code, Section 58500). Minority families were actively sought for the school. More and more people came to each organizational meeting; and by May, Mary Lou recalls looking out at a sea of some 300 faces at a meeting held in the District's cafeteria at 135 Van Ness St. in which Tom Shaheen, the outgoing Superintendent, gave his strong approval. The School Board which was in the midst of changing over from an appointive to an elective board did not put up a big fight. The major opposition came from the second rung of administrators such as Assistant Superintendents Reiterman and Pivnik. They didn't like the prospect of seeing the power shift from the central administration to individual school sites. In spite of the resistance the parents encountered in searching for a site, Community School opened in the fall of 1972.

Another alternative school, Rooftop, was also started in the fall of 1972. A group of teachers from the ghetto schools at Hunter's Point and Potrero Hill had been meeting informally for several months to discuss their experiences and the problems with traditional school environments when they heard about Community School and applied for teaching jobs. However, Community School only wanted to hire two out of the four of them; so they decided to form their own 4th-6th grade school. They were interested in a site in the Excelsior District but a principal in that neighborhood objected. The teachers were finally given the top floor in an old building in Pacific Heights - hence, the name Rooftop.

Now, just seven years after Community School and Rooftop started, there are twelve alternative elementary schools in San Francisco. At this point in time it is difficult to imagine all these programs fading away, despite the fiscal pressures of Prop 13. In Robert Alioto's Redesign Plan of 1978 the alternative schools received a strong endorsement. The minimum competency tests given this past spring show that, on the average, alternative schools scored above the district average in basic reading and writing skills required for promotion to the fourth and sixth grades. The results of these tests show that while some alternative schools scored well above the district average - students in at least five of the twelve schools scored below average in one or more skills areas. Local educators find it difficult to gauge the success of these particular programs because they are so unique and diverse. Perhaps the most promising affirmation of the San Francisco alternative schools success has been the establishment of an Alternative School Council (Feb. 1979) to promote the concerns of these schools and coordinate lobbying efforts in Sacramento.

San Francisco School Board member Myra Kopf observed that youngsters produce better results only if the teacher is well prepared. "The trend I've seen is that individualized instruction requires alot more preparation on the part of the teacher, rather than just a plain old-fashioned 'structured' classroom. Unless the teacher is very structured herself, the unstructured program doesn't work."¹¹ It seems that the discrepancy between alternative school schools' scores in the minimum compentancy tests can partly be accounted for by pointing out that many of the teachers in the schools are themselves unprepared to teach the new methods. In this light it may be actually remarkable the alternative schools preformed as well as they did.

Alternative public schools offer advantages over traditional public schools other than the good fortune of a quality education for the individual students. They present communities a means by which cultural traditions and other parochial values can be preserved. This can be especially important to urban areas with large minority populations. Therefore, it would be wise for policy makers to take advantage of the tremendous potential which these schools have for reducing racial friction in the center cities. It should be understood that a wide variety of needs and conflicting objectives exists in America and that the subjugation of children to traditional educational environments increases the potential for alienation among all participants. Alternative schools return some of the decision making activity back to the parents, students, and teachers who are directly affected by the system. One important purpose of parental involvement in the inner city schools is to show pupils that the people who live in their neighborhood are able to exercise influence over the institutions they are taxed to support. If alternative schools demonstrate that quality education in the inner city schools is possible with diverse participation in the educational process, then many families who would have opted to leave for the suburbs and their "better" schools might stay. It is our hope that future studies will determine the extent to which these lofty aspirations are being met by these experiments within the City's school district.

School	Power Base	Focus	Minimum Standards Scores			
			3rd grade Reading	Math	5th grade Reading	Math
Argonne	Teachers, parent participation emphasized	Year-round, flexible calendar school, organized in multi-age groups; curriculum highly individualized to accomodate flexible attendance	97	91	-	-
* Buena Vista Multi-Cultural	Administration, Teachers	School within a school, bilingual teaching, full command of English and proficiency in core subjects as well as mastery of primary language and culture	73	80	100	57
Buena Vista Annex	Teachers, parent participation and community involvement	Alternative teaching strategies to provide individualized curriculum and child centered environment	72	78	85	74
Douglas Traditional	Administation, teachers, parents in supportive role	Basic subjects taught within a non-graded framework. Emphasis on well ordered environment, includes teaching responsibility, good manners and self-discipline	96	98	97	90
John Swett	Teachers, parent and community involvement	Basic subjects team-taught in integrated, multi-aged setting. Focus on art, science, Korean bilingual/bicultural studies	77	68	100	80
Lakeshore	Administration, teachers, emphasis on community support	A 3R's program offering Spanish or French in addition to basic subjects. Extensive handicapped, creative arts, and library programs	92	89	100	97
Lawton	Administration, teachers	Traditional and structured. Academic excellence, discipline, and high behavioral standards stressed. Emphasis on reading with classical literature exposure	94	86	91	84

New Traditions	Parents and teachers. Parents required to attend meeting and individual conferences	Non-competitive learning environment. Child-centered curriculum based on Piaget's theories. Teaching in small groups using inquiry, problem solving and practical investigation	100	100	100	100
Rooftop	Administration, teachers	Child-centered environment; Multi-graded classrooms with emphasis on basic subjects	84	87	89	58
San Francisco Community	Parents, teachers utilized neighborhood resources; parent's commitment required	Community school, supplied by deliberate and consistent participation of parents. Focus on urban and social phenomena	100	100	96	81
S.F. Second Community	Parents, teachers. time commitment required from parents	Encourages responsibility for learning and self-paced progress in an informal unstructured environment	79	74	70	30
Alternative schools' averages:			88	86	92	75
District schools' averages;			81	77	88	71

* Buena Vista Multi-Cultural has been incorporated into Edison, a regular elementary school, as of Fall of 1979.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 When Gov. Jerry Brown signed AB 65, the comprehensive school finance bill of 1977, he heralded it as a major step in providing parents and communities a partnership in the schools through the "School Improvement Program". Under this plan, each school has a site council made up of staff and parents. If the Legislature in its attempt to economize knocks out the School Improvement Program, the whole structure for community input will be lost.
- 2 These critics argue that families with higher incomes will have a far greater opportunity to shop for private schools in order to escape the crumbling public education system. We think this argument has been overblown because many upper-middle and middle income families are already sending their children to private schools and it is unlikely that the voucher plan will cause any major shift from public to private schools. What is more important is the advantage such choices offer all families in the form of education.
- 3 Serrano v. Priest, L.A. 29820 (Super. Ct. No. 938254) opinion filed August 30, 1971. The court held 6 to 1 for the children plaintiffs, adopting the view that spending per pupil in public education may not be a function of wealth differences.
- 4 Coons, John E. and Stephen D. Sugarman. Family Choice in Education: A Model State System for Vouchers. Institute of Government Studies. 1971: 8
- 5 Levine, Daniel. Reforming Metropolitan Schools. Goodyear Publishing Co.. 1975. Because social class and family background are highly correlated with motivation and preparation to succeed in existing school programs, it is possible to make accurate predictions concerning how well a group of students will succeed academically without knowing anything at all about the characteristics of the schools they attend (e.g. amount of money per pupil, class size, new or old buildings).
- 6 Ravitch, Diane. "Community Control Revisited". Commentary. Feb. 1976: 70-74
- 7 Schiff, Herbert J. "The Effect of Personal Contractual Relationships on Parent's Attitudes Toward Participation in Local School Affairs". PHD dissertation, Northwestern University. 1963.
- 8 Rempson, Joe L. "The Participation of Minority-Group Parents in School Activities: A Study and Case Study with Guidelines". Paper presented at the annual AERA Conference. Chicago. April, 1972.
- 9 Ornstein, Allan C. Reforming Metropolitan Schools. Goodyear Publishing Co. 1975: 143
- 10 Although Riles initial proposal envisioned a pre-school section, this idea was rejected by the Legislature and it remained a K-3 program.
- 11 San Francisco Examiner. 7/24/79.

WESTSIDE TRANSPORT

LISA GROTE

In 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (PL92-500) were passed, establishing as a national goal the elimination of discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. One interim goal of this federal law was to have, by 1977, effluent¹ quality be that of secondarily treated² wastewater. Subsequently, this law gave the federal government a powerful instrument, the withholding of federal money to coerce reluctant local governments into taking appropriate action.

With \$1,125,000,000 federal dollars at stake and the passage of the Coastal Act of 1976³, San Francisco has slowly developed a Wastewater Management Plan answerable to three levels of government: federal; state; and regional. This Plan is a series of inter-related sewage projects designed to bring the City into compliance with standards for dry and wet weather effluent discharges. The West Side Transport, a concrete box used to store and transport sewage, is a main component of this attempt to reduce the discharge of untreated sewage into the San Francisco Bay and surrounding ocean.

I intend to briefly survey the historical development of the West Side Transport project as it offers an excellent opportunity to examine the ways in which power struggles between various levels of government over jurisdiction and accountability are resolved. In addition, one can observe the fine line local governments must walk between satisfying national/regional goals and meeting the needs of an impacted community.

During dry weather San Francisco now empties 100 million gallons of wastewater, treated and untreated, per day into the Bay and ocean. The wastewater that is treated receives primary treatment⁴ from the three plants already located within the City. The system at present is large enough to handle these dry weather flows. When it rains, however, the system is expected to handle the rainwater run-off as well as the sewage flow. It is not capable of doing so. As a result, when rainfall exceeds 0.02 inches an hour, the combined flows incapacitate the system and spill directly into the Bay and ocean without any treatment. Currently this overflow takes place about 80 times per year resulting in almost

30 billion gallons of untreated wastewater being emptied into the Bay and ocean annually.⁵

This run-off not only pollutes the water with heavy metals, oil, grease, pesticides and suspended solids but pollutes the beaches as well. The consequence is that San Francisco's beaches are posted as unsafe for water contact recreation approximately 100 days out of each year.⁶

To ensure the curbing of this occurrence and the attainment of the aforementioned effluent quality, a permit program, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, was established. Locally, this program is administered by the California Regional Water Quality Board, San Francisco Region. The United States Environmental Protection Agency reviews and monitors the program to ensure the standards are met. This type of pressure from the federal and state governments has forced San Francisco to update its existing sewage system. The City must comply with Regional Board orders to incorporate Federal and State standards for the West Side Transport.

There are three basic components of the West Side project: 1) The Transport itself; 2) The proposed accompanying pump station; 3) The redesign of the Great Highway, under which the Transport will be built.

The Transport, as finally recommended, will be a concrete box 2.5 miles long, 25 feet wide with 2 to 3 foot thick walls. It is designed to be a consolidation sewage system combining wastewater with rain water run-off. It will be located under the Great Highway, parallel to the ocean and Ocean Beach. It will be bounded on the north by the northern edge of Golden Gate Park and on the south by the San Francisco Zoological Gardens. During dry weather the box will transport sewage from the Richmond/Sunset drainage basin to a pump station and then on to the proposed Southwest Water Pollution Control Plant for treatment. During wet weather rain and wastewater will be stored in the box and pumped along to the treatment plant as capacity becomes available.

The pump station's proposed location is on land bordering the western edge of the San Francisco Zoo, 200 feet south of the intersection of Sloat Boulevard and the Great Highway extension.⁸ The bulk of the station will be underground. The portion above ground will be 220 feet long, 65 feet wide and 25 feet high. It will have a dry weather peak capacity of 37 million gallons per day, utilizing two of the four electrical pumps. Its wet weather peak pumping capacity will be 440 million gallons per day, utilizing all four of the pumps.

The final element of the project is the redesign of the Great Highway. Under federal law all costs of repairing any street torn up while making improvements required by the Federal government shall be paid for by the Federal government. The City will be responsible for maintenance. San Francisco has employed Michael Painter and Associates to draw up a suitable proposal for the redesign of the Great Highway. In February and March of 1979 after holding a series of required public hearings⁹ in conjunction with the Coastal Conservancy, Painter and Associates drew up a preliminary plan. This plan consists of a 4-lane curvilinear road with bike and equestrian trails available. Also, two public restrooms, parking for 800 cars and a number of pedestrian under-passes for easy and safe access to the beach and other recreational facilities.

At present, the total cost for planning, design and construction, 75% (1.1 billion dollars) will be paid for by the Federal government (Environmental Protection Agency), 12½% (\$187,000,000) by the City and County of San Francisco. San Francisco will also pay for all maintenance and operating costs. The City will fund its share of the costs with proceeds from a bond issue already passed by the voters. The bond will be paid off by a sewer service charge.

In order for the City to start construction on this project they had to receive a number of permits, including one from the California Coastal Commission. According to the Coastal Act of 1976, the North/Central Regional Commission, one of six such regional commissions, has jurisdiction over all coastal development 1000 yards from the mean high tide line of the ocean extending from Sonoma through San Francisco counties. This places the Transport within the Commission's jurisdiction.

On July 14, 1977 San Francisco brought their proposal in front of the Commission. No action was taken at that time and it was a year later before it was heard again. On June 15, 1978, a second hearing was held. It included applications for both the Transport and the redesign of the Great Highway (application #'s 137-77 and 128-78). The hearing did not include application for the pump station.

At that time the National Park Service, whose jurisdiction also encompasses Ocean Beach, announced plans for a conference of experts to be held the first week in August 1978. The Ocean Beach Erosion Control Conference looked into the problem of sand erosion on Ocean Beach as a result of placement of the Transport under the Great Highway. As beach erosion had developed into a major concern for residents in the area as well as environmental and citizen groups, the Regional

Commission decided to continue the hearing until September in order to gain the benefit of the Conference findings.¹⁰

At the ensuing hearing, August 29, 1978, the staff of the Regional Commission, upon full consideration of the Erosion Conference findings and their own analysis of the data, recommended approval of the West Side Transport and Great Highway redesign proposals. The staff was of the opinion that the major issues of concern - public access, wave erosion hazard, geologic and seismic hazard and visual appearance - could be sufficiently mitigated. The eleven members of the Regional Commission, however, did not agree. They were of the opinion that the project had not adequately demonstrated that it would: 1) maintain and maximize public access to and use of the beach areas and tidelands; 2) ensure structural stability of the project and site; 3) not contribute to increased erosion and/or require subsequent construction of beach protective works. The Commission maintained these factors were in direct violation of section 30253(2) of the Coastal Act of 1976. This section requires specifically that any development: "...assure stability and structural integrity and neither create nor contribute significantly to erosion, geologic instability or destruction of the site or surrounding area..."

These arguments, coupled with vehement disapproval of the project from residents in the Great Highway neighborhood, prompted the Commission to deny the City both applications on a 0-9 vote with one member absent and one abstention.

The City of San Francisco took this decision to the State California Coastal Commission on appeal. The State California Coastal Commission is a state-wide commission also established in 1976 as part of the follow-up legislation supplanting Proposition 20, the Coastal Act, passed in 1972. Any decision made by one of the six Regional Commissions can be appealed, if state-wide concerns are involved, to the State Coastal Commission.

Upon initial review of the situation the State Commission decided that the issue was indeed one of state-wide concern. This was determined on the basis that the Transport and accompanying outfall would actually inhabit land in two separate Regional Commissions' jurisdictions, the North/Central and Central.

To expedite the permit process, the State Commission imposed initial jurisdiction over all components of the Wastewater Program located within the coastal zone. This assertion was based on the condition that the City work with the staff of the State Commission to mitigate the problems which had caused the North/Central

Regional Commission to initially deny the permits. The city agreed to this condition and on November 28, 1978, withdrew its appeals.

In attempting to fulfill the condition, the City, working with the State Commission to staff, undertook the following: 1) hired an independent shoreline process expert to re-evaluate the dynamics of Ocean Beach and suggest an engineering solution; 2) participated in a series of three public meetings sponsored by the State Coastal Conservancy, providing a forum for public participation in the Great Highway redesign plan; 3) instituted a Design Jury composed of design professionals representing the Commission, the City and the National Park Service, to review the redesign of the Great Highway.

On May 1, 1979, the State Commission held its first public hearing on the West Side Transport and Redesign of the Great Highway proposals. Mayor Feinstein and Mr. Albert Perrini, Director of Special Projects, were the principal speakers for the City.

The Mayor pointed out that any delay in approval of the Transport would result in the continuation of partially treated and totally untreated wastewater being dumped into the Bay and ocean 80-100 times per year. She also pointed out that any delay would add extraordinary costs to the City and citizens of San Francisco as inflation drives up the price of construction and the City is faced with daily fines for not being up to national standards. The Mayor also commented that when she was Supervisor she had not received one complaint from citizens in her district about the pump station and outfall in existence there.

Mr. Perrini went over the main issues of concern as the City viewed them and what the City's response was to these issues. Briefly, these were: 1) size and cost of the West Side facilities; 2) citizen protest of the Great Highway as the location for the Transport; 3) beach erosion as a result of the Transport's placement; 4) earthquake hazards; 5) aesthetics of the Great Highway Redesign Plan; 6) maintenance of the highway and sewer; 7) special mitigation.

The City's response to the first issue was that in March 1979, the Regional Water Quality Control Board granted a waiver from the standard on annual overflow, allowing the City to design the Transport for an average of eight overflows per year. This allowance results in a savings of \$110 million in construction costs and will make the Transport considerably smaller (25 feet wide instead of the original 60 feet wide) than originally planned. At present, the size of the Transport is one half what it was when brought before the Regional Commission. Mr.

Perrini suggested that the reduction in both the size and cost of the Transport was a beneficial change and should be taken into consideration by the Commission.

The City's response to the second issue was that if the Transport were to be placed under Sunset Boulevard (a once-considered location), an added \$130 million would be incurred in construction costs. Because houses are located on both sides of Sunset Boulevard, a more difficult and expensive method of construction would have to be used. Also, Proposition A, passed in 1975, designated the Great Highway as the best location for the Transport.

The third issue was responded to by pointing out that Cyrill Galvin, an independent engineer, had been hired by the City to discern what impact the Transport would have on the beach. Galvin found that the shoreline was basically stable. To ensure the protection of the Transport, though, the most easterly placement possible, 180 feet east of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area boundary, would be the most desirable. Also, re-routing dredged sand from the sandbar outside the Golden Gate Bridge would help replenish the beach. The sand could be placed in such a location as to allow rebuilding processes to occur.

The City responded to the fourth issue, earthquake hazards, by stating that Blume and Associates, independent consultants, had determined in March 1979 that the west wall of the Transport would be able to withstand substantial seismic movement and substantial wave action should there be a following tsunami.

The City believed that the fifth issue, aesthetics, had been sufficiently addressed by the public hearings on the Redesign Plan. Citizen participation in this process had been high. All three of the hearings were well attended. Citizens decided that the dunes should be retained the dunes should be retained and landscaped with beach grass and the road be curvilinear with bike, equestrian and foot paths along each side.

The City's position on the sixth issue was that they will pay for all maintenance costs for the highway and sewer while the Recreation and Parks District will be responsible for the landscaping east of the Transport.

The issue of special mitigation was responded to by pointing out that the EPA and the State of California would be mitigating some of the problems of the Redesign Plan by putting the Treatment Plant underground, thereby ensuring the implementation of the plan. Also, the City would help find an interim location for the Handicapped Center during the construction period (since this had become a

major cause for concern among residents and users of the handicapped facility).

The neighborhood representatives who attended the meeting were not as enthusiastic as the City. Although the Citizens Advisory Committee leadership had finally come out in favor of the Transport's proposed location, by a slim 8-7 vote, many of the residents along the Great Highway believed the problems had not been satisfactorily mitigated. Their main contentions were that Ocean Beach was too unstable an area for the location of the Transport; the disruption of their neighborhood as a result of the construction was too great and for an unreasonable length of time (approximately 6 years); and that the City was displacing the Handicapped Center without making any provisions for an alternative location, either temporarily or permanently. The citizens that spoke did not raise any new evidence in their behalf; their position was simply that what the City was proposing was not appropriate or realistic.

On June 5, 1979, the final hearing on the West Side Transport and Redesign Plan was held. At this hearing, in concurrence with the staff's recommendation, the State Commission voted 10-1 in favor of issuing the permits in question. This approval did not come without conditions, however. As erosion of Ocean Beach and the effects on the surrounding neighborhood as a result of placing the Transport under the Great Highway were main concerns throughout the application process, approval of the applications was only granted on the condition that the City make every feasible effort to accomplish the following: 1) nourish the beach from available offshore sand supplies; 2) restore the beach and dunes with excess sand from the projects' excavations; 3) maintain this sand in the system by effective plantings and maintenance; 4) periodically replenish the sand when storm waves threaten the Transport and highway; 5) locate all permanent structures as close to the natural shoreline "equilibrium line"¹¹ as is feasible. These main conditions, along with several mitigation measures designed to minimize the impact of six years of construction work, constituted the requirements imposed by the Commission in order to approve the applications.

Even though these provisions appear to mitigate the technical, physical and social problems, they could become ineffectual. The absence of a monitoring system reduces the provisions to "good faith" agreements which can't assure that the established levels of mitigation will be met. Ultimately, this leads to the confusion of the power relationship between the State Coastal Commission and the City of San Francisco. Presently there is insufficient legislation which enables regional governmental bodies to exercise real authority. The dilemma of regulating

environmental matters is that the natural environment behaves through a process of regional interconnectedness while the human relationship to the environment expresses itself through localization and fragmentation. The existence of many levels of government has led to competition for control. This competition threatens to weaken the effectiveness of legislation and reduce regional environmental quality, which in turn increases the political pressure by environmental groups on law makers to deal more effectively with these issues. The continuation of this circular process worsens the present situation and virtually renders useless any attempt at improving the human condition.



FOOTNOTES

- 1 Effluent is the treated wastewater flowing out of a treatment plant.
- 2 Secondary treatment is the second level in a three level process of treating wastewater. It brings wastewater into contact with micro-organisms that feed on the impurities and turns them into carbon dioxide, water and more cell material. This treatment removes 80-85% of the suspended solids from the water.
- 3 The Coastal Act of 1976 was adopted as permanent legislation superseding Proposition 20, passed in 1972. It temporarily continued the State Coastal Commission established under Proposition 20; authorizing it to supervise the creation of Local Coastal Programs (LCPs) for each of the counties and cities adjacent to the ocean. Until the LCPs are completed the Commission will continue the permitting process. After the city or county LCP is certified all developmental power reverts to that jurisdiction and planning and control of both private and public building becomes the local government's domain. The State Coastal Commission will remain as an appeal body in disputed cases.
- 4 Primary treatment is the first level in the three level process of treating wastewater. It removes 60-65% of the suspended matter from the water by way of settling, scum removal and disinfection.
- 5 San Francisco Chronicle. 1/17/79.
- 6 City and County of San Francisco. Final Environmental Impact Report - West Side Transport Project Vol. 1. 1977 :16
- 7 California Regional Water Quality Control Board. Cease and desist order numbers 76-51-20-76 and 76-23-3-16-76.
- 8 Op Cit. City and County of San Francisco: 130
- 9 The public hearings were required as part of the agreement made between the City and the State Commission in order for the Commission to assert initial jurisdiction over the area in question, thereby expediting the permit process.
- 10 The Ocean Beach Erosion Conference found that the width of Ocean Beach does indeed fluctuate a great deal. This fluctuation is due mainly to the placement of the San Francisco sandbar. When the bar is dredged annually, so ships can pass under the Golden Gate Bridge, the natural process of rebuilding the beach is inhibited. Because of this inhibition the Conference concluded that if the Transport is placed under the southbound lanes of the Great Highway portions of the box will be exposed to wave action during some periods of the structure's 100 year life. This exposure will become more and more pronounced if present trends continue. For every foot of vertical exposure of the trunk line 30 feet of useable beach will be lost. Even placing the structure under the northbound lanes will result in exposure within a few decades.
- 11 The equilibrium line is the estimated natural shoreline.

MURAL ART

JERRY CRUMPLEY

Mural art as a current phenomenon has deep roots reaching back as far as the dawn of civilization. The earliest wall paintings can be traced back to cave-dwelling artists who inhabited Europe some ten thousand years ago. Ancient Egyptian society, which flourished approximately 3500 years ago, left modern man with many examples of mural art as a story-telling device. Some of the finest mural art works ever produced have been found decorating the walls of the ancient Roman city of Pompeii as well as in the ancient cities of China, Japan, and Korea. Examples of mural art have also been found among the remains of early African and Latin American cultures.

Today murals embellish urban America. They add color to the cityscape, foster cultural awareness, promote economic activity, and are often a voice for the politically disenfranchised. The walls of San Francisco boast murals as diverse in style as the city is in character.

Once patronized primarily by the church and the wealthy, the western mural art tradition underwent a period of transformation in the early part of the 20th Century. A new wave of mural art began to evolve, with some of the finest examples appearing in government buildings. The Depression era Works Progress Administration employed the talents of artists hungry for food and work, commissioning them to decorate federal property throughout the nation. San Francisco's Rincon Annex Post Office is an excellent example of this style of mural art. The WPA provided the nation with art we might have otherwise never had. However, the Second World War turned national attention away from art and toward something deemed more important - national defense. Massive federal patronage of this art form was essentially finished.

Our own American tradition in mural art has been heavily influenced by the rise of several Mexican muralists in the early part of the twentieth century. Diego Rivera, Jose Orozo, and David Alfaro Siqueiros are all well known and widely respected in this country. Rivera, who has attained immense popularity, was commissioned in the early 1930s to paint a mural at New York's Rockefeller Center. However, the underlying theme of Rivera's creation was in conflict with the social

views of his patron, and the mural was removed before it was ever completed.

Rivera's art, often political in nature, profoundly influenced an emerging "People's Art" movement which began to appear in black neighborhoods in the late 1960s. This movement is generally conceded to have started in the ghetto areas of Detroit with the works of Eugene Eda and William Waller. A common theme in their murals is that cultural and racial solidarity can be advanced through an accessible and highly visible medium - mural art - which emphasises pride and political change. These deliberate expressions of self-consciousness have spread to the streetscape of San Francisco.

Although mural art has flourished in many of San Francisco's ethnic communities, the most prolific use has been in Latino neighborhoods. Much of this is due to the emphasis placed on the history of "La Raza" by Latino leaders, particularly Cesar Chavez of the United Farm Workers, and Luis Valdez of El Teatro Campesino. With their encouragement Latino artists have taken to the walls in an attempt to publicize the many contributions of Latinos to American culture.

One Mission District mural, created under conditions similar to Rivera's experience in New York, is illustrative of this style of mural art. In 1974 the Bank of America commissioned a group of artists from the city's Latino community to paint a large mural inside the bank's Mission District branch. The project was seen by the community as an attempt to appease their hostilities toward the bank and its policy of lending to large agribusinesses and other institutions considered exploitive of the rights of Mexican-Americans. The ninety-by-ten foot mural pictured a dark-skinned laborer of the fields. In his hand was a book, on the cover of which was written "Our sweat and blood have fallen on this land to make other men rich". Bank officials found this to be unacceptable, and wanted the words removed. The artists insisted that the mural remain intact or be completely obliterated. The tension this incident created in the community subsided when bank officials agreed to let the mural remain as originally executed, but removed the caption from photographs of the mural displayed in literature promoting the bank's social services.

One of the first groups to begin painting murals in The Mission, Mujeres Muralistas ("Women Muralists"), has distinguished artists among its ranks. Patricia Rodriguez, a teacher of art at the University of California, Berkeley, and a member of Mujeres Muralistas says, "Murals are the best way of demonstrating my art because they belong to everybody". Instead of spending time in a studio, Rodriguez would rather be out on the street where the widest possible audience can view

her work.

Robert Garcia, another leading artist in the barrio, believes that art can play a role in the political and social struggles of his community. "Art is not going to win," he says. "Art and culture never overcome repression, people do that. But art can contribute and be helpful." Like his colleagues, Garcia can be found plying his craft on the streets.

One excellent example of People's Art in San Francisco is located at Masonic and Hayes Streets. This block-long mural depicts the struggles of all Third World people against their enemies; illiteracy, poverty and discrimination. Another classic example of the revolutionary motif of murals in the late sixties and early seventies is "Rainbow People", located on Haight Street between Masonic and Ashbury. The mural, on permanent loan to the people of The Haight, recreates a street scene from the neighborhood's colorful past. It displays the identification of young whites with many of the struggles and aspirations of people of all colors.

San Francisco is a changing community, a fact reflected in the city's mural art. These works celebrating ethnic heritage and advocating revolutionary change are not as predominant on the streets of San Francisco as they once were. Several new types of mural art are appearing, most notably beautification murals, advertising murals, and supergraphics.

Beautification murals have no central message to present to the viewer, save that form and color can add life to a dull wall. The best example of this trend in mural art is Balmy Alley, between 24th and 25th Streets, which is decorated with no less than fifteen murals. The works, largely non-political in expression, enliven a typical urban alley, making the passageway an enjoyable place to visit. The artists' message is clear and well executed: color adds vitality to the urban scene.

The advertising mural promotes economic activity. Two of the city's most highly regarded murals of this type can be found decorating La Palma, a grocery store on 24th Street, and El Faro's, a delicatessen at 20th and Folsom Streets. The advertising mural adds to the San Francisco cityscape a certain quality which a medium like neon can not reproduce.

The supergraphic represents a new and exciting field of mural art. Supergraphics may have aspects of either beautification murals or advertising murals, but are usually unique in some aspect of shape, design, or size. They may en-

hance the integral design of the structure they are painted on. A rainbow-hued supergraphic graces the southern portal of the Highway 101 tunnels in southern Marin County. Another noteworthy supergraphic can be found at 176 Ord Street, a San Francisco residence adorned with a landscape, rather than the usual monochromatic or two-tone designs.

History has shown us that wherever there is urban development there is public art, and the mural is truly a public art form. Used as a vehicle for increasing creative employment, as an alternative medium, or for the simple but noble purpose of beautifying the cityscape, the mural remains an important aspect of the urban scene.



WALK IN - WALK OUT:

THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS AS A SUBCULTURE

SCOTT DEWAR - EVELYN FLOYD

It is often to the advantage of some groups in society to portray the condition of its minority population as far better than it actually is, to mask a darker truth. Currently, it is suspect that some scholars, such as Aaron Wildavsky¹, have conveniently substituted the numerically small black middle-class for the whole black population in their analysis of socioeconomic status in order to characterize America as a benevolent and egalitarian society beset by "discontents" and "crisis mongers". This hides the important fact that the American capitalistic class structure denies blacks the educational and employment opportunities which are crucial to improving their quality of life. Even within the black culture, class serves to divide blacks into a basically two tiered system: those very few black families who, with a combination of luck (personal and historic) and effort, have attained "success" relative to other blacks; and those who have not. What is the true socioeconomic condition of blacks? How did the black middle-class subculture² manage to evolve and what are its real and potential impacts on the entire culture?

Truly there are vast differences between the dominant myth of minorities "pulling themselves up by their boot-straps" to become part of the "melting pot" and the reality of a low success rate at which racial minorities have attained parity in class status, particularly economic affluence. Recent census data sheds some light: the median income of black families and unrelated persons in 1977 was \$9,485 (the median income for white families was \$16,060), an actual decrease of 2% in the relative wealth of the average black family to the average white family in the twelve turbulent years since the special census in 1967, from 61% to 59%. Nearly one out of three black families (7.4 million black individuals) existed on an income below the official poverty line, while only 8% of white families were found to be as poor. An individual white family has over two and a half times the chance of a black family to earn over \$25,000 a year (19.2% to 7.2, respectively).³

Income isn't the only indicator which reveals this tragic inequality between blacks and whites. Major progress in the basic building blocks of stability and upward mobility is not evident. Only 27% of all blacks 25 years or older had grad-

uated high school in 1975.⁴ Although the median years of school completed by blacks rose from 8.2 years in 1959 to 10 years in 1969, the rapid escalation of educational experience required for employment has more than made up for that advance. Minority groups own less than three percent of America's businesses and these businesses control 0.5% of the nation's business assets.⁵ In 1977, black households headed by women accounted for 36% of all black households and illegitimate births accounted for half of all the live births to black women.⁶

One of the major obstacles to increased social mobility among blacks is their inability to flee the troubled central cities with the same earnestness as whites (See Table A+B). The 1970 U.S. census reported that within the nation's SMSAs 84% of the black population lived within these central cities (against only 46% of the white population).⁷ As a percentage of suburban population, blacks represented only 5.3% of the total.⁸

ROOTS OF DIVISION

The origin of a distinct social structure among blacks can be traced back to their unique process of immigration and the white man's prescription for living. As slaves, they were the only group brought to these shores against their wills for the explicit purpose of exploitation. They were forced to adopt a new way of life and a new way of viewing themselves and the world. The conditions under which they lived, primarily on southern plantations, were dehumanizing and annihilating. For over two centuries black people were enslaved in a system which attempted to generate within them feelings of racial inferiority and a sense of defeatism, primarily by limiting the productive capacity of blacks solely to the input of their labors into the economic system.⁹

Occupation was the principle factor which separated blacks into three socioeconomic groups.¹⁰ The largest group was the field hands, who struggled to feed America's nearly insatiable need for cheap manual labor, receiving no further reward than to greet the next day's sun. A smaller group of skilled and semi-skilled craftsmen - blacksmiths, carpenters and masons - maintained the capital equipment of the plantation and had far greater contact with the white man's ways. On the top of the black socioeconomic ladder were the household servants, frequently mulattoes, who by the nature of their work maintained the closest contact with the Anglo-Saxon culture. They were encouraged to accept a divide-and-conquer scheme which had them believe their white blood made them superior to other blacks.

Conditions changed somewhat after Emancipation with sharecropping replacing

TABLE A: BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL METROPOLITAN AND NONMETRO POPULATION

	1960	1970	1975
Total	10.5	11.3	12.2
In Metropolitan areas	11.5	13.2	14.3
central cities	17.6	22.0	25.1
outside central cities	5.4	5.3	6.3
Nonmetropolitan areas	11.1	10.0	9.4

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1960 Census of Population, Vol. 1; 1970 Census of Population and Housing, PHC (2)-1.

**TABLE B: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CENTER CITY RESIDENTS IN POVERTY AREAS
BY POVERTY STATUS AND RACE: 1970 and 1978**

Residence	ALL PERSONS ¹			WHITE			BLACK		
	total	poor	non-poor	total	poor	non-poor	total	poor	non-poor
1970 (April)									
Central Cities	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
poverty area ²	24.4	50.0	19.9	15.4	34.6	12.9	58.8	72.7	53.0
nonpoverty area	75.6	50.0	80.1	84.6	65.4	87.1	41.2	27.3	47.0
1978 (March)									
Central Cities	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
poverty areas	19.0	44.9	14.3	10.6	27.6	8.6	47.2	64.8	39.3
nonpoverty areas	81.0	55.1	85.7	89.4	72.5	91.4	52.8	35.2	60.7

1) Includes races not shown separately.

2) Poverty areas defined in terms of census tracts in which 20 percent or more of the population had incomes below the poverty level.

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census Current Population Reports, series P-23 #55, and P-60 #116, 1978.

slavery as the economic system by which the field hand group participated in the white man's world. This group remained in the rural southern areas while thousand of the skilled black craftsmen and unneeded servants began to migrate to the northern urban areas where their labor was needed to help fuel the Industrial Revolution.

Although migration to the north meant facing an impersonal and competitive environment away from their families (not unprecedented), their children were, for the first time on a large scale, exposed to educational opportunities (in segregated schools). Subsequently, the availability of employment opportunities to these "lighter colored" blacks formed the economic basis for the germinating middle class. A whole parallel social structure emerged in which the educated and highly skilled members formed a black subculture of doctors, lawyers, businessmen, ministers and teachers who lived in an all-black environment. Though they were accepted in areas of the job market on a limited basis and open to educational opportunities, they continued to be socially rejected by the dominant society as a whole. This rejection and isolation led to further formation of a separate social structure within the race, and though some attitudes and behavior were modified by urban influences, the dichotomy of field hand and "house nigger" continued to influence the classes of blacks which evolved.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLACK SUBCULTURE

A rigid distinction of social class stratification has eluded scholars for as long and to the same extent as have the notions of "middle" and "normal". When position is only relative to our limited understanding of the extremities "rich" and "poor", what can we make of existence at the mid-point? This problem becomes even more convoluted in connection with subculture like the black middle-class which espouse variations on the values of the dominant culture. Richard Coleman and Lee Rainwater in their work, Social Standing in America: New Dimensions of Class, demonstrate the usefulness of defining "class" and "social standing" as relative to an individual's perception of achievement, in values presented to him by his environment.

Both (class and social standing) refer to a person's position in a status hierarchy based on the relative desirability of life situations ... Overwhelmingly, class in the public view refers to how individuals seem to stand in the distribution of life chances in America today. Prestige, or status, must be understood to be more a result of how well one has fared in the competition for things valued in society, than a cause of it.¹¹

TABLE C: BLACKS IN UPPER-WHITE COLLAR JOBS

Federal Employment: (under General Schedule pay system)

	GS 5-8 \$9,959-\$17,757	GS 9-11 \$15,090-\$23,739	GS 12-18 \$21,803-\$58,245
1972 May			
# per 1,000 (% total)	59.0 (19.1%)	18.8 (9.2%)	9.3 (5.1%)
1977 May			
# per 1,000 (% total)	75.1 (22.2%)	28.5 (13.0%)	15.8 (7.4%)
% change 1972-1977	(+3.1%)	(+3.8%)	(+2.3%)

Source: U.S. Civil Service Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity Statistics, annual, 1977.

State and Local Employment:

	<u>Skilled Craft</u>	<u>Technicians</u>	<u>Professionals</u>	<u>Official/Admin</u>
1976 June				
# per 1,000 (% total)	40 (10.8%)	47 (11.0%)	65 (8.5%)	12 (5.4%)
median annual salary	\$16,212	\$12,666	\$9,740	\$9,940

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Minorities and Women in State and Local Government, annual, 1976.

Reflecting the difficulty sociologists have had in distinguishing between lower-class and middle-class are the loose boundaries surrounding the objective criteria they use to identify those groups. The black middle-class is commonly separated into lower-middle, middle-middle, and upper-middle with annual incomes ranging from \$10-14,999, 15-19,999, 20-24,999 respectively, with the largest proportion being in the lower-middle range.¹² In 1978 the U.S. Census reported approximately 2,400,000 black middle-class persons, or 31.3% of the black population. However, this still compares rather poorly with the 47% of the white population whose income classifies them as middle-class. In 1976, the "average" young black husband-wife families with both parents working had median incomes \$16,715 in the northern and western states, compared with median incomes of \$16,691 for similar white families. The black middle-class, like their white counterpart, encompasses a wide range of educational experiences, from high graduates to holders of advanced college degrees, and various types of occupations - schoolteachers, small shop owners, technicians, engineers, and lower level bureaucrats.¹³

As of 1977, nearly 340,000 black individuals were government employees in upper-white collar positions.¹⁴ This can be attributed to a massive effort to implement affirmative action programs throughout all levels of government, particularly at the federal and state levels. Although many social critics find it to be merely a well camouflaged attempt to co-opt blacks, it is clear that the government is providing the managerial and technical experience necessary for a growing middle-class (See Table C).

The subculture seeks to solidify itself as a group and is acutely aware of the differences which divide it from the rest of the black population.¹⁵ Perhaps it is from this self-conscious attitude of different behavior and values that the dissimilarities of the lower-class and middle-class blacks can be seen most clearly. Middle-class blacks perceive themselves as having a value system not shared by the lower-class; one of their highest values is social respectability, which is acquired by having public behavior in accord with standard American bourgeois morality.¹⁶ In this regard, the lower-class blacks are viewed as a negative reference group.

Middle-class blacks place a strong emphasis upon achievement, education, property and smaller families.¹⁷ Women are more likely to become part of the working force than white middle-class women, giving the typical black family a dual source of income.

They (the black middle-class) want to establish their own community apart from the whites and apart from the black lower-class. They desire nice homes and good schools for their children, and for these reasons they move into white areas of the city. But they do not have to be integrated with whites per se. Nevertheless, the presence of whites usually means that the schools will be better and the community services adequate.¹⁸

In the realm of relative social standing, members of the subculture are more advantaged than the lower-class blacks because their incomes (a result of other socioeconomic variables) allow them the basic needs of life and permit them a better choice of life styles. However, when contrasted with their white counterparts, they can be viewed as deprived - their incomes, status and power not being equal even when their backgrounds and education are similar.

THE SUBCULTURE AS AN ASSET

In the mid-1960's a major debate formed between two distinct groups which advocated clearly separate strategies for improving the condition of blacks. One group was the integrationists, led by Martin Luther King Jr., who were committed to passive resistance, judicial reform, and coalition politics, through which they believed they could live in the same neighborhoods and go to the same schools as whites. Curiously, efforts to integrate housing resulted in even worse conditions of segregation. Bitter struggles over placing low-income public housing (the only sort affordable to many blacks) in white neighborhoods led to a protracted block-by-block fight which yielded only token concessions by the white majority, and the flight of the more affluent whites to the suburbs. Segregation has actually increased at an alarming rate. Between 1960 and 1970, the nonwhite population in the central cities rose by 32.8% while the white population continued to decline. Central cities now contain less than half the urban white population and eighty percent of urban nonwhites.¹⁹ Despite early suggestions that this demographic situation would at least give rise to a powerful and significant development of black political power, this has not occurred.²⁰

Several prohibitive factors work against integration on a grand scale:

- 1) Housing is largely controlled by the regular institutions of the real-estate market, who have historically capitalized on the process of segregation.
- 2) Federal efforts to increase low-income public housing in order to better distribute the racial mix have been utter failures, mainly due to a lack of consistent commitment to improved housing policy.²¹

- 3) White hostility has generated such intense opposition to black "invasions" of white neighborhoods that politicians, in the interest of self-preservation, are forced to avoid any actions except to promote token measure.

Out of the civil rights movement a "separatist" faction emerged which attacked the tenets of integration as basically flawed. Indeed, the Brown vs. The Board of Education decision by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were large victories, but many activists believed that these largely isolated judicial and legislative declarations would not change the enormous structural bias against black people.

After a century of "melting", other class and ethnic groups still did not, by and large, live in the same neighborhoods or go to the same schools. The separatists also questioned the benefits that would presumably result from integration, particularly the psychological benefit of denying black identity But what seemed most to the point was that, whether or not integration was a desirable goal, it was not going to be achieved.²²

Evidence tends to support this view. In one recent study of American education, racial diversity was found to be less important than mixing middle-class students (either black or white) with lower-class students (either black or white). Economic heterogeneity decidedly improved the achievement of lower-class students while not diminishing the middle-class student's achievement.²³

Separatists suggest (and we agree) that the fundamental problem confronting blacks is the lack of an organizational vehicle to enable them to compete with whites for control of the major institutions which shape the destiny of the ghetto (housing and educational systems, government bureaucracies, corporate economic complexes, and political parties). They advocate the organization of separatist institutions to share control in these spheres.

There is, of course, considerable precedent for ethnically based social-welfare institutions, which symbolize for many the highest values of self-help. Networks of agencies have been formed by Jews and white Catholics; even Protestants - under the impact of a pluralism that has made them act like a minority as well - have formed essentially white ethnic welfare institutions to advance their interests.²⁴

The separatist movement must utilize the technical expertise and relative wealth of the black middle-class to succeed. They will need to form their own organization apparatus to examine the merits of alternative public policies and to activate their constituency on behalf of needed changes. What remains to be

resolved is the willingness of the black middle-class to risk its close link with the white socioeconomic system in order to participate in the growth of a separatist movement. Surely in the long-run huge benefits would accrue to the subculture (through growth in political power and larger control of minority businesses) but social groups are often slow in seizing opportunities beyond those at hand.

While the economic necessities of the plantation served to divide and thus exploit blacks, the urbanized industrial system and explicit and implicit public policy have artificially maintained this division by holding out selective rewards based on class. By no means do blacks monopolize this wealth of victimization. That is just the point. It is not only black people who are so divided up amongst themselves, but all the people who suffer when capitalistic propensities split them into classes. Obviously there are severe and disturbing inequalities in our society. The contrast in the living conditions and prospective futures between the growing dependence of the central city population and the relatively wealthy suburban population indicates this malaise.

Scholars who merely lump blacks together only serve to damage our ability to perceive, and finally tackle, the challenge before us. We must identify the scope of the problem and tap the special resources of specific groups. And the black middle-class is probably the only major social group which has the ability and the potential will to improve the living conditions of the floundering and predominately black central cities. Will they be walking in or walking out?



FOOTNOTES

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- 2 A subculture is a subdivision of a national culture having distinctive values, behavior patterns, and economic, ethnic or other characteristics which differentiate them from others within the culture. Black Americans as a whole can be regarded as a subculture but the crux of our argument surrounds the distinctive characteristics of the black middle-class relative to the black culture.
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- 6 Newsweek. "Blacks: Fresh Trials". May 15, 1978.
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- 8 Glazer, Nathan. Affirmative Discrimination. Basic Books. 1975.
- 9 Kronus, Sidney. The Black Middle-Class. Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.. 1971.
- 10 Ibid. Relatively few slaves succeeded in becoming free. Evidence indicates that those who did succeed, this freedom was barely more than psychological in nature, as their economic position was still largely determined by their labor as craftsmen.
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- 12 The 1970 U.S. Census reported only 48,000 black families earning over \$25,000 a year.
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- SPSU OFFERS MPA DEGREE
- 15 Frazier, Franklin E.. Black Bourgeoise. Free Press. 1957.
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 - 17 Ibid. This pattern of low fertility, contrary to the high fertility rate of the black lower-class, is indicative of families who see the amount of personal and financial investment needs for children in an urban industrial society. This pattern can be seen in most West European nations.
 - 18 Op Cit. Kronus.
 - 19 Our Nonwhite Population and Its Housing. Washington D.C.: Housing and Home Finance Agency. 1963
White central city population declined by 5.4% between 1960 and 1970
 - 20 Piven, Francis Fox and Richard A. Cloward. Politics of Turmoil. Vintage Books. 1974
 - 21 Goodman, Jay S. The Dynamics of Urban Government and Politics. MacMillian Publishing Co.. 1975.
 - 22 Op Cit. Piven and Cloward.
 - 23 Schermer, George. "Desegregating the Metropolitan Area". A paper presented at the National Housing Workshop, West Point N.Y., April 1966.
 - 24 Op Cit. Piven and Cloward.

S.F.S.U. OFFERS MPA DEGREE

As of September 1979, San Francisco State University has offered a graduate program in public administration, leading to the Masters in Public Administration Degree. Building upon six years of experience with a pilot program in Political Science, the curriculum has been strengthened and broadened. The program is fortunate in having faculty members who have had extensive experience in government, consulting, and research as well as having taught in public administration and public policy.

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REDIRECTING CDBG FUNDS

**NORM SCHNEIDER - DICK LEGATES -
RICHARD DELEON**

Will federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds be used for large scale "economic development" projects of questionable benefit to the poor, or will they be used for housing, community-based economic development, neighborhood facilities, and neighborhood revitalization activities which have clear and direct benefits for low and moderate income people? If CDBG funds go into large "economic development" projects such as downtown convention centers and industrial parks, can these projects be tied to job training, affirmative action, childcare and other actions which will assure jobs for low income people? This article will describe the background of the CDBG economic issue and an approach to critically evaluating and pressing for changes in proposed large scale economic development projects.

The present (fifth year) CDBG application for San Jose, California proposes using more than half of all its funds for a single downtown "economic development" project consisting of a hotel, government office buildings, commercial and retail stores, parking structures, and a few market rate condominiums. This use of CDBG funds is justified by the city as "principally benefitting" low and moderate income persons on the theory that it will directly provide a large number of permanent new jobs, the majority of which will go to low and moderate income persons. The San Jose situation is a common one, and the analysis developed for San Jose may prove useful in other contexts.

The federal CDBG program is important for several reasons: (a) It is overwhelmingly the best funded physical urban development program. \$14.5 billion in CDBG funds have been authorized for expenditure in the period 1977-80. In most cities CDBG funds is one of the largest pots of funding in town. (b) The stated "primary purpose" of the CDBG program is the "development of viable urban communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate income."¹ (c) As "flexible" funding CDBG money can be used by cities for a wide range of projects. Some types of CDBG-funded activities provide very tangible direct benefits to low income persons - rehabilitated houses, urban parks, senior centers, new capital im-

REDIRECTING

provements and other projects for their neighborhoods. Other CDBG projects provide little or no specific benefits for low and moderate income people, e.g., historical preservation projects. Still other CDBG-funded projects hurt low and moderate income people, e.g., a CDBG-funded program which has the effect of upgrading a neighborhood and displacing current residents.

One of Community Development's major predecessors - the Urban Renewal Program - underwent a process of gradual corruption from a poverty and housing program to a program which ultimately displaced hundreds of thousands of poor and minority persons and provided cheap land for private, profit-motivated business development. In its early phase the CDBG program represented a significant departure from this pattern. Aside from "closing out" holdover urban renewal projects, few cities allocated significant CDBG funding for big downtown clearance projects. Use of CDBG funds to underwrite other commercial/industrial ventures was generally secondary to other programs, including some positive neighborhood oriented programs.

In 1977 the CDBG legislation was amended to permit use of CDBG funds for "economic developments" - including major downtown projects. Current HUD regulations are aligned with the new legislative changes and the general thrust of HUD policy now stresses economic development activity. Some community-based economic development activity offers opportunities for small scale, neighborhood-based (frequently minority owned) entrepreneurship. But most economic development activities proposed by cities are underwriting large-scale commercial and industrial ventures: acquiring, clearing, and preparing land for reuse as downtown convention centers, hotels, retail and commercial stores, and parking structures, as in San Jose, or subsidizing "industrial parks." These kinds of development projects are justified by applicant cities in various ways - as strengthening cities tax bases, diversifying the local economy, and most particularly (since HUD regulations now require this justification) providing jobs. Current HUD regulations consider an economic development project to "principally benefit" low and moderate income people if the majority of permanent jobs which will be directly created by the project benefit low and moderate income persons.² Thus, many cities expediently assert that their pet economic development projects are really aimed at providing permanent jobs for low and moderate income people.

In many (probably most) cases a close look at the reality underlying the rhetoric of job creation will reveal statistical fabrications and political creative counting systems which discredit the empirical claims made on behalf of the pro-

ject. In cases like these it is appropriate to demand that funds be reprogrammed to other uses which will principally benefit low and moderate income people. There are still other cases in which a sufficient number of low and moderate income jobs can be "shaped into" a proposed project through advocacy to turn an otherwise unacceptable project into an acceptable one. These salvage operations can take such forms as restrictions on types of businesses which can go into a project area to favor those hiring lower-skilled persons through affirmative action programs, job training programs, and apprenticeships.

The challenge to a city's CDBG application which asserts that a large scale economic development project will provide low and moderate income jobs hinges on the accuracy and reliability of the estimates concerning the number and type of jobs that will be created by the proposed project. If it can be demonstrated that the total number of jobs which will be created is very small in relation to the cost, the "appropriateness" of the project should be questioned and considered grounds for the rejection of an application.

While there is a great variety in the methods used to make job-creation projections or forecasts, some of the more common approaches are severely limited and have common fallacies connected with them.

Under current CDBG regulations,³ there is a two-step process in analyzing "program benefit" issues. Virtually all applicants certify that more than 75 percent of their CDBG funds "principally benefit" low and moderate income people. Such a certification introduces a presumption that the application as a whole principally benefits low and moderate income people. Thus, an attack on a city's assertions that an economic development project principally benefits low and moderate income people almost always involves initially rebutting the presumption that 75 percent of CDBG funds principally benefit such persons. HUD regulations currently require a determination whether each listed project does or does not "principally benefit" low and moderate income people. If a project does, then 100 percent of the project funds are counted as principally benefitting low and moderate income people. Thus, in contesting an application, the first stage in analysis is to recategorize activities. Those activities which do not principally benefit low and moderate income persons should be challenged and struck from the list. After such a re-evaluation process, if less than 75 percent of funds remain, categorized as principally benefitting low and moderate income persons, the presumption is rebutted.

In light of the typical justifications given by cities for economic develop-

ment projects, some specific current HUD regulations and advisory material merit particular attention. The controlling HUD Handbook states that the following common rationales for economic development projects may not be considered in making a determination whether or not such projects principally benefit low and moderate income persons:⁴

- (a) that the project will increase the city's tax base (and by implication thereby benefit low and moderate income person who will get tax-funded services);
- (b) that the project will indirectly create jobs, i.e., the project will have a "multiplier" effect in the economy;
- (c) that temporary jobs - particularly construction jobs - will be created for low and moderate income persons.

Current tests as to whether or not such a project "principally benefits" low and moderate income people focus on the proportion of all permanent jobs which are low/mod jobs; not the absolute numbers of jobs created, or the ratio of jobs to dollars spent. For purposes of the program benefit regulations, a hundred million dollar project which directly created three permanent jobs - two for dishwashers and one for a bank president - would "principally benefit" low and moderate income persons. For purposes of such program benefit analysis the cost-effectiveness of the project is irrelevant.

In order to attack a proposed economic development project, thus, two lines of attack are in order: (a) to document that the ratio of low/mod jobs has been overstated, i.e., that fewer low/mod income jobs in relation to the total number of jobs created, and/or (b) to document that the total jobs are so few in relation to what it will cost to create them that the project is "plainly inappropriate" to meeting the stated goal of creating new jobs for low and moderate income persons.

Many CDBG applications contain hazy and methodologically questionable assertions about job creation. Following are ways in which they are commonly defective:

Uncertainty/risk

Usually the ultimate nature of proposed developments is not known at the outset. Always there is an irreducible minimum of uncertainty and risk involved and often the best that can be hoped for is an outcome that broadly conforms to the original visions and expectations. Yet frequently the plans and blueprints and artists' renderings that accompany these proposals convey a false impression

of exactitude which often crumbles under careful scrutiny. Such exactitude presumes certainty of outcomes in a riskless environment. Plausibility is enhanced when a range of possible outcomes (e.g., "worst case," "most likely case," and "best case") is specified for varying conditions. Deserving greatest suspicion are precise numerical estimates with no range or confidence intervals specified - e.g., statements such as "5345 jobs will be created" - not 5344 or 5346 but 5345.

Net jobs vs. gross jobs

CDBG plans frequently present an estimated figure for the new jobs which will be created by economic development projects. An important question is whether these are gross or net jobs. If, for example, a new industrial park project provides space for a factory which closes down its plant in one part of town and moves its 500 workers intact to the new facility with no change in the labor force, it would be absurd to claim that 500 new jobs for the community have been created, or to assert that 500 low and moderate income persons will "benefit" from the expenditure of public funds. Any major economic development project which fails to draw the distinction between gross and net jobs may reasonably have its numerical job creation estimates substantially reduced. For a large CDBG project such as San Jose's, a 50 percent reduction would be conservative.

Secondary employment and employment multipliers

It is commonly assumed that one basic sector job in a project will create additional secondary jobs. The number of indirect jobs for each primary job is derived by a so-called employment "multiplier." Indirect or secondary employment may not be counted for purposes of qualifying a project as "principally benefiting" low and moderate income persons.⁵ However it may be relevant in making a judgement about how appropriate the project is in meeting low/mod employment needs. Cities may assume explicitly or implicitly very high "multipliers." In general employment multipliers higher than 2.0 are suspect.

How might the above concepts be employed in the typical economic development situation? Imagine, for example, an application which proposed spending 50% of a city's CDBG funding on an industrial park or on a downtown convention center, and asserted that the project would create 5,000 jobs, most of which would go to low and moderate income persons. If the city's 5,000 job figure represented gross jobs, arguing that net job is the relevant category and applying a standard deflator should "whittle down" the initial number at least by half to 2,500. If the project outcomes were highly uncertain, application of some expected value adjustments to account for risk should knock the figure down further - say to

2,000 jobs. Calculating when these jobs would be created and applying conservative discounting and phasing-in to capacity assumptions could easily reduce that still further to 1,500. If the dollar investment required to produce these jobs were way out of scale and the city's application identified other more "appropriate" needs or approaches, a plausible argument could be made that the proposed project is plainly inappropriate.

Another approach is to document that the proportion of low/mod jobs is lower than estimated by the city. Some fallacies in city employment projections could help document that the proportions are different than assessed.

First, if a facility is operating at less than full capacity it may be assumed that the ratio of low/mod to higher jobs is constant. However this is not usually the case. Ordinarily higher income managerial personnel are hired first - the hotel management is "in place" early on with additional maids and busboys hired to meet capacity; plant managers of an industrial plant are hired early on with plant workers added in relation to capacity. Thus, if any facility is identified as operating at less-than-full capacity, not only will the absolute number of jobs decline; so will the proportion of low/mod jobs.

Second, "skill" and low/mod may be confused in employment projections. An example is clerical workers. The category "clerical workers" may be treated in the application as a single unified category with all clerical workers treated as "low skilled" persons, or their jobs as those potentially accessible to persons of low and moderate income. Actually this is not the case. Highly-skilled legal secretaries are usually well paid and are unlikely to be recruited from the un- or low-skilled labor pool in the area. More detailed analysis may show a significant portion of jobs inaccurately and misleadingly categorized as low/mod jobs in order to justify a project. City assertions that an "economic development" project will provide low/mod jobs may be undermined by critiquing the documentation in a city's application to show that they are not making serious efforts to design projects which will provide opportunities, recruit and train the low/mod labor force, and otherwise assure that the project will in fact benefit them. Some cities are taking commendable action in this regard; many are not. Four indicators of the seriousness with which a city is treating the low/mod job aspect of an economic development project relate to affirmative action, job training, daycare, minority entrepreneurship, and the nature of the project itself.

Affirmative action plans

- Since race and poverty are frequently linked, a city which is making a

serious effort to have its economic development project address low/mod issues will usually have a serious affirmative action plan which includes:

- a) firm "targets" or hiring goals;
- b) active outreach and recruitment efforts;
- c) union apprenticeship programs;
- d) non race-biased exams;
- e) promotion policy.

Job training

- Training programs designed to furnish individuals with skills that give them good jobs with tenure and advancement opportunities show a more credible good faith effort.

Daycare

- Provision for daycare in connection with economic development releases economically deprived single-parent women into the labor force.

Minority entrepreneurship

- Provision of contacts to "minority firms" which guarantee some benefits to minority entrepreneurs and minority workers.

Nature of the project

- Certain activities offer substantial opportunities for low-skilled jobs. So do certain industrial activities. The degree to which an industry is capital or labor intensive, the nature of the work force required, and skill level all vary enormously. Alleged job-generating projects should be scrutinized carefully to see whether what is being proposed really does offer job creation potential.


Assume that a defective large scale economic development project is identified and that overblown job-generation figures are effectively attacked. What then?

First, it is unlikely that the application will be totally disapproved or less than the full entitlement amount of funding granted. This has only happened in a very few instances of extreme abuse. Nor is delay in funding a possible outcome of a complaint - HUD is statutorily obligated to act on applications within 75 days of their submission. Two major kinds of outcomes are possible: (a) reprogramming, and (b) contract conditioning. For example, a complaint and supporting documentation which makes out a case that an economic development project does not principally benefit low and moderate income persons may set the stage for a more

or less large portion of the funding allocated to it to be shifted over (reprogrammed) into other activities which do principally benefit low and moderate income people. Alternatively or in addition, the contract for funding may be approved subject to more or less strong conditions. Among the kinds of conditions which would be helpful in turning around economic development programs would be ones: (a) restricting reuse of the project land to those kinds of projects which are most likely to provide low and moderate income jobs, (b) a strong affirmative action program, (c) inclusion of daycare facilities, (d) ancillary job training for the project, (e) minority contracting, (f) a program for hiring low/mod persons from the community.


It is important to see any such remedies as partial - ones which would require constant vigilance and policing. Reprogrammed funds may not be used effectively, or contract conditions may lead to weak responses by the city, rubber-stamped by HUD.

In sum, the present surge of interest in large scale economic development threatens to drain off a substantial amount of federal CDBG funds into projects which have little or no relationship to benefitting low and moderate income persons. Vigorous advocacy which calls into question inflated estimates of the likely benefit such projects will have in terms of low and moderate income job generation can set the stage for reprogramming funds away from such projects into others which will have a clear benefit for low income people.



FOOTNOTES

- 1 42 U.S.C. 5301 (c)
 - 2 24 CFR 570.302
 - 3 Current CDBG regulations were published in the Federal Register on March 1, 1978 and are found at 24 CFR 570.302. The current HUD Handbook clarifying them is HUD Handbook Fifth Year Review and Processing of Community Development Block Grant Applications (March 1979). (Hereinafter referred to as HUD Processing Handbook.)
 - 4 HUD Processing Handbook 1-14, pp.2-20
 - 5 HUD Processing Handbook, pp.2-20
- * This article is based on the monograph "Housing and Community Development in San Jose: A Time For Change"





CONSUMER PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH CARE

MAGGIE JAMES

Americans now spend over 139 Billion dollars annually on health care.¹ Over 40% of these expenditures come from public funds.² While the health care industry keeps growing and commanding more and more of the nation's GNP, it is often argued that this growth doesn't result in any real increased benefits in the health of those who pay for health care services. It has become increasingly apparent that something is wrong with the medical care system and that the structure seems incapable of serving its prescribed purpose. This paper offers a summary of some recent steps federal legislators have taken towards rational health care policy formation, and chronicles the participation of consumers in that endeavor.

Ideally, health care should be a reciprocal relationship between the patient (consumer) and the provider (physician, hospital, clinic). However, that two-way relationship is a missing component in current health care delivery. It is important to note that the system has been organized not by the recipients of health services, but almost entirely by the providers, leaving the consumer with little or no voice in the matter. Consumers have been traditionally unorganized in comparison to the providers and in practice it is the physician who makes the decisions as to what kind and how much health care the patient will receive.

The historical roots of this power among physicians can be traced to the formation of the American Medical Association (AMA) in 1847. The AMA defined the physicians' function and formalized the notion of the physician as the director of the doctor-patient relationship. This professional status was exclusive to the physicians and separated them from the largely undefined group of consumers. To further promote professional interests, the AMA and its lobbying arm - the American Political Action Committee - became proficient at maintaining control over health care legislation.³

The relationship between the professional medical community and the health care delivery system has only recently been opened to serious scrutiny. With the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, health care became increasingly viewed as a right instead of a privilege and higher expectations were placed

on the delivery system. Public frustration with that system has therefore led to a critical focus of attention towards the providers.

These changes in public attitude bring forth a series of questions: Why did the system remain under the control of the providers? Why did the professional mystique surrounding medical practice continue? Why was the public kept relatively ignorant in regard to health matters? When the legislators issued public insurance to the needy, why was the government unable to demand changes from the providers? Why did consumers encounter rising health costs, while bearing the brunt of inadequate, poorly located, and/or needlessly duplicated services and facilities? An analysis of both public and provider positions in the health system offers an explanation.

From the standpoint of the physician, the promotion of professionalism was probably the wisest concept to be encouraged by the AMA and allowed for providers to attain a high level of esteem. The professional skill required to assess illness and deliver care is, according to traditional medical reasoning, beyond the scope or interest of the lay public. The physicians' concern with the delivery system is, therefore, strong, ongoing, and guarded. As a result, this concentrated interest group will perceive any change in the system as a sharp and obtrusive threat.⁴ In that respect, providers are aided at the legislative level through representation from old and well organized lobbies. These conditions almost guarantee that any comprehensive policy changes demanded by consumers will be defeated leaving them with, at best, only incremental concessions.

The position of the consumer, on the other hand, is quite the opposite. He or she does not make a career of acquiring health care. Consumer concern with medical delivery is confined to discreet participation. He or she enters the system and then leaves it, concerned with other daily matters.⁵ The patients, not formally organized, span wide geographic distances. In addition heterogeneous political beliefs and socio-economic factors weaken the group effectiveness, making a united consumer movement almost impossible. Because of these disadvantages, any change in the delivery system will only marginally affect the individual consumer's life.

How do these conditions affect the formal decisions of policy makers in the area of health care planning? In recent years, consumer oriented policy makers have responded by developing three programs aimed at the mobilization of consumer interests and the application of pressure towards the powerful providers: the

Regional Medical Programs, the Comprehensive Health Planning/Partnership for Health Act, and the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act.

The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 brought the federal government into direct financial involvement with the health care delivery system. Shortly thereafter, it became painfully clear that the advances in medical technology, largely paid for by the federal government, were not being practiced - consumers were not given the benefit of the expertise developed by providers. Federal response was to establish, in 1966, a system of voluntary advisory councils set forth by the Regional Medical Programs (RMP). The goal of RMP was to advance the standard of care practiced by providers. To ensure that the medical advancements offered by providers would be acceptable to the consumers, the councils were required to broadly represent both medical and consumer interests.⁶

In the councils, however, consumers found themselves lacking in decision making skills, and unfamiliar with the workings of formal meetings and voting procedures. They subsequently began to rely heavily on the groundwork of professionalism supplied by providers, who were more at ease with established procedures. Thus, it appeared to many of the consumer members that their inclusion was merely a symbolic gesture on the part of policy makers.

The AMA was opposed to establishment of RMPs, fearing that the program set up regional medical centers to erode the AMA's firm grip on the system of health delivery.⁷ The doctors indicated their belief that medical care was best delivered in more individual settings, wherein their autonomy remained protected. As a result, the regional councils endorsed grants to medical schools and research institutions based on categories to study cancer, stroke and heart disease.⁸ While they argued that the consumer would be the eventual beneficiary of this research, the very makeup of the institutions that received the funding - i.e. private hospitals - excluded any direct consumer input.

Congress also enacted a parallel act to involve the consumers in the planning of health care. The Comprehensive Health Planning/Partnership for Health Act of 1966 was aimed directly at the delivery system. Commonly known as CHP, it was the first publically mandated effort that gave consumers legal responsibility in planning the delivery system. The system encompassed social, organizational and financial considerations and once again, an attempt was made to coordinate the lay public with the providers. However, as with RMP, the providers dominated the organization and procedures.

CHP rested on the assumption that voluntary cooperation would exist between providers and consumers and that the providers truly would consider the needs of the consumer as the foremost basis of the planning process. CHP raised that possibility, but carried no inherent assurances. The program did, however, function to raise consumer expectations of what the delivery system would be capable of achieving.

While both groups eyed each other suspiciously, it became evident that the power base of CHP organizations tended to be large urban medical centers, or in other words, the provider's home base. The Office of Economic Opportunity, representing the lower socio-economic groups and the Neighborhood Health Centers, actively sought, with limited success, access to the formal decision-making process of CHP.⁹ They were joined by other activist groups with the shared goal of presenting a voting force - the representation of forty million voting consumers.¹⁰ It was hoped that the force could move Congress to expand CHP from a limited role of marginal planning to one with more regulatory power backed with legal sanctions. Congress however, did not or could not respond (representative of its failure to take appropriate action was the failure to adequately define the word "consumer" when they drafted the law. The mandated consumer majority had increasingly been filled with hospital administrators and the wives of CHP participating physicians).¹¹ CHP expired in 1974 and, due to its failure to accomplish any real planning, was not renewed.

The lesson the policy makers extracted from their CHP fiasco was that a highly technical and complex structure - health care delivery - required an equally complex and coordinated system involving bureaucratic reform.¹² In place of CHP, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (PL93-641) was passed. The law set up a complex structure of planning with regulatory power at the state, local and federal levels. The act is currently in operation and is known to most of us as the program of Health Systems Agencies (HSAs). The 205 local HSAs have decision-making power directly toward the number of hospitals and doctors, and other regulatory matters. The responsibilities of the local HSAs indicates the importance still attached to the concept of regionalization in the promotion of consumer input by Congress. These regional HSAs are primarily concerned with avoidance of any further duplication of services offered by providers, and thereby hope to contain the rapidly growing health industry and keep health care costs to the consumer and government from skyrocketing, through their regulatory efforts.

FEDERAL JOBS FOR STUDENTS

The makeup of the HSAs governing body shows the priority of representation of consumer interests. While HSAs can be either private, non-profit, public or general local government¹⁴, they must include a governing board comprised of 51% to 60% health care consumers representing the general makeup of the area's population. In addition, careful attention is paid to what actually constitutes a consumer. To help in the organization and coordination of consumers, HSAs attempt to employ a now inherent aspect of the system to their advantage. Because fragmented services have resulted in increased patient access points (that is physician, medical clinic, hospital), patient sophistication and mobilization has been fostered.¹⁵ It is hoped that this will be one of the policy's saving forces.

It is important to note that in drafting the law, the legislature was not able to avoid attempts made by provider interest groups who desired to undermine the policy maker's goals and objectives. The AMA and the American Hospital Association's first desire was to delete any reference in the law with regard to rate settings.¹⁶ Also, the states were required by law to enact Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws. The American Hospital Association chose to support the CON laws. The provision insured existing hospitals control of their domain by restricting new competition. What worried the hospital lobby, however, was the provision allowing HSAs to review existing hospitals on the grounds of the continued or projected need. The successful efforts of the hospital lobby replaced the word "need" with the word "appropriateness", and removed the legal sanctions of the state to close down institutions.¹⁷ As a result of the medical lobbying efforts, the power of the HSAs are limited and the teeth of the law that might have provided consumers with powerful legal options have been removed.

In effect, the interest group with the most power in the system is still the provider group. All three attempts from the federal level - RMP, CHP, and HSAs - have remained under the influence of the providers. While these laws have tried to improve the system, all were forms of internal rationalization based on the assumption that any change in the system must come from within.

Congress needs to apply itself towards a commitment of full consumer participation in health care policy formation and implementation. Furthermore, consumer participation and interests must be fully supported by Congress and backed by legal confirmation. In addition, consumer education and mobilization should be conducted to ensure that consumers take full advantage of opportunities.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Executive Office of the President, Council on Wage and Price Stability, Staff Report. "The Problem of Rising Health Care Costs". Washington D.C.. April 1976:16
- 2 National Health Insurance Report. June 15, 1979.
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FEDERAL JOBS FOR STUDENTS

The United States Federal Government offers a wide range of programs offering financial aid to assist students. A select group of relevant and promising programs for Urban Studies majors follows:

1) BA/BS Degree Student Program

Who: Undergraduate students pursuing BA/BS Degree (12,684 in 1979)

Scope: All majors/disciplines

Eligibility:

- Full-time enrollment
- Family restrictions
- 2.0 GPA
- College recommendation

Employment after Graduation:

- Agency options
- Competitive entry options
- Eligible for non-comp. internship (120 days)

2) Graduate Student Co-op Program

Who: Masters & Doctoral degree students from accredited graduate schools

Scope: Six academic disciplines

- Engineering
- Life sciences
- Accounting
- Administration (Bus.)
- Physical Sciences
- Management (public)

Eligibility:

- Enrollment in 1 of six programs
- Agency selections limited to 20% of entry level hires
- PACE Job Test required.
- Family restrictions
- Academic credit for work phase or pre-requisite for degree

3) College Work Study Program

Who: Undergraduate, Graduate and Professional students

Scope: Provide assistance to students with legitimate financial need

Eligibility:

- Need to earn to pursue degree
- Evidence of academic ability/promise
- Enrolled/accepted to college on at least a half time basis (Voc. School or 6/mon. duration)
- Citizen/National

4) Stay in School Program

Who: Youths whose employment might represent the difference between some education and none.

Scope: Provide \$ assistance (start)

5) Student Trainee Program

Who: Students with at least 2 years of college work

Scope: Unique new way for students seeking Federal employment/career

Eligibility: Competitive exam

Employment at Graduation:

- Upon completion of college work, possible promotion to professional positions
- Must have pursued course of study leading to qualification at GS-5/7 profession at graduation
- Current career opportunities include Dept. Agr., Dept. Air Force, Army&Navy (Mgmt., Engr., Math, Physical Science)

6) Presidential Management Intern Program

Who: Students of exceptional management potential (MA/MS Grad.)

Scope: 250 outstanding public management positions (interviewed)

Eligibility:

- Must have educational training at graduate level in planning and managing public programs/policies
- Nominated by graduate school's Dean of Public Admin. or Bus. Admin.
- Must have completed all graduate degree requirements

Employment at Graduation:

- Interns are eligible for conversion to regular civil service appts. w/o further competition (GS-12)
- Employment may cross government lines

7) Congressional Intern Program

Appointments are made directly by congressional staff (non-Civil Service). Student receives experience within congressional office. Normally paid and during summer or vacation periods.

8) Graduate Student Program

Graduate students may be assigned work of scientific, professional or analytical nature. (Need for credit to be awarded toward degree requirement). Employment limited to one year unless extended by OPM.

