

URBAN ACTION

"An initial concern with urbanism as a 'thing in itself' thus fades into a concern with all facets of man, society, nature, thought, ideology, production, and so on, built around the concept of a relationally defined urbanism." — David Harvey

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1980

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EDITORS'S NOTES

My own involvement with this journal, and that of a core of people on Winter 1980's staff, began with collating and stapling the first issue together in February 1980. Thus was born my first decision as managing editor of the second issue -- that in terms of efficiency, such tasks should definitely be contracted out. Many decisions have followed since, several based on a similar sequence of trial and error, and all with the help and advice of a great many people, both on and off campus. An exhaustive accounting is not practicable here, but I would like to make a few acknowledgements.

Where to start is always a problem best addressed by origins. Winter 1980's lie in the first issue of URBAN ACTION, which was largely the result of the time and effort expended by now alumnus Scott Dewar. My second debt of gratitude goes to Associated Students for funding us, and to Summer Tips in particular for her continued assistance and enthusiasm. Our Student Activities advisor, Bob Westwood, is due similar appreciation.

On the editorial side, several professors have been indispensable for their advice and encouragement, notably Dick LeGates, Debbie LeVeen, and Barbara Phillips. Dick, particularly, provided contacts and substantive ideas for our interviews with Allan Jacobs and Manuel Castells. Our advisor, Norm Schneider, was always accessible and willing to offer his insights into our decision-making.

In terms of support, the alumni of the Urban Studies Program must be acknowledged. A goodly proportion of this group donated generously to the sometimes precarious funding of Winter 1980, and their interest and support has been greatly appreciated. As has that of the student body and faculty of Urban Studies and other departments, and innumerable others, during our fundraising drives.

And finally, my own heartfelt thanks to the staff and authors of Winter 1980 for working together to make our ideas come to life. We all worked hard, and I think I can say to our readers with confidence, "Enjoy!"

Martha J. Sullivan
Managing Editor, UA Winter 1980

P.S. As we go to press, postscripts are due on two of our articles. The November 1980 election yielded a thumbs-down on district elections, and something of a validation for Jay Kleinwaks' hypotheses of incumbency. Eight of the eleven district incumbents were returned to office in the at-large election, a number roughly equivalent to that found in Jay's study. In December 1980, S.F.'s Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board adopted new regulations governing the eviction of tenants. As Mimi La Place and I point out, previously it had refused to deal with alleged violations of just cause eviction provisions in the City's rent control ordinance. Reports of such violations will now be investigated by the Board's executive director and a hearing process has been established.

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UA interviews: allan jacobs

From 1967 through 1974, Allan Jacobs was San Francisco's Director of City Planning, after having worked on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania and as a planner in Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Calcutta. The author of Making City Planning Work, he is presently the chair of U.C. Berkeley's Department of City and Regional Planning. UA editors Martha Sullivan and Mimi LaPlace interviewed Mr. Jacobs in his office in late September.

UA: As the former director of San Francisco's Department of City Planning, who do you think the planning process, or the planner, serves?

AJ: I think it served a lot of people. There was a real attempt to serve some minorities and not so well-off people. That's why a lot of planning was done in places like South Bayshore and Chinatown. Those were real attempts to serve those who seem to be the "have-nots." At the same time, there was an attempt to serve "everybody," and that's an awful lot of what general planning, citywide general planning, is supposed to be about. There is an ongoing reality of serving, or at least responding to, immediate neighborhood concerns and individual needs. If you've never spent time listening to the zoning cases go down to the Planning Department on Thursdays. All those cases are being considered on a parcel-by-parcel, building-by-building basis. And that's an aspect of planning at the very, very local level.

On the question of who the decisions serve, I think anything I would say would be self-serving. I think you'd want to figure out some method of judging how each one of the decisions went. My sense consciously at that time, when we were running the Planning Department, was to try to do it on some meaningful planning principle, such as good land use development. At the same time, it is important to understand that for an awful lot of decisions, it doesn't make a lot of difference how they are decided, at least not in relation to the physical development of the City. At that point, the question is how do you decide when you make the recom-

mendation? You base your recommendation on a combination of factors. One is what the neighborhood or the people living in the area, the people who seem most affected, want. Another basis is where can you earn the most currency. That gets to be a political decision. If the decision in your mind really doesn't make a lot of difference one way or another, then you can make it in terms of who it's helping or where you can gain the most currency for the Department.

UA: Then it comes down to who exactly you're working for?

AJ: The question of who you're working for is a good one, because you're working for a lot of people, just loads and loads of people. At one level you're working for the Commission that signs your paycheck, and you never want to forget that. On another level you're working for the Mayor. On another, you're working for the Board of Supervisors. You're working for a neighborhood, and also the supposed interests of the City as a whole at that time. All those clients are in mind, including yourself. You've got to sleep at night. And sleeping well at night may be based on some notion of what society ought to be like and what a city ought to be like.

UA: In San Francisco, the idea you raise of serving a variety of interests may be even more relevant because due to the Charter, there are so many different actors in the City's decision-making process. How do you feel about the revisions that have been proposed in the Charter with respect to planning?

AJ: I haven't looked at the last version of the Charter. I was asked to comment and took part in a symposium about a year ago on what the recommendations were at that time. It's interesting that with one or two exceptions then, planning remained pretty much the way it was. It's fascinating that they did that, and thank God they did. They understood the importance of that. The place where they didn't, and now I gather that they've changed back, is that they took away some powers on zoning. Now, if the Planning Commission says it doesn't want to change something, it takes a two-thirds vote of the Board of

Supervisors to overrule it. In the version they drew up, it took only a majority vote. I think they've got it back to a two-thirds vote. I hope it is, that's an important power. So, it's interesting, I think it's fascinating that with all the changes, they've maintained the Commission and the Planning Dept. They've kept it the way it was. I happen to think that that's maybe the wisest thing they did. Aside from that, I don't think much of what they're doing is wise, at least as I observed it. They're into efficient government, and they've centralized power.

UA: *In trying for that efficiency, do you think they have sacrificed a certain amount of responsiveness and equitability? Which is a dilemma often faced in planning.*

AJ: I have great doubts about centralized power in this City, especially in this City. I have observed that

"Whether regulation becomes more or less, there are other ways to do important things."

almost every one of the actions in recent years have been toward more centralized power. I think that's bad.

UA: *You are sympathetic to the need for height limitations in San Francisco. Do you think that the existing height provisions need to be strengthened along the lines of last year's failed Proposition "O," such as abolishing the "bonus" system?*

AJ: All those height limitations that exist were put

in while I was Planning Director. I would agree wholly that you should get almost no bonuses (for square footage), probably none of them. Those went in not as a part of the height ordinance of 1972, but as part of a downtown zoning ordinance enacted in 1968. As far as height is concerned, I suspect that a stiffening of those height proposals enacted while I was Planning Director is in order, and that they should be more restrictive. Something else, though, are the floor area ratios (FAR's), those also were enacted in 1968. It's important to understand that the initial recommendations for those were much lower than what was finally enacted. The Board of Supervisors at that time, very development-oriented, added about four points to what the Planning staff initially proposed. That's a big difference. It doesn't make a difference in height, necessarily, but it makes a difference in amount, in how much development you get. I think they ought to reduce the FAR, take off bonuses, which has been done, I gather. I think it makes sense to re-look at the height controls. I would look at them in a couple of ways, though. I think they're probably a little high downtown; on the other hand, there are some places where height ought to go up, if you're thinking about strict designing. Look at the original urban design plans that came out in 1971 and see where some proposals for height were lowered. Maybe it makes sense at 19th Avenue and Golden Gate Park to allow, in a small space, some height. What would that height be? Not office buildings, build some housing there. There are some places on the north side of the park where that also makes sense. Those were initial proposals, too.

Success and failure are strange. It's terribly easy to say, "Wow! We were terribly successful in that we got all these height restrictions, and boy, look how tight they are." A piece of that, as far as I'm concerned, is little bit a failure, in that there were some places where we proposed some height (not huge buildings), and those were not enacted. I happen to think that was a failure.

UA: *Do you think it's realistic to think that after the defeat of Prop "O," the Planning Department will consider and tighten their recommendations for height limitations?*

AJ: It could, whether it does or not, I don't know. Keep in mind that the citywide height controls that were put on in 1972 followed two similar defeats. In November of 1971, the initial Duskin amendment was defeated. In June of 1972, the second Duskin proposal was defeated. If you look at when the height controls were passed, they were passed, actually, in August 1972 by the Board of Supervisors. Well, that's "after," isn't it? We'd been doing a whopping amount of work preparing them and keeping the pressure on. But at the time I was scared to death that if Duskin lost a second time, all of the support for what we were proposing would totally erode. In fact, I once had some telephone conversations with Alvin (Duskin) to say, "For Gods-sakes, don't go in June with your second time, go in November. But give us a chance to come out first and if the Board doesn't enact ours by the time yours comes around, then you can say, 'Look, you're not doing anything.' And that would fuel your proposal. But he wouldn't do it. In reality, as far as I'm concerned, it turned out alright because we got ours passed anyway. But I can tell you, within a week of the time Duskin failed, support was beginning to erode on my Commission. It didn't erode on the Board of Supervisors. It's a scary business.

I'm saying, you could get something done if you wanted to, if you wait long enough. The political sort of trick in a game like this is that during the period when the initiative is on, you try to extract some promises or some public commitments out of Chamber of Commerce types. So that even if the initiative fails, you have them publicly on the books. That's the game you want to play.

UA: There has been a shift to a mood of conservatism in the United States, especially fiscal conservatism. Calls for deregulation have been part of this. How do you think planning and planners could respond to this shift? Or do you think it is a significant concern?

AJ: It'll be interesting to see whether the interest groups want "deregulation" in planning, which is really zoning. My suspicion is that deregulation will be less than you're suggesting it might be. Nonetheless, that doesn't mean it couldn't be less. It might not wisely be less. I look with some amazement at the amount of red tape put on developers. It seems to me that if we're going to be good planners, one of the things to do is to say publicly, and pretty finely, what we mean and then let everybody act within it; so that you're not reviewing every proposal each time, which is bad planning. You ought to be able, at some level, to set rules of the game that everybody can live by, and those rules don't necessarily mean

that you have to have a huge process with every building proposal. I think that a lot of the planning staffs around the country, probably including San Francisco's planning staff, have run a little amok in not coming to grips with this. It means that you're not doing much planning if you can't say right at the outset to the guy, "Hey! Here's the rules of the game. Follow them." Sure, he'll produce some garbage within those rules, but let him. The world won't end. Change the rule next time, then.

The City Planning Commission in San Francisco is at least as much at fault, to the extent that there is a "fault," as its staff. Regardless of what its staff says, the Commission hears too many cases under its discretionary review powers. My feeling is that that's a misuse of power.

So, I don't think deregulation is going to be as strong as you suggest. Second, whether or not it is, I think planners ought to get their act together and not be reviewing everything. Third, implied in what you're saying is that regulation is the major way of implementing plans. It's not the only way. You can implement a proposal in a number of ways. You can get it carried out by direct public action--the building of something, which is not regulation but direct design action. Proposition "J," the open space amendment, is not zoning or regulation, but a direct public action to go out and buy open space in high need areas. That's one of the two or three things I'm most proud of in terms of my time in San Francisco. That's a real achievement that has nothing to do with regulation. That's coming up with a plan, selling it to the community and going out and building it. That's one way.

The second way is by influence, by suggesting to people, showing by example and getting people to do things. There are more ways than one to skin a cat. Whether regulation becomes more or less, there are other ways to do important things.



UA interviews: manuel castells

Manuel Castells is an internationally known urban theorist whose works in English include The Economic Crises and American Society, City, Class, and Power, The Urban Question, and as a contributor to Urban Sociology: Critical Essays (ed. by C.G. Pickvance). He is presently on the faculty of the Department of City and Regional Planning at U.C. Berkeley, where UA editors Martha Sullivan and Mimi LaPlace interviewed him at the beginning of its Fall 1980 quarter.

UA: *From your international perspective, who do you think benefits from the planning process? Who does the planning process serve? Especially in a comparative sense between the U.S. and other countries.*

MC: Basically, what you have to understand is that the planning process is a bargaining process, not a normative theory that you propose and develop in a particular city. Even the most rigid planning schemes have to be discussed and implemented in relationship to what is the actual situation of a city or of a region. This in fact is not at all what has traditionally been considered planning theory, but that's the planning practice. In one of my research projects I actually measured the use of time by planners. Seventy percent of the time was spent on telephone calls and meetings. The actual technical work of drawing, calculations and so on was done by clerical people. So, I think that the planner is a negotiator and a bargaining agent that puts different interests into the same process. The planner meets with the Chamber of Commerce and sometimes with some community groups; and then with the political forces in the city, with the trade unions and the business interests and so on. This doesn't mean that the planner is neutral, because the rules of the game largely determine the outcome of the game. For instance, you have some actual rule, like no public land policy can be implemented. Well, this narrows considerably what the public sector can do in terms of the betterment of the city. Or, we have to take care that, under no conditions, business leaves the city to avoid the taxation policies. This limits what you can do in relationship to business.

So, in that sense, the planning process has two aspects: It's subordinate to the general laws and financial and fiscal procedures for the given society and city, and therefore expresses or represents what the city or this society has already established for the planning operation. At the second level, within this

framework and set of laws, it is a bargaining process. And therefore, the planning agents and the planning institutions are going to actually represent the balance of forces existing in each particular city at each particular time. Subjectively, what the planner can do, under these conditions, is very limited. He can try to support this more than that, but basically, everything will depend on the balance of forces in the city. Which means that, unlike what some radical thinkers have said about planning, it's not necessary that planning has to be a very technocratic instrument, it can be a very progressive policy.

UA: *Can you elaborate on that concept?*

MC: Let's take the case of Bologna, in Italy, for instance, where you have a situation in which urban renewal has been based on the idea that you preserve the city, but you also preserve the people that live in the core of the city as well as its architectural forms and the functional and cultural uses of the center of the city. Obviously, in that sense, planning has been very effective in implementing progressive policies.

At the same time, however, because Bologna remains within the context of Italian policies and also in the context of the capitalist economy, what they have been able to do in Bologna is very limited in terms of an urban renewal process. Only 500 housing units have been renovated until now in Bologna. Of course, they have done all the things in terms of transportation, open space, social services and so on, but the renewal process, which has been the big thing about Bologna, has been very limited.

"The American popular movement overall has been weaker than in Europe not because of some kind of American 'incapacity' for social change."

Another example, one in which I participated in close negotiations, is Madrid. In 1976-78, it was finally agreed by the government and by the city core that all shanty towns would be renovated, but on the condition that people in the shanty towns, as well as the squatters, would be provided free public housing in the same location with much better collective equipment than most areas in the city. The basis of this condition was that they had a right to this be-

cause for twenty years they had organized the city and created the city. So once that land had been valued, they had to take advantage of this value, and not the landowners. So what they (the renewal program) did was they extricated both the land, which was privately owned, and the shacks. They paid very little for the land, because actually it was land which had no value before; they paid very highly for the shacks, because it was due to the shacks and the urban services they obtained through their demands and their struggles that the land's value increased. And then, on the basis of the high sum of money paid for the shacks, people could buy a nice, new apartment. This was obviously not a technicality. This was possible because of the very strong popular mobilization within the neighbourhood.

I think what is unique is the site of the operation, which concerned 30,000 families. The shacks were not on the periphery of Madrid, but close to the core of the city. So, given the fact that you have a popular mobilization, a clear consciousness about the questions, and a mass political and social capacity to impose these questions, then it was very important to have planners, lawyers, architects and economists that could design such a plan and make it possible for the city and the government to accept it.

This is my main, basic point--when you have a political situation that allows you to go ahead with the planning process, clearly you can do a lot. So in that sense, I would say that planning is not different from any other activity, such as the economy, or engineering, or whatever. It is a series of techniques that are sometimes different; obviously, the way you control land use values is not the same way you foster popular participation, but basically the whole thing will depend upon the social forces where the planning is going to be implemented.

UA: With respect to that point, a contrast which has been cited between the United States and Europe is Europe's higher level of social/political dialogue between citizens. Is this contrast an indicator of the difference between "urban renewal" programs undertaken in the U.S. and those implemented in Europe, Madrid for example?

MC: That's really the crucial point. If you do not have a process of participation and self-organization, it would be very difficult for the planner to develop policies that really emphasize people's interests. He will not have the time. That is why real estate and business are highly organized.



Photo: Donna Kempner

Furthermore, take the case of the trade union movement in all countries, not only in the U.S. Sometimes, if they are not linked to other experience, they have a very narrow vision. For instance, to refuse a policy of urban conservation and rehabilitation on the basis that this is going to diminish construction jobs. Which is not true. In all cases of massive conservation and rehabilitation—not the nice conservation of one house for a bourgeois family, but in terms of a massive program—on the contrary, it requires even more jobs, and more skilled jobs. But, people who live under very hard conditions, who have a very limited vision of the world because they have to survive every day, cannot open themselves up to other policies, unless it is not clever planners talking but other people living in their same neighbourhood that could talk to them, e.g., “Look, we need this kind of neighbourhood and not the others.”

Unless there is a very broad cross-section of citizen and neighbourhood organization and participation in the public sector, I don't think that any kind of political force, right or left, can implement any major program. One of the problems in Italy and in France that left-wing municipalities have run into is that when they do not have this kind of popular support, even if they have the votes, they cannot do anything. Because if they go too far, they lose the votes in the following election. In that sense, I think that the problem is not that the U.S. does not have a wide source of neighbourhood mobilization—there is much community mobilization in this country. In some sense, more than in most European cities.

UA: *Then what would you attribute the difference to?*

MC: The major difference (between U.S. and Europe) stems from two factors: First, the ethnic segmentation of this mobilization (in U.S.). The main reason why the American popular movement overall has been much weaker than in Europe does not come out of some kind of American “incapacity” for social change, or even from a relatively mild way of social conflict. The workers' movement in this country has been much more violent—the kind of violence in the strikes of the thirties and forties is absolutely out of proportion to the European experience. The problem is not that. The problem is that the mobilization has been segmented along ethnic lines, through different wages and because of very careful political desire and purpose of the existing institutions to keep this up. It is almost

impossible, for example, to get the black and latin communities together, which are the two most exploited communities in the city. Or, when you have a mobilization, very progressive in many aspects, of the gay community, you have at the same time this hostility between communities. Of course, this problem cannot be solved in a very short period of time. What I am pointing to is the fact that it is because of this segmentation and this division and not because of the absence of mobilization that the movements are ineffective.

The other major difference, I would say, has been the capacity of neighbourhood organizations and community groups to participate in local government and in urban and regional policy decisions. I think that the kind of “localistic” approach to the problem in this country hasn't been really very effective. Unless people realize that you really can make a difference, in political terms—in terms of the decisions—it is very exhausting to be every day participating, after the work, after all your activities and so on, just to feel a very small amount of power.

UA: *Hasn't that “reality” become all the more manifest in recent years?*

MC: The problem is that in this country what happened, particularly in the sixties, was such a terrible experience of community groups and neighbourhood organizations being swallowed up by manipulatory urban policies. As a backlash, people now refuse to go into the political system. At this level, I think it is a major political mistake. Participation is a two-fold process: you can be absorbed, you can be swallowed, you can be integrated; but at the same time, if you are not there, you don't have any chance to make any difference. Unless you turn the whole system upside-down and you really seize power from the bottom. Which I don't think is a likely hypothesis or even a desirable one, to have a process where in one minute you change everything.

To summarize, it is very important in the actual development of neighbourhood movements all over the U.S. that to become more effective, they have to accept the challenge of participating in the local governments, the regional authorities and in the state governments. And really go there and battle, and fight for your autonomy and for your independence. That has been the European experience and has been highly successful.

CASTLE OF DREAMS

By Alan H. Stein

Alan Stein is a photographer whose credits include still photography on several films, including the award-winning feature, Northern Lights; publication in a number of periodicals (Pacific Sun, Phoenix, Cineaste, among others); and work with the S.F. Art Commission and the S.F. Study Center.

Raymond Reed is bereaved on May 11th. The result is not just loneliness, but a rapid decline of faculties and even the will to live. During Thanksgiving or Christmas, Raymond and three thousand other welfare, SSI recipients and drifters, relieve the hunger pains and social isolation at St. Anthony's dining room. But on Mother's Day there is, for Raymond, a remembrance - a recall of past and present, sometimes unpleasant. Like the life of Nate Shaw in All God's Dangers, Raymond demonstrates that a person is, at every moment, everything he always was. He remembers his childhood as a happy time, but something taken away from him, and that's when the world changed. Whether a statistic for the recently completed U.S. Census, or as a number for his welfare caseworker, Raymond, at 54, is still Sylvia I. Reed's child, though she's been dead 47 years. Born outside of Seattle, Washington, he has traveled three western states, but hasn't left the Tenderloin and South of Market since coming to San Francisco 15 years ago. "My folks didn't know the world was going to change. They didn't know I'd be living in 1980 either."

It's Mother's Day and I'm sitting in Kenneys Restaurant watching Raymond Reed sip his soup and listening to his life story. He looks at me for a long second. Under his short grey hairs and eyebrows his fifty-nine years disappear as his deep brown, wide, searching eyes fully open now--then his rounded mouth creases a smile in the corners that almost never ceases during our interview.

"Today is a sad day, do you know why? Guess.

Because it is Mother's Day and Raymond has no mother. Her pictures were in the window of his hundred dollar a month room at the Mission Hotel, which is adjacent to this restaurant. No bath, no plain light globes that hang from the ceiling in the room he calls his "castle of dreams."


"She had cancer and they took her away. That's what she died from according to my belief. She prayed to God all the time for healing, then she died and went to heaven in nineteen hundred and thirty three."

Raymond was born and raised in Kitsap County, Port Orchard, Washington. "Not here in California or Oregon, but Washington. I didn't come into the world because I'm Raymond Reed. They must have had me for some other reason, or I wouldn't be here in this hotel on welfare supporting myself."

His mother, Sylvia, married Frank I. Reed and they lived for four dollars a month in a rented shack. Raymond helped put the shingles on the roof of that shack. He stayed home and read the Bible twenty four hours a day and gained faith, which today he sometimes gets weak on.

He wears a tatoo on his left forearm. It was burned on with an ink pen. It's a love heart. "I wanted one tatoo in my life 'cause my folks never had nothing. So I did get that done. I wanted to have L-O-V-E in the middle of it. That was back in the thirties when food was cheap and my folks were poor."

Raymond studies my shirt and finally asks me if it is wool or cotton. "Cotton," I reply. He says he needs to wear wool shirts, because wool holds the heat in while he is panhandling on the streets. He doesn't like to talk about his street experiences. He has great fear of bus drivers, policemen, and especially total strangers. He fears the sniper that will shoot him and the robber that will mug him. He's not smiling now.



"If I'm smiling I'm lying to my own heart. In my own heart I'm not happy at all. Smiling is fictitious to me, because I know in my own heart I really can't smile."

He suffers from a stomach ulcer which he thought was cancer. But today he has no pain. He drank a quart of milk last night, with bread in it. He breaks the bread up and puts it in the cup. It's nourishing. He loves small curd cottage cheese, but it costs too much.

"I had it last June 11th, once a year, because I can't afford to buy it no other way. I'm on welfare and my social worker said 'you have to eat less 'cause I can't change it,' he said, 'it's beyond me and my job.' We had a two hour talk about it. He told me this to my face and I was sitting beside him. I just had it out with him because my life's not worth living on borrowed time, and he said 'I can't help you.'"

Raymond's journey began when he buried his daddy, a half block from the Kitsap County Courthouse. He didn't have one nickel when he left home. At seventeen all the signs said: SOUTHBOUND TO CALIFORNIA. The time had come to leave by his thumbs.

"They had no freeways when I left home, only two lane highways. Now they got freeways everywhere you go. They built freeways since my daddy died. I never knew they would do that, but they did. See how things change?"

He was riding down the coast in that old dirt road memory.

"Since my folks died people have been mean to me during my travels here on earth. I've been in fights with strangers that I've never seen before."

In San Diego, U.S. Navy servicemen tore the coat off his hunch back (the deformity a result of polio when Raymond was eight) and beat him up.

"They called me a hunchback and I said I'm not in the Navy, but I can't help my back. It was late at night and I was trying to get a cup of coffee. I didn't have one dime on me--broke in San Diego--no where to stay except on skid row, and these three sailors came at me. They told me to get off the street and I couldn't-- nowhere to go. They didn't care, but I am as human as they are."

After all these dead years of his personal mother and daddy gone, deep in the earth, he's still alive in California, a little different altogether than his baby home in Washington State, where he was raised on Wonder bread when it only cost a dime. He never planned to lose them, he didn't know they were going to die. He's still fighting his way with a fourth grade education, cigarettes and coffee. "That's all I have in this world called happiness. It's these little things, like cigarettes, that man made in the Virginia fields back east..."

Raymond has finished his soup and is smoking a Lucky Strike cigarette. I'm finishing a second cup of coffee. I ask him what kind of music he likes. His face lights up.

"I like only country music! Ernest Tub's *Till the End of the World*, sold a million copies in 1946. Every state had it on the juke box." He likes Loretta Lynn's *One's On the Way*, a song about having a baby



in Tennessee. He heard it in 1972 when he lived at the Hillsdale Hotel. He stayed there for six years before moving to the Mission.

From our booth we can look outside at the traffic on South Van Ness Avenue.

"I tried to meet the great beyond right here on Van Ness because of my personal life. I tried it last Saturday at two o'clock and some cop said 'come on, don't die yet.' He took me back to the Hotel here. I said 'don't drag me back mister, because my life's not worth it.' I did try it, right here, right in the middle of the white line. I didn't move an inch for any bus or car. I won't tell you what I think in my heart but I did it, I did it on my own faith, no-

body told me to go out there and end my life because of hardships and world events; but I did try it last Saturday right out here. Every bus, every Greyhound bus, you know they go by fast, so do police cars. They can't stop in a few seconds if they're going fifty miles an hour. They're bound to smash you to the moon. So I figured one way out of the world without knowing anything is when a car hits you you're going to be up in the air, because they don't have time to put the brakes on. That's how I did it my way because I had to hitchhike in a car to get here. I don't like to have anything to do with cars, but I like to have a job in this American country, which I've never had. A lot of reasons why I tried to get by with the end of the world. I did, I tried it, nobody told me to."

He looks at me. "I'm just as sober as you are. Life gets to be too much. Real life and bus drivers and cops and welfare and things I've been through in real life. It all adds up to my heart and I can't take it. I just go out there on a sunshiny day and stand there in the street and try to meet the end of it. That's the best I can do and I can't cope with it no longer.

"Whether it's a quart of milk or a candy bar, it's my life and I've tried to do my very best with everybody I meet up with. I try and treat people the same way. But I've been treated real bad by people. I have great fear. I do have a great fear of people outside on the streets of San Francisco."



A NEW HORIZON

By Tuan duc Nguyen

Tuan duc Nguyen left Vietnam on April 30, 1975, arriving in the U.S. in October of the same year. With no family or relatives, he came to San Francisco, earning an AA degree in music from City College and a BA in French from San Francisco State University. He is now studying for a master of divinity (majoring in philosophy and systematic theology) at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, and plans to teach mathematics, theology and philosophy.

April 30, 1975 - Saigon, the last stronghold of the South Vietnamese army, fell into the hands of the communists. Due to different reasons (e.g., religion, economics, politics), hundreds of thousands of people fled Vietnam at that time to go to other countries, hoping that they could find in these new places what they call FREEDOM. The majority came to the United States of America. Here in San Francisco, according to the Indochinese Resettlement Center, there are approximately 12,000 Vietnamese refugees. Among them, about 3,600 are single (by "single" I mean those who came here alone, without any member of their family and/or relatives going along with them).¹

As have many other refugee groups (e.g., the Germans, the Austrians, the Jews, the Cubans), the Vietnamese do encounter many difficulties in adjusting to American society. Perhaps, in order to have a feeling of how difficult this adjustment is, it would be best for the reader to "listen" to a complaint of an old refugee:

"I am frustrated and unhappy. Before, I was living in a natural jungle of trees and animals. But then I was very happy. Now that I have to live in an artificial jungle of machines and computers, I feel miserable and rejected..."

Naturally, it would not be true that all the refugees have the same feeling toward American society. In fact, some of the interviewees seem to be quite happy with their new life in the U.S.A. Nevertheless, whether a refugee is happy or not, the fact that he

has difficulties in adjusting to the American way of life is certainly evident. The cause of all those difficulties, in the author's belief, lies in the difference between the American and Vietnamese perceptions of reality. Phillips and Legates (1981 : 178) point out:


"Need we repeat that one person's reality is another's fantasy?...It shows that perceptual data is processed through three reality filters: cultural, social, and psychological. It implies that how we filter perceptual data determines how we construct 'objective' reality."

Two people coming from two different cultures would naturally have different perceptions of "reality." Moreover, the difference between these two persons' cultural interests would be evidently great. Different cultural interests of the refugee make friendships with the native-born difficult to establish. A Vietnamese doctor expresses his opinion:

"The Vietnamese are much introvert; the Americans in contrast, extrovert. Unfortunately, the latter don't seem to realize that fact. Or, even if they do, they immediately 'condemn' us by saying things such as: 'It's not natural and sincere to hide your feelings.' Moreover, in most of the conversations between me and some Americans, they seem to be interested in only one thing - sports. I could rarely have the occasion to talk about other subjects such as music, arts and sciences...It's indeed very difficult to make friends with the Americans..."

The message which the doctor wants to convey is clear: due to differences in cultural interests, the refugee finds much trouble in attempting to make friends with the native-born.

Unfortunately, if the refugee is to succeed in his adjustment, he needs to become americanized as much as possible, i.e., he needs to change his Vietnamese perception of "reality" to that of the American. Obviously, this change of perception in the process of assimilation into American society is not easy. This paper will present a case study of twenty single Vietnamese refugees now living in San Francisco as an attempt to explore and analyze a few difficulties this group encounters in its adjustment to the American urban life of San Francisco. Of this group, there are ten women and ten men: Fifteen are under 30 years old and five above; three whose education is not higher than elementary level, eight who finished high school, five who continued their education after high



school and four who have completed four years of college. This paper will address four interrelated issues: learning the language, making friends in America, making a living and social adjustment.

Learning The Language

According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (in Phillips & Legates, 1980:179),

"Language does much more than reflect culture: it molds a person's world-view and thoughts. In this view, people's conception of reality is significantly determined by the categories available to them in their language."

If this is true, then language is indeed a vital part of culture. Therefore, a command of English is basic to the entire process of americanization. Without it, the newcomer's contacts with the natives, his participation in the community's activities and his social and occupational adjustments are greatly limited. In short, his adjustment to American culture would be much impeded. This relationship will be repeatedly illustrated throughout this paper. Interviews and a questionnaire conducted as the base of this paper have revealed factors which undoubtedly facilitate the refugee's acquisition of English. Conversely, the absence of these factors would impede his learning of the language.

Previous Knowledge of the Language: Of the group studied, twelve people had some previous knowledge of English before their arrival in the U.S.A. As a result, they do not find as much trouble in their acquisition of English as the eight others who had no previous knowledge of English. A student at City College of San Francisco tells the interviewer how he has been suffering a lot in school due to his ignorance of English:

"Gee! I really felt very bad for the first two years at school. In fact, I was desperate every time I thought about my future. Life was then depressing and as dark as the ink. Occasionally, the idea of suicide came to my mind..."

*Linguistic Ability:*² Among the 20 refugees interviewed, four showed remarkable linguistic ability in learning English: Only one year after their arrival to the States, they could already speak English quite well. The remaining 16 typically had to spend three years in their studies before they could speak under-

standably. Based on the interviews, the women seem to have greater linguistic ability than the men. They seem to be able to acquire the language quickly.

Strong Motivation to Learn: This factor stems most obviously from the need for English in employment activities. Not all occupations require workers to be able to speak and write excellent English.³ Although white-collar jobs frequently require a good command of the language, less motivation to learn is manifest among blue-collar workers.

Age: Age appears to play an important role in the refugee's acquisition of the language. Of the people in this study,⁴ it is clear that the older the person is, the more difficult the learning is for him. Five people who are above the age of 30 encountered great difficulties in studying English. A 40 year old man explains in Vietnamese:

"Believe it or not, I keep forgetting whatever I've just learnt at school. It took me two complete weeks to learn the verb 'to be.' Besides, I find it almost impossible to speak clearly and understand English. Perhaps I am getting old; therefore I can no longer articulate my tongue as easily as the time I was young..."

There are, of course, many other factors which facilitate or impede the acquisition of the language. The "home language" is an evident example: of the four people who show a remarkable linguistic ability, three are actually living in "English-speaking homes." The factors in learning the language (i.e., linguistic ability, previous knowledge of English, age, motivation to learn and many others) appear to be inter-related. None of the interviewees isolated one factor from the others. Less than 40% of the respondents in this study felt that they had acquired a good command of the language.

Making Friends in America

It would be hard to think that a refugee has successfully adjusted to the American way of life when most of his friends are Vietnamese and very few are American. In my opinion, the degree to which the refugee is considered to be successful in his adjustment or his assimilation into the American way of life could be measured by the number of intimate relationships and friendships he has with Americans. In reality, the refugee's contacts with the other Americans are very important to his americanization, as Fairchild (1947:117) expresses:

"The wider the variety and the more intense the degree of the associations which actually prevail, the more rapid and thorough, by and large, will be the assimilative process."

Undoubtedly, the refugee's making friends in America is necessary for his adjustment to American societal patterns.

In the course of this study, the researcher, with the help of assistants, has found many factors which clearly create serious obstacles for the refugee in his attempt to make friends in America.⁵ The lack of funds, for instance, prevents entertaining and socializing, and anti-foreign feelings are another example. As discussed earlier, cultural differences also make it difficult for Vietnamese refugees to forge friendships with Americans. Two more factors warranting attention concern language and time.

Language Difficulty: In order to become friends, two people frequently need to be able to talk to each other. But how can they understand one another if they talk in different languages? (I mean here, of course, that one's language is unknown to another.) It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for Vietnamese who can barely speak English to make friends with Americans. Of our group, it is surprising to find that even though eight people feel they have a good command of the language, only three feel that they have little or no difficulty at all in making friends; the others, in contrast, find it very hard to make friends because, they said, of the language difficulty.

friends; the others, in contrast, find it very hard to make friends because, they said, of the language difficulty.

Lack of Time: Of the group in this study, the lack of time is the most important factor impeding the refugee's making friends in America. Most of the people have to go to work and/or to school which takes up all of their time. During the interviews, many complained that they have no time at all to do anything. One woman writes: "I cannot afford even the time to go shopping. Making friends with the Americans seems to be unreal..."

Making a Living

According to Donald Peterson Kent (1953:71),

making a living greatly determines the success of the refugee's adjustment to the American society. He explains:

"Economic adjustment is pivotal to the entire process of assimilation, not because a receptive psychology on the part of the newcomer frequently depends upon it but also because many social contacts with the native-born are either by-products of or promoted by a satisfactory economic adjustment."

All of the refugees in this study group believe that acquisition of the language and economic adjustment are the most important factors determining the success of their assimilation to the American society. In the author's belief, the economic factor does indeed play a very crucial role in the refugee's adjustment since the economic success would certainly give the refugee a certain feeling of satisfaction and security in his new life. The feelings of satisfaction and security would then enhance the process of americanization.

From the responses to the questionnaire, the following factors which might impede economic adjustment arise:

"In this country, if you cannot speak English, you are like a deaf musician."

Social Status: Of the group, there is one doctor who is still unemployed even though he has been living in San Francisco since 1975. The problem is that he's afraid other occupations would lower his social status. He complained: "Over in Vietnam, I was a doctor. Here in the United States, can you (the interviewer) imagine that they (the Americans) 'force' me to become a clerk for a certain bank? It's an insult..." About 20% of the group feel the same thing even though they now have jobs. A former lawyer expressed her feeling:

"I actually feel very bad now that I am a teller in this bank...For five years, I do not want to meet my former confreres lest they might despise me. I have accepted this job (as a teller) at my great reluctance..."

Language Difficulty: The language factor seems to be one of the key determinants in the refugee's adjustment to American society as a whole. Twelve people of the group, in responding to the questionnaire, write that they have been denied the "good" jobs in the past because of their handicap in English. ⁶ A refugee commented: "In this country, if you cannot speak English, you are like a deaf musician. The situation is just hopeless..."

Prejudices: Of the group in this study, the feeling of being persecuted or of being victims of prejudice is found most often among those who continued their education after high school. In their occupations, the others think there are very few or no prejudices at all. Nevertheless, some people have left their jobs due to the prejudices they found among the co-workers, the supervisors, the managers and even the bosses. One engineer told the author:

"I had to leave my job because of too much pressure from the administrators...I feel that I was looked down upon and persecuted. I was going like a dog in this company; still the managers kept complaining that I was lazy. Worse, all the supervisors, but one, took advantage of me and got all my good credits...It was impossible to have any promotion.... The Americans are always bosses; the Vietnamese, slaves for life..."⁷

Besides these factors, one can find many others such as the transfer of skills at the professional level, the difficulties encountered in interviewing, applying for jobs, and licensing restrictions.

Social Adjustment

The refugee's social adjustment implies many meanings: his way of dressing, the foods he eats, his house...In this paper, social adjustment will be discussed as the refugee's participation and integration to the American community where he lives.

Social adjustment is an important factor which greatly reflects the process of assimilation for the Vietnamese refugee. Social adjustment can be considered a valid index of the refugee's assimilation: it explains how successful the refugee's participation and integration in the American community has been. The refugee's success in this aspect means that he is at ease among Americans; feels, acts and think like an American; and that Americans would see him as an American, not as a Vietnamese, in every respect. Undoubtedly, if we are to think in terms of absolute success, none of the refugees would be successful in

regard to a "perfect" social adjustment. Perhaps it is best to think in terms of relative success. Even then, because of many difficulties, many refugees still find it hard to adjust socially to American society. The reasons for these difficulties are many. As mentioned in "Making a Living," personal attitudes and status perception play a part in the refugee's social adjustment, as well as:

Language Difficulty: Fourteen people in the group find it extremely difficult for them to adjust socially to the American way of life due to their handicap in English. A former soldier explained:

"I tried once to go to a meeting of an organization. But heck! I was in a big trouble: I could not understand anything they said. I was just smiling every time people asked me questions. Some guys got really mad because I did not say anything. From that time on, I don't want to go anywhere..."

Great Mobility Among the Refugees: Joining an organization takes a person quite some time. In addition, it usually requires him to live in permanent quarters. The reason is clear: it would be very difficult for anyone to join any organization if one keeps shifting to new communities. (Note: The exception could be found among many professional groups. In the sense used here, "organization" refers to something similar to a community.) Unfortunately, this is a common case among single Vietnamese refugees. Of the group, 14 people had moved more than six times and none of the refugees in this study has lived in one place for the last five years.

As was stated at the beginning of this paper, "...command of English is basic to the entire process of americanization." Language was a recurring factor of concern to refugees in this study - in making friends, making a living and in adjusting to American society. It is by far the most visible obstacle to the assimilation of refugees into the dominant society. A far less visible, but no less crucial, element in the adjustment of Vietnamese refugees to America is the different "perceptions of reality" held by Vietnamese and Americans. This factor was also evidenced throughout the study, from different cultural interests to differences in sources from which personal satisfaction is derived. Needless to say, the writer has intentionally overlooked many important factors during his discussion. Many of his judgments and opinions are very personal, subjective, and therefore possibly false. He does not pretend that his judgments are value-free and right in every respect.

Since this is just a case study of 20 single refugees living in San Francisco, the author has tried to generalize ideas in regard to the Vietnamese community across the country as a whole. He has occasionally, in spite of himself, made some generalizations which should be criticized and verified in every detail. However, due to the lack of time and funds, it is impossible to fulfill such a great task.

Nevertheless, the writer feels that he has somehow succeeded in conveying some of the refugees' feelings, attitudes, values and ideas toward the American people. The 20 people in this study cannot be considered as a large group at all. But, in certain respects, this "very small" group does reflect the Vietnamese community in the United States of America as a whole. Hopefully, by reading this short paper, the reader will gain some general insight into the feelings and opinions a Vietnamese refugee might have in regard to the American society.

NOTES

- 1 The exact number of the refugees living in the U.S. and in every American city, town and place is unknown, if not impossible to determine. This can be explained by the following facts:
 - a. Since the Vietnamese refugees have just arrived in the last five years, they are not in the 1970 U.S. Census.
 - b. The refugees keep "pouring into" the U.S. each day, preventing any attempt to count them.
 - c. The great mobility of refugees from state to state, city to city, adds to the difficulty in making an accurate count.
 - d. Many refugees refused to or simply did not report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the beginning of each year.
- 2 A person with linguistic ability simply means that he can easily pick up a foreign language other than Vietnamese. A person who has general linguistic knowledge can be considered to have a linguistic ability.
- 3 One or two examples might be helpful: A doctor does need, for instance, a good command of English, while a waiter does not.
- 4 The age range of the people in this study is from 18-60.
- 5 Men seem to find it more difficult to make friends with the Americans than the women. Of the group, there are nine people who said they have (i) an equal number of American and Vietnamese friends, (ii) more American friends than the Vietnamese. Moreover, of these nine people, eight are women.
- 6 A "good" job for the Vietnamese refugee does not mean only that which makes a handsome amount of money. As a matter of fact, a "good" job could be defined as one that gives the refugee a sense of higher status in society, while at the same time providing him with enough money to feel secure financially.
- 7 Naturally, not all the intellectual refugees would have the same feeling as this engineer.

COOPERATIVE HOUSING:

AN OVERVIEW AND CASE STUDY

Ruth M. Gupta and Pamela P. Johnson

Presently working in the Bank of America's Urban Affairs office, Ruth Gupta is an Urban Studies major graduating in the Spring of 1981. Working with the United States General Accounting Office, Pamela Johnson is a cooperative education student in Urban Studies, graduating in the Fall of 1981. This paper was researched and written in the Fall of 1979 for Dr. Norm Schneider's special topic course in community enterprise.

The original intent of this paper was an in-depth case study of the St. Francis Square Apartments, Inc. cooperative housing development located at 10 Bertie Minor Lane, San Francisco, California. After our first interview with the Project Manager, it became evident that we needed a basic understanding of the structure of cooperative housing in the Bay Area. Consequently, the scope of this paper encompasses an overview of cooperative housing as a form of community development and focuses on St. Francis Square as an example of a successful development in this area.

Early in our research, it became clear that cooperative housing may have a large role to play in the solution of the housing crisis. Assuming a continuance of the traditional value of homeownership in American culture, and the decreasing ability for most to realize this goal, the structural framework of housing cooperatives may provide a viable alternative avenue for pursuit.

The legal and organizational framework of cooperative housing allows for the provision of home ownership in the context of limited financial resources. For the past 20 years, U.S. housing policy has encouraged the creation of various housing programs which indirectly subsidize cooperative developments.

In San Francisco, the majority of these programs have been used as a part of the Urban Renewal program. Since St. Francis Square lies in the Western Addition Redevelopment Area, we have included a summary of this area.

There is a growing consensus among the actors involved in the supply side of the housing industry, namely bankers, developers, construction companies and realtors, that a housing crisis is sweeping our nation.

The use of the term "housing crisis" is not unfamiliar to anyone who has studied the American housing scene. The preamble to the 1949 Housing Act espoused a National Housing Goal "of a decent home and healthy surroundings for every American family." In 1967, President Johnson, aware that this goal remained unfulfilled, appointed a committee chaired by Edgar F. Kaiser, to recommend programs that would meet this objective. The recommendations of the Kaiser Committee were incorporated into the 1968 Housing Act. With reference to "a decent home...for every American family" the Housing Act acknowledged that "this goal has not been fully realized for many of the nation's lower income families" and determined "that it can be substantially achieved within the next decade by the construction or rehabilitation of 26 million housing units, six million of these for low and moderate income families."

Unfortunately, a decade later this goal remains unmet. Perhaps even more crucial, however, is that the cost of housing has risen so sharply that more and more Americans are priced out of the housing market.

In 1976 the average cost of a new home in California was \$65,000 and the cost of an existing home was \$48,000. In October, 1979, the average price of a new home was \$108,000 and an existing home was \$85,000. To afford the downpayment and mortgage on an \$85,000 home requires an annual income of about \$40,000, which excludes over 80% of California's population. Only five years ago, 60% of the population could qualify to buy an existing home.

The problem in the rental market is even worse. Construction of multi-family dwellings has virtually ceased in California. In 1972, 917,000 units were built; by 1975 that number had dropped to 208,000. Most of these units are available only to middle and upper income persons. The construction industry reports that building multi-family units would not be profitable unless rents out of the reach of most Californians were charged. Thus, the nation, and particularly California, is faced with serious problems on both the demand and supply side of the housing industry. As a result, attention has begun to focus on alternative vehicles to the traditional single family home or apartment building. One alternative is the development of cooperative housing - long popular in New York City but largely ignored by the rest of the country. In November of 1979, however, Califor-

nia Federal, the nation's largest federal savings and loan association, sponsored the "Cooperative Housing Conference" in San Francisco. The Conference attracted over 500 individuals including government officials, legislators, mortgage bankers, developers, realtors and financial consultants. Part of this new interest in California has been sparked by recent favorable legislation pertaining to cooperative housing. Speaking at the Conference, Mayor George Latiimer of St. Paul, Minnesota, referred to the tenant population as a "sleeping dragon." He also forecasted a "potential consumer uprising" among tenants and potential homeowners. Californians have begun to experience the rumblings of this "uprising." Rent control initiatives have appeared on the ballots of several cities and the construction industry maintains that even the "spectre of rent control" has a negative effect on their industry.

Recent trends toward condominium conversion in multi-family dwellings have also tightened the rental market to the extent that the vacancy rate in San Francisco is less than 2%. Last, but not least, on the demand side in California is the fact that the State's population is growing by about 150,000 new residents per year. At the same time, the average household size is decreasing as senior citizens, couples without children and single individuals compete for housing.

On the supply side of the industry, developers cite government regulations, especially environmental impact limitations, and local "no growth" control policies as major culprits in the spiralling costs of development. These, coupled with rent control, place disincentives on the industry to increase production.

The above summary is necessarily brief and has not included a review of existing housing, its conditions and degree of rehabilitation requirements. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a crisis does exist and that feasible alternatives to the construction and financing of either single-family or multi-family dwellings should be given every consideration. Cooperative housing is one of the alternatives to pursue.

What is Cooperative Housing?

The term "cooperative housing" refers to the joint ownership and operation of a housing development by those who live in it. A cooperative is formed

by the creation of a corporation which owns all of the property in the development. Its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws are specially designed so that the corporation can be owned and operated by its members.

Each participant in a housing cooperative (hereinafter referred to as a cooperator) must purchase a share of the corporation's stock which entitles him or her to (1) a proprietary lease to a designated unit in return for payment of a monthly maintenance charge, and (2) a voice in the operation of the development, either directly as a member of the elected Board of Directors, or indirectly as a voter. The law permits only the elected Board of Directors to officially act for the corporation.

"Stock cooperatives were used to avoid rent control on the East Coast in the 1920's."

In contrast to the traditional homeowner, condominium owner or any holder of real property, a cooperator does not own a fee simple title to the land under his unit, but rather owns a portion of the cooperative organization itself. In turn, the corporation holds title to the dwelling units and directly assumes the mortgage, tax and other obligations necessary to finance and operate the development. Each cooperator signs an Occupancy Agreement with the cooperative corporation. The Agreement sets forth the monthly "maintenance" or "carrying" charges for which each cooperator is liable. These charges encompass payments towards the blanket mortgage of the development, utilities, taxes, insurance and the salaries of hired personnel. As a result of this organizational structure, each cooperator is relieved from the necessity of becoming an individual mortgagor under a mortgage contract. However, each member is entitled to a proportionate share of the real estate taxes and mortgage interest paid by the corporation for use on personal income tax statements.

In addition to the advantage of income tax deductions, there are several other benefits to participation in a housing cooperative. The low to moderate wage earner, for whom home ownership is often unaffordable, can escape the inherent insecurities of the landlord-tenant relationship by joining a limited equity cooperative housing corporation. (An explanation of "limited equity" vs. "stock" cooperatives is in the following section.) Since the cooperator is protected from arbitrary eviction and can actively participate in the operation of the cooperative, there exists an element of homeownership, so highly valued in traditional American culture. There is also the advantage, shared by condominium owners, of freedom from maintenance work, although the cooperative may decide to perform these services itself to reduce the monthly maintenance charges.

There are two potential disadvantages to participation in a housing cooperative. The first applies to both stock and limited equity cooperatives. Since development of the cooperative is financed by a blanket mortgage, each cooperator is financially interdependent on the other stockholders. Therefore, if in the initial stages, units (shares) go unsold or, in the later stages, other cooperators fail to pay their maintenance charges, the burdens on the original and non-delinquent cooperators may be sufficient to force foreclosure and liquidation and result in uncontrollable personal losses. Generally, this can be avoided by the corporate purchase of adequate insurance coverage.

The second disadvantage relates to the transference of ownership in limited equity cooperatives. By definition, appreciation of equity is limited according to the rules and regulations set forth in the by-laws. However, over a period of years, even this limited build-up of equity may amount to a sum of money which is over and above the financial capabilities of most low and moderate income individuals. (This problem is discussed in the next section and in the section on recent legislation in the State of California.)

Although stock and limited equity cooperatives are both corporations formed primarily for the purpose of providing housing to their stockholders, the factors distinguishing them lie in their equity earning capacities and the transfer value of each.

As with more traditional forms of home ownership, the owner-occupant of a housing cooperative is

entitled to the equity gained on his initial investment, which can be realized by the sale of the owner's individual housing unit. The amount of the sale, known as the transfer value, in stock projects is regulated only by what the market will bear. In limited equity projects, this transfer value is severely restricted.

Stock cooperatives have historically benefitted middle and upper income groups; they were used to avoid rent control ordinances on the East Coast in the 1920's, and have been used recently in California to circumvent the stringent regulations imposed on condominiums. Recently, many municipal ordinances have been enacted to place controls on proposed stock cooperatives which parallel those restricting condominiums. One such ordinance forbids the conversion of existing rental units to stock cooperatives unless the owner agrees to construct additional affordable rental housing in the area, while another requires a fraction of the units to be set aside for low and moderate income groups.

Limited equity cooperatives have been historically targeted to low and moderate income groups, by purposely linking the amount of equity gained to a cost-of-living or cost-of-construction index. The transfer value is determined by adding the original share cost and the owner's equity which is the accumulated principal paid on the blanket mortgage. This amount is then increased by one of the indices outlined above, or by one which is specified in the by-laws of the corporation. In the event that the individual cooperator cannot find a buyer for his unit, the corporation is restricted to sell the vacated unit at the transfer value only.

California Legislation and Federal Assistance Programs

In November of 1979 there were approximately 160 cooperative housing developments (25,000 units) in California, comprising less than one percent of the state's housing inventory of 8 million units. However, as we have discussed earlier, cooperative housing has come under the spotlight and recent California legislation is beginning to pave the way for future development. Although much of the attention of bankers and developers has been focused on stock cooperative construction and conversion, limited equity cooperatives are also being studied more closely because of their potential to harness considerable amounts of federal dollars and also serve the needs of low and moderate income individuals. The following is an overview of recent California legislation.

Amendment to California Financial Code (Section 7153.4 and 2136): Effective January 1, 1978, the California Financial Code was amended to permit state chartered banks and savings and loan associations to provide financing for purchasers of leasehold interests in individual cooperative housing units. The Code allows individual amortized loans for up to 30 years in an amount up to 80% of the stock certificate and lease. This applies to stock cooperatives only. Previously, mortgage financing was only available to the cooperative as a whole in the form of the underlying "blanket" mortgage and the purchase of stock was only available through commercial loans. The amendment was intended to apply to existing cooperatives, however the language is sufficiently vague as to apply to conversions and new construction.

Amendment to the Homeowners Act of 1933: On October 15, 1978, the Homeowners Act of 1933 was amended to authorize federally chartered savings and loan associations to make loans secured by individual units in cooperative housing projects. On August 2, 1979, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board adopted final regulations to implement this authority and the regulations became effective on September 6, 1979.

Now recognized as real estate loans rather than commercial loans, the amendment authorized cooperative unit loans up to 95% of value. Although HUD has been authorized to insure individual loans on stock cooperatives since 1974, such a program has yet to be implemented. However, the U.S. Senate is currently reviewing a proposed amendment to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act to allow federal savings and loans to sell mortgages on cooperative housing units to the Mortgage Corporation. The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) is also reviewing its charter and regulations to determine whether it may purchase these mortgages. The opening up of the secondary mortgage market is crucial to the re-sale of cooperative units, especially for low and moderate income individuals.

SB 832: This bill became effective on January 1, 1980. Prior to its passage, cooperative housing conversions were subject to less stringent regulations than condominium conversions. Specifically, the bill amends the Map Act, which requires public hearings on land divisions which have already been approved by the State Department of Real Estate, to include cooperative conversions. However, S.B. 832 does *not* apply to limited equity cooperatives.

AB 333: This bill became effective January 1, 1980.

The California Department of Housing Community Development (HCD) is authorized to set up a Homeownership Assistance Fund to provide loans to developers of low and moderate income housing. HCD is also authorized to provide financial assistance, directly or through a mortgage lender, to eligible tenants of rental housing or mobile home parks which are to be converted to condominiums or cooperatives. The latter authorization is intended to attack the problem of displacement which often occurs during conversion.

AB 1364: This bill became effective January 1, 1980 and is specifically directed at limited equity housing cooperatives with the following provisions: (a) the California Housing Finance Agency is authorized to insure loans for limited equity housing cooperatives; (b) local redevelopment agencies are required to give preference to limited equity housing cooperatives when requested by a project area committee; (c) "limited equity" is defined as follows: The aggregate down payments of the initial purchasers may not exceed 3% of the greater of the cost or fair value of the project. Upon resale, the original cooperator may receive the "transfer value" which represents the downpayment price, the cost of any authorized improvements made by the cooperator and accumulated interest or an inflation allowance not to exceed 10% per year. The cooperator is therefore *not* entitled to realize profit based upon any increase in the market value of the land and improvements from the date of original purchase.

AB 109: This bill became effective January 1, 1980. A.B. 109 contains two provisions which relate to cooperative housing: (a) non-profit organizations which receive federal monies to develop housing cooperatives and which qualify for welfare tax exemptions will no longer be disqualified from receiving the welfare tax exemption from property taxation, and (b) a change in ownership is defined and also the requirements for the individual transference of stock.

The Nixon Administration's 1973 moratorium on housing suspended many of the subsidy programs which aided in the development of low to moderate income housing units. Four such programs were instrumental in the development of many of the Bay Area's cooperative projects.

The first legislative assistance was provided for under Section 213 of the 1950 National Housing Act. Section 213 provided Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance for privately origi-

nated loans for new construction, rehabilitation and acquisition of cooperative housing projects to be occupied by members of non-profit cooperative corporations. In most cases, Section 213 benefitted middle income persons.

The Housing Act of 1954 authorized Section 220, which provided aid in eliminating slums and blighted conditions and preventing the deterioration of residential property. Section 220 provided HUD insured mortgages for the rehabilitation of existing structures and new construction in an urban renewal area, an urban redevelopment project, or an area receiving assistance as a result of a natural disaster. This program is generally used for market rate housing.

Sections 221(d) (3) BMIR (Below Market Interest Rate) and 221 (d) (4) were also authorized by the 1954 Housing Act. These programs were designed to meet the needs of low to moderate income families who were displaced as a result of government action (e.g., urban renewal). Under both programs, loans for the construction or substantial rehabilitation of multi-family rental or cooperative projects are insured by HUD. Non-profit organizations are restricted to 221(d) (3) mortgage insurance, while 221(d) (4) mortgages are targeted to profit oriented sponsors. Formerly, 221 (d) (3) projects could qualify for below market interest rates with the ultimate source of loans being the Government National Mortgage Association. Although below market interest rates are no longer available for new projects under this program, however, they may qualify for assistance under the Section 8 program.

Created by the 1968 amendment to the National Housing Act, Section 236 sought to replace the 221 program by subsidizing stockholders whose cooperatives obtained mortgages from the private sector, with FHA approved interest rates. The cooperative must still meet the requirements set forth in the 221 programs, but Section 236 sought to secure mortgage funds from private institutions, rather than the Government National Mortgage Association.

In 1973, these housing programs were suspended. Since then cooperative housing developments have been facilitated through the Section 8 program. Section 8 guarantees maintenance charge subsidies to qualified (low income) individuals which, theoretically, encourages private and non-profit development through guaranteed occupancy. Bay Area cooperatives which have taken advantage of this program are Savo

Island in Berkeley (85% Section 8) and Oak Center Homes, Inc. in Oakland (100% Section 8).

Redevelopment in the Western Addition

In 1948, federal law established Redevelopment Agencies which were responsible for economic development and revitalization of certain city neighborhoods designated by local municipal governing councils. In constructing and implementing long-term revitalization plans, the Redevelopment Agencies were required to purchase all land in the designated area, clear it, and sell it to commercial, industrial or housing developers provided that their proposals complied with existing redevelopment plans.

Acquisition of land often required the Agency to exercise its powers of eminent domain, which has resulted in the forced relocation of many residents of the area. Moreover, property values tend to increase after redevelopment (the intended effect), which can cause further displacement of residents.

In 1962, the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (LWU) Longshoremen's Redevelopment Corporation proposed plans for a housing cooperative - St. Francis Square - in a redevelopment area known as the Western Addition. Designated as such in 1948, this 385 acre site in the north-east quadrant of San Francisco was sub-divided into area A-1, and A-2 where the second part of the redevelopment is still under way. Together these areas contain six cooperative housing projects; one is a stock cooperative, five are limited equity cooperatives (of which St. Francis is the oldest) and two more are in the planning stages.

Bound by Post Street to the north, Franklin Street to the east, Eddy Street to the south, and Broderick Street to the west, the A-1 area contains 108 acres of land designated for residential, public, commercial and industrial purposes. Implementation of the redevelopment plans began in 1956, and were fully completed in 1973. Prior to redevelopment, 40% of this acreage was used for residential purposes; after implementation, 27% of the land was used residentially. Of the 1,853 new housing units constructed in the A-1 area, 35% are federally subsidized for low to moderate income groups. They are: St. Francis Square, the area's only cooperative with 299 units financed under Section 221 (d) (3) BMIR of the National Housing Act; Jones Memorial Homes, financed under Section 202 which contains 32 units of elderly housing; Midtown Park, 140 units originally financed

under Section 213 in 1964, then purchased by the city to provide housing for low to moderate income people. Lastly, there is Western Addition Park, financed under Section 236, which contains 183 units of low to moderate income elderly housing. The remaining 65% was developed as market-rate housing with either Section 200 or conventional financing. The Redevelopment Agency has been criticized for granting 65% of new construction to market rate housing developers in an area which was largely considered low income.

At this time, an effective relocation plan did not exist for displacees of area A-1; those displaced were awarded preferential treatment in the newly constructed housing units. The cost of the new housing coupled with the lengthiness of construction (in some cases, the land had lain vacant for five years) prevented most of the displacees from returning to A-1.

The redevelopment plan was also responsible for the development of the Japanese Trade and Cultural Center, which provides a showcase for Japanese merchandise and center for Japanese business and government offices, and also the development of the new St. Mary's Cathedral. Upon completion of redevelopment, the assessed value of area A-1 increased 900%, from \$2,849,000 in 1948 to its present day \$28,011,000. Despite this increase in property value, the area lost 31% of its population. (Indications are that part of this population shifted to area A-2.)

Implementation of the second phase of redevelopment in the Western Addition, the area A-2 plan, began in 1966 and has yet to be completed. Encompassing 277 acres, the area is bound by Bush Street to the north, Van Ness Avenue to the east, Grove Street to the south, and its westernmost boundary is St. Joseph Street.

Housing development has taken a largely different turn in this area. In contrast to A-1, emphasis is being placed on development of 4,116 new housing units (69% to be low and moderate income) and retention and revitalization of 3,100 existing units. Moreover, priority is being given to sponsors/developers from the Western Addition and, if possible, direct rehousing of residents is being sought.

Of 2,864 low to moderate income housing units planned, 74% are Section 236, 8% are Section 221(d) (3), with the remainder (18%) being Section 8 in conjunction with 221(d) (4), 231 or 202 assistance. The remaining 31% of market rate housing is conventional financing, or Section 220.

This area contains four cooperatives, two of which were inspired by St. Francis Square and financed under Section 236:

Freedom West - Built in 1974 as a limited equity cooperative and sponsored by the Bethel AME Church, this development contains 382 units.

Loren Miller - Built in 1972, this limited equity cooperative development contains 107 garden apartments.

In A-2 residential land acreage is projected to increase by 26%, while land used for streets and industrial purposes is expected to decrease by 3% and 6% respectively. A 29% increase in population is projected, and assessed value of area A-2 is projected to rise 188% from \$30,228,000 before redevelopment to \$56,900,000 after redevelopment.

St. Francis Square Case Study

Situated on eight acres in Western Addition Redevelopment area A-1, St. Francis Square Apartments, Inc. is bordered by Webster, O'Farrell, Ellis, Laguna and Geary Streets in the heart of San Francisco. Within walking distance of the project are public and private schools, shopping facilities, churches, medical facilities, as well as other professional offices. The Civic Center is 15 minutes away by foot. Public transportation provides access to San Francisco's financial district within 20 minutes. By automobile, Geary Boulevard, one of the city's main arteries, borders the project to the north and provides easy access to other parts of the city.

The complex itself contains 299 units, in 12 three-story wood frame stucco buildings. The award-winning design consists of three sets of four rectangular apartment buildings, each one of the four facing inward and surrounding a semi-private, landscaped open space. Also incorporated into the plan are protected play yards for children, parking areas, and pedestrian walkways and malls. Streets, pathways, as well as the three squares themselves are named after ships, derived from the affiliation with the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. All first floor units have patios; second and third floor units have sun decks.

There are 14 one-bedroom units, 107 two-bedroom units, 3 three-bedroom units with one bath, and 175 three-bedroom units with two baths. All are fur-

nished with electric ranges, refrigerators, garbage disposals, gas wall furnaces and wall-to-wall carpeting. Three coin laundry facilities are also provided.

The Square's full time carpenter, maintenance worker and gardener, along with the volunteer co-operators, maintain the beauty of the complex. Amidst the furor of traffic, noise and congestion of the surrounding commercial areas, the complex provides a transition from this atmosphere to one of a well designed, peaceful landscaped interior open space.

In 1962 the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union and the Pacific Maritime Association established the ILWU Redevelopment Corporation in order to build a cooperative housing project in the Western Addition. As Lou Goldblatt, ILWU Secretary/Treasurer and prominent participant in the development of St. Francis Square said at the dedication ceremonies held in August, 1963, "Its purpose was to build a consumer controlled, non-profit, democratic community and to build a fully integrated project which would represent all races and groups in the community."

Having chosen a site south of Geary Boulevard, the Union applied to the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) for the land. The cost of the land proved to be the subject of considerable debate. The SFRA claimed it was bound by law to charge the full market rate. The union, through its president, Harry Bridges, petitioned the Board of Supervisors to direct SFRA to reduce the price by 50% in accordance with a new provision in the 1961 Housing Act. The Union was unsuccessful and paid the market rate of \$2.97 per square foot for a total of \$976,585.50. At the same time, the SFRA appealed to HUD for the ability to write down land cost of non-profit redevelopment sponsors. Eventually, this led to a national policy which now permits redevelopment agencies to sell land to qualified sponsors at the rate of fifty cents per square foot. (Land in the premium areas of San Francisco goes for approximately \$8.00 per square foot.)

While land negotiations were being conducted, the Union applied to HUD for mortgage insurance at a below market interest rate. The Bank of California agreed to issue a mortgage loan in the amount of \$5,360,000 at an interest rate of 5%, provided that it could be assured of a buyer in the secondary mortgage market. Under Section 221(d) (3), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) issued mortgage in-

surance to the project and the FNMA agreed to purchase the loan from BankCal, subsidizing the loan down to 3 1/8%.

Originally, Section 221(d) (3) had no provisions for the earning of minimum equity, nor did it allow for a cooperator's income to rise over the FHA established limit. In short, from the Union's perspective, the former provision eliminated any potential homeownership value, and the latter could lead to instability and rapid turnover in the Square. Moreover, this amounted to the antithesis of the sponsors' goals, namely, to provide a sense of homeownership free of the inherent insecurities of the landlord-tenant relationship. To overcome these restraints, the ILWU lobbied HUD/FHA headquarters in Washington, D. C. and was successful in altering the 221(d) (3) program.

When the mortgage was finally obtained, the seed capital was refunded to the Union. However, \$400,000 that they were entitled to under the law was rechanelled back to the Square for landscape purposes.

In September, 1963, the 299 units of St. Francis Square were ready for occupancy. Eligibility for entry into the development was formulated by the ILWU Redevelopment Corporation, acting as the interim Board of Directors, and by Hal Dunleavy and Associates. Since the development was FHA insured, income ceilings were included as part of the criteria for entry. The downpayment required for the initial cooperators was the cost of the share price, as Table I illustrates.

Once the Square was 97% occupied, the Corporation relieved the sponsors of the management and operation of the project. At this point, the residents assumed sole responsibility and proceeded to organize the cooperative in accordance with the by-laws.

A five-member Board of Directors was elected to carry out the following duties:

1. Solidify criteria for eligibility into the corporation;
2. Establish monthly maintenance charges prescribed in the Occupancy Agreement and based on the annual budget;
3. Outline rules and regulations pertaining to the use and occupancy of the premises consistent with

TABLE I

Cost of Share Price: St. Francis Square Apartments, Inc.

No. of rooms in dwelling	Share Price	Estimated Monthly Maintenance Charge	Estimated Monthly Personal Benefit Expense	Estimated Monthly Housing Expense
A - 4 ½	\$410	\$ 84	\$4.17	\$ 88.17
B - 6	510	125	4.90	129.90
C - 6	550	127	5.15	132.15
D - 7 ½	610	140	5.65	145.65

TABLE II

Budget Expenditures: St. Francis Square Apartments, Inc.

Expense	1979		1980		% change
	\$ amount	(% of total)	\$ amount	(% of total)	
Administrative	\$ 77,900	(9.6)	\$ 84,300	(9.8)	+1.5
Operating	251,420	(31.0)	291,400	(33.8)	+8.8
Taxes and Insurance	61,200	(7.6)	65,200	(7.6)	+0.0
Repair and Maintenance	133,600	(16.5)	150,500	(17.4)	+5.7
Reserves	48,200	(5.9)	36,000	(4.2)	-3.0
Mortgage	237,300	(29.3)	235,300	(27.3)	-7.0
Total	\$ 809,620	(100%)	\$ 862,700	(100%)	

the by-laws and Regulatory Agreement; and

4. Establish additional monthly carrying charges to be paid, at the option of the Corporation, by families whose incomes exceed the limitations established by the FHA.

The principle of a cooperative is not only to provide housing for its members, but also to elicit their active participation in the decision-making process. In St. Francis Square, this participation has taken the form of serving in an official capacity, such as board or committee membership. Many of the cooperators have served in several different capacities over the years, such as Paulette Grigsby, the present Project Manager, who has served on the Board of Directors in the past.

Cooperators are encouraged to present any policy issue to the Board of Directors or the committees, who then formulate key issues into referenda which are then voted on by the entire membership. One of the key issues to be formulated annually is the budget.

The budget making process, conducted by members of the Finance Committee, is an attempt to arrive at a monthly maintenance fee within each shareholder's means, while also preserving the solvency of the corporation. The Finance Committee recommends the budget to the Board of Directors who must take into consideration the cooperators' investments and the financial and physical integrity of the Square itself. Money collected through the monthly maintenance fees not only pays for utilities for the individual units, but must provide for a plethora of expenses. These expenses can be broken into six groups:

1. *Administrative*, which include the managerial offices' salaries and benefits, legal fees, private guard service for the Square, and provisions for bad debts. As shown in Table II, the budget allotment for administration is projected to rise 1.5% in 1980.

2. *Operating expenses*, which include all utilities for housing units, along with janitorial staff salaries and benefits. This allotment is projected to increase 8.8%, largely due to the rise in gas and electricity costs in the coming year.

3. *Taxes and insurance*, which include city licensing fees, insurance and property taxes. No percentage increase is projected for the coming year.

4. *Repair and maintenance*, which includes grounds, repair and carpenter's salaries and benefits, and supplies and materials for these maintenance duties. A 5.7% increase is projected in the coming year.

5. *Financial expenses - reserves*, which includes money kept for general operating expenses, replacements and painting. A 3% decrease is projected.

6. *Mortgage interest and principal*. This allotment is expected to decrease 7% in 1980.

Being non-profit, the sole revenue earned by St. Francis Square Apts., Inc. is that percentage of the maintenance charges which is left over after the blanket mortgage payment has been met. The rise in maintenance fees is directly correlated with the rise in the operating expenses outlined in the budget. The Table III illustrates the rise in maintenance fees for the life of the project.

This amounts to an average increase in maintenance fees of 4% per year. In contrast, the maintenance charge is expected to rise 5.5% in 1980, 3.7% of which will be allocated to natural gas. Quentin Baker, who serves as Treasurer in the cooperative, predicts that the price of natural gas will rise 60% in 1980, and recommends development of a long-range comprehensive heat conservation plan in conjunction with a solar energy project for heating water. The Square has proposed such plans to the federal and state governments, but none have been accepted thus far.

As with any private corporation, St. Francis Square has exclusionary membership selection rights. The selling of membership certificates (stock) is initiated by the individual vacating cooperator. Once a prospective buyer is found, he must be approved by the Board of Directors before the stock can be transferred. This is known as the Corporation's "right of first refusal."

Should the Board reject the prospective buyer, they must provide an alternate selected from their pool of applicants. Therefore, not only is the vacating cooperator guaranteed a buyer, but the cooperative has control over the selection of its prospective members.

In selecting members for the cooperative, the Square has striven to maintain a racial balance within

each of the three individual squares, as well as the project as a whole. Originally, the Square had a racial composition of 54% white, 21% black, 15.5% Asian and 9.5% "mixed." Over the years, this changed to 33% white, 33% black and 33% Asian. The corporation has gone to considerable effort to maintain this balance.

Because of the emphasis on family activities, family composition carries considerable weight in the selection process. Young families are preferred over childless couples, singles and senior citizens.

Desire to be active in the cooperative's recreational and managerial functions is also an important criterion. The sense of shared community in St. Francis Square can be illustrated by the variety of ongoing social activities that have been patronized and expanded on over the years.

In outlining the criteria, the Project Manager stated that they have encountered problems recruiting potential cooperators using the above criteria. Specifically, young, low to moderate income families

have difficulty in obtaining the amount of the transfer value required for entry into the cooperative. (A problem discussed earlier in this paper.)

"Young, low-to-moderate income families have difficulty obtaining the amount of transfer value required."

A report on the success of St. Francis Square would not be complete without mentioning the myriad of social and political activities that have served to unite the Square's residents. The on-going nature of these activities illustrate the strong sense of community that pervades the Square. The following is a sampling of the kinds of events which have become an annual tradition and an opportunity for community interaction:

TABLE III

Rise in Maintenance Fees: St. Francis Square Apts., Inc. 1963-1979

Unit type	Cost (1963)	Cost (1979)	Percentage Increase
3 bedrooms 2 baths	\$140.	\$230.90	65%
3 bedrooms 1 bath	127.	209.60	65
2 bedrooms	125.	204.25	63
1 bedroom	84.	138.40	65
		average percentage increase	64.5%

Potluck Christmas Supper
Christmas Carol Sing
Halloween Gala (a party preceded by a competition
between buildings for the most original decorations)
Labor Day Picnic
Back to School Barbecue
Summer Youth Recreation Program
Potluck Picnic

The Square has also been active in founding the Western Addition Cooperative Nursery and took the lead in organizing the Western Addition Boys' Soccer teams. Within the Square, children's and youth programs have not only concentrated on recreation, but also on contributions to the development's maintenance.

In the community at large, St. Francis Square has exhibited its support in the following ways:

Hosting forums for local political candidates
1967 - Signed a petition in support of the United Farm Workers
1967 - Participated in a march against the war in Vietnam
Participated in the development of other cooperatives in the Western Addition
1971 - Contributed \$500 to support the ILWU strike
1974 - Established a neighborhood food cooperative

All of these activities illustrate the fulfillment of the ILWU's goals; namely, an integrated and family oriented community where working people can live in the heart of San Francisco.

Conclusion

St. Francis Square represents the first generation of limited equity cooperatives in the Bay Area. Conceived during a time when a strong legal framework encouraging cooperatives did not exist, St. Francis Square faced tremendous odds, such as the initial problems with Section 221(d) (3), and more recent battles, fought and won, over property tax assessments. Despite these problems, St. Francis Square has been successful, and part of this success can be attributed to the collective determination and interdependence of its residents.

Since the construction of rental housing has come to a virtual standstill and the cost of single family dwellings is rising far beyond the reach of most families, cooperative housing may well become

more visible on the U.S. housing scene. The development of a legal and organizational network which facilitates cooperative housing is developing as a four-way partnership between developers, financial institutions, community organizations and the public sector. The basic threads of this potentially broad network were woven at a Cooperative Housing Conference, sponsored by California Federal and held in San Francisco.

California Federal's initiation of this conference is indicative of the private sector's recognition of the need for an alternative form of housing. Representatives from private industry, the public sector and community organizations participated in the Conference; each saw the benefits of cooperative housing in a slightly different light, but there was a general consensus of the need to focus attention in this direction.


The establishment of the National Cooperative Consumers Bank in 1978 represents the federal government's commitment to cooperative endeavors. Hopefully, this will facilitate a liaison with community organizations and other interested parties to encourage cooperative housing developments.

Almost 20 years ago, St. Francis Square Apts., Inc. was conceived to provide home ownership for people who could otherwise not afford it. It has accomplished this goal, but since that time, the housing crisis has developed to include not only low to moderate income groups, but the majority of U.S. families. Cooperative housing can be an alternative solution to this crisis. The growth of sympathetic institutional policies may well be the nexus for this change.

ST. FRANCIS SQUARE

COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS

SAN FRANCISCO



-  HOUSING UNITS
-  PARKING
-  SERVICES
-  BUS STOP

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Tim Caldwell

what you may not know about rent control

By Margaret L. LaPlace & Martha J. Sullivan

Margaret ("Mimi") LaPlace is an Urban Studies student with interests in land use law, housing development and bond law. Also in Urban Studies, Martha Sullivan is interested in California politics and public policy, especially in the areas of housing and community development. Both are graduating in the Fall of 1980. This paper was researched and written during the Fall 1979 semester for Dennis Keating's housing class.

To be evicted, for any reason, is an unpleasant experience and often one in which the tenant has had little or no choice in the matter. Historically, landlords have been able to evict a tenant for any reason s/he chooses, or for none at all. Yet today in California, this is changing. We are seeing an increasing number of "just cause" provisions being included in municipal rent-control ordinances. Just cause evictions, also called "good cause" evictions, are just that: evictions limited to those based on good causes. A "good cause" could be objectionable behavior of the tenant; rehabilitation of the property requiring vacancy; conversion of the building to con-

dominiums or stock cooperatives; or that the landlord or his/her immediate relatives wish to move into the apartment. These "reasons" are common to most just cause provisions, though several such provisions go much further.

In California, there are three statutes existing at the state level which touch upon the issues raised by just cause eviction. We shall briefly discuss this existing body of law which includes C.C.P. (California Civil Procedure) 51, part of the Unruh Civil Rights Act; C.C.P. 1161, procedures for unlawful detainer (eviction); and C.C.P. 1942.5, Assemblyman Gary Hart's retaliatory evictions bill (AB 771).

At the local level in California, several jurisdictions have passed provisions for just cause eviction. All of these local ordinances have been tied into a larger rent control (or "rent stabilization") ordinance. In this paper, we will review the current San Francisco ordinance, administered by the S.F. Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board; and the provisions made in a Berkeley ordinance which gained notoriety in *Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley*, 17 Cal. 3d 129, before the California Supreme Court.

At the state government level, we shall discuss the phenomenon of the New Jersey statewide just cause eviction statute. New Jersey is the only state in the U.S. to have a "solo" just cause eviction statute at the state level. We propose to look at the chain of events leading up to this plateau, and make some observations with respect to California, which has had its own share of tenant activity in recent years.



California Statutes

The California tenant is currently afforded some protection against arbitrary and/or retaliatory evictions. C.C.P. 51, Unruh's Civil Rights Act, designed to discourage discrimination, has been interpreted by the courts to provide protection against arbitrary evictions. The Act goes a long way toward defining discrimination as it regards business activities. However, it says nothing directly regarding eviction protections, thus leaving the way clear for further legislation in this area.

Section 1161 of the California Civil Procedures is primarily a statement of procedures to be taken in actions of eviction by landlords against tenants in what is known as "unlawful detainer." An action for unlawful detainer may be brought against a tenant who:

1. Continues possession after the expiration of the term of the lease.
2. Continues to stay after having defaulted on the rent and having received a three day notice to quit.
3. Neglects or fails to perform conditions or covenants of the lease.
4. Commits a nuisance and has received a three day notice to quit.

We see here what has evolved into "just" or "good" causes for eviction.

Unsatisfied with the protection provided by the two existing statutes, Assemblyman Gary Hart went a step further toward equalizing the powers of landlords and tenants. Assembly Bill (AB) 771 (Retaliatory Eviction Bill) added Section 1942.5 to the California Civil Procedures, C.C.P. 1942.5, to address landlord and tenant relations:

"Under existing law, the lessor is precluded for a certain amount of time, after the occurrence of certain events, from taking any of certain specified actions against a lessee where the lessee is not in default in the payment of rent and the lessor has as his dominant purpose retaliation against the lessee because of the lessee's exercise of any certain specified rights."

This bill provides that it is unlawful for the landlord to take action to evict a tenant in retaliation for the tenant's legal attempts to enforce existing code requirements, activities to organize tenants, or participation in any organization advocating tenants' rights. Under AB 771, a tenant is protected from eviction for 180 days after engaging in such ties, and if successful in a civil action against the landlord, can be awarded damages set by the Bill to include:

- "1. The actual damages sustained by the tenant
2. Punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars (\$100) nor more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000) for each retaliatory act."

AB 771 puts the burden of proof in a civil suit on the landlord if notice to evict is in fact given. However, if the landlord does not give formal notice (i.e., a "three day" or "thirty day" notice to vacate) the burden shifts to the tenant to prove harassment. Such proof

has proven difficult to obtain since the best witness and source of evidence is a hostile one, thereby effectively nullifying the gain in protection the Bill's existence implies. It has been said the the existence of such legal avenues of protection and enforcement of tenants' rights will further tax an already overburdened judicial system. Yet studies have been made which prove to the contrary. Traditionally, tenants default on unlawful detainer actions, or actions are dropped by the landlords, leaving a very small percentage of actions which ever get to court. This small percentage is indicative of our adversary legal system requiring action by both parties. Tenants, either lacking knowledge of their rights or expecting failure, have done little to enforce the rights provided them by existing legislation.

Local Ordinances

Where tenants have begun to organize, this syndrome of non-participation is disappearing. Several municipalities have begun to respond to the cry for tenant rights and protection, leading to the enactment of rent control ordinances which most often include a provision for just cause evictions.

As has been previously noted, all of the ordinances passed at the local level in California making provision for just cause eviction have been included in an overall rent stabilization ordinance. Also included in most of (if not all) the rent stabilization ordinances passed by local California jurisdictions is a "vacancy de-control" provision. This provision allows for the "de-control" of a rent-controlled unit when it is vacated by the tenant (i.e., rents on vacated units can be set at any level). Also operative in many rent stabilization ordinances is a formula which bases the initiation of rent adjustments on the date of the rent rollback specified by the ordinance or the start of a new tenancy, whichever occurs *latest*.

These two features are major reasons for the unanimous incidence of just cause eviction guidelines within rent stabilization ordinances in California. At a hearing of the State Assembly Judiciary Committee on the subject of Assemblyman Mel Levine's just cause eviction bill (AB 779), Chairman Jack Fenton answered the question of "why vacancy de-control" put by a committee member with "Because that's the only way they could get it (rent control) passed." A candid statement, and one which is obviously accurate, given the political clout of the estate and housing industry.

People's Law School, located in San Francisco, has conducted two studies on eviction in San Francisco. One released in March 1979, prior to the adoption of a rent stabilization ordinance by the Board of Supervisors; the other, as a follow-up, released in November 1979 after the ordinance (which included vacancy de-control) had been in effect since June. The March study cited an increase in private housing evictions (as opposed to public housing) of approximately 20% over the period between 1971 and 1978, including an increase of 10% during the six months following the passage of Proposition 13. The November study, covering the period of June 1 to August 31, 1979, cited an increase of 28% over the same period in 1978. In a statement by Scott Weaver of the PLS, the vacancy de-control provision in the S.F. ordinance was identified as an "encouraging" factor in this increase. This observation gibes with that of Assemblyman Fenton, earlier noted, and indicates that landlords have taken advantage of the provision inserted for reason of political expediency.

"AB 779 provides civil remedies currently unavailable to the tenant."

The model for most, if not all, of these ordinances has been the Berkeley ordinance passed in the early 1970's and made famous in *Birkenfield v. Berkeley*. As a result of this case, decided by the California Supreme Court in 1976, the Berkeley ordinance was declared unconstitutional and invalid. The constitutionality of the ordinance, however, was determined by the Court with respect to *procedure*, not the imposition of rent controls or the establishment of just causes for eviction of tenants by landlords. In fact, with respect to said "just causes," the Court found that:

"These permitted grounds for eviction appear to cover most if not all of the grounds that would otherwise be available except that of termination of the tenancy."

The Court went straight to the heart of the just cause for eviction movement in its comment that:

"...we assume for present purposes that the effect of the provision is simply to prohibit the eviction of

a tenant who is in good standing at the expiration of the tenancy unless the premises are to be withdrawn from the rental housing market or the landlord's offer of a renewal lease has been refused."

The procedures which eventually brought the fall of the Berkeley ordinance were those employed by the rent control board established by the ordinance to adjust maximum rents and regulate evictions. The Court ruled that the ordinance:

"...transgressed the constitutional limits of the police powers by withholding powers by which the rent control board could adjust maximum rents without unreasonable delays, and instead required the board to follow an adjustment procedure which would make such delays inevitable."

And agreed with the trial court's finding:

"...that to require a landlord to obtain a certificate of eviction before seeking to recover possession of a rent control unit invalidly conflicted with state statutes providing landlords with a summary procedure for exercising their rights of repossession against tenants."

Therefore, the issue in the area of local ordinances establishing just cause for eviction is not the establishment of such guidelines, but the extent of the ordinance procedurally. An opinion written by the legal counsel of the California Dept. of Housing and Community Development regarding the enactment of a good cause eviction ordinance by a general law city concluded that:

"A general law city has authority to enact such an ordinance both by virtue of this power being fairly implied by existing State legislation as well as pursuant to the police power conferred on all municipalities. The concept of such an ordinance is not preempted by existing State law, although it must be *carefully drafted to avoid this result.*" (Emphasis ours.)

The "Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance" adopted by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in whole on June 12, 1979 manages to do just this. However, a residue of this concern has been the stated refusal of the Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board established by the ordinance to have any involvement with the enforcement of the just cause provision of the ordinance. The Board contends that it is the District

Attorney's province--the D.A. maintains that it will not pursue any such cases unless they are referred by the Board.

This "Catch-22" opens up a whole new avenue of discussion with respect to the feasibility and/or need for a statewide just cause for eviction statute. Thus, we will proceed to the role of state government in just cause for eviction.

New Jersey

New Jersey, atypical of most states, has a long history of strong tenant organization, resulting in a wide range of local rent control ordinances protecting tenants' rights. Perceiving their strength at the local level, tenants in New Jersey successfully enacted multiple municipal ordinances, all of which provide some sort of just cause eviction protection.

Several attempts were made to enact such legislation on the state level, but each attempt was successfully blocked by the strong anti-control lobbying of New Jersey's realtors. The real estate lobby, foreseeing a trend towards such legislation, and fearing even stricter controls in the future, relented in 1974, clearing the way for the enactment of the first just cause eviction statute at the state level in the United States.

New Jersey Statute Ann. Section 2A 18-16.1 provides that "evictions from all residential units (with the exception of owner occupied dwellings with not more than two units) be based on good cause." Good cause as stated in the statute includes:

1. Tenant's failure to pay rent provided that any increase in the rent is not unconscionable.
2. Disorderly conduct of the tenant.
3. The tenant negligently permitting or willfully causing damage to the premises.
4. Breach of reasonable rules or covenants agreed to in the lease.
5. Refusal to agree, at the termination of the lease, to reasonable changes of substance in the terms and conditions of the lease, including specifically any change in the term thereof.
6. The owner's intention to end rental of premises either after citation for code violations which would be economically unfeasible for the owner to correct, or as part of the 'permanent' retirement of the unit from the housing market."

Interestingly, unlike most local just cause eviction ordinances, New Jersey's statute does not deal with a landlord's intention to convert the unit to a condominium or stock cooperative. In light of its existence at the state level at all, it is not unlikely that several compromises were made to ensure its eventual passage. In any case, no other state has enacted a similar piece of legislation providing for such protection, although several attempts have been made most recently in California, to do so.

"Why vacancy de-control? Because that's the only way they could get rent control passed."

California Legislature

The California Legislature in 1979 witnessed a raft of legislation addressing the subject area of landlord-tenant relations. Those specifically germane to the theme of this paper include Sen. David Roberti's legislation against age discrimination in rental housing; Assy. Gary Hart's retaliatory evictions bill; and in particular, Sen. Alan Sieroty's and Assy. Mel Levine's bills regarding just cause for eviction (SB 517 and AB 779, respectively.)

Sen. Sieroty and Assy. Levine, who co-sponsored each other's legislation, presented their respective bills on March 7, 1979. SB 517 was amended in the Senate on May 14, in numerous instances changing the intent of the bill's language. SB 517 was soon considered "dead in committee," as legislative jargon goes. This means that for all intents and purposes, the bill is finished for that particular session of the Legislature. AB 779 managed to avoid this fate for a time, but just barely. In assessing the bill's chances last winter, Assy. Levine's aide, Annette Porini, was very skeptical, explaining that the recent reorganization of the Assembly Republican leadership had involved a member of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, Charles R. Imbrecht. Imbrecht had become the Assembly minority whip, thus serving to consolidate his own stand on the bill as well as that of other Republicans on the committee with the party line against just cause for eviction. She

did, however, speculate that it appeared that AB 779 and SB 517 had done some trailblazing for Sen. Hart's AB 771 (retaliatory evictions) and that the phenomemon might very well reverse itself, the Hart bill having passed. The passage of the Hart bill, however, may well have been a tactic to *avoid* the Sieroty and Levine bills by throwing one small bone to tenants. Therefore, Porini's observation can only be taken with a grain of salt, so to speak.

As for the contents of AB 779, it proposed substantially the standard guidelines for just causes for eviction. In the opinion of the San Francisco Commission on the Aging, among others, however, it did not go far enough with respect to the subject of condominium conversion, which it simply lists as a just cause for eviction consistent with existing State law. Last year's defeated Proposition R (rent control) in San Francisco specified that condominium conversion could not be cited as just cause for eviction, and also would have legislated relocation assistance of up to \$1,000 for tenants evicted because of the landlord's or said relatives' desire to occupy the unit, or if the building were going to be demolished. In instance of demolition, the tenant would be given first choice of any new housing constructed on the demolition site.

AB 779 was essentially a mechanism for clarifying the existing, somewhat ambiguous, law surrounding evictions and what "arbitrary" really means. It is not a comprehensive landlord-tenant bill covering all the issues of interest to tenants. But the clarification of the law at the state level at least provides tenants with a substantive defense in court. AB 779 also places the burden of proof on the landlord ("that the termination of the tenancy was in good faith") and establishes a minimum award of damages to the tenant (\$300). AB 779 provides civil remedies currently unavailable to the tenant in the form of "breach of contract for termination of the tenancy without just cause;" again, the landlord will bear the burden of proof. Finally, the bill prohibits the inclusion of a waiver of the rights provided by AB 779 in a rental or lease agreement.

Supporting AB 779 was a myriad of tenant and public interest organizations and government agents, including:

Fair Housing Council of Orange County
California Campaign for Economic Democracy
City and County of San Francisco (excepting condo conversion provision)
Coalition for Fair Rent -- San Diego

California Housing Action Information Network
Legal Aid Society of Orange County
Western Center on Law and Poverty
California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA)
Retired Senior Volunteer Program
Legal Aid Foundation of Long Beach
Mid-Peninsula Citizens for Fair Housing
Council of the City of Los Angeles
Bay Area Urban League
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles
National Housing Law Project

In opposition to AB 779 stood the real estate and apartment industries:

California Apartment Association
Apartment House Associations Consolidated, Inc.,
of S.F.
Apartment Association of Los Angeles County
California Association of Realtors
California Housing Council

(These lists are by no means inclusive.)

Support for AB 779 centered primarily on the need to clarify existing state law and balance the landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, in the words of Myron Moskovitz, Chair of the California Commission on Housing and Community Development, tenants' dependence on government for recourse will be diminished. Also, as was pointed out by many proponents, placing the burden of proof on the landlord makes sense in that, as it stands now, the tenant must somehow make a case when most of the relevant information is probably in the landlord's possession. Proponents also point out that a statewide just cause for eviction statute will serve as a stabilizing influence on the tenant population, as people will be reassured of the relative stability of their situation. This attitude, proponents argue, will result in a greater tendency to establish community ties and maintain and upgrade rental units.

And, of course, the spectre of "vacancy de-control" provisions is an argument in favor of AB 779.

Opponents of AB 779 argue that the incident of evictions coming under the jurisdiction of the bill does not justify statewide legislation. (They maintain that 30-day notice evictions now occur in less than one percent of all tenancies.) Opponents also maintain that placing the burden of proof on the landlord in actions where the landlord is the defendant reverses the general rule of law.

A legislative consultant for the CA Association of Realtors voiced what the collective opposition sees as the perception of the authors and supporters of AB 779, which is that housing is a "public utility." This is the heart of the matter for the opponents of AB 779 and more broadly, tenant rights. They simply do not want government toying with what they perceive as landlords' inalienable property rights.

In conclusion, we would like to make some observations and projections regarding the course that the just cause for eviction movement is likely to take.

Given the example of New Jersey, we perceive a similar chain of events to be likely in California. Some of the ingredients of the scenario are already there--evolving tenant activism, local ordinances making provision for just cause evictions, and the initial defeat of a proposed statewide statute. We think it likely that tenant organizations may return to the local level to pass just cause for eviction ordinances and mobilize greater support. The outcome of this strategy could be one of three things: 1) local just cause eviction ordinances will become so prevalent that the state will be moved to establish its authority in this area and so pre-empt the local ordinances (in the interest of equity for all of its citizens); or 2) the opposition to just cause eviction will perceive the growing trend (as they appear to have done in their support of the statewide "fair Rent" initiative) and move to pass a pre-emptive amendment in their own best interests, thereby eliminating the power of localities to pass stronger ordinances; or 3) tenant groups will not be able to generate the requisite support and thus will not present a threat either to the state's authority or to the powerful real estate/housing lobby.

Given that lobby's recent efforts to preempt local rent control ordinances under the guise of the "Fair Rent" initiative, we tend to discount the latter possibility. Mount Olympus does indeed appear to be shaking. The defeat of Proposition 10, the "Fair Rent Initiative," in June, coupled with S.F. Mayor Dianne Feinstein's summer veto of a tougher rent control ordinance indicates something of a stalemate, however. A thorough analysis of the Proposition 10 defeat, we suspect, might reveal that it was less a vote for tenant rights than a vote for home rule, or an unsophisticated vote against rent control. Tenant advocates must continue to tread that fine line of strategy. And scholars must continue probing.

AT-LARGE VS. DISTRICT ELECTIONS: FACTORS OF ELECTORAL SUCCESS

By

Jay Kleinwaks

A graduate student at San Francisco State University, Jay Kleinwaks would eventually like to teach political science at a Bay Area community college. The following article has been derived from his thesis on the differences in representation between at-large and district elections in San Francisco.

During San Francisco's "half million dollar" Special Election of August 1980, as during the "Policy Statement" vote in November 1972, the 1973 Charter Amendment Vote, the November 1976 Charter Amendment Vote, and the Special Recall Election in the Spring of 1977, charges and counter-charges abounded regarding the pros and cons of district and at-large electoral systems for San Francisco supervisors. The need for each system was thrown around with abandon by the partisans of each side, who also partake in pointing towards the immorality of what their adversaries represent.

The question of which system should be used to elect supervisors will again be put before the electorate in November 1980. Judging from past elections on this question, the voters will be puzzled by the often ludicrous and confounding claims made by both sides about the needs of San Francisco, democratic theory, and the absurdity of either the at-large or district system.

In the past, partisans have launched their arguments with claims such as:

"San Francisco is divided today: divided between downtown where the money is and everywhere else where the people are."

"Without question, San Francisco's small geographic area and uniquely close-knit, cosmopolitan population, does not lend itself to division..."

The question of which system of representation provides more voting power to the individual is also often brought up:

"(At-large elections) means you get back ALL ELEVEN of your supervisorial votes."

"District elections move the process of government closer to the people by providing citizens with direct

access to their supervisors."

Evil visions of partisanship are often invoked:

"A ward system means either total control by political bosses who develop "klout," or worse, an anarchic evasion of comprehensive political responsibility."

"(An at-large election) would be (conducted) in the middle of Presidential campaign...bringing partisan politics into non-partisan races."

The advantage of each electoral system to business has been often disputed. In a bit of irony, the same person made the following arguments, the first made in 1973 for the *Voter Handbook* and then the second with a changed mind in 1980:

"Proponents of (district elections) claim that this proposal would end 'big money' campaigns. The new campaign spending law - proposed and enacted by the present Board of Supervisors who represent all San Franciscans - severely reduces the total amount that can be spent and the amount that can be raised from any contributor or source. 'Big money' campaigns are already dead and the present board killed them."

"Proponents of (at-large elections) stand out clearly as disappointed officeholders and frustrated power-grabbers, irresponsible, insensitive to the waste of hard-earned tax money, anxious only to reopen the flow of contributions from Montgomery Street to the supervisor's chambers."

The following arguments, in conclusion, typify how simply the rhetoric on the question is often presented:

"This special election (1980) is both disruptive and costly - a waste of over \$500,000..."

VOTE NO! NO! NO!"

"STOP THIS UNDEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF DISTRICT ELECTIONS.

STOP THIS UNAMERICAN SYSTEM OF DISTRICT ELECTIONS.

VOTE YES, FOR AMERICA.

VOTE YES, FOR SAN FRANCISCO.

VOTE YES, FOR FREEDOM OF CHOICE.

VOTE YES, FOR THE DEMOCRATIC WAY.

VOTE YES, FOR THE AMERICAN WAY."

This article will look at the biases of the at-large and district systems. It specifically examines the at-large elections of 1969-75, and the district elections of 1977-79 in San Francisco. For each electoral system, the relative strength of three independent variables are examined. INCUMBENCY, MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS and EXPENDITURES are the independent variables examined in relationship to how they benefit a candidate's VOTES received. Their effect for at-large and district elections will be ultimately compared; if their strengths differ for the two electoral systems examined, we should then be able to understand the biases of each system in terms of what type of candidate has an inherent advantage in each system. And as each system might be biased towards different candidates, these biases will allow the election of candidates who are biased towards certain groups in the City.

The three variables mentioned, INCUMBENCY, MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS and EXPENDITURES are often judged to be key determinants of electoral success. An excluded factor is POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP, as San Francisco municipal politics is non-partisan. Successful candidates in non-partisan systems need to set up personal campaign organizations and raise their own funds, there being no political party to provide a readily available campaign organization and party funds to favored candidates.

Incumbency

In non-partisan elections, due to the absence of a party label which often provides legitimacy to a challenging candidacy, an INCUMBENT has definite advantages. Their candidacy has an instant validity; they are judged to be "serious" in their quest for office. This in turn promotes news coverage and campaign donations. On an a priori basis, it seems that an INCUMBENT's primary advantage is that they are recognizable to a higher percentage of voters than the challengers are.

Furthermore, it would seem that the value of INCUMBENCY would be accentuated for at-large elections, for the larger the political boundary, the larger the probable gap between incumbent and challenger recognition. The popular leader from the Bay districts may be completely unknown by Oceanside districts but

the INCUMBENT's popularity or, at least, familiarity, is city wide.¹

The only time the familiarity of an electorate with an incumbent works to the incumbent's disadvantage is when an election generates attention. In other words, when a campaign does not generate much attention, the clear beneficiary is always the incumbent. This worked out well for San Francisco's at-large incumbents; newspaper accounts suggest that at-large supervisorial elections were dull:

"(The 1973 race is a) humdrum contest...The office seekers sometimes outnumbered the audience at improvement club meetings."

"(The 1975 race) fails to radiate much beyond the contestants themselves."

One writer suggests that it was the norm for the incumbents to appear jointly, and "merely crow about greater things they will accomplish for San Francisco." In short, the incumbency advantage is that an incumbent has pre-campaign publicity, publicity that evades a challenger in at-large campaigns.

Newspaper Endorsements

Of course, the benefit of incumbency is not a virtue to any particular group of candidates, until one looks at the other factors that establish and keep certain candidates as incumbents. One of these factors is MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS.

In the non-partisan environment, there is no citywide organization to disseminate political information or recommend candidates except for the seemingly unbiased newspaper. The newspaper is thus a double-edged sword. It covertly affects the results of elections in the way it presents the candidates in its news stories, and overtly affects the results via electoral endorsements.

Hypothetically, a newspaper's influence should be stronger when at-large elections are held. If one accepts the following premise:

"As one ascends the social scale, there is a greater sense of ease, intimacy, and personal relationship between the reader and his paper."

then we can assume that the strength of a newspaper is greatest when it appeals to an electorate that contains a middle class majority, the electorate of the

whole city. When this electorate is broken down into districts, there will be some pockets that contain a lower class majority, thus creating some districts which care less about the newspapers' dictates than the voting middle class counterparts.

Secondly, in a district the campaign is on a more personal level, taken out of black and white type and brought to the doorsteps, streetcorners and neighborhood meetings. While the newspaper is the prime citywide news source, its function is supplemented and effect inconsistent in each district.

Expenditures

Finally, the third factor that on an a priori basis should contribute to electoral success is a candidate's EXPENDITURE level. In the non-partisan system, wherein a candidate has to set up their own organization and finance their own campaign, the amount of funds a candidate spends on their campaign becomes all important.²

Some political scientists disagree with the notion that "spending produces votes" in a unidirectional fashion. One argument put forth is:

"...reciprocal causality is an equally plausible premise...The expectation that a candidate will do well may bring campaign contribution...Characteristics that also help to attract votes - personal charm or "charisma," political skill and experience - should also ease the job of fund-raising."

While the above is true, that the perceived "viability" of one's candidacy will tend to generate donations, one has to ask what factors established the candidate's "viability" in the first place. Having sufficient EXPENDITURES to kick off a campaign (along with INCUMBENCY and NEWSPAPER support) is the way it's usually done. Thus, EXPENDITURES spent well tend to snowball into more EXPENDITURES.

Finally, it is assumed for now that EXPENDITURES will mean more in at-large than in district races. Prominence is much easier to establish within a district (e.g., local group leader) than citywide, hence a few candidates in districts may already have the prestige and popularity to be serious contenders before an election starts. Secondly, because there is less of an electorate to reach and area to cover in a district campaign, the expensive methods of cam-

paigning (e.g., television, radio) used in at-large elections are discarded for less costly tactics.

In summary then, the hypothesis that will be tested in this paper is that strength of INCUMBENCY, MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS and EXPENDITURES to each other and to VOTES decreases for district elections when compared to at-large elections.

Methodology

For the at-large elections of 1969-71-73-75 (22 supervisors elected) and the 1977-79 district races (15 supervisors elected)³ the correlation (r) will be computed for each variable mentioned above. They will be operationally defined in the following manner:

Votes - Number of votes a candidate receives in the November election, as recorded in "official Statement of Votes Cast - General Municipal Election in the City and County of San Francisco."

Expenditures - Total and final amount of expenditures reported in "Committee Post Election Campaign Statement," as filed with the Registrar of Voters. A small percentage of candidates did not file statements, 6% of the at-large candidates, 2% of the district candidates. They are considered as "missing data" and not computed for this variable. A small percentage spent less than \$200 on the election, 13% at-large, 7% district candidates. As many candidates who spent less than \$200 did not list any actual amount spent, only indicating that they did spend less than \$200, all candidates falling in this category were assigned a value of \$200 for this variable.

Incumbency - Having incumbency status equals one, non-incumbent status equals 0. (When incumbency was numerically defined as number of years in office [e.g., twelve years in office = 12, two years = 2, nonincumbent = 0] the strength of incumbency and the other variables declined.)

Major Newspaper Endorsements - An editorial endorsement by each of San Francisco's major newspapers counted as 1. Thus, a candidate who received a *Chronicle* and *Examiner* endorsement received a 2, a *Chronicle* or *Examiner* endorsement equaled 1, no endorsement equaled 0.

The correlations for each election year will be computed to see if these variables are strongly related to one another, and if so does their strength increase or decrease for district elections in comparison to at-large elections.

To some, it may seem that the strength of relationships between the variables will be necessarily lower for district elections, since the units of measure are lower than for at-large elections. This is not true as Table I indicates.

Relationships Between Independent Variables

For at-large elections incumbents usually spent more than challengers. The high level of expenditures that was usually available to an incumbent came from "big money" contributions (discussed later); an anomaly of sorts was that the challenger spending a minuscule portion of what the incumbent spent had to finance a portion of his own campaign.⁴

For the four at-large elections studied, under 4% of the challengers outspent an incumbent.

The advantage of incumbency and money spent continued for district elections. For the two years of district elections studied, only a little over 4% of the challengers outspent incumbents. In terms of *r*, the correlation between EXPENDITURES and INCUMBENCY can be seen in Table II.

A more pronounced change was the percentage of incumbents who received newspaper endorsements. For at-large elections over 85% of the incumbents were endorsed for reelection by the *Chronicle* and *Examiner*. Two of the three incumbents not endorsed by both newspapers had been appointed the same year they were up for reelection (1971 - Driscoll, 1973 - Chinn). The third incumbent (1969 - Morrison) was a liberal who had run against the "business candidates" for mayor two years earlier.⁵

For district races, the incumbents were still usually endorsed, 80% of the time by the *Chronicle* and 70% of the time by the *Examiner*. However, in 1977 when the incumbents were at-large incumbents running in district races, all received endorsements. The first time district incumbents ran, in 1979, only 60% and 40% were endorsed by the *Chronicle* and *Examiner* respectively. This may be an indication of future trends. Table III presents the correlations.

The third relationship between EXPENDI-

TURES and MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS might be caused by EXPENDITURES intervening in the relationship of INCUMBENCY and MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS. Drawn as a diagram, it would appear as:

INCUMBENCY → EXPENDITURES → MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS

But what about the few challengers that receive NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS, were they the highest spenders among challengers? It would appear so. Only one challenger who received an endorsement (1969 - Barbagelata) was not the highest spending challenger. In later at-large elections, the three challengers who would be endorsed by both newspapers were the highest spending challengers.

For at-large elections, 75% of endorsements going to challengers went to high spending challengers. For the district elections studied, 75% went to the high spending challengers. (Don't forget that more endorsements went to challengers in district elections than at-large elections.) The correlation for these variables is seen in Table IV.

In summary, the relationship between INCUMBENCY, MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS and EXPENDITURES was lower for district elections than for at-large elections. In essence, this means that the chance of one candidate monopolizing the benefits of all three independent variables was lessened in district elections.

Relationship Between Independent Variables and Dependent Variable

This final section compares the relationship of the independent variables to the dependent variable, the VOTES a candidate receives.

Incumbency/Votes

Incumbent usually retained their seat for at-large elections. For the four at-large elections studied over 80% of the incumbents successfully retained their seat. Out of the 20% who failed to win reelection, half of the losers were appointed by the mayor to fill vacancies the year of the election.

For district elections, incumbents prevailed 67% of the time. While this may seem like a small decrease, it is a salient point needing further clarification.

TABLE I

Hypothetical Relationship Between EXPENDITURES and VOTES
For At-Large and District Elections

At-Large			District		
Candidate	Expenditures	Votes	Candidate	Expenditures	Votes
A	\$ 100,000	150,000	E	\$ 10,000	1,500
B	80,000	120,000	F	8,000	1,200
C	50,000	75,000	G	5,000	750
D	10,000	15,000	H	1,000	150

TABLE II

Relationship Between INCUMBENCY/EXPENDITURES

	Average	High (Year)	Low (Year)
At-Large (1969-75)	.797	.892 (1975)	.701 (1969)
District (1977-79)	.738	.886 (79-11)	.422 (79-11)

TABLE III

Relationship Between INCUMBENCY/MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS

	Average	High (Year)	Low (Year)
At-Large	.812	1.000 (1975)	.715 (1971)
District	.631	1.000 (6 cases)	.200 (79-1) -

For the four at-large elections studied, only four candidates finished in runner up slots for two or more elections (runner up slots are considered the 6th - 13th slot, doubling the number of positions to be filled). Two of these candidates (Morrison and Chinn) were in one election defeated incumbents. The other runner-ups were both times challengers (1973-75 Milk, 1974-5 P.P. Mendelsohn finishing 10th, 7th and 9th, 9th respectively). However, the 1975 7th place finish, only one slot "out of the money," meant receiving but 65% of the 6th place finishers total. For at-large elections, an electorate dissatisfied with the incumbents rarely had viable challengers "waiting in the wings" for the dissatisfied to get behind.

For the 1979 district election, four challengers had been runner-ups in the previous district election (District 1 - Lawson, 5 - Hallinan, 11 - Bardis) and one challenger had been the treasurer of one runner-up's last campaign (District 9 - Walker). Thus, in five of the six district races in 1979, the electorate had a known challenger to vote for, and three of these challengers were elected. Essentially, the 67% figure of incumbents repeating for district is artificially high, inflated by the 100% success of at-large incumbents in the 1977 district races. If district elections continue, the possibility of defeating incumbent's should continue rising.

The only pratfall of district elections in this regard is the "free ride" two incumbents were given. An incumbent has run unopposed in each election. The correlations for comparison of the relationship is given in Table V.

Major Newspaper Endorsements/Votes

As mentioned before, newspapers have an effect on elections in two ways, through endorsements of candidates and their coverage of the news. The former is measured in this article to show the change in this relationship for district elections. The latter can't be measured, but some illustrations of the ways newspapers cover the election of Supervisors is in order.

For the four at-large elections from 1969-75, the *Examiner* endorsed 82% of the successful candidates, the *Chronicle* endorsed 95%.⁶ With the advent of district elections, the newspaper apparently lost its ability to persuade (or predict, depending on one's view): The *Examiner* endorsed 53% of the winners, the *Chronicle* dropped to 65%.

I mentioned that an editorial's success reflects a paper's ability to persuade. Some will argue that this is not the case; rather, newspapers want to have influence with the elected Supervisors so they predict/endorse those candidates they feel will win. However, the newspaper's other arm of persuasion, the news story, helps create the candidate who will win. Some examples:

Before the 1973 election, the *Chronicle* ran two stories about the Supervisor's race. The first was devoted exclusively to the five incumbents in the race. The following article was on the challengers. In the story on challengers, 13 paragraphs discussed one challenger (Nedler), 12 paragraphs another (Morrison), 8 paragraphs were spent on a third (Masonek), and the rest of the 22 challengers were lumped together in 6 paragraphs. Only one of the 22 challengers was mentioned by name and it was not gay challenger Harvey Milk or redevelopment fighter Peter Patrick Mendelsohn. The candidate mentioned was Bob Sparrow, also known as Jesus Christ Satan "veteran of four mental hospitals...A self styled androgynous human being..." who was quoted as saying "I don't think I'm crazy, I know I am."

In 1975 redevelopment fighter Peter Patrick Mendelsohn was again excluded from consideration in another *Chronicle* article, though he had finished 9th four years earlier. In this article about the election, 17 paragraphs passed before an incumbent was mentioned. Then in 6 paragraphs, 3 of the remaining 22 candidates were mentioned by name.

A funny thing happened to news about district elections. News stories did not focus on the campaign as a closed affair, challengers were mentioned frequently and elections were billed as "scrambles" for the incumbents' seats.

The correlations presented in Table VI can't reflect the covert influence of news stories, but do reflect the declining influence of overt newspaper endorsements for district elections.

Expenditures/Votes

For the at-large elections studies, one candidate spent considerably less than some of the also ran's and was elected (1969 - Barbagelata). The correlation between EXPENDITURES and VOTES for the four at-large elections were .917-1969, .957-1973 and .932-1975. As one can see, this relationship was consistently strong; in 1971 and 1973 only one unsuccessful candidate outspent a winner, in 1975 all of the

top spenders won.

Even with the advent of campaign finance laws in 1973, which limited campaign contributions, the gap between the average amount spent by a winner and the amount spent by losers dropped \$21,000 from \$67,000 to \$45,8000. Not a perceptible change for an eager candidate who's short on finances.

In absolute terms, the least an elected supervisor spent was \$28,000 (1975 - Francois), the least a first place (Board President) spent was \$61,000 (1973 - Feinstein).

For district races, the relationship between EXPENDITURES and VOTES did not significantly drop in 10 of the 17 campaigns. For example, in 1977 one candidate (Molinari - District 3) spent \$70,000, more money than the next two candidates spent combined. The last four finishers combined spent 4% of what the winner spent.

However, after district elections were instituted, many winners spent considerably less than candidates who lost. In 1977, the winner in District 4 (Hutch) spent 73% of what the third place finisher did and in District 5, the winner (Milk) spent 58% of what the runner-up spent. In District 7, the incumbent outspent the rest of the *nine*-member field combined and won by only 26 votes. In District 9, one candidate spent \$8,100, 39% of what the runner-up spent. He (Dolson) finished first.

In 1979 these occurrences continued. A challenger (Lawson) in District 1 spent 48% of what the incumbent spent and won. The incumbent in District 9 who spent \$8,100 in 1977 to win spent \$45,900 to retain his seat and lost in the run-off to a challenger (Walker) who only spent 60% of that sum. Of all the relationships studied as affected by district elections, the relationship between EXPENDITURES and VOTES declines the most. (See Table VII)

As we have seen, the relationship of the independent variables to each other and to the dependent variable VOTES drops off for district as compared to at-large elections. This, in turn, allows candidates to be successful even if the candidate is not able to accumulate an abundance of the resources which determined success for at-large elections.

The consequence of district elections is that it limits the power of certain groups in determining who the successful candidates are. Unlike we would love

to imagine, the candidates who accumulate a big financial "campaign treasury" do not gather such from an abundance of \$5, \$25 and \$55 contributions from the "little people." Most contributions arrive from professionals, business people and businesses in donations of \$100 upward. Eighty-five percent of Terry Francois' \$28,000 (the *least* amount of money a successful candidate spent for the at-large elections) was derived from contributions in excess of \$99. "Big money" determines the size of a candidate's campaign chests with the same names often appearing on a few of the elected's contributor list.

"For at-large elections, a dissatisfied electorate rarely had viable challengers 'waiting in the wings.'"

With the advent of district elections, the power of business to act through the press is limited. San Francisco's two newspapers, the *Chronicle* and *Examiner* certainly are slanted toward business, a point Edward Banfield makes in the abstract about "big city papers" and Chester Hartman directs specifically towards the *Examiner* and *Chronicle*.

Finally, with district elections incumbency is no longer synonymous with perpetual tenure. Challengers wait in wings to appeal to a dissatisfied electorate. Incumbents have to deliver what the voters want, not what their big contributor wants.

Essentially, the question of what's better, district or at-large elections, comes down to one's point of view. For the conservative, at-large elections are presently advantageous; for the liberal, district elections are beneficial. That is, until the City one day becomes overwhelmingly liberal, when the liberals will argue for at-large elections, and conservatives will argue for district elections in order to retain representation for the pockets of conservatism in the City.

TABLE IV

Relationship Between EXPENDITURES/MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS

	Average	High (Year)	Low (Year)
At-Large	.828	.932 (1973)	.585 (1969)
District	.539	.947 (77-7)	.010 (77-9)

TABLE V

Relationship Between INCUMBENCY/VOTES

	Average	High (Year)	Low (Year)
At-Large	.779	.920 (1975)	.618 (1969)
District	.637	.848 (77-2)	.510 (77-7)

TABLE VI


Relationship Between MAJOR NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS/VOTES

	Average	High (Year)	Low (Year)
At-Large	.869	.952 (1973)	.687 (1969)
District	.611	.848 (77-2)	.249 (77-8)

TABLE VII

Relationship Between EXPENDITURES/VOTES

	Average	High (Year)	Low (Year)
At-Large	.947	.985 (1973)	.917 (1969)
District	.866	.991 (79-1)	.483 (77-9)



THE "BALANCE" IN AT LARGE ELECTIONS

NOTES

- ¹ In 1973, "Mrs. Feinstein had a poll done which shows her leading in the race with a remarkable name recognition factor of 96%. (Jerry Carroll, "Five S.F. Supervisors Face Tough Elections Tests" *San Francisco Chronicle*, 29 October 1973, p. 4.)
- ² In 1969, "Mrs. Feinstein, 40, in her first bid for office...introduced the media blitz into municipal politics, spending *twice* as much as anyone else on radio and television and *topping* the vote total." (Jerry Carroll, "Five S.F. Supervisors Face Tough Election Tests," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 29 October 1973, p. 4.)
- ³ The analysis is truncated as to length of time studied for a number of reasons. By starting with 1969, four at-large election years are studied, in comparison with the two district years available, within a ten year period. Earlier at-large elections would have to be compared in light of changing long term factors, e.g., demographics and issues, and would confound the results. In addition, detailed financial disclosures began to appear for most candidates with the 1969 campaign (mandatory in 1973). Inclusion of earlier elections would bring up the problem of sketchy financial data.
- ⁴ In 1975, Harvey Milk donated personally 25% of his \$10,000 campaign "war chest." Two incumbents who ran first and fourth respectively in this at-large election, Quentin Kopp and Bob Mendelsohn, contributed 0% to their \$70,000 and \$50,000 campaign fund. (Milk led the pack of unsuccessful challengers.)
- ⁵ For an illustration of the strange happenings that occurred in the 1967 election for mayor and how Morrison annoyed the "establishment," see pps. 58-61 in *Yerba Buena: Land Grab and Community Resistance* by Chester Hartman, et. al. (San Francisco: Glide Publications, 1974)
- ⁶ These percentages are not phenomena of 1969-75. Elections dating back to 1950 yield essentially the same figures.

“NO OTHERWISE QUALIFIED HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL...”

by Timothy Caldwell

Tim Caldwell, a junior in the Urban Studies Program at San Francisco State, has had an interest in the transportation systems of the Bay Area for several years. He is presently involved with van-pooling as an intern with RIDES, Inc.

At 5:00 p.m. on a hot July afternoon in 1978, San Francisco Muni riders were given the choice of either walking or waiting, while AC Transit bus riders could either wait or take BART. The problem was not an accident, bad planning, or a transit strike, but a protest by a determined group of handicapped people against Muni and AC Transit for not providing wheelchair accessible buses. Approximately 70 wheelchair-bound protesters plus 150 other handicapped people and their supporters blocked both transit systems during the height of the evening rush hour. First, they prevented street cars from making the turnaround loop at the Transbay Terminal on Mission Street. Then all bus lanes in the East Bay Terminal Building were blocked, preventing AC buses from leaving for the East Bay. Police had to be brought in to arrest and remove the protesters before the transit systems could start operating again.

Kitty Cone, a representative from the Center for Independent Living (CIL), a grass roots organization for the disabled located in Berkeley, said the following day:

“The freedom to go where you want is something everyone takes for granted, but if you don’t have it, it’s terribly frustrating.”

Inconvenienced commuters and the newspaper-reading public were made more aware of the handicapped and of their desire to be provided with wheelchair accessible public transportation.

What the Feds Have Done

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, with the highly controversial Section 504 in particular, prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals in any federally funded program. Section 504 reads as follows:

“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall solely, by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”

While the primary purpose of the Act was to encourage employment and job training for handicapped persons, the implications of this Act have spread to almost every facet of American life. Schools, businesses receiving federal funds, political campaigns and transportation, to name a few, must abide by this broad federal regulation. One could interpret the Act to cite a bus system like AC Transit, which receives federal funds, as excluding participation or

denying benefits to handicapped individuals because they are not capable of boarding its buses. Because handicapped people do not have easy accessibility to buses, they have charged transit systems with discrimination and violation of the 1973 Act.

To clarify and implement the law, the Urban Metropolitan Transportation Administration (UMTA), a branch of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), set down regulations in 1976 pertaining to accessibility for all handicapped including those in wheelchairs. A short version of the 1976 regulations follows:

1. All new buses purchased with UMTA funds must be lift-equipped.
2. Half of the buses at peak hour must be lift-equipped by July 1982 or an "accessible interim service" must be provided. (This interim service could include minibuses, taxis, vans, jitnies, or dial-a-ride programs.)
3. Operators (e.g., AC Transit) must identify "programs and policies" which affect accessibility in a "compliance evaluation" to be submitted to UMTA by January 1980.

promptly produce efficient and effective wheelchair lifts due to mechanical problems. Installation of lifts on current bus fleets have also encountered mechanical difficulties. As of July 1980, AC Transit has no wheelchair lift buses while in May 1980, San Francisco Muni introduced 25 Grumman buses with wheelchair lifts.

The UMTA Regulations in the Bay Area

The first UMTA regulation states that all new buses purchased with federal funds must be equipped with lifts. To understand the long process of implementing this regulation in the Bay Area, we must look at the main controlling agency for the seventeen Bay Area transit districts, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). MTC was created in 1971 by the California Legislature to respond to Bay Area transit's problems of jurisdictional fragmentation. The Legislature also wanted a body to implement a 20-year transportation and land use plan for the Bay Area region. The goal of the Commission is to have a comprehensive regional transportation plan for all of the nine Bay Area counties. The Stanford Transportation Research Program best gives an overview of MTC:

"The freedom to go where you want is something everyone takes for granted, but if you don't have it, it's terribly frustrating."

The regulations leave planning and implementation to local transit districts.

To comply with the regulations, all public bus companies had to alter their financial and geographic plans. Because of the rising prices of oil and gas, the public increased their use of public transportation, yet the bus companies could not readily increase their bus fleets. Bus manufacturers could not

"The commission is empowered to review and approve application for federal and state financial grants whenever such grants contain transportation elements. The commission, therefore, has not only the responsibility for ongoing transportation planning, but through its powers to review and approve state and federal grants it has the necessary teeth to create a balanced transportation system in the Bay Area."



The power MTC has to create "a balanced transportation system in the Bay Area" is one reason why SF Muni has received 25 Grumman wheelchair accessible buses while AC Transit has not obtained any accessible buses. MTC has attempted to create a balanced transportation system by concentrating on SF Muni, which serves a high population density area, rather than AC Transit, although it is considered one of the best bus systems in the country. MTC has implemented this same policy with regards to the rapidly growing transit district in San Mateo County, SAMTrans. SAMTrans has scrounged for every bus possible, even leasing late 1950's AC Transit buses. Due to its ridership demand, SAMTrans has been persistent, and successful, in obtaining new buses through MTC. By the end of 1980 this transit district expects to have approximately 180 wheel-

chair accessible buses on the road.

While the 1976 UMTA regulation states that all new buses must be equipped for wheelchairs, MTC is determining which districts get new buses using criteria based on general transportation needs, not need for wheelchair accessibility. In the meantime, the disabled are objecting to a slow-moving bureaucratic process, when "misguided" might be a better objection.

The second UMTA regulation stipulates that half of buses at peak hour must be lift equipped. U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Neil Goldschmidt, speaking in Berkeley on March 20, 1980 criticized this peak hour requirement as too strict and as unworkable. The Secretary indicated that the Federal government was not going to waste time being a

regulator over local transit districts. He went on to say that many of the new wheelchair lifts that are on the road are not being used, although he did not indicate if this was because of poor marketing practices by the local operators or because the elderly and handicapped simply do not use buses. He was in favor of making buses accessible to handicapped people, but felt that the practical economic side must be considered since these new buses do cost an exorbitant amount more than the standard buses to build, operate and maintain.

The inconsistent performance of these lifts has been noted by both SF Muni and SAMTrans. According to one SF Muni planner, there is a high operating cost in maintaining the lifts on the new Grumman buses. This planner believed that supplemental service to the Grumman buses, such as jitnies and minibuses with lifts, is needed in order to accommodate the handicapped. However, at an open noon rally on June 17, 1980 in Justin Herman Plaza in San Francisco, the disabled used loudspeakers to emphatically object to these supplemental alternatives. The handicapped insisted that they must be mainstreamed into society by lift-buses and that vans or jitnies are unsatisfactory. SAMTrans is more satisfied with the performance of their new Flyer lift-buses in comparison with their older unreliable GMC lift-buses. However, it appears that even with the newer, more efficient Flyer lift-buses, the needs, rights and desires of the handicapped are often in conflict with immediate economic costs and therefore, with the agendas of public officials.

The third UMTA regulation requires research into the transportation needs of the handicapped and an evaluation of compliance. As an example, AC Transit hired a private consulting firm, Crain and Associates, which compiled 150 pages of extensive research identifying unmet transportation needs for the handicapped. However, Crain's survey did not employ random sampling in identifying residences and needs of the handicapped in the East Bay. Thus, this survey has largely been considered invalid. Question 19 (c) on the long form of the 1980 Census may provide more reliable data in the future in developing a demographic profile of individuals who have trouble using public transportation:

"19. Does this person have a physical, mental or other health condition which has lasted six months or more which:

c. Limits or prevents using public transportation?

Yes _____ No _____

Optimally, this information gathered by the Census Bureau will be passed on to local transit district to better accommodate the needs of elderly and handicapped individuals.

San Diego: Life Without UMTA

The Bay Area experience reinforces a widely held perception that long delays and costly operations seem to occur when federal regulations must be implemented. San Diego has attempted an alternate approach, which could prove a possible solution to the problems of both transit districts and the public thus far described. The San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board (MTDB), which is similar to the Bay Area's MTC, is in the process of building a 15.9 mile, light rail transit (LRT) line that extends from downtown San Diego south to the Mexico/California border. This transit system has not utilized federal funds and is therefore not bound by federal regulations. With the aid of State Senator James R. Mills, who authored the key legislation, the project draws upon 25 percent of the state gasoline tax collected in San Diego County. Other financing comes from a county gasoline sales tax. This LRT system will be completely built and tested in thirty months, for a total cost of \$ 71.6 million or \$ 4.5 million per mile.

MTDB is creating an excellent regional transit system which will provide the handicapped with wheelchair accessible transportation without the time-consuming federal regulations that Bay Area transit systems have had to contend with. The system will accommodate the elderly and handicapped wheelchair-bound individuals, with lifts on the LRT trains and buses connecting from the outlying suburban areas that will accommodate both the general public and the handicapped. The residents of San Diego County are gaining an inexpensive transit system that seems capable of serving many facets of the public need. Although the San Diego plan has used State funds rather than Federal funds in order to circumvent federal regulations and delays, it is also important to recognize the perceptual differences between MTDB and MTC. Although MTDB is not bound by funding obligations, it still seeks to effectuate the intent of federal regulations with respect to the handicapped. MTC, despite such obligation, has not. There are obviously many distinctions between these two bodies precluding a direct comparison. Nonetheless, the San Diego plan presents a hopeful example to other transit districts which should be studied in detail and, if appropriate, used as a model.

URBAN CENTER OPENS AT SFSU

Anyone interested in urban studies should be aware of the new Urban Center at San Francisco State. After an intensive year of development and planning the Center is officially in place and ready for action during academic 1980 - 1981. URBAN ACTION interviewed Director Richard LeGates, of Urban Studies, to find out more about this new resource.

UA: Why an "Urban Center?"

RL: The purpose of the Urban Center is to help connect up University resources with the urban community to undertake research, technical assistance, outreach, and alternative educational activities. For students this should mean increased opportunities to participate in paid, professional urban problem-solving work. For faculty it will involve research opportunities to bring their skills to bear and to learn from community projects additional information which can enrich their classes. For the University it will mean a new concept of education and service.

UA: Can you give us an example of what the Center will be involved with?

RL: A project completed under the auspices of the Center during the Spring and Summer of 1980 is a good example. Professor Norman Schneider received a grant of \$ 12,500 from the San Francisco Charter Revision Commission to undertake a study of San Francisco city arts policy. Professor Schneider assembled an interdisciplinary team of faculty and students from a number of relevant disciplines. He worked with a student who had completed urban economics and other urban studies courses to do a portion of the report analyzing the economic impacts of city arts policy for a city like San Francisco which has important tourist and cultural center aspects to its economy. Professor Bill Issel from History and Urban Studies completed an historical review of the evolution of city arts policy. Kay Lawson of Political Science surveyed the opinions of citizens, arts-related groups, and city policy-makers toward city arts policy, and Dan Safran of Social Work Education provided an exposition of how the various city boards and agencies connected with the arts interrelate. The students involved in this project had an opportunity for paid professional work under faculty supervision on issues of interest to them. The faculty had a chance to interact with city officials and sharpen their understanding of some current urban policy dilemmas which will enrich their classroom teaching. The University demonstrated its relevance. And the City and County of San Francisco got a useful policy document which is helping to redefine city arts policy.

RL: A rather different type of activity which can also serve as a model for Center activities is the experience Social Work Education and Employment Studies have had with federal grants to train professionals in social work and manpower policy. Both Departments have obtained grants which have permitted them to hire additional faculty, pay students who engage in a mix of learning and on-the-job training, and work much more closely with urban professionals.

In addition, a special impact grant from the Legal Services Corporation permitted an interdisciplinary team of faculty and students from SFSU to work with a neighborhood housing coalition in San Jose to help them redirect federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds away from a destructive downtown redevelopment project into community-oriented housing and economic development activities.

UA: What is the Center currently involved in?

RL: Presently the Urban Center is developing research proposals concerning alternative city-wide energy systems for local government action; the way in which professionals from both the natural sciences and social sciences can collaborate on community-serving projects in such areas as earthquake safety training, environmental protection, energy, and conflict resolution. Other proposals involving gerontology, criminal justice, manpower, community economic development, racial integration, housing, and transportation are in the offing.

UA: Who is involved in running the Center? Besides yourself, of course.

RL: The Urban Center is located organizationally within the School of Behavioral and Social Sciences. The Board of the Urban Center consists of Professors Rufus Browning (Political Science), Luis Kemnitzer (Anthropology), Bill Littel (Psychology), Barbara Phillips (Sociology), and Norman Schneider (Urban Studies) with BSS Associate Dean John Sloane sitting *ex officio* in a non-voting capacity. Martha Roditti of Social Work Education also joins the Board in meetings as an advisor on grants strategy.

UA: Where can people get more information about the Center?

RL: For further information about the Urban Center, contact me: Richard LeGates, Director
Urban Center

Mailing Address San Francisco State University
1600 Holloway Ave.,
San Francisco, CA 94132
Office: HLL 382.
Telephone: 469 - 1858.

The First Urban Studies General Social Survey

by Richard DeLeon *et al**

This brief report summarizes some of the finding of a telephone sample survey of 401 San Franciscans conducted during the period April 14-20, 1980. The survey was conducted as part of an urban research methods course and was sponsored by the Urban Studies Program and the Urban Center. Under the instructor's supervision, students designed the questionnaire instrument, pre-tested it, selected a sample of respondents, conducted the interviews, coded and processed the data, and conducted some very preliminary analyses. Following a short description of the survey research methodology, selected results (including frequencies and one cross-tabulation) will be reported.

Method

The questionnaire evolved through several drafts. The final version incorporated the suggestions of virtually every student in the class. It was decided collectively that the survey should cover a broad range of topics rather than focus on a single issue or theme. The final version of the questionnaire contained a total of twenty-two questions. These include questions asking for attitudes and opinions regarding preferred modes of transportation, fuel conservation, Proposition 9 (Jarvis II), district versus city-wide elections, business taxes, spanking in the schools, the ERA, eligibility of women for the draft and combat, and the growing size of the gay community in San Francisco. Questions on personal background included length of residence in San Francisco, sex, age, income, race, voter registration status, and sexual preference.

The sampling method that was used combines telephone directory sampling with random digit dialing. Systematic sampling was employed to select the prefixes and the next three digits of telephone numbers contained in the most current San Francisco telephone directory. The seventh and last digit was drawn from a table of random numbers and added to each number on the list to form the sample.¹ The survey results are accurate to within plus or minus five percent and have a confidence level of 90 percent. This means that one can be 90 percent sure that the reported percentages do not vary more than five percentage points from the real population percentages.

Most of the interviews were conducted on weekday nights between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. The remaining interviews, many of them callbacks, were done on the weekend. Respondent selection within households was done using the Trolldahl-Carter technique.² A two-callback rule meant that each household would be called a maximum of three times. The response was about 65%. Ten percent of the interviews were verified. Spanish-speaking and Chinese-speaking interviewers conducted interviews by referral with non-English speaking respondents using translated versions of the questionnaire.

The data were coded and punched on IBM cards. An SPSS program was written to produce frequencies and selected cross-tabulations using the campus CDC 3150 computer. (Faculty and students who are interested in analyzing the data may now do so on the CYBER timeshare system.)

Some Findings: Frequencies

To keep this article brief, percentage breakdowns will be given for selected questions with no interpretation. Total sample N is 401. The N reported for each question excludes "don't knows," no answers, and so forth.

*Christopher Ahamefule, Sandra Baily, Susan Ballati, George Bergman, Jon Box, Lynn Cadmus, Claire Curtin, Kit Curtiss, David Duncan, Valerie Eisman, David Epstein, Daniel Everson, Susan Gardner, Karen Howard, Keith Hunter, Daniel Ip, Debra Kelleher, Rebecca Kotite, Richard McKillop, Elise Menashe, Lydia Munson, Alvera Pritchard, Alan Steed, Robin Whybrow. The assistance of Ellen Bonaparte, Deborah LeVeen and Kit Bumar is gratefully acknowledged.

Q3 "On the average, how many days per week do you use public transportation?"

No. Days	n	%
None	118	30%
1	45	11
2	38	10
3	34	9
4	17	4
5	83	21
6	25	6
7	37	9
	397	100%

(This question and the next two were asked of the 318 respondents who said they had heard about Proposition 9, the initiative to cut the state income tax.)

"If the election were to be held today, would you vote for Proposition 9 or would you vote against Proposition 9?"

For Proposition 9	47	(20%)
Against Proposition 9	191	(80%)
	238	(100%)

Q8 "Assuming that Proposition 9 passes, which of the following city services would you MOST like to see cut?" (The following list was rotated with each interview.)

Welfare	111	(53%)
Fire-Police	21	(10)
Libraries, parks and recreation	53	(26)
Public education	10	(5)
Public transportation	13	(6)
	208	(100%)

Q9 "Which city service would you NEXT most like to see cut back?"

Welfare	39	(24%)
Fire-Police	13	(8)
Libraries and recreation	64	(39)
Public education	19	(12)
Public transportation	28	(17)
	163	(100%)

Q10 "San Francisco is divided into eleven supervisorial districts. The people in each district elect a representative to the Board of Supervisors. Some people in San Francisco are saying that the City should do away with the district elections and go back to the old citywide system where supervisors were elected by the entire city. Which system do you think best represents San Francisco residents?"

District Elections	193	(57%)
Citywide Elections	144	(43)
	337	(100%)

Q11 "Downtown businesses should be taxed more than they are now in order to help pay for city services. Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with that statement?"

Strongly disagree	21	(6%)
Disagree	67	(19)
Agree	171	(48)
Strongly agree	96	(27)
	335	(100%)

Q12 "Spanking students is an acceptable form of discipline in San Francisco public schools. Do you...?"

Strongly agree	31	(8%)
Agree	106	(28)
Disagree	118	(31)
Strongly Disagree	121	(32)
	376	(99%)

Q13 "The Equal Rights Amendment should be passed nationally. Do you...?"

Strongly disagree	16	(4%)
Disagree	26	(7)
Agree	168	(45)
Strongly agree	162	(44)
	372	(100%)

Q14 "Women should be drafted for military service. Do you...?"

Strongly agree	63	(16%)
Agree	151	(39)
Disagree	96	(25)
Strongly Disagree	76	(20)
	386	(100%)

Q15 "If women were to be drafted, and if there should be a war, then women should be involved in active combat. Do you...?"

Strongly disagree	120	(31%)
Disagree	106	(28)
Agree	126	(33)
Strongly agree	33	(9)
	385	(100%)

Q16 "What are your feelings about the increasing size of the gay community in San Francisco?"

very negative	72	(19%)
Somewhat negative	65	(18)
Uncertain	104	(28)
Somewhat positive	88	(24)
Very positive	42	(11)
	371	(100%)

A socio-demographic profile of the sample respondents shows that 55% are female; 32% are 50 years or older while 35% are between 18 and 29; 28% reside in households making more than \$25,000 while 15% make less than \$5,000. Seventy-six percent claim they are registered to vote; 64% are white; 10% identify themselves as gay or bisexual. (Except for the sexual preference question, these results are very similar to figures obtained in two recent telephone sample surveys conducted by DeLeon and Courtney Brown for the San Francisco Charter Commission. In those surveys, 16 to 17% of the sample respondents identified themselves as gay or bisexual. The sample Ns were 761 and 773, respectively.)

Analyses and Interpretations

As part of the course requirements, students prepared brief reports on cross-tabulation runs and on elaborations controlling for a third variable. Considering the time constraints facing them, many of their papers are quite good and contain interesting findings.

One perspective on social theory (at least of the "middle range" sort) is that it seeks to explain significant differences.³ Some people support district elections, for example, while others support citywide elections. What accounts for the difference? As part of the logic of survey analysis, often the interesting initial differences to be explained are those revealed in simple bivariate cross-tabulation. Variable X and variable Y are found to be correlated. That is a finding. But why are they correlated? Answers to that question represent the first steps in the intellectual journey called theory construction. As a way to conclude this article, a cross-tabulation is presented below showing a strong correlation between respondents' feelings about the gay community and their choice of electoral system. (Keep in mind that each of the subgroup Ns has a sampling error much greater than plus or minus 5%; the percentage differences shown in the table as a whole however, are highly significant statistically.)

Q16 "What are your feelings about the increasing size of the gay community in San Francisco"?

Q10 Which system best represents SF residents?

	Very Negative	Somewhat Negative	Uncertain	Somewhat Positive	Very Positive
DISTRICT	26%	56%	60%	70%	86%
AT -LARGE	74%	44%	40%	30%	14%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(N=57)	(N=55)	(N=87)	(N=81)	(N=36)

NOTES

You are the theorist. What factors account for the strong linkage of responses to these two questions? What additional variables would you introduce into the analysis to test your ideas? Assuming the sample size were large enough to permit it, what further breakdowns of the data would you perform to test rival hypotheses as well as your own?

¹See Seymour Sudman, "The Uses of Telephone Directories for Survey Sampling," *Journal of Marketing Research*, Vol. 10 (May, 1973), p. 204-207. Also see Don Dillman, *Mail and Telephone Surveys* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), Chap. 7

²Verling C. Troidahl and Roy E. Carter, Jr., "Random Selection of Respondents Within Households in Phone Surveys," *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 1, no. 2 (May, 1964), p. 71-76. The findings reported below are not weighted for household size, a consideration to be kept in mind if there is a suspected correlation between a given variable and household size. See p. 74.

³One might also seek to explain non-differences, of course, especially when there is good reason to expect differences. For a solid, readable treatment of survey analysis, see Morris Rosenberg, *The Logic of Survey Analysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).



associated students