URBAN ACTION

1981/82



INSIDE

- UA Interviews
  Peter Hall
  on Enterprise Zones
  Lawrence Livingston
  on the planning process
- San Francisco's Freeway Revolts
- Urbanization in Cuba
- A Social Geography of Belfast
- Urban Revitalization without Displacement

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CONTENTS

Urban Policy and Coalition Politics

UA Interviews

International Urban Perspectives

Editor's Notes

URBAN ACTION has been produced annually since 1979 by the Forum of Urban Studies Students of San Francisco State University. This is an entirely student-written, student-produced journal, serving as a vehicle through which undergraduates may have outstanding research and academic works published.

My experience with URBAN ACTION began in 1980, when I co-authored an article for this edition. Subsequently, I became involved in the production aspects of our journal, and gained exposure to many facets of its publishing.

URBAN ACTION, Winter 1980, enjoyed a hearty reception; I'd like to thank all of our readers for this success. UA 1981-82 comes to you in a different format; every issue shall have its own mark of individuality or uniqueness, but what I've striven for in our 1981-82 issue is adherence to a certain quality, a certain striving for greater heights, as my professors taught me throughout my undergraduate work.

I'd like to thank our Urban Studies faculty for their support and encouragement. Norm Schneider provided us invaluable recommendations for our production. Richard LeGates, our faculty advisor, deserves a special note of thanks; without his undying dedication this journal would not have been published. URBAN ACTION owes Dick a debt of gratitude which can never be repaid.

The funding of UA 1981-82 proved quite challenging, to say the least; thanks to all of our contributors, who donated so generously. Your support was instrumental in the production of this issue.

Finally, I extend my greatest appreciation to the staff of UA 1981-82. You worked diligently during times of uncertainty, and produced a work which we can all be proud of.

Pamela Johnson
Managing Editor, UA 1981-82

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Freeway Revolt! San Francisco Neighborhoods Fight for their Future

by Stephanie L. Tutt

During the late 1950s and early 1960s residents of San Francisco rebelled against the proposed construction of nine freeways, using the political arena as a vehicle for protest. These so-called "freeway revolts" caused San Francisco's legislative bodies to implement a policy change which considered the neighborhoods and residents of the city when planning solutions to the congestion problems caused by daily commuters. This paper presents the history of the San Francisco freeway rebellions, from their rise to the final rejection of six "necessary" freeways by the Board of Supervisors, and an analysis of the political and policy climate in which the revolts occurred.

The post-World War II era brought a boom of economic growth and prosperity to the United States. Many cities of the country had experienced a growth of job opportunities brought about by the war building effort. San Francisco received a naval building shipyard during the war which created thousands of new jobs and attracted people from all over the country. After the war San Francisco's downtown area continued to grow as the financial focal point of the Bay Area. This growth continued to attract people and jobs from all over the nation.

One social trend that accompanied the growth of the downtown business area as the focal point for job opportunities was a movement of families out of the central city and into surrounding suburbs. This decentralization had begun in the last decades of the nineteenth century with the advent of the streetcar and grew during the early decades of the twentieth century with the introduction of the inexpensive automobile. It was accelerated after the war by the creation of FHA and VA loans which guaranteed low mortgage rates to qualifying families and veterans who moved into single-family detached homes outside of central cities. This out-of-the-city movement was happening in San Francisco and most cities across the country. More and more families with jobs in the downtown area of the city were moving outside of the city.

The daily journey to work trips of people living outside the city but working inside the city's downtown area caused congestion problems in downtown areas and in the neighborhoods used as throughways to downtown. In San Francisco congestion problems had been realized and studied in the late 1930s when the city contracted the engineering firm of De Leuw Cather and Associates to devise a traffic control plan for the city. Their master plan was completed in 1940 and updated after the war (Haligan, 1981). This was only an interim plan and recommended a more comprehensive study of the city's transportation systems. In March of 1947 the Transportation Technical Committee, which was appointed by the Mayor, introduced its "Traffic, Transit and Thoroughfare Improvements for San Francisco." This plan, which was based on the 1945 master plan, was a joint effort by various city agencies to suggest possible updates (Technical Committee of the Mayor's Administrative Planning Council, 1947:15). It called for two freeways, the Bayshore and the Embarcadero, and a series of major highways and major city streets which included heavily traveled routes on the perimeters and through the middles of some neighborhoods.

A subsequent plan which was laid out a year later by the combined efforts of the De Leuw Cather firm as consulting engineers and appointed city planners raised the number of proposed freeways to seven. This plan recognized the city as a "machine for the production and distribution of goods and services," and proposed "transportation improvements to help the business district retain and enhance its drawing power." The city was also seen as a place for living. The need for "living areas to be separated from work areas with ways of moving quickly and conveniently from one to the other" was stated. "Long distance trunk lines were planned to pass between and around communities." These lines were to be "well insulated with wide right-of-ways and planting to avoid a blighting effect" (De Leuw Cather and Ladislas Segoe, 1947:17). In its stated objectives this plan was conscious of the city's neighborhoods and possible blighting effects of highway development within neighborhoods. However, this neighborhood awareness is not apparent in the placement and number of proposed freeways.

After a two-year study of the 1948 plan proposed by De Leuw Cather and Associates the City Planning Commission released its own Trafficways Plan (Lanthrop, 1971:133). The plan called for the following nine freeways: the Park Presidio, the Golden Gate, the Embarcadero, the Western (Panhandle), the Central, the Crosstown, the Mission (Southern), the Bayshore, and the Junipero Serra. It

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A Native of Philadelphia, Stephanie Tutt has interests in policy formation and analysis. She will graduate in the Spring of 1982 as an Urban Studies major and Geography minor. This paper was written for an Urban Policy class during her junior year.



Pamela Johnson

also included three expressways, major and secondary thoroughfares, and a series of parkways. The placement of the expressways, thoroughfares, and parkways was along existing community boundaries or along heavily traveled routes; but the placement of the freeways, following the 1948 plan, showed no consideration of community boundaries whatsoever. This plan was formally adopted into the master plan in July of 1951.

With an approved master plan and additional funds the California Division of Highways began preliminary studies for the Western, Junipero Serra, and Park Presidio freeways. What had seemed to be far off and remote planning was now showing signs of reality, which meant freeways would be cutting into neighborhoods and through Golden Gate Park. This aroused opposition from residents and neighborhood groups in the areas of these proposed freeways. The Park and Recreation Commission opposed the building of a freeway in the Panhandle and through the park, and passed a resolution in early 1955 stating their position. Soon afterwards the City Planning Commission deleted the part of the Western freeway which would have run through the Panhandle "pending further study" (Lanthrop, 1971:135).

"More and more families with jobs in the downtown area of the city were moving outside of the city."

In December of that year two thousand residents of the Sunset, West Portal, and Parkside districts gathered to ask questions and express their anguish over the southern part of the Western freeway. They asked the State Highway Chief, City Director of Public Works and a representative from the City Planning Department why the freeway was proposed when it would only serve out-of-towners; how many houses would be taken and whether San Francisco was to become just an other platform for freeway ramps. These officials claimed that the freeway was necessary to prevent predicted future immobility from traffic congestion along Nineteenth Avenue. They also emphasized that the freeway would also serve the numerous intra-city trips not caused by out-of-towners. Although these officials could answer some of the questions, they were ill-prepared to answer all of the questions posed by the residents and neighborhood groups.

The reasons for building the freeway as stated by these officials apparently were not convincing enough for property owners. This meeting intensified public concern; many residents felt that the Division of Highways was attempting a cover-up with its faltering presentation. Neighborhood awareness of the freeway threat was aroused in other areas, and anti-freeway meetings continued through the spring of 1956. Another large meeting in oppostion to the Western freeway was held that April. Over sixteen hundred residents, property owners, merchant associations, and realtors in the area of the Sunset, West Portal, Parkside, and Haight-Ashbury districts attended (Lanthrop, 1971:136). Through the use of written complaints, including petitions with over twenty thousand signatures, to the Board of Supervisors and other city legislative bodies and by attending Board meetings en masse, these residents and interest groups made their opposition known to the appropriate agencies. They also made the controversy known to the city by writing editorial letters to various city newspapers.

These tactics were successful in raising public awareness to the controversy and pressuring the appropriate agencies into halting the plans for the Western freeway. On June 12, 1956, the Board of Supervisors passed a resolution opposing the construction of this freeway. Their reasons were that the freeway would take too much residential property, degrade surrounding neighborhoods, and serve through but not local traffic (*San Francisco Chronicle*, June 12, 1956). These were the very objections raised by the local protesters.

Proponents of the Western freeway were not about to give up. Groups like the State Highway Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Downtown Association claimed this freeway was an essential link in the state and national highway system and was a vital connection for commuters in the rapidly developing suburbs around the city. These powerful groups succeeded in pushing the Board of Supervisors into authorizing a study to determine whether the Western freeway was necessary. This study, published in December of 1957, stated that the freeway would be necessary in ten years (Lanthrop, 1971:136).

During the next two years the battle over the Western freeway continued but was overshadowed by the construction of the Embarcadero and Central freeways. No opposition arose over the Embarcadero route because it ran along the waterfront and caused no damage to residential areas. It was welcomed by the businesses along the waterfront because it would provide quick and easy access for delivery and shipping trucks. Reasons for the lack of oppostion to the Central freeway are less clear since it did run through the Mission neighborhood.

The Embarcadero and Central double-decker freeways opened in early 1959. Even before they opened, the twisting concrete structures were considered ugly by many residents of the city. Visual evidence of the ugliness and destruction of freeways was now available. Many felt that these freeways affected the aesthetics of the city by ruining views for miles around. The Embarcadero freeway cut in front of the historical Ferry Building at the foot of Market Street. Residents on Nob Hill no longer had a clear view of the Bay.

In January of 1959, before these two freeways were completed, anti-freeway revolts started to overshadow the construction again. The citizens could see what the construction was doing to the once-quaint city of San Francisco. The first permanently stopped freeway was the proposed Crosstown freeway. This action followed protests by Glen Park neighborhood groups and concerned property owners (Lanthrop, 1971:137). The tide turned against further freeway construction when two hundred freeway opponents appeared and voiced their opposition to the Board of Supervisors' Street Committee. This committee had been sent out to discover neighborhood feelings on the freeway plans. No groups or individuals appeared in favor of the freeways.

This was reported to the Board of Supervisors at their next meeting along with a recommendation for the rejection of the plans for six of the nine proposed freeways. On January 26, 1959, before an audience of 162 freeway opponents, the Board of Supervisors, following the recommendations of its Street Committee, voted to reject plans

for six of the nine proposed freeways. The rejected freeways were the Western, Junipero Serra, Crosstown, and Park Presidio freeways, the Central freeway from Turk Street to Lombard Street, an extension of the Embarcadero freeway to the Golden Gate Bridge, and finally the Mission freeway which had already been scrapped by the Highway Department because of cost. One of the stated reasons for this massive rejection according to Supervisor Hailey was that it was unfair to leave freeways in the master plan that would cause blighted property in the surrounding neighborhoods.

During the early 1960s the anti-freeway movement which had started in San Francisco began to spread to other cities across the country. This did not mean that the movement was dead in San Francisco, however. The fight over the Panhandle and Golden Gate freeways came into the spotlight for the final battle in the mid-1960s. During the intervening time over one hundred alternative designs were proposed because of insistence from the Chamber of Commerce and the Downtown Association that these freeways were essential. These alternative designs ranged from underground tunnels to above-ground tree-line boulevards to double-decker arrangements to various combinations of the three. Clearly the organizations concerned with the continued economic prosperity of the downtown area were trying to please the city's residents, but were not about to give up the fight.

Neither were the opponents of these two freeways which included neighbrohood councils and groups from the Haight-Ashbury District, the Human Rights Commission, all of the city's black and civil rights groups, and area merchants. These groups felt that the Panhandle freeway would damage the neighborhood, and the city would lose this valuable integrated area by changing it to a segregated one because of necessary displacement from the construction. Various groups concerned with preserving the residential atmosphere in the Marina District also voiced their opposition to the proposed Golden Gate freeway.

Backed by the experience gained from the freeway

"The citizens could see what the construction was doing to the once-quaint city of San Francisco."



San Francisco's Freeway Routes

Reprinted by permission of the San Francisco Department of City Planning

revolts of the 1950s, along with the growing national trend away from using freeways as the only cure for congestion problems, these groups were successful in getting the Board of Supervisors to reject the plans for both freeways. They used the same political manuevers of written protest and mass attendance of Board meetings that had proven effective years before. On March 22, 1966, the Board of Supervisors laid the last of the opposed freeway plans to rest with a six-to-five rejection vote. The Supervisors felt that the Board had an obligation to approve only those freeways that would cause a minimum disruption to housing, business, and the aesthetic values of the area (*San Francisco Chronicle*, March 22, 1966). The long anti-freeway battle had been won, leaving behind only a few reminders of how a freeway can ruin the beauty of the city.

Analysis

After reading the history of the anti-freeway movement in San Francisco, many questions arise as to why and how events occurred as they did. First, a definition of what a freeway is would be helpful. Freeways were defined by various planning agencies as limited access routes without interference from cross traffic. Exit and entrance ramps were designed so as not to interfere with the main traffic flow. Highways and expressways were defined as limited access through routes with separate grades, no left turns at stoplights, and no parking (De Leuw Cather and Company, and Ladislas Segoe, 1948:25). Other terms such as major and secondary throughfares, parkways, and major city streets refer to routes with higher levels of local access up to regular city streets.

But why were freeways seen as the cure-all for congestion problems? These structures were designed to drastically reduce the number of necessary decisions made by a driver. This would therefore allow him or her to travel safely at much higher rates of speed than possible on regular city streets. Freeways were seen as a way of moving large numbers of people in and out of and between areas quickly, as would be necessary during commute hours in and out of downtown San Francisco.

It is also important to keep in mind that the entire nation was moving towards decentralization during the post-World War II period. The U.S. Government was encouraging movement out of central cities. The Department of Defense had begun planning the interstate highway system to allow for rapid mobilization of troops and tanks to key areas, if necessary. The thinking during this time and through the 1950s was decentralization with quick and easy access to major business centers.

Turning back to San Francisco, a first question might by why the number of proposed "necessary" freeways was increased from two in the 1947 "Traffic, Transit and Thoroughfare Improvement Plan" to nine in the 1948 "Transportation Plan." Two reasons are possible. First, the 1947 plan was produced by a team, appointed by the major, representing the departments of City Planning and Public Works, the Public Utilities Commission, and the Police Department (Lanthrop, 1971:133). These city agencies were in touch with the atmosphere of San Francisco and therefore proposed many tree-lined major thoroughfares and highways and only one freeway. They would also be here in the future to hear complaints and would also have to develop alternative plans if problems arose. Therefore it was to their advantage to devise a plan which would cause as little neighborhood disruption as possible.

Contrastingly the following plan of 1948 was produced by a consulting engineering firm and consulting city planners. These consultants were possible more removed from the atmosphere of this city. They would not necessarily be involved in future plans to fix the problems arising from all the construction. Possible these consultants wanted to produce an innovative plan using the wave of the future: freeways.

The second possible reason for the drastic increase in the number of proposed "necessary" freeways is that more funds for highway development became available in 1948 with the passage of the Collier-Burns act. This act raised the state gasoline tax. Perhaps the expanded plans anticipated and attempted to use the additional funds in a manner which was considered more efficient. The adopted plan of 1951 probably echoed this sentiment.

The question of how residents were able to block plans set forth by various planning agencies also arises. According to ex-supervisor Jack Morrison, the residents and some small merchants of the proposed affected areas banded together and put pressure on the Board of Supervisors, the Transportation Commission, and other involved agencies by writing letters to newspapers and the agencies, by getting thousands of signatures on petitions, and by attending meetings of the Board of Supervisors en masse. These local groups of residents and merchants took action only when it was clear that the proposed freeways affecting their area were beginning to take shape. These protesters were not interested in stopping all freeway construction; they just did not want freeways constructed through their neighborhoods.

"The placement of freeways...showed no consideration of community boundaries whatsoever."

Who were these people and how were they able to get the Board of Supervisors to vote against the city's master plan and transportation experts? As has been stated, the protesters were mostly residents and local small merchants of the affected neighborhoods. Towards the end of the long freeway rebellion a few citywide anti-freeway groups had appeared to aid in the fight. These people joined together to form neighborhood residents associations, such as the Haight-Ashbury Neighborhood Council, homemakers associations, such as the West Portal Homemakers Association; area merchants formed merchants associations, such as the Haight Street Merchants Association. Other groups included local property owners associations and associations of realtors, and in later protests, larger groups such as the city's civil rights and black groups, along with the Human Rights Commission. These groups wanted to keep the residential atmosphere of their areas and prevent blight, reduced property values, and neighborhood separation from freeways which they felt would not serve the needs of the community.

There were a few freeways built in San Francisco despite the strong anti-freeway movement. These routes were the Southern, Bayshore, and half of both the Central and Embarcadero freeways. The Embarcadero freeway ran

along the waterfront and therefore caused no disruption to residential areas. This freeway was welcomed by the local manufacturers because it allowed quick access for delivery and shipment vehicles. The Central freeway passed through a residential area, the Mission District, that was neither organized nor wealthy. Perhaps the poverty or the ethnic fragmentation of the area prevented action. The Southern freeway also passed through residential areas in the Ingleside District. This freeway may have survived scrutiny since it followed existing Alemany Boulevard and the Southern Pacific's old Valencia branch right-of-way. This had been a neighborhood barrier for many years, and there was probably little opposition to its continuance (Lanthrop, 1971:142). The Bayshore freeway also passed through many residential districts, such as the Portola and Potrero districts, but these areas probably also lacked organization for perhaps the same reasons as the Mission District.

A final question concerning the political system in San Francisco and the steps a proposed freeway must take to be built will show why the residents could halt a freeway. Proposed freeways in San Francisco which were to link up with other freeways outside the city were originally planned by the state as part of the state and national system. Freeways which originated and terminated within San Francisco were planned by the city and appointed consulting firms. All of these plans worked with funds received from the state Division of Highways and some federal funds. But the routes within the city, whether part of the state or intra-city system, needed the approval of the Board of Supervisors because only it held the power to close city streets to allow the right-of-way for a freeway. According to Mr. Haligan who worked for the Division of Highways under the Department of Public Works during the late 1950s and 1960s, a relatively small number of city residents were able to pressure the Board into rejecting certain freeways because the Board members were elected at large. This meant that each member's re-election was based on support from residents all over the city. If a large number of voting residents of one area made their feelings known to the Board, it was in the best interest of the Board members to act accordingly if they had hopes of re-election. Although powerful downtown groups like the Chamber of Commerce and the Downtown Association were pressuring the Board to take the proper steps to get the freeways built and supposedly enhance and retain downtown's drawing power, it was the voters and not downtown interests that Board members would have to cater to for re-election bids. This is not to suggest that self-interest was the only factor that made many of the supervisors vote against freeways; many of them were truly concerned with preserving the neighborhoods and aesthetic values of the city, but voter preference was what had gotten them elected and what they were obligated to listen to.

After the first freeways were built and residents saw the blighting effects caused by lowered property values from what were seen as ugly, noisy, concrete monstrosities, planners became more sensitive to these problems and tried to re-route freeways through other areas. They were not ready to give up the freeway idea, however. Information and statistics concerning safety, efficiency, property loss, and other areas of public concern were published to try and persuade the public into acceptance. Then in the early 1960s planners began to realize that freeways did not solve congestion problems but instead transferred the congestion from city streets to the freeways at interchanges and on exit and entrance ramps during rush hours. Before this, however, starting in San Francisco in the 1950s and 1960s and spreading to other metropolitan areas in which freeway construction was occurring, residents realized that if they were organized and targeted their efforts at the appropriate local agencies they could stop freeway construction.

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Urban Revitalization Without Displacement

by Zackary D. Smith *et al.**

Bay Area neighborhood and community activists received first-hand technical assistance from a panel of urban experts at the National Urban Coalition's regional conference, which convened on October 7-8, 1981, in Oakland, California, at Goodman Hall.

Close to five hundred conferees joined a select group of politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, and academicians to discuss "Revitalizing Urban Communities Without Displacement."

The conference was called in response to the increasing phenomenon of urban displacement, which is defined by Grier and Grier in their 1978 HUD Displacement Report as follows:

> When any household is forced to move . . . by conditions which affect the dwelling, or the immediate surroundings, and which
> - are beyond the household's control;
> - occur despite the household's having met all conditions of occupancy; and
> - make continued occupany impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable.

Most urban displacement affects low and moderate level income city-dwellers, and occurs as a result of rent increases, and disinvestment—resulting in undermaintenance.

The conference themes covered seven areas: The Changing Housing Climate, Developing Public/Private Partnerships to Maintain Neighborhood Stability, Capacity-Building for Neighborhood-Based Organizations, The Role of Federally Supported Programs and Public Interest Groups in Controlling Displacement, Strategies to Minimize Hardships Associated with Displacement, and Homeownership Options.

The conference was organized to treat each theme area critically, to provide an overview of the various social, political, legal, and economic forces at work, and to assist Bay Area residents threatened by urban displacement.

★*This article is based upon proceedings from a conference sponsored by the National Urban Coalition on "Revitalizing Urban Communities Without Displacement." The conference was funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.*

Full copies of the proceedings, which were written by the staff of Urban Action, are available from the National Urban Coalition, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036.

Striking a thematic note in his opening remarks, National Urban Coalition President Carl Holman compared the political currents which underlie the Reagan Administration with those which preceded the "New Deal." According to Holman, the focus of political access has shifted from the federal level to the state and local levels.

Holman stressed that, "You have to start at the local level and build some of the safeguards that were originally at the local level." He lauded Oakland as a model of the kind of coalition building which will be needed in the challenging years ahead.

Other speakers on the Opening Remarks forum included Arthur Chandler, Director of the San Francisco State University Urban Center; Aileen Hernandez, National Urban Coalition board member; Wilson Riles, Jr., Oakland City Council member; and William Ward, Chairman of the New Oakland Committee.

Urban revitalization must include a mechanism that will provide affordable housing for low and moderate Bay Area residents, speakers agreed at the Wednesday morning plenary session attended by the full body of panel experts.

This view was expressed by Richard LeGates, Associate Professor of Urban Studies at SFSU; Charles Harlins, Special Assistant to HUD Area Manager for San Francisco; Donald Terner, Director of the California State Department of Housing and Community Development; Daniel Lopez, Senior Regional Planner, Association of Bay Area Governments, and Kenneth Simmons, Professor of Architecture, U.C. Berkeley.

The panelists discussed "The Changing Housing Climate: Problems and Possibilities for Preventing Displacement by Maintaining Affordable Housing for Low and Moderate Income Residents in Urban Centers." The discussion among the panelists brought forth several widely divergent opinions.

LeGates, who moderated the session, pointed out a "cruel paradox"—that urban revitalization is occurring; but in the context of a political conservatism, which threatens to displace low and moderate income urbanites.

Harlins conveyed HUD's uncertainty over the Reagan administration's position on federal housing and urban development programs. According to Harlins, the specter of "devastating" budget cuts is impending.

Terner cited the state's mechanisms for remedying the displacement phenomenon. Among them are: (1) equity sharing for moderate income renters facing condominium conversions, (2) moderate income deferred rehabilitation loan program, (3) the modest rehabilitation of seventy thousand single room occupancy hotels facing demolition,

and (4) the provision of replacement housing for residents of Watts, California, who face displacement by a proposed freeway.

Lopez advocated the forming of public/private partnerships to compete with inflationary land speculators.

Simmons warned that supply-side economics will exacerbate current trends unless community organizations develop the political savvy necessary to protect their neighborhoods from the ravages of urban displacement.

One speaker after another described to the registrants the nuts and bolts process of implementing an affordable housing program, or suggested tactics which community groups can use to combat displacement.

Eileen Weinreb, Mayor of Hayward, California, citing the example of large urban renewal projects such as those occurring in San Francisco's Western Addition, which displaced thousands of households, said that an important lesson learned about displacement relates to scale. Large projects are difficult to manage. According to Weinreb, Hayward has been encouraged to undertake affordable housing programs by the availability of flexible Community Development Block Grant funding.

"...urban revitalization is occurring; but in the context of a political conservatism, which threatens to displace low and moderate income urbanites."

Weinreb described Hayward's efforts to create ways to involve both the private sector and state and local levels in the creation of affordable housing for working people: "We need to use all the 'tricks of the trade' to finanace moderate income housing and subsidize low income housing."

Examples of projects which Hayward has undertaken include: 58 units of Section 235 below-market-interest-rate housing, and a proposed 160 units of mixed market rate and Section 8 multi-family rental housing.

On the other hand, Elihu Harris, state assemblyman, Oakland, California, urged conference participants to reexamine their value systems, with an eye to developing the social consciousness necessary to organize effectively at the grassroots level. Harris believes that something is wrong with contemporary attitudes, philosophies, and institutions.

According to Harris, "We have to go back to developing a sense of community; to establishing lines of communication, talking to each other, to know our neighbors. . . . We've got to move beyond rhetoric to implementation of programs."

Warren Widener, president of the Urban Housing Institute, told registrants that affordable housing can be built without displacing people. He identified key ingredients as getting neighborhgood residents involved and building quality construction. Widener said that the real difference between programs which just displace and ones which revitalize neighborhoods is the way that the people who run the programs look at what they are doing.

Widener stated that "A housing program should help the residents of a neighborhood improve the quality of their life, and you start by improving the quality of the place in which they live."

Workshop Summaries

The following is a condensation of the panel discussions which took place at the seven workshops that spanned the two-day conference. Each workshop was presided over by an urban expert, chosen as moderator because of his or her background in a related field. Each moderator was assisted by panelists, chosen from among conference participants to assist in articulating the respective workshop topics. The panelists spoke briefly at the outset of each workshop, reflecting their own expertise in the area of discussion. This condensation draws heavily from a record of the conference proceedings prepared for the National Urban Coalition by a team of students from San Francisco State Urban Studies Department, under the direction of Richard LeGates.

"Developing Public/Private Partnerships to Maintain Neighborhood Stability"

Ward Hill, administrator of the Foundation for the San Francisco Architectural Heritage, Inc., and panel moderator began this panel by describing the dynamics of the displacement phenomenon. According to Hill, in recent years a dilemma has arisen because lending institutions have begun to lend in "high risk" neighborhoods to in-movers with good credit. As intended, the availability of mortgage money created value, but in older urban areas this has produced a negative spin-off-displacement of lower income groups. Hill expressed his view that urban heterogeneity is healthy and desirable, but that the marketplace offers "virtually no affordable housing" for low income groups who are displaced.

Billy Richardson, neighborhood advisor for the National Urban Coalition's Neighborhood Technical Assistance Project, agreed with Hill's analysis of the displacement problem, but went on to explain how joint ventures between public and private partners can redress the displacement phenomenon by providing financing for housing programs. Richardson mentioned: use of Community Development Block Grant funds, tax abatement, eminent domain, federal mortgage insurance, interest reduction through the sale of state bonds, and federal tax advantages implicit in various financial packages.

Richardson believes that neighborhood associations are valuable resources in the struggle to arrest displacement because they bring people together to work on such common problems as blight, local politics, and enhancing property values—all important to would-be private investors in low and moderate income neighborhoods.

Karen Schuyler, real estate broker and member of the Oakland Chamber of Commerce and Board of Realtors, noted that she frequently confronts the problem of displacement. In her judgement, the hope for the future must be based on cooperation between private industry and the public.

Schuyler urged community groups to make contacts with local developers and contractors, and to consider alternative funding sources such as bond issues or pension funds. Schuyler stressed that stabilizing

neighborhoods is especially important in the city of Oakland, where 4½ million square feet of office space will be available by 1985.

"Capacity-building for Neighborhood-based Organizations"

George Woo, associate professor of Asian-American Studies at San Francisco State University, acted as workshop moderator and introduced the workshop participants.

Paul Cobb, director of the Oakland Citizens' Committee for Urban Renewal, began by defining coalition building as the development of the economic, technical, and political resources needed to build self-help organizations to a point where they possess the capacity for self-determination.

Gordon Chinn, director of the San Francisco Chinatown Neighborhood Improvement Resource Center extended Paul Cobb's definition by emphasizing the need for *organization* capacity as well as community capacity buillding.

Susan Bain, neighborhood advisor, National Urban Coaltion, discussed the Orange Heights Neighborhood Association—a low/moderate income area in San Diego with which the Urban Coation has been working—as an example of effective coalition building. In this area OHNA members, including elderly residents, obtained sufficient self-help skills to rehabilitate their homes in order to preserve their neighborhood.

Gordon Chinn pointed out the usefulness of the Community Reinvestment Act as an advocacy device and a basis for building bridges to developers. At the same time, development must be sensitive to displacement.

George Woo summarized the workshop's main points as (1) the need for *omniperspective* community organization and coalition building around total community need, and (2) the need to look to private sector organizations for resources and to build up non-profit corporations and joint-venture projects.

"The Role of Federally Supported Programs and Public Interest Groups in Controlling Displacement"

Robert Chastain, housing manager, Office of Community Development, Oakland, California, and workshop moderator, introduced the theme of the workshop as an examination of the federal government's new policy on displacement and the role of public interest groups in controlling displacement. He indicated concern that Washington has little or no concern with the displacement problem and there is a turning back from public/private partnerships for housing.

Virgus Streets, an urban development analyst for the Oakland, California Community Design Collaborative, began his remarks by commenting on several definitions of displacement and the new process of "unfiltering." According to Mr. Streets, the conventional definition of displacement is the unwilling dislocation of a household from its place of residence. Alternatively we are today seeing increasing "in-place displacement" as households fall behind in the amount of money they need to retain their existing housing.

The word "squatterization" captures something of what is going on because it focuses on the victim. In contrast to the conventional "downfiltering" of housing, Mr. Streets pointed to the new phenomenon of "upfiltering." To prevent filtering up, the following conditions are needed: (1) income stability, (2) equity building, and (3) long-term affordability.

Mr. Streets criticized the effectiveness of two much-discussed techniques to maintain long-term affordability: rent control and inclusionary zoning. Under rent control, Streets argued, rental units pass from friend to friend; lower income people are pushed out and cannot pass on the unit. Inclusionary zoning is not effective because it does not insure that low and moderate income households will get the low and moderate priced units.

"...the real difference between programs which just displace and ones which revitalize neighborhoods is the way that the people who run the programs look at what they are doing."

Jackie Walker pointed out that *private* market forces account for more displacement at the present time than *government* actions. Policies to counteract displacement include the possibility of national policies on condominium conversions in low and moderate income areas, regulation of lending institutions, and anti-speculation measures such as requiring a specific length of stay in purchased units to eliminate speculation. For some moderate income potential homeowners, "urban homesteading" such as the Kansas City urban homesteading program provides an alternative. There, some units may be purchased for $1.00 if the buyer agrees to fix them up and live in them for one year. Robert Chastain pointed out that the federal urban homesteading program, in existence since 1974, was a good program, but that presently HUD has no houses available for urban homesteading.

Anita Patton, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, noted that HUD had included requirements that localities plan measures to slow or stop displacement in their Community Development Block Grant plans, but that as HUD is eliminating its requirements for detailed applications, citizens will have to take greater initiative if they want to see anti-displacement policy a part of local CDBG programs. HUD will limit its involvement to monitoring CDBG programs in the future. Ms. Patton argued that there should not be a national policy on condominium conversions or in other displacement matters because the federal government knows no more than communities about such matters.

"Local Government Regulatory Strategies to Control Displacement"

Wilson Riles, Jr., member of the Oakland City Council and workshop moderator, introduced the panelists.

Dennis Keating, a staff member of the Legal Services Corporation Anti-Displacement Project and lecturer at

Boalt Hall Law School, described the research and writing of the Legal Services Anti-Displacement Project. These include a *Displacement Report* which found that displacement is a large and growing problem, increasingly a private market (rather than government caused) phenomenon, is hitting poor and working class neighborhoods; and a guide—*Displacement: How to Fight It*. This latter publication, to be published in November, describes such anti-displacement strategies as rent and eviction controls, condominium conversion ordinances, demolition controls, and residential hotel conversion ordinances. Professor Keating argued that cities need to adopt comprehensive anti-displacement policies.

Frances Werner, a staff attorney from the National Housing Law Project, began by identifying some underlying structural causes of displacement including lack of new rental housing construction, high interest rates, rising construction costs, and high land costs.

Local government options to control displacement include commercial rent control, condominium conversion control, limited equity coops, anti-arson measures, below-market-interest-rate financing for housing, use of pension funds for housing, public housing retention strategies, use of CDBG funds for site acquisition, and fees imposed on commercial development for housing.

Ways of enlarging the housing supply she mentioned include downzoning, inclusionary zoning, allowing development of in-law apartments, and faster processing of paperwork for developers.

Patricia Jenny, a consultant with Berkeley Planning Associates, described work which BPA did under HUD contract to develop a strategy for San Francisco to minimize displacement. The strategy developed called for use of existing housing resources and regulatory controls in order to retain the existing supply of affordable housing and to harness resources to produce more affordable housing. She went on to describe how measures suggested by Dennis Keating and Frances Werner could be applied to San Francisco.



Ralph Payne, a member of the Mission District (San Francisco) Planning Council and San Francisco Rent Stabilization Board described the potential for housing speculation in San Francisco's Mission District. The Mission Planning Council has been active in many efforts to help stabilize the area. It opposed downzoning, fought for commercial streets to be zoned mixed commercial/residential (not just commercial), and for inclusionary zoning of more than 10 percent of units.

The council tried to help families to get together to buy buildings, but found this difficult in the present market. While limited equity coops are good, Mr. Payne pointed out that they keep people from getting on the equity bandwagon. He pointed out loopholes in the current San Francisco rent stabilization law which should be closed, including, most importantly, vacancy decontrol.

Larry Weston, deputy executive director, Metropolitan Washington Planning and Housing Association, Washington, D.C., began by noting that because investor participation in rental housing has decreased during the last few years, tenants are now being forced to fend for themselves in the rental market. Many investors are looking to sell their properties, minimizing maintenance, and otherwise hurting tenants.

Mr. Weston discussed different projects with which he has been involved in the Washington, D.C. area. He noted that coops respond to the current consciousness of need for security among city residents by providing both financial and physical security.

In Washington, D.C., the regulatory framework is strongly pro-tenant. For example, owners must notify their tenants of their intention to sell a building and give them forty-five days to organize an association capable of holding the building. If such an association is formed, D.C. law grants it another 120 days to negotiate purchase of the property from the owner, and at least another 120 days to settle after the contract is signed: D.C.'s so-called "Right of First Purchase" legislation.

Washington, D.C. also has a condo conversion law which requires that 51 percent of tenants agree to a conversion before it becomes legal and very strong rent control and eviction laws.

Mr. Weston described in detail the process of converting apartment houses to cooperatives, including feasibility studies, negotiations, settlement, and rehabilitation, if necessary. He elaborated on the seven important steps involved in organizing a coop: (1) initial organizing, (2) feasibility studies and establishment of a technical team, (3) contract negotiation, (4) settlement, (5) transition and development of management, (6) rehabilitation stage, and (7) consolidation. He emphasized the importance of the initial organizing phase and the critical need for tenants or others considering forming a coop to develop a detailed organization plan and to obtain technical assistance from an organization with experience and technical expertise. He stressed the importance of assembling a development team to handle all the technical problems in determining the feasibility of the project—structural, financial, and

organizational (particularly assessing the costs involved). The next three steps—contract negotiations, settlement, and the transition to ownership and management involve ensuring that everyone involved in the project fully understands the requirements and responsibilities the project entails. The rehabilitation stage involves actually doing all the work needed to bring the structure up to standards and making necessary alternations and repairs. The consolidation and operation phases involve establishing a management schedule and setting up maintenance, payment, and operating procedures.

Richard Illgen, executive director, Oakland Better Housing, discussed possibilities for forming smaller cooperatives—in buildings with fewer than twenty-five units. While many banks refuse to lend for small projects, Mr. Illgen believes that San Francisco is a good area for small coops because of the number of small (three to fifteen unit) buildings. In such buildings, sweat equity becomes a more realistic possibility, as do more self-management and a less rigid institutional structure. Mr. Illgen stressed the importance of training and technical assistance services to coop residents. Community Economics and others are establishing networks to do this.

"...Washington has little or no concern with the displacement problem and there is a turning back from public/private partnerships for housing."

A discussion centered around possible financing alternatives. Carl Holman, president of the National Urban Coalition, stressed the need to bring in private firms and pension and investment funds not only as a source of money, but in an effort to involve a wider sector of the population in housing issues. Richard Illgen, in response to a question concerning the best size or scale for cooperative development, indicated that traditionally most financing has been made available for large coops. Optimal size is a matter of some debate among coop organizers. He pointed to the need for some small (five to fifteen unit) coops.

What did conference attendees gain from this two-day symposium? The majority hoped to receive information on the urban displacement phenomenon, and they were not disappointed. Virtually all speakers made themselves available for questions, and conferees seemed especially pleased with the opportunity to receive technical assistance from a respected panel of urban experts.

The complexity of the displacement phenomenon was crystallized by the speakers' thorough analysis of specific issues, although a few felt that the immediate future was bleak.

"Strategies to Minimize Hardships Associated with Displacement—Housing Counseling and Relocation Services"

Roy Schweyer, assistant housing manager, Office of Community Development, City of Oakland and workshop moderator, introduced the workshop by stating that the workshop issue was not housing, but rather what to do with people who are in fact being displaced.

"While limited equity coops are good...they keep people from getting on the equity bandwagon."

Edward Hernandez of Metro Housing commented from the perspective of someone who deals constantly with evictions and relocation problems. He noted that Oakland's housing situation was bleak: there are not enough units in the city. While facing frustrations from landlord tenant law that is not sufficiently attuned to tenant needs and with greed of individual landlords, he pointed out that they educate tenants to what is possible and try to make deals with landlords to buy time for persons who are being displaced.

Margaret Stafford of Central Relocation Services, Kansas City, Missouri, described her agency's program of temporary replacement of persons being moved from Neighborhood Strategy Areas, the attempt to relocate them back into rehabilitated units, and the calculation of Replacement Housing Payments. She detailed some of the elements of cost imposed on tenants (security deposits, telephone installation fees, moving costs). A final point was that for persons displaced by private money (as opposed to CDBG funds) little can be done.

Ricardo Rivas, program manager, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, San Francisco Area Office, pointed out that cities which received federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds can fund housing counseling and referral services for displacees if they choose to. Moreover, they *can* fund relocation services—even for private displacement. Another option is for local governments to rehabilitate units and make them available to displacees. Mr. Rivas cited the example of San Francisco, which limits condominium conversions to one thousand per year and mandates that 10 percent of units are supposed to be made available for tenants to purchase at below market rates.

Roy Schweyer pointed out that during the last two to three years, there has been a substantial increase in both rents and housing prices in the seven "community development districts" in Oakland. Oakland has responded with a program to address defaults, provide delinquency counseling, and to counsel tenants who are being displaced. He described Oakland's condominium conversion ordinance which provides elderly tenants a lifetime lease in the building, requires up to five hundred dollars moving expenses for other displacees, and requires development of replacement units. Mr. Schweyer described other Oakland housing programs including (limited) rent stabilization, a municipal low-interest rehab loan program, and a program of providing low rent public housing for persons displaced as a result of housing code enforcement.

In response to a question, Mr. Schweyer described most of the city's clients who are displaced as black

females, single heads of household, and on welfare.

Mr. Schweyer indicated that he would like to see a quasi-governmental agency with a central bank of housing available for emergency housing for displacees. He noted that most emergency housing in the East Bay is currently through women's shelters which are full all the time. Audience members suggested creation of a volunteer fund of money, volunteer time, carpentry assistance, involvement of churches in housing, even temporary barracks for displacees.

"Home Ownership Options: Using Housing Cooperatives as an Alternative Displacement Tool"

Kenneth Nunn, program manager for Owner-Built Housing, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, San Francisco, introduced this workshop by citing cooperative housing ownership as a viable means of home ownership, especially in the future. Mr. Nunn is the program manager for Owner-Built Housing, a cooperative endeavor invented in Oakland. Fourteen Oakland families built a project at 73rd Avenue, though the housing is not owned cooperatively. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is introducing this concept to other cities nationwide.

Janet Falk, cooperative housing consultant with Community Economics, a Berkeley, California, consulting firm, explained that cooperatives could be used as an anti-displacement tool by providing residents affordability, control, and a sense of community.

Affordability comes into play primarily with limited equity cooperatives. By definition, the return to the owner of a unit in a limited equity coop is limited when it is sold. In California, AB 1364 specifies that this return is limited to the resident's original down payment, any amount spent in improvements, and a fixed increment not to exceed 10 percent. Therefore, over a period of time, most of this limited equity cooperative housing will remain lower in cost than other market rate housing. It is non-speculative and fixed.

Control translates into a guaranteed right of occupancy for members of the cooperative. Each household owns one share of stock in the coop corporation which entitles

"...cooperatives can be used as an antidisplacement tool by providing residents affordability, control, and a sense of community."

them to residence in a unit. The coop as a whole elects a board of directors—each household has one vote.

Sense of community in a cooperative comes from living and working closely with others.

The structure of a housing cooperative is as follows: each participant in the cooperative owns a share in the coop corporation, which in turn owns the housing structure. The share allows residence in a unit of housing. In addition, the participant pays monthly costs—usually maintenance fees and some portion of a blanket mortgage. The mortgage rate is fixed—usually for thirty to forty years. Refinancing is not necessary when a unit comes up for sale.

Ms. Falk identified the following advantages of a cooperative: tax advantages of home ownership are available to participants, i.e., each may deduct interest payments, property taxes, and depreciation. These can be especially advantageous to moderate income persons in higher tax brackets. Buying into a cooperative can be less expensive than traditional market rate housing, because in transferring shares, realty specialists are not needed.

Disadvantages identified included: with limited equity cooperatives, participants do not build up equity, and each individual owner is dependent upon others in the cooperative to maintain the property and to make payments required.

In closing, Ms. Falk identified sources of funding for cooperatives including a shrinking pot of Section 8 funds, some Section 8 funds under a set-aside to the California State Housing Finance Agency (CHFA), and possibly the National Consumer Cooperative Bank. The latter institution has just been privatized—i.e., it is now a cooperative itself with shares purchased by the cooperatives who have borrowed from it. It is capitalized by the federal government and did receive appropriations for 1982. Drawbacks in working with the coop bank are a lending rate of 17 to 18 percent and the fact that it will only lend on mortgages which can be traded in the secondary mortgage market. Mortgage revenue bonds may be a potential source of funding, although it is not clear if coops will be considered as single or multi-family dwellings in light of the 1980 Mortgage Revenue Bond Act.

UA Interviews: Peter Hall

Peter Hall was educated at the University of Cambridge, where he received the degrees of M.A. (1957) and Ph.D. (1959). He has taught as Reader in Geography with Special Reference to Regional Planning at the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1966 to 1967 and as Professor of Geography at the University of Reading from 1968 to 1980. He is currently Professor in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley, and Associate Director of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development there. His publications include: Urban and Regional Planning *(1974),* Europe 2000 *(1977),* Great Planning Disasters *(1980), and* Growth Centers in the European Urban System *(with Denis Hay, 1980). He has served as advisor to the British government in a number of committees, and from 1974 to 1980 was a member of the British Social Science Research Council.*

Dr. Hall's theory of urban enterprise zones has received much attention recently. Urban Action staffers Janice Stern and Zackary Smith interviewed him in October.

Pamela Johnson

UA: Dr. Hall, what would you define as the root cause of declining urban space economies in post-industrial western society?

PH: The root cause has to be the decline of the economic base in certain cities. What we are finding, especially in the United States, and to some lesser extent, Great Britain, is this: the employment in manufacturing industries is going down because of greater productivity, and because of competition from newly industrializing countries overseas. Japan led the way in that, and it is no longer a newly industrializing economy, but behind Japan are coming countries like Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, and Brazil, and this plus the productivity factor is causing a sharp decline in employment, and is also causing a rationalization of the location of production in those industries, which in turn is leading many of them out of older plants and older sites in central cities, and into suburban locations, even locations outside of metropolitan areas. There is some compensating increase in service employment, especially in downtown areas in central business districts, but it isn't enough to counteract the decline of manufacturing and associated functions like warehousing; and it isn't providing jobs for those who are thrown out of work by the loss of manufacturing.

UA: Do you perceive any structural crises in Western economic and political institutions, which are contributing to this problem?

PH: I see a structural problem, whether it's a structural crisis depends on how Western policies respond. The structural problem is the loss of a substantial part of the economic base that provided jobs. What we are seeing in the British economy and parts of the American economy is a long-term decline in the economic base, which could become a crisis unless policies can be devised to deal with it.

UA: In a June 1977 address to the Royal Town Planning Institute, you described the Urban Enterprise Zone as an experimental strategy for arresting disinvestment and unemployment in certain inner-city areas. Would you elaborate on this topic?

PH: I was describing structural forces that were leading certain British cities into economic decline, and I cited possible answers to that problem, including the development of tourism and associated craft industries which might serve tourists. I concluded that certain cities should try combinations of these policies, but I also suggested that these policies might not deal with the hard core unemployment of low-skilled people who may never find work again. I suggested the setting up of freeport areas outside the customs area of Great Britain, like Shannon Airport in Ireland, that would be free of all British regulation, almost like independent territories outside of Great Britain. This would encourage entrepreneurs to come in from other parts of Britain and from abroad.

There is a great deal of entrepreneurial spirit in newly industrializing nations which might be applied to these areas if people with capital and business initiative were encouraged to locate in these areas. I didn't think that a British government would adopt anything like this in the short run, so I was somewhat surprised when a couple of years later the incoming Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher adopted the enterprise zone concept.

UA: Would you discuss the recent legislation which emerged in Great Britain regarding enterprise zones?

PH: The enterprize zone legislation which emerged in 1980 resulting in the designation of eleven Enterprise Zones in Great Britain, was a great deal narrower in intent than the idea I originally proposed. It has a number of elements: first, there is freedom from planning or zoning controls. They have made it difficult for industrialists to establish or enlarge their factories in urban areas. Second, incoming industrialists in these zones pay no property tax. The local authority gets from the central government the property

"...newly industrializing nations are the great success stories of the late twentieth century."

taxes that these industries would have paid, so that the local authority gets the same amount of property tax. Additionally, industrialists going in there are allowed to write off their capital expenditures against their tax liabilities. This kind of feature has been frequently used in British regional planning policy in the so-called development areas, ever since World War II and it isn't very novel. The remission of property taxes is novel, but in general most legislation and regulation continues to apply in these areas, and in no sense are they freeports. So the legislation that's developed in Britain is very different from the idea I was originally proposing.

UA: What were the reasons for the Thatcher government's failure to mandate a more experimental version of your Enterprise Zone Concept?

PH: I think they were frightened by the possible opposition. The proposal as it was enacted was very bitterly attacked by the British Labour Party on the grounds that it would encourage sweatshop-type industry. I think there is absolutely no evidence, because all existing factory legislation remains. If they had been willing to make a more fundamental experiment, the first assumption I think would be to say that these areas were outside the area of United Kingdom legislation. That the Conservative government was unable or unwilling to do.

UA: In your address to the National Conference on Enterprise Zones, in Atlanta, Georgia, back in February 1981, you argued that although jobs supplied by enterpreneurs in the zones would be lower-paying than those in surrounding areas, that low-paying jobs are better than the unemployment lines. Do you see enterprise zones as an ultimate solution to the problems of cities, or a stop-gap measure?

PH: I see them as both. I think it is a very important principle of a policy to take workers from unemplolyment lines bacause this benefits workers and benefits the economy in general. Paying workers to be unemployed is simply bad policy, especially if the workers are unemployed long term. It degrades the unemployed worker and gives him no hope for the future and condemns him or her to a second-class

citizenship. I think that this is entirely wrong and I do feel there is a real danger in this in Great Britain and in the United States as well. So I think it would be far better to employ those workers, even at lower than the present minimum wage, because the worker would benefit and so would the economy. However, I don't see employment at lower than the minimum wage as other than a short-term solution, because I would hope—and this would be the acid test of whether the experiment worked—that the enterprise zones would evolve. They would start by employing people in fairly low-skilled jobs at low wages and evolve—as the newly industrialized countries have evolved—into much more sophisticated economies in which wages would advance and the general standard of living would advance. I see the enterprise zone, therefore, as a kind of springboard for economic development of a new kind, exactly following the story of these newly industrializing nations which I firmly believe are the great success stories of the late twentieth century.

"I'm certainly not happy about introducing enterprise zones and simultaneously withdrawing funds for training. That strikes me as economically crazy."

UA: What sort of problems do you think are unique to the American cities?

PH: It depends on whether you are talking about uniqueness within the U.S. or uniqueness worldwide. I don't think American cities are any more unique worldwide because I think the British cities now share exactly the same problems of a work force that cannot find long-term secure employment. Now, that's not the whole work force; we're talking about a section of the work force which is in danger of becoming permanently unemployed and poor. In the U.S. there is obviously a racial and ethnic dimension to this and a high proportion of the unemployed—especially the long-term unemployed—are Black. The interesting point about British cities is that a substantial proportion of the long-term unemployed are white, but they are still low-skilled and they have got an insufficient educational basis for the kind of skills that they need in the kind of economy that these countries are evolving into. Therefore, I don't see any difference between some of the worst American cases—cities like Detroit, or Newark—and cities in Great Britain like Liverpool or Glasgow; they share the same problems. On the other hand, they tend to be unique in comparison with other nations because other parts of these nations are still buoyant and the economy is in good shape. That's very evident in the U.S., where so much of the Sunbelt is really not feeling the impact of the present recession. It's even to a smaller extent evident in Great Britain where the southern half of England is still relatively prosperous and you could call it England's "Sunbelt." So the problem is that the impetus of spatial development has deserted these older inner cities and the question is how to get it going again.

UA: Several American adaptations of the Enterprise Zone concept have been introduced on the federal and state levels. Perhaps the most publicized version has been the Kemp-Garcia bill. How effective do you think this legislation will be as an incentive for encouraging local economic development and revitalizing the designated areas?

PH: I have some doubts about the Kemp-Garcia bill, although I haven't followed its latest progress in detail. The major problem is that it encourages almost any area in the U.S. within very broad limits—defined basically by levels of unemplolyment—to declare enterprise zones, which could be very wide-ranging in area, and therefore, I think there is a certain danger that too large a proportion of given cities, or even of the entire U.S., would find themselves designated as enterprise zones. If enterprises zones are to work they've got to be fairly small, and therefore very distinct from the rest of the country, and the rest of the city in which they're located. The other problem is that the legislations talked in terms of a certain level of unemployment, thus insuring that the enterprise zone will include substantial residential areas which are deemed to be blighted. I believe that enterprise zones should be designated as almost completely derelict or barren areas in which there is very little existing physical development, and they shouldn't include substantial residential areas. The reason for this is that if you are going to have an experiment—a lifting of regulations—those regulations, such as zoning, are designed to protect residents in residential areas and you could have a very serious effect on living conditions if you take all regulations off that area. I see considerable problems with environmental protection if that's done.

UA: Where would you create enterprise zones?

PH: Let me give you an example. Suppose you've got a central business district that's gone down—as is true in many Eastern cities—and many of the buildings have been torn down, awaiting redevelopment that never came, so you get—as you so often do—a vast area of parking lots and low intensity uses with no buildings or temporary buildings on them. That would be an ideal site for an enterprise zone, if it were large enough; you need several blocks in the city, obviously.

Alternatively, if you have an abandoned warehousing or industrial area where the buildings are lying empty or gutted, that would be suited for an enterprise zone, or if you had a port area that has declined and decayed because of containerization and the movement of the port downstream, so that you get another derelict area, that would be a good example, or in other parts of the country you might have an abandoned mining area or big works that have just gone out of business, that would be suitable for rehabilitation.

UA: Can you think of any examples in the Bay Area that might be suitable?

PH: It's more difficult in the Bay Area than anywhere else, oddly enough, because there aren't really so many uses. I guess certain parts of the waterfront in San Francisco—the south waterfront in San Francisco and the central business front in Oakland might be examples. They are more likely to be found in eastern cities, I think.

UA: Do you believe that the Kemp-Garcia bill should provide for training the local unemployed, or would such a provision overburden the legislation?

PH: I think that training is very important, but I'm not so sure it ought to be tied into enterprise zone legislation. I think it's a separate matter. I do think it needs to be linked because enterprise zones in the U.S. may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition, because you do need simultaneously to bring up the skills of the people close to the enterprise zones—remember I'm saying that there should't be people living in them—but since the job of the enterprise zone is to help neighboring communities with high rates of unemployment, then upgrading skills is crucial. It's better to have it done outside the framework of the legislation.

UA: So you could envision an enterprise zone bill accompanying another bill which provides for training?

PH: Yes, I'm certainly not happy about introducing enterprise zones and simultaneously, withdrawing funds for training. That strikes me as being economically crazy.

UA: What do you see as the function of cities in the future?

PH: I think that they are always going to perform the same functions as cities always did. Cities have always been places where people came together because they needed to be close to each other—face-to-face type activities—that will probably give a continuing role to cities as the scene of tertirary activity, service activity; especially those involving large amounts of face-to-face contact, and I see a continuing very strong future, especially for the downtown areas of many American cities, especially the larger ones, for just that function. That isn't going to go away and I don't believe that electronics are going to substitute for that kind of activity. Therefore, those cities that are communications hubs, that are regional centers, that have strong regional airports will develop downtown offices, convention and hotel facilities, as many are doing.

"...instead of being programs that gave lower income people in the cities better housing (urban renewal programs) proved to be recipes for removing lower income people."

Also, I see a role for them as centers of specialized entertainment and recreation, and associated with that, various kinds of tourism, sometimes depending on the historic past of those cities, and sometimes tourism which is deliberately created in association with the business function. I see also an associated role for certain kinds of craft industries requiring special kinds of skills. I see them as continuing strong centers of higher education and research, all of which suggests that cities will increasingly become places where the more affluent live and work. I see a continuation of the gentrification phenomenon, whereby the decayed residential areas are taken over by generally white-collar service industry workers who rehabilitate them, and I don't feel particularly uncomfortable about this, because I think that cities throughout American history have been places of great change; they don't remain still; parts will go up and parts will come down, and that process will go on.

"Gentrification itself, I don't think is a bad thing, as long as one...can deal with the consequences of displacement."

I see a continuing process whereby functions like manufacturing and warehousing, that were traditionally the basis of center cities, will decline, and will move out into the suburbs and beyond. That means that some ways need to be found of taking the workers out to the work. Perhaps the major problem following that is insuring that the outward movement of jobs and the outward movement of the appropriate kinds of workers are kept in some kind of balance, so that you don't get pools of people in the inner city who can't find jobs, but who could find jobs outside the city if only they could get the information and the housing to move out there. I see that as one of the major policy problems still confronting the American cities and their surrounding metropolitan areas.

UA: How would you assure the movement of people out to where the jobs are?

PH: I see it largely as an informational and also, as a housing problem. The problem here is that because of the very large scale or sprawl—if you like—of metropolitan areas in the last twenty-five years, jobs have become displaced so far from inner-city residents, until they're really beyond effective commuting range, by which I mean they maybe are more than 45 minutes to one hour from where the people actually live. Therefore, the only way to deal with that is to encourage—although this isn't conventional wisdom—a higher rate of outflow of those people in to the suburbs including the outer suburbs, where the jobs are. The British had a way of doing this after World War II, through the new towns movement, and I think that something like a new towns solution would be a good solution for America, although I recognize that it necssarily couldn't and wouldn't involve the amount of public investment that went into the British new towns.

UA: Would there be a central area where they could get all the goods and services they need?

PH: I think what would occur, as has already occurred in larger American metropolitan areas, is that the whole area would flatten into a series of sub-areas each based in a local service center for shopping and other kinds of service. I think this is inevitable given the scale of the larger American metropolitan area today; you can't conceive of them as a single central area anymore.

UA: Are you talking about decentralization?

PH: We're talking about large-scale decentralization and then to some degree a recentralization around new subcenters.

UA: The urban renewal programs of the sixties and seventies have been described by conservatives as failures. What is your opinion of their effectiveness?

PH: I think that in some ways they achieved the opposite results from what they were supposed to achieve. Instead of being programs that gave lower-income people in the cities better housing, they proved to be recipes for removing the lower-income people and replacing them with higher-income people. Now, I take a mixed view on this. I'm not against the notion that cities are going to change, that some areas that were high income are going to become low income and vice-versa, but I am against a kind of hypocrisy of using large sums of public money, ostensibly to achieve one purpose, and achieving the reverse. If you're going to have gentrification of inner cities, let it be fairly conscious, and to an end, and let it be accompanied by a process of upgrading the housing conditions of lower-income people in other parts of the metropolitan area.

"The only test (of enterprise zones) is whether they benefit low-income people in the inner cities, because most of the rest of the people can fend for themselves."

UA: Do you think there can be revitalization of inner cities without displacement?

PH: I don't in a sense know, because cities are in turnover all the time. If you actually look at the statistics, it's almost as if cities are always in some kind of a flow; they're never constant; people moving in and out and always have been, and much more in American cities than in any other cities, because of the great amount of mobility, traditionally, of Americans in comparison with most other people. I believe you bring change about in cities through new people coming in and changing the character of an area. I believe this is going to happen and one should accept it as a fact of life, but one should be prepared to using planning as a means to try and deal with the consequences, to some degree, before they arise, because I don't believe that the pure market mechanism is going to achieve the best of all possible worlds. The real problem is what happens when the people are displaced by gentrification. Gentrification itself, I don't regard as a bad thing, as long as one is aware and can deal with the consequences of displacement.

UA: How would you deal with the consequences of a community breaking up because of displacement? What kind of policies would you suggest that would combat that, or should it be aided?

PH: I think that one thing you can do is not to stop the process, but to put a brake on it and prevent a wholesale turnover of an area by having a proportion of housing which is taken outside the pure market process. By that I don't necessarily mean public housing, but I mean various forms of subsidized housing for people of lower incomes, in order to maintain some kind of social mixture in the neighborhood and prevent this total homogenization that you see in some American cities in the gentrified areas. I see the other major problem as providing some kind of aid for the people who are displaced to find superior housing than they had in the areas they were displaced from, so that in effect, all will benefit from the change to some degree. That might be through the provision of some kind of housing aid or housing voucher, I don't know. I don't foresee the provision of further public housing on a large scale, because I believe that the history of public housing in America has, on the whole, been an unhappy one. It's led to the formation of very small, very racially segregated, very low-income areas which have gone down very rapidly, and that I think is the kind of policy one should avoid at all costs. It's not easy to see what should be done instead, but I think that what not to do is evident.

UA: Who do you see as benefitting most from the whole concept of enterprise zones?

PH: The only test is whether they benefit low-income people in the inner cities, because most of the rest of the people can fend for themselves. There is some longer run benefit to the whole of society because through enterprise zones, you generate enterprise, which then proves to develop a lot of jobs, not only for low-income people, but for the whole spectrum of society. The second function is more important to the British economy, which is in such bad shape, but here I don't think you have to worry about that so much.

UA: What is your favorite American city?

PH: It's a rather perverse one. I like Los Angeles because it's so diverse. Although I see it as a city with very large social problems, it's an example of a city which has grown and changed an enormous amount over a fairly long period of time, and shown enormous dynamism and capability to change, and I like it better than San Francisco, which is the conventional favorite American city.

UA Interviews: Lawrence Livingston

From 1949 to 1953, Lawrence Livingston was assistant planning director for the City of Oakland, and from 1953 has been principal of Livingston and Associates, City and Regional Planners. As well as being consultant on urban and regional planning to the states of California and Oregon and numerous cities and counties in the Western United States, Mr. Livingston has also lectured at several Bay Area universities including the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Urban Studies Department at San Francisco State University. He has had a long association with the San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR) and is currently a member of the SPUR Advisory Council. Mr. Livingston's recent urban and regional planning work has included: the Los Angeles County General Plan Revision (1976); the San Francisco Downtown Growth Management Program (1979), and the California Tahoe Regional Plan Implementation Program (1980).

Preston Burris and Pamela Johnson interviewed Mr. Livingston in his office in late October of this year.

Pamela Johnson

UA: In your thirty years as a planning professional, you have probably seen many changes in land-use policies and the legal and regulatory framework by which they are enforced. It appears that in an earlier climate relatively few and broad-ranging land-use regulations were in force. These regulations later proliferated. Now we are experiencing a political climate of deregulation and less government interference. In your opinion, Mr. Livingston, what can these trends be attributed to?

LL: I think the present trend is not necessarily in the direction of less regulation. For example, the 1980 session of the California legislature enacted a number of new regulations requiring cities and counties to plan for an adequate housing supply to meet the needs of all incomes. But I think there are two primary reasons for the present opposition to regulation. There is a backlash against the environmental movement—making the environmental movement the "whipping boy" for a lot of things that have gone wrong with the economy and the nation and the world in general. There is a great and very understandable dissatisfaction with the procedural delays and the red tape that have resulted from the regulations. Perhaps even more importantly there is increasing concern about the rising cost and limited availability of housing, and at least part of the blame for the housing shortage is placed on land-use and development regulations. It is part of the cause, but I'm not sure how big a part. Interest rates are a bigger part of the problem.

"I do not think there has been enough emphasis on planning as pointing in the direction of where you should *go."*

UA: What purpose does planning serve and how would you contrast that with the purpose that it should serve?

LL: Looking at urban and environmental planning, which is my field, I would say that planning has been to too great a degree a negative force—a force which is utilized, particularly through the legislative process in a negative manner rather than being a positive, creative force. I do not think there has been enough emphasis on planning as pointing in the direction of where you *should* go. Very frequently plans are aimed at preserving the status quo and pointing out directions in which development should *not* go.

UA: Do you believe that planners are responsible for this negative orientation, or are the results a combination of professional planning in a political context?

LL: I believe that planners are partly responsible, but they would have a much more positive orientation were it not for the fact that the constituencies that have given planners a very considerable degree of political power are also the constituencies that are against change and in favor of preserving the status quo.

UA: What could the planning profession do to use this negative orientation to its benefit?

LL: Well, I think that perhaps from the standpoint of the professional planner the present housing crunch is a blessing in disguise. Something is going to have to be done. Even the children of the well-to-do cannot afford to live in the same communities, or in some cases in the same counties, as their parents. In fact, some of them are living at home and getting in the way, so to speak, because they can't afford to provide their own housing. I think the public is very close to demanding a solution to the housing crisis and that will enable planners to go in a more positive direction rather than to put so much stress on what cannot be done.

UA: Who is responsible for the planner's preoccupation with maintaining the status quo?

"...change is very unpopular among the comfortable."

LL: In some cases the planners themselves have advocated the status quo. For example, in terms of environmental preservation, planners have said, "let's not have densities as high as they are permitted by the present law; let's have lower densities; let's preserve more land in open space." In many instances I think those are wise as well as just policies. But they should be balanced by positive proposals. Frequently, it's the negative, the more restrictive features of plans that have been politically marketable.

UA: Then it's been much easier to stop something than it is to propose something else.

LL: To propose *change*; change is very unpopular among the comfortable.

UA: What can planners do to facilitate this change?

LL: Well, first of all, they can't do anything unless there is a positive political climate. What I am suggesting is that perhaps the current housing crunch will provide the planners with an as yet unrecognized opportunity to come forth with some constructive proposals—such as greater amounts of in-fill and more compact development—which can provide adequate housing at lower costs in terms of public services and transportation. These kinds of proposals have a lot going for them and at the same time they have the advantage of saving outlying open space—farm lands, scenic areas, and lands that are highly suitable for recreation.

UA: How much, do you think, are regulations to blame for the inadequate supply of housing?

LL: It hasn't helped, that's for sure; but nobody has done a really careful, controlled study of just what the impacts have been. For example, a group at the University of California at Davis did a study comparing the costs of housing in Petaluma, where growth is limited to five hundred units a year, and the housing in its neighbor cities, Rohnert Park and Santa Rosa. That study indicated that housing prices are higher in Petaluma. However, it did not

attempt to identify the causes, and some of the criteria that were used in that study were rather curious.

UA: You mentioned the Bay Area quite a few times in your essay, "Confessions of a City Planner," *and you cited a few projects to be ill-conceived and wasteful. You mentioned the California Aqueduct System, San Francisco's Market Street Improvement Plan and the Yerba Buena Center Project. Could you elaborate on each of these and describe what you thought was ill-conceived and what the results should have been?*

LL: The California Aqueduct System, of course, was not a planner's project. It was an engineer's project. I always liked the slogan that you see on the Kaiser Sand and Gravel truck, because it so accurately expresses an engineer's point of view—that is, "find a need and fill it." It was quite obvious that there was a need for water in southern California so the California water system was designed to fill that need without any heed as to what the implications might be. The consequence, of course, was to foster continued growth of a region where I believe wise public policy would have dictated a slowing down of growth. It is an area that is suffering a very serious illness caused by excessive growth.

UA: What kind of illness would you characterize Los Angeles as having?

LL: A disease characterized by dirty air, shortage of open space, traffic congestion, an unworkable circulation system. Urbanization is so thinly spread that it's virtually impossible to provide a workable mass transit system.

UA: Would you discuss your criticism of the Market Street Improvement Plan?

LL: In my article when I talked about Market Street, I simply pointed out that the Market Street plan was a cosmetic treatment of the street; that the public spaces were beautified but the people remained the same. The basic problems of poverty and all kinds of other pathological social conditions still exist. I like to refer to Market Street as "the people's street," like Broadway is in New York, or Main Street in any city. Putting nice brick pavements and sycamore trees and granite benches and bronze street furniture on Market Street really didn't change the character of the people that were there, nor of the many commercial establishments that cater to them. However, the lower portion of Market Street near the financial district has had a great boom in high rise office development as everything around it has experienced the same kind of development pressure.

UA: What do you think the rationale was in creating such a plan? Who were the actors in it?

LL: The principle actors were the board of directors of the San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR), most particularly its dynamic director at that time, John Hirten. The public had voted to build BART. It was well-known that the BART stations would be built and that Market Street was going to be torn up for a considerable period anyway, and it really made good sense, in theory at least, to rebuild the surface of the street and make something better out of it. I'm not at all sure that the most brilliant planner in the world could have found some way to eliminate the pornographic book stores, the X-rated movies, or the salvage shops, and the other kinds of low-grade establishments that are found in the less fashionable parts of Market Street.

"...probably the reason that downtown San Francisco is doing so well now is it is regarded as a high fashion center catering primarily to tourists and nonresidents."

UA: Do you think it was part of the rationale of the plan to try to make them go away?

LL: I think that rather unrealistically, the Market Street business groups thought they could wish them away or that the new improvements on Market Street would raise real estate values so high and make it such a desirable location that rents would be too great for these types of undesirable establishment. The greatest disappointment on Market Street, if you want to name just one particular site, is the empty Penney's store at Fifth and Market.

UA: What do you think is the problem with that site?

LL: I chose that example because it's fairly far up on Market Street and the further west you go in the sector of the street from the Ferry Building to Van Ness Avenue, the worse the problems become. At Fifth and Sixth Streets, you get the closest tie between what we used to call Skid Row, which, pre-Yerba Buena Center, was on Third Street. But look at Roos-Atkins, which was a relatively new store at Fourth and Market. It went out of business. It still has branches in suburban shopping centers, but it couldn't operate successfully here.

UA: Do you see this as shift towards suburban shopping malls?

LL: Well, that's already happened, and actually, downtown San Francisco is probably doing better today, in terms of retail trade, than it has in the past twenty years. The new Saks store has just opened, Neiman-Marcus is under construction, Magnin's is remodelling to compete with the two new stores, and over the last ten years, Macy's has expanded. But all this is happening in the Union Square sector, leaving Market Street behind, although the Emporium, which is probably the most important retail anchor on Market Street, recently has remodelled and upgraded its store. I think probably the reason that downtowm San Francisco is doing so well now is it is regarded as a high fashion center catering primarily to tourists and nonresidents. Most of the residents of the Bay Area are indeed doing their shopping in the suburban centers which they call "malls" in southern California. (I always thought a "moll" was a gangster's girlfriend.)

UA: What was the rationale of the Yerba Buena Center plan and what caused it to be delayed so long?

LL: The most easily identifiable causes of the delay were the lawsuits, but the lawsuits were brought, and I think justifiably brought, to try to stop the Redevelopment Agency from turning low income people out into the street. Going way back to the early 1960s, the theory was that the people living in the Yerba Buena Center Project Area, who

were mostly elderly males, would be rehoused in the Tenderloin. At that time, the Tenderloin didn't have nearly the crime or the other social problems it has today or has had for the last ten years or so. There was the fundamental mistake of moving the people out of YBC without providing satisfactory substitute accommodations, followed by successful lawsuits to stop that from happening, and then the long delays resulting from lawsuits. However, there's not much controversy anymore. The issues seem to be minor ones, and they're not very dramatic or exciting.

UA: In general, what do you think about revitalization and the Yerba Buena Center in particular? Do you think such construction can take place in San Francisco without displacement?

LL: Well, everyone who is going to be displaced has already been displaced, for better or for worse. I don't really understand the image that the planners of YBC have in mind. You see, they call it Yerba Buena Center Gardens, and they tend to regard it as a potential park-like place modelled partly after Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagen and partly after some of the more high-class features of a World's Fair. For example, they are proposing a cinema center which would be very similar, as I envisage it, to the cinematic attractions at Expo in Montreal in 1967. Well, this is a splendid thing to go to once, but I can't imagine many people going back again. I think the developers, being from Canada, really don't understand what the San Francisco climate is like and how few nights one wants to be outdoors, no matter how safe the neighborhood might be, and needless to say it is by no means safe.

UA: What was the rationale behind that proposal? It seems it is rather pointless to use that much acreage downtown to attract tourists only once in a while.

LL: The original plan, which I prepared for Justin Herman (who was then the very well known executive director of the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency) was essentially a plan for business and office development, with what I chose to call some "goodies," such as an art museum, a sculpture garden, a large public plaza with an ice-rink, and so on. But it was essentially a commercial development. The first person who took a different stance was San Francisco architect Mario Campi, who came up with a plan under the auspices of the San Francisco City Planning Department, which called for making a very, very substantial part of the project site a downtown park. An architect by the name of Richard Greisik conducted a crusade, and I think the word is properly chosen, to make YBC a Tivoli Gardens. I think it was a fallacious concept, but for two years or more he was employed as a consultant by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. I think what happened at YBC is in part a response to the movement against making it primarily a business development area, and it has resulted in a proposal to make it primarily some kind of an open space area for popular use. However, that concept, I think, has been stretched to a point where it becomes illogical. For example, in response to a vote of the public, and at great additional expense, the Moscone Convention Center was placed "underground." It isn't underground at all—it's about twenty feet above the ground, but the roof still can be devoted to some kind of open space use. But I fancy that even if the convention center had been built entirely above ground, there would still have been plenty of open space in the YBC project area without utilizing the convention center roof. Lawrence Halprin, whom I consider to be the world's outstanding landscape architect, is designing the open spaces for the developers. However, just looking at the sketches and plans I saw, they seemed to be really running short of ideas with what to do with all that open space.

UA: You characterized some of the problems with the California Aqueduct as stemming from the fact that it was principally an engineering project and not a planning project. Would you characterize YBC as a planner's project?

LL: Oh yes, I think planners have to take all the blame.

UA: So successful or not, you would characterize that as an example of planning?

LL: Yes, planning plus urban design.

"In the Bay Area, urban renewal has had very limited success."

UA: What is your overall opinion of urban renewal in the Bay Area?

LL: In the Bay Area, urban renewal has had very limited success. The big urban renewal project in downtown Oakland is still far from completion twenty years later. We keep hearing good things are going to happen, but it is taking a terribly long time. I'm not sure the Western Addition has been improved by the presence of Japan Town. Maybe it would have been better off if the Victorian houses that were removed to make way for Japan Town had been rehabilitated as attractively as the many in the vicinity that remain. The concept of what was called Western Addition A-1 was that as long as the city was going to widen Geary Boulevard and make it a major arterial of six lanes, the Redevelopment Agency might as well take advantage of that opportunity to redevelop the area. A lot of people were displaced who need not have been displaced and they ended up with much worse housing accommodations outside the Western Addition. I don't regard the Japan Center as a great asset to the city. It was nice that the city could provide a site for a new cathedral when St. Mary's burned, but couldn't the cathedral have been reconstructed on the old site? Diamond Heights was vacant, prematurely subdivided area—subdivided on an unsuitable grid pattern. Diamond Heights has provided upper middle income and I suppose by this time, really quite expensive housing for families, and that's probably a plus in a city that is so drastically short of housing as San Francisco is. But redevelopment was almost a formality in Diamond Heights. There have been some minor redevelopment projects in Richmond. Downtown San Jose has been notably unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, I read in the paper just a week ago that they are going to grant favorable tax treatment to people who will build in downtown San Jose twenty years after the project was originally planned.

UA: Are there some examples of successful urban renewal projects?

LL: Yes, I think there are a number. Staying on the Pacific Coast for a minute, I think that the redevelopment that has occurred immediately south of the central business

district in Portland, Oregon, has been well done. I'm not really too well-acquainted with the social consequences, but I've heard nothing negative about displacement of existing residents. I think the two plazas that Lawrence Halprin designed there, the Auditorium Fountain and Lovejoy Plaza, are more successful than anything he has done in San Francisco with the possible exception of the new Levi's Plaza development, which is really very nice. Baltimore's Downtown and Harbor projects are well designed and very successful. The Government Center project in Boston is a real asset, and so is Constitution Plaza in Hartford.

UA: Would you characterize urban renewal in the Bay Area as being largely unsuccessful?

LL: Not a spectacular success. Nationwide, let's face the fact that urban renewal destroyed more housing units than it built, and its original purpose was to improve housing conditions. It didn't achieve that purpose, that's certain.

UA: Do you attribute the fact that planning has a negative orientation to the lack of success of many of these projects?

LL: Well, as a matter of fact, in every case, those examples were very positive planning proposals that have been translated into action, but without sufficient regard for the socioeconomic consequences.

UA: Would you characterize them as poor planning?

LL: Misguided planning, to some extent.

UA: The Sunbelt region of the United States has experienced a great amount of growth over the past ten to twenty years. What advice would you give to planners of this region?

LL: Do not repeat the mistakes of Los Angeles. When you look at Phoenix or Tucson and other Sunbelt cities, you see the very worst features of Los Angeles replicated; the sprawling, low density, hard-to-service kind of development, the long, seemingly unending commercial strips, the lack of major open space. I believe that no city should plan a very large expansion without including a large urban park of the Golden Gate Park scale. Low density housing development, relieved only by shopping centers and school sites, and intervening strips of commercial development along the arterials is a pretty bleak way for city dwellers to have to live—and yet that is what is happening. The parks of Houston seem to be the shopping centers. That's where people go for recreation. The same thing is true in some parts of Southern California. I know young people who grew up in Orange County who said they used to spend their weekends in shopping centers because "that is where the action is."

UA: The field of planning is viewed as a generalist, multidisciplinary field. Do you see that as in conflict with this age of specialization?

LL: I think that the more specialized the world becomes, and as you say it quite truly has become very, very specialized, the more need there is for generalists, or what you might call an umbrella type of field which takes account of all the facets of human needs—and this is what I think planning should be. I would be the first to admit that we are far from achieving that goal. But I think that in an era of specialization there comes a greater need for a generalist overview so that no set of projects, no matter how desirable they may appear to be, is allowed to happen without taking account of the whole range of human needs. Something that sounds as good as building hospitals, for example, may be a mistake unless you have a comprehensive overview and weigh that need with other needs such as housing and transportation. I'm not certain that the planners are yet worhty of the trust which would be involved in giving them that tremendous responsibility, but we still have to move in that direction even if we make some mistakes along the way. Perhaps we need a whole new breed of policy planners, such as those being trained at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, or in the School of Public Policy at Berkeley, who are less oriented to the physical environment than my kind of urban and environmental planning is.

"Low density housing development, relieved only by shopping centers and school sites, and intervening strips of commercial development along the arterials is a pretty bleak way for city dwellers to have to live..."

UA: What do you think is in store for American cities for the 1980s and beyond from a planning point of view?

LL: A lot of effort has been put into revitalizing American cities with varying degrees of success. Some are so troubled, the illness is so serious that I think it is going to be difficult, perhaps impossible to achieve any real improvement in the 1980s as long as rampant inflation continues and there is a trend away from federal government assistance. The money is just not there to solve the problems of a Detroit or a Cleveland. Other cities are doing much better. Some of the revitalization efforts that have been made seem to have taken effect. Cities continue to be the great financial headquarters of the nation. The financial institutions have not fled to the suburbs along with the light industry and the shopping centers. Some cities, San Francisco notably, are even doing pretty well in the specialized, high and retail field. Probably the number one problem, which is a symptom of the enormous concentration of low income people in the certain cities, is crime. I don't think tougher laws or tougher judges or incarcerating more people is going to solve the problem of crime in the cities, because the cause of the problem is poverty.

UA: One possible solution which has been proposed for the gross disinvestment, unemployment, and poverty in certain inner city areas is the enterprise zone concept, in particular the Kemp Garcia Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Bill. What do you think about that concept?

LL: No matter what the tax advantages might be, even if you gave me free land and a free building, I think I would be loath to put my business in an enterprise zone as long as I felt that the area was unsafe. Enterprise zones, it seems to me, tend to reinforce ghettos. My idea is that the inner city walls should be broken down and not reinforced. I don't think enterprise zones have any great promise. But on the

other hand, like cancer, the disease of poverty is so pervasive and so destructive that maybe enterprise zones should be tried and we'll see if they work.

UA: Would you have any advice for a young planner who is just entering the field?

LL: Well, I see a lot of young people who are desperately looking for jobs, but who are unwilling to leave the Bay Area. If you're going to land a job in planning, you may very well have to leave the Bay Area. A young planner has to be flexible.

UA: What's your favorite American city?
LL: San Francisco, without hesitation.

A Social Geography of Belfast

by Mary M. Hall

To explore the social geography of an urban place is to examine the groups of people that comprise it and their relationships to one another and to the outside world. The merging of the disciplines and methodologies of sociology and geography leads to the study of how social relationships are determined by the physical structrure of the environment in which groups of people interact; and, conversely, to how these relationships contribute to the design of the physical environment. Patterns are easier to detect and explain in some places than in others; thus researchers have varying degrees of success in their attempts to correlate ideal types with actual phenomena. The city of Belfast is particularly appropriate for social-geographic analysis. Its cultural divisions are so distinct and its neighborhoods so segregated that academic theory can enjoy an occasion of reflecting social reality to an exceptional degree of accuracy.

My most recent occasion for public attention to Belfast was precipitated by the deaths of hunger strikers appealing for certain prison reforms and by the violent response of their supporters. The hunger strikes and the violence, though, were neither isolated events nor individual appeals. They stemmed from events that have taken place over centuries between two groups of people with different political and religious beliefs. To give an entire and accurate background of the differences between these groups would require volumes. A brief identification of the two sides to the conflict should, however, orient the reader enough so that the following discussion of the consequences of their living in the same city will have some significance.

The six counties of Northern Ireland, also known as Ulster, are a British province. The majority of Ulster citizens are Protestants and supporters of the British goverment. In addition, there is a minority of Catholics who, like their ancestors for nearly four centuries, oppose British rule. The Catholics more closely identify with the Republic of Ireland to the south, a nation whose independence from Britain was established in 1920 by the Home Rule Bill. The original bill, passed by the House of Commons in 1923, called for a united Ireland, but Ulster Protestants let it be known in a bloody war from 1918 to 1924 that they would not stand for being absorbed into Irish society (Trevor-Roper, 50). Although the two groups are referred to as Catholics and Protestants, it is important to remember that their differences are more than religious ones.

However one wishes to refer to the conflict in Northern Ireland—as a religious war or a political war—the most prominent feature of the battles is that they take place on the streets of the cities and towns, thereby affecting the lives of all the people. In Belfast, this conflict has determined the structure of the environment and the relationships between citizens in space and in mind. The physical structure of today's Belfast was determined, in large part, in 1969. It was in the summer of that year when, provoked by the Protestant celebration in Londonderry of the anniversary of the 1689 invasion of Ireland by William of Orange—Britain's conquest of all of Ireland—a few Catholic observers voiced their protest to the festivities and a full-scale riot ensued. The events in Londonderry triggered an explosion of violence in the cities of Ulster. British troops were sent to quell the riots. A wall of steel and barbed wire was erected to separate Belfast's Catholic and Protestant districts. The military police and the wall are still present—token deterrents to street violence.

"Ages of argument and years of street battles have led to the filtering of the Belfast people's perceptions through hatred and prejudice."

Any group of people has certain cultural variables; i.e., characteristics by which individuals may be identified as members of the group and filters through which the rest of the world is perceived from within the group. The two cultures of Belfast express these variables not only in the context of their religion but in educational, political, and economic context as well.

The way in which people of both faiths present their religiosity to the rest of the world is suggested by the manner in which symbols of their faith are displayed. In Catholic households there are likely to be holy pictures and statuettes in the living room and crucifixes in many rooms. Protestant families, on the other hand, usually limit the display of their religious beliefs to a prayer book in a corner or a bible on the shelf (Fraser, 23).

The Catholic Church in Ulster requires that its members send their children to Catholic schools. The ex-

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perience for the children is not only that of religious education but of ethnic acculturation as well. Morris Fraser (1973:110-11), a child psychiatrist who worked in Belfast in the early seventies, relates the story of Michael, a fourteen year old Catholic boy who moved to Belfast from a school in England where he had been a popular soccer player. When asked whether he had been able to keep up his sport, Michael shook his head sadly and replied, "The only games we can play in our school are hurley and Gaelic football. I once told the Brother that we wanted to play soccer and rugby. He was very cross; he said these were British games. He went to see my mother about me." Michael's experience indicates that ethinc differences are at least as significant as religious ones in the Ulster conflict and the Belfast way of life.

Unemployment is high in Belfast, particularly for the Catholics. This appears not to be a result of discrimination in hiring as much as the outcome of the industry's locational decisions. Multinational firms tend to locate in the eastern, Protestant section of Belfast at the expense of the Catholic west. Although these decisions proceed from a history of prejudiced investment policies on the part of Northern Ireland financial interests, it has been suggested

"Paths between origin and destination in Belfast are rarely the shortest distance between those two points."

that contemporary policymakers are seeking to avoid controversy by encouraging investment away from Belfast altogether (Parsons, 219-20). Neither the unemployment rate not the conflict show any signs of wearing down.

Although both Irish and British currency are legal tender in Northern Ireland, the use of each is confined to certain areas. To produce an Irish coin in a Protestant neighborhood would be cause for, at best, refusal of service. This is another indication that the ethnic differences are not easily transcended and that they impose upon every aspect of the lives of those living in and even visiting Belfast.

Ages of argument and years of street battles have led to the filtering of the Belfast people's perceptions through hatred and prejudice. For many, it is a hatred based on little more than tradition. For the children, prejudice against the "other" religion is something with which they were born and which has a greater influence on the shape of their lives than parents, teachers, or television. Those who have known nothing other than violence in their streets come to expect it and believe it to be normal. The filter is both geographical and ideological: "my district and my beliefs are right; yours are wrong." Perceptions are filtered in this way even though one may not know the reasons for the districting or the actual beliefs of one's church.

Behavior, then, is a reaction to the environment as it is perceived through one's cultural filter. The physical environment itself is significant to the extent that one must be sufficiently organized in the use and recognition of space in order to carry out actions and obtain the desired results. The classical study of this type of spatial ordering is that carried out by Kevin Lynch (1960). In Lynch's analysis, there are five elements which contribute to the cognitive ordering of physical space: districts, edges, paths, nodes, and landmarks. In defining these terms with respect to Belfast, their importance to the discipline of social geography is affirmed.

Districts are homogeneous enclaves of either Catholic or Protestant activity. It is extremely rare to find a family of one group residing within territory known to be the district of the other group. Rather, a Catholic neighborhood is often a "hole"[1] in a Protestant's reception of his or her city-space, and conversely. These "holes" are areas about which little is known and even less is likely to be understood.

The major Catholic district is the area radiating from Falls Road in West Belfast. Other Catholic districts are Ballymurphy and Ardoyne, to the west and north of Falls Road, respectively. Within each of these areas the most prominent fixture, both physically and immaterially, is the Catholic church, serving as both landmark (major reference point) and node (focus of activity). The Shankill

[1]Though this is not one of Lynch's elements, Dr. Jean Vance proffered this sixth element, "hole," to identify places about which one's experience has not led to any knowledge. I find it valuable correlary to Lynch's work.

Road, north of and parallel to Falls Road, is the axis of the most notable Protestant district, notable due to its proximity to the Falls and the violence that results.

The edges which define the boundaries between Catholic and Protestant districts are much more than just the ideological differences between the two groups. The streets which once connected the Falls and Shankill Roads have been blocked off by the Army. Barriers consist of high brick walls, corrugated iron fences, and steel stakes driven permanently into the ground. Between Shankill and Falls the barrier is three-quarters of a mile in length. Roads leading into and out of the Catholic districts are opened and closed by gates. The British Army and the civil service have taken these measures to contain the conflict. In addition, the barriers offer protection to those within them, keeping Protestant terrorists out and thereby reducing public outcry against the latter (Conroy, 1981:19).

"Even before segregation was imposed by a physical barrier...interaction between the two populations was minimal."

Paths between origin and destination in Belfast are rarely the shortest distance between those two points. Aside from the physical obstacles to travel, there is an element of safety which governs the path one may choose to take. Safe and dangerous routes are mapped out ahead of time for even the simplest of journeys such as a trip to the market. It is not uncommon for one to go considerably out of his or her way in order to avoid the violence for which there is an ever-present potential. And like whole districts, there are roads that some have never seen and would likewise never consider entering because they are known to be the territory of the other group. The evaluation of risk, therefore, comes to play as important a role as physical structure in determining the way people in Belfast order their community space.

In 1969, when trouble broke out, many Catholic families left integrated neighborhoods and fled to the ghetto from which they had ascended years before. For them, safety came before the notion of class mobility. Safety, in their minds, could only be had in a neighborhood where people were most like themselves ideologocally. The same type of process—evaluation before action—takes place in daily decision-making in Belfast. Where every corner may be a sniper positioned, it is essential to know which way to run if pursued or which yard door will be open for refuge.

The necessity of becoming so familiar with one's surroundings has contributed to the development of tightly knit networks of kinship, class, religion, and residence. In his ethnography of one Catholic neighborhood, Frank Burton (1978:15) finds the qualities of an "urban village," in his words, "a community whose housing density makes life public and where street life together with affinity create a plethora of shared knowledge." Indeed, the possibilities for differences within Belfast communities are sharply minimized by the emphasis on differences between them.

Complementary to the image of an urban village is the labelling of Belfast's districts as ghettos. In the modern usage of the term, overcrowding, poverty, and unemployment are visible conditions, particularly in the Catholic districts. And the government-imposed segregation of the warring groups fits the traditional definition of the ghetto, a medieval reference to walled quarters of cities in which a divergent cultural group may enjoy autonomy and refuge from the intolerance opposite the wall (Jones & Eyles, 1977:169).

Even before segregation was imposed by a physical barrier, it was demonstrated in a survey that interaction between the two populations was minimal. They patronized different shops, read different newspapers, and often even walked on different sides of the street and waited at different bus stops (Fraser, 1973:17). Physical separation is not the cause of violence in Belfast as much as it is the necessary consequence of two groups of people unwilling to live peaceably together. A circular reasoning can be argued, inasmuch as living within a zone with others like you can create greater distance from those unlike you. For the children growing up today in Belfast, the difference between "we" and "they" is a difference in the side of the fence on which they live. Although that may be the only difference that the children can actually perceive, it is a difference for which they will fight.

At this writing, Belfast is relatively calm; weeks ago it was in chaos. These scenarios are intended to give an overall view of the conditions of life in Belfast over the last decade. The volumes that have been written about the people and the struggle in Northern Ireland have yet to draw any conclusions for a peacefull future, and the wall shows no signs of coming down. Far from the average American image of the enemy with his finger on the button is the fear of rounding a corner to face a teenager with a Molotov cocktail.

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Breaking Down the Separation between Town and Country: Notes on Urbanization and Settlement Policies in Contemporary Cuba

by Anthony B. Ryan

Introduction

This paper will discuss urbanization policies, new settlement strategies, and community involvement in contemporary Cuba.

Cuba has abandoned the traditional development modes of capitalist governments, notably those of her sister Latin American republics. From the initial stages of its Revolution, Cuba's planners decided on a course that would create a new spatial structure which would reflect the needs of the new society that was being created. Toward this end, the extant spatial structure and the urban models inherited from the old society were radically altered. Based on thorough-going urban and agrarian reforms, planning and settlement policies and practices became part and parcel of new national programs for social and economic development. In Cuba's view, such transformations form the environmental base for the development of the new "Socialist Man."

Like the United States (U.S.), Cuba, since its 1959 revolution, has engaged in slum clearance, urban renewal, and community participation. It too declared a war on poverty—both rural and urban. This "war" is a permanent feature of contemporary Cuban life and can be examined in order to understand what level of effectiveness it has reached.

Cuban urban policymakers have altered and regulated the growth of Havana, the country's overgrown capital. Their plans toward this end have gone a long way toward regulating that city's growth to contain a smaller percentage of the country's population.

The Cubans contend that the seemingly traditional flow of peasants to "Third World" metropolises will be significantly altered by the rapid amelioration of conditions in the countryside. Such improvements are not merely "economic" but are also of a political, cultural, and social nature. With this premise in mind, Cuba embarked on a massive program of creating new communities and industry in the countryside.

Cuba's solution plans for urban and rural renewal are based on a very different set of assumptions and analyses of the problems and causes of poverty, unemployment, and urban decay than those generally accepted in the U.S. Cuban socialism sees the root causes of these problems in the so-called "free market system" of capitalism, and sees this system as being responsible, in the past, and to a degree in the present, for its backwardness. For Cuba, capitalism is seen as a system of domination in which a small minority exploited the vast majority of its people.

"In the socialist Republic of Cuba, government control of economic life radically changes the content and direction of the planning process."

The Cuban planner/urbanist would maintain that the socialization of the economically decisive forms of private property (tools, capital, and raw materials used in production) by the Revolution redirected Cuba to the socialist road of development, and that this redirection benefitted the workers, peasants, and other disenfranchised sectors of the population.

In the socialist Republic of Cuba, government control of economic life radically changes the content and direction of the planning process. Planners must address the needs of the country and people. Since there is no room for "the invisible hand of the market" in Cuba, plans must also show the method of implementation.

Planning in Cuba is not merely a technical exercise exclusively reserved for the initiated. It is instead a socialist planning that must increasingly use the developing expertise of the Cuban people through the new democratic governing system of Poder Popular (People's Power).

I have visited Cuba several times (1969-70, 1977, 1980), and each time I have travelled there I have been struck by the great progress both country and people have made. In spite of the obvious differences in social system, the great

A graduate student in San Francisco State's MPA Program, Anthony Ryan has traveled to Cuba several times to observe and write about its culture and urbanization process.

deal of misinformation in this country due to the U.S. blockade of Cuba, and Cuba's relatively short history of active concern with these problems, I believe that this island nation has much to offer urbanists in the U.S.

Spatial Relations and Urbanization in Latin America

According to Jorge Hardoy (in Borkin and Manitzas, 1973:1) "the implicit or explicit objectives of different sociopolitical systems, which successively determined the characteristics of Latin American society, were reflected in different spatial structures and models."

Thus, there is a vital interrelation between the governmental-societal program of particular socioeconomic groupings, i.e., classes holding state power at a given time and the physical-spatial-sectoral distribution of productive investments, social infrastructure and human and natural resource utilization. All such investments condition and influence the shape and use of urban, suburban, and rural space. Since these investments are the bone of contention of definite interest groups with conflicting objectives, it is logical that a country's spatial structure will be determined by a broad range of factors rooted in that nation's paticular culture, history, present (as well as past) worldview, and political economy.

The scope of Latin American urbanization can be seen from a demographic view. A country or section of a country may be very urbanized, but the urban population still tends to be concentrated within a limited area of the total territory. The predominant influence of cities such as Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Havana, and generally, of all the great Latin American capitals extends to "their" countrysides—culturally, economically, and politically. Significantly, the foreign tourist's view of a given country is often conditioned by such capital cities. Hardoy notes that "It is a distorted image which does not reflect the realities of rural backwardness, regional underdevelopment, and underutilization of the resources of entire territories which have been poorly served by the prevailing concentration of political power, productive investment, and national services within the central metropolis" (in Borkin and Manitzas, 1973:1-2).

Sociopolitical systems are reflected in distinct urban ecologies. In Latin America's capitalist cities, land and housing values, various municipal rules and regulations, etc., reflect different socioeconomic class levels and relations in the urban environment. The deterioration of living conditions in these metropolises are the result of these urban conditions.

Urbanization in Latin America with the exception of Cuba, according to Hardoy (in Borkin and Manitzas,



1973:2-3) generally means the following:

1. a spontaneous process with little planning or policy implementation,
2. a parasitic capital constantly growing,
3. an absence of regional centers,
4. a disjointed framework of rural towns considered too small to justify the provision of public services and other amenities,
5. a scattered, poverty-stricken rural population existing without services and subject to unemployment and under-employment as a result of existing land use systems and land tenure.

Such generalities were applicable to Cuba before 1959. Prerevolutionary Cuba was one of the most urbanized countries in the world. In 1953, 24.3 percent of its population lived in such cities as Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Camaguey. This was a greater urban percentage than that of Canada, France, Italy, and other industrialized countries. In Latin America, it was inferior only to Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. By 1958 this percentage had risen to 28.6 percent.

In comparison, contemporary Cuba has stabilized its urbanization processes in the main.

The effectiveness and revelance of Cuba's urbanization and settlement policies of today are reflected in the preliminary report of its 1981 Census. According to *Granma Weekly Review* of November 8, 1981, the total population is 9,706,369. In the last eleven years, the total population rose by 1,137,248 persons, representing an annual increase of 1.2 percent, based on 1970 census data.

Of the total population, 6,698,571 persons—or 69 percent—live in urban areas, while 31 percent, or 3,007,798, live in rural areas. The rise in the percentage of the urban population is largely explained by the development of new communities in agricultural areas, and new



"Sociopolitical systems are reflected in distinct urban ecologies."

industrial sites, and not as a consequence of spontaneous migration from the countryside. An area is considered "urban" in Cuba if it has 2,000 or more inhabitants or if it has facilities such as electric lighting, medical services, schools, or paved streets.

The Sugar Connection

As in all Latin American countries and much of the rest of the "Third World," the origin of urban centers in Cuba goes back to the colonial period. Cuba's main economic activity was based on the import-export trade which only serviced the demands of a small national market. Cuba had limited industrialization. Benitez (1970:29) draws attention to the fact that sugar was the dominant cash crop and sugar mills rapidly proliferated throughout the island around 1763.

The Cuban economy of sugar, monoculture, and latifundia was characterized by annual harvest cycles, extensive misuse of the land, and in the words of Fidel Castro, "a slavery of invisible chains" (in Barkin and Manitzas, 1973:4). Cuba's unstable economy was dependent on world prices it could not control or predict, and its political system was dominated by foreign economic interests.

The spatial structure of the country reflected this condition.

Excluding sugar production, Cuba in the 1950s was not very industrialized, even by Latin American standards. In 1957, sugar comprised 81 percent of the export trade, while its world-famous tobacco comprised a mere 6 percent. Cuba imported 71 percent of its imports from the U.S. which included agricultural machinery, vehicles, textiles, metals, foodstuffs, liquor, and fuels. The U.S. acquired 58 percent of Cuba's exports, which included tobacco, sugar, cement, glass, dairy products, fruits, and ceramics. Much of what Cuba exported depended on imported raw materials.

Cuba is an elongated and narrow island with a length of 760 miles and a width varying between 25 and 125 miles. Its total land area is 44,204 square miles and its population in September 1969 was estimated at 8,360,395. The city of Havana is located on the western part of the island. A 1953 population figure gave the city a population of 1,217,674 inhabitants which was 7.46 times larger than that of Santiago de Cuba (167,237) and 3.46 times larger than the combined population of the twelve principal Cuban cities (Acosta and Hardoy, 1973:167).

Urbanization in prerevolutionary Cuba, and Havana in particular, was historically fed by rural migration and some foreign immigration. The existing cities were adequately distributed in relation to resources prior to the revolutionary seizure of power, but the wealth of the country was concentrated in the cities and conspicuously so in Havana.

Cuba's countryside was characterized by its backwardness and the instability of its inhabitants. The expansion of the latifundia and the consolidation of the sugar monoculture displaced populations to the cities and

to hilly areas less suited to agriculture and prone to erosion.

The best lands were owned by large landowners who practiced extensive, rather than intensive, agriculture. Thirteen thousand farms, which represented less than 8 percent of the total number of farms, controlled 70 percent of the cultivable land area, while 70 percent of all farms were crowded into a little over 11 percent of the nation's available land. Manitzas (in Barkin and Manitzas, 1973:5) notes that such extensive landuse served several purposes:

—It maintained a large labor force that could not work its own land and thus was available to work the large latifundias.

—It permitted a minimum of capital investment.

On the eve of the Revolution there were more than 100,000 small agricultural workers, 83.8 percent of whom did not own the land they worked. Forced to find work in an economy characterized by seasonal crops and prone to periodic crises, many of these workers joined the migratory movement to the urban areas, especially Havana. The isolation of rural housing and its low quality, the absence of communities, and the depressive chronic unemployment and underemployment of the population were starkly incongruous with the rural agro-industrial origin of most of Cuba's wealth.

Often "belts of misery" (not unlike those found in many Third World cities today) surrounded Cuban metropolitan areas. These breeding places of infectious disease, ignorance, and generalized social alienation contained hundreds of thousands of people. Slums and "squatter housing" abounded. Sanitation was generally non-existent (Mace, 1979:121).

By the early 1950s, 87 percent of all urban dwellings had electricity; only 9.1 percent of rural housing was similarly supplied. Further, 66 percent of all rural homes had dirt floors, only 2.3 percent had running water, and 96.5 percent had no refrigeration of any kind (Manitzas, 1973:6).

Rural housing was generally scattered and inaccessible, making access to jobs, education, culture, and other services impossible for most people.

The traditional pre-Spanish Conquest peasant home, or *bohio*, while offering good qualities, especially its adaptability to the temperate climate, lacked essential amenities such as sanitary services and privacy.

Havana before 1959

In 1959, on the eve of the victory of the Revolution, 75 percent of all industrial production excluding sugar, and 52.8 percent including it, was concentrated in the city of Havana. Oriente province, at Cuba's eastern end, with 31.9 percent of the total area of the country, contributed a mere 15 percent of the industrial production (Acosta and Hardoy, 1972:11). Before the Revolution, Havana's port took in 90 percent of the nation's shipping and was also the country's main fishing center.

In addition to once having the dubious distinction of being the main center in the western hemisphere for prostitution and gambling, Havana was preeminent in Cuba in the spheres of tourism, education, medical services, transit, and professional services. An internal colonialism prevailed in Cuba: that of Havana over the rest of the country.

The cultural life of the country was situated in Havana, as was the university population for the most part. The University of Havana, founded in 1721, accounted for 87.8 percent of the university students in 1952-53. Attracted by housing construction for the upper middle class, 90 percent of the architects worked in Havana on the eve of the Revolution. About 85 percent of the total circulation of all daily newspapers was published in the Havana metropolis (Hardoy, 1973:6).

Havana was the center of the country's political and administrative life. This centralization corresponded to the demographic and economic centralization and was repeated on a smaller provincial scale in all the capitals and large towns throughout the country. The national capital was *the* place for transportation in spite of its geographic eccentricities in relationship to the rest of the island. The predominance of Havana in Cuban life was the inheritance of the colonial period and reflected an economic arrangement oriented toward the *export* of agricultural products and the *import* of foodstuffs, equipment, machinery, and consumer goods in general. The settlement scheme reflected an almost undiversified agriculture of low-yield, based on extensive sugar plantations and cattle ranches. The pattern of urban and rural settlement did not adequately serve the nation. The concentration of decision-making and the major part of industrial, commercial, political, and cultural activities in Havana deprived the rest of the nation of many existing opportunities for development and leisure.

"An internal colonialism prevailed in Cuba: that of Havana over the rest of the country."

Prior to 1959, U.S. interests shaped the unbalanced economic, social, political, and spatial patterns of development. U.S. capital controlled 40 percent of the island's raw sugar production, 90 percent of all telephone and electric light and power services, and 50 percent of the railways (Manitzas, 1973:7). The U.S. provided 70 to 80 percent of Cuba's imports (1957). Cuban investment flowed to the U.S. rather than into nascent Cuban enterprises. The agricultural nation of Cuba *imported* agricultural commodities totalling $200 million.

Cuba's land, up to 1959, was almost completely in private hands. Speculation on urban fringe and suburban lands, prime agricultural sites, and other areas affording a quick profit, made the few public sector initiatives costly or ineffective and produced a struggling, chaotic city form.

The Revolution Succeeds

In January 1959 when the Revolution was victorious, and in the following years, Cuba's new government instituted a series of important measures which included extensive urban and agrarian reform laws, the nationalization of foreign-owned companies, massive literacy and health campaigns.

Cuban urbanists faced the difficult task of designing and implementing a strategy that would make full use of

existing physical structures and installations, while at the same time targeting priorities for new investment, and concentrating resources to support the island's social, economic, and political development. They developed the following policies:

- The rural population would gradually be concentrated in small towns in the countryside. This would make possible the creation of an "urban" standard of living in the rural areas through the provision of health care, public utilities, housing and would stem the large amount of immigration to the urban centers.
- Havana's growth was to be limited in favor of the development of other areas of the country.
- The most rapid growth was to occur in the small and medium-sized cities. Most new industries would be located near existing cities, while others would serve as the base of medium-sized new cities. The proportion of urban dwellers in the country as a whole was projected to grow from 60.5 percent of the population to 80 percent in 2010. As the new industries developed, a higher proportion of the urban labor force would work in production (Hamburg, 1977:9-10).

The New Communities in the Countryside

Cuba, since the Revolution, has created more new cities and rural towns than any other country in Latin America. Most of the towns are small, frequently numbering a few hundred people, but are clear indicators of a coherent policy of controlling urbanization processes. By 1978, 350 such new communities were built throughout the countryside (Zeitlin, 1978:27).

The physical changes wrought by the Revolution are the most dramatic in the rural areas. The importance of the countryside in the socioeconomic development of the



island was established early on in the revolutionary process and was a constant in the programs of the 26th of July Movement and other antidictatorship organizations, and remains a theme today (Harday, 1973:7).

The impetus for such rural settlement transformation, according to Edwards (1979:116) derives from:

- The needs of the new agriculture *as a modernized industry* and the need to reduce commutation from home to work.
- The current projected needs for the provision of services which most of these developments have, i.e., food and clothing shops, a cafeteria, childcare center, schools, clinics, social center, bookstore, library, Party office and sometimes a theatre (such a service is considered necessary when a settlement has 280-plus dwellings).
- The need for a physical and social framework for the development of socialist (and ultimately communist) political life. Each settlement elects a council as well as having all the normal branches of the mass organization. The act of living together in a planned community and managing the collective is seen as a clear contribution to the political and social education of the once-isolated rural people.

In the years 1959-62, eighty-three new rural towns had been created. This step, while improving employment opportunities and rural life generally, consolidated the population in key production areas and avoided the exacerbation of regional disparities between availability and demand for employment. The year 1961 saw the uniting of a large part of Cuba's productive apparatus under state control, which in turn, facilitated the distribution of technical and productive inputs (Harday, 1973:8).

Transformation of the Countryside

It was clear from the middle sixties and onward that the pioneering agrarian reform laws had greatly transformed production, and in general, life in the countryside. Latifundia were transferred to government "plans" (state farms) or divided up into smaller cooperatives and peasant holdings. Concerted planning of agricultural production to take advantage of Cuba's fertile soils and long growing season had become the order of the day. Now, instead of eking out a miserable existence as small tenant farmers or itinerant laborers, peasants living or working on agricultural lands became small holders or fully employed agricultural workers.

However, higher incomes and improved conditions don't automatically call forth better services. The Agrarian Reform had gone a long way toward overcoming the basic inequalities in Cuban society, the low cultural and educational levels of the rural areas, and the individualism of the isolated farmers and migrant laborers. But this was not sufficient. Becoming a stable, well-educated part of the working class or liberated peasantry in Cuba would be a much longer term process. To have changed the incomes or property titles in the country was no small feat, but such transformations were in reality the solid bases of even more profound changes in the future. Many problems remained in the countryside.

It was for these other needs that the concept of "new communities" was developed. The only way development was to occur in the countryside was when at least a minimum number of families were brought together in a common area. The adequate provision of basic services such as health, education, water and sewage disposal, electricity, and community facilities was impossible without this basic grouping together.

"Cuban investment flowed to the U.S. rather than into nascent Cuban enterprises."

The new communities created in the 1960s accomplished many of these goals. But such physical changes in the environment were not always as deep as expected. It was found that peasants who had previously lived isolated from one another in backward conditions and with individual lifestyles (some not so socially acceptable) had retained many of their old ways in the new towns. Problems began to mount up between the new neighbors.

In response, the Community Development Group (CDG) was created in 1971. Its purpose was to study, with a view to improving, the situation in the new rural communities built between 1959 and 1971, to suggest improvements, and to act as chief implementer.

Studies conducted by the CDG in 1971 of 196 communities revealed serious social and physical problems. Hamburg (1977:9) notes that the studies uncovered the following:

- In some cases almost all the people living in the towns were not working in the agricultural plan for the area.
- Only a small proportion of women were incorporated into the labor force.
- There was no effective local governing or administrative body.
- There were no social rules and regulations for community life.
- Community services were inadequate.
- Many residents put fences around "their land" and sometimes planted their own vegetables in areas intended as communal flower gardens and green open-space areas.
- Many people kept nondomestic animals such as chickens, pigs, and cows, in their yards or even in their homes.

It was felt that these problems were in large part due to failures in planning for social integration as part of all aspects of life in a new community.

Several recommendations were made and carried out on the oasis of these studies. Community councils and tenant organizations were created. Efforts were stepped

up to involve more massively women's participation in the work force. Community gardens were set up to provide vegetables. Cultural, educational, and health systems were expanded and improved.

In order to properly evaluate the effects of the new policies, follow-up studies were made in 1975 of communities in the then province of Pinar del Rio. While it was difficult to statistically determine changes in consciousness levels or in the quality of life, certain trends could be discerned.

For instance, in 1971 only 24 percent of the potential female labor force in these communities was working, while in 1975 it had increased to 49 percent. Women had represented only 18 percent of the total local labor force before but in 1975 they had increased to 30 percent. In 1971, 92 percent of the houses had fences on communal land and 48 percent had non-domestic animals. By 1975 practically no dwellings had either. (Hamburg, 1977:10)

Community planning in Cuba from the mid-1970s to the present has taken into account the shortcomings and failures of the mid-1960s.

"Cuba, since the Revolution, has created more new cities and rural towns than any other country in Latin America."

Presently, before a new community is built, the CDG carries out an exhaustive study of the area, including its history. Detailed interviews with people living there and any other specialized research needed for the project are made. It is on the basis of these studies that the national, provincial, and sectoral plans, the size and layout of the town and its corresponding agricultural or industrial relationships, are projected. During this implementation phase, a "community development officer" from the CDG attends to the selection of families for the new town and encourages their involvement in the Revolution's plan for the area (Hamburg, 1977:10; Edwards, 1979:116).

The officer's first job is to contact the families affected by the proposed plan. The officer explains it to them and points out the voluntary nature of each household's participation in the new community. The peasants are given the real choice of remaining on their holding (or a close substitute) or joining the new community. The percentage of those who wish to join is apparently high, but there are still non-joiners, and their family plots are often very visible: small plots with mixed crops and thatched bohios in the middle of extensive state farms or cooperatives. Cuba has stringently abided by its revolutionary promises to the peasants, and has allowed the small holder economy to exist at an extensive level. Past results, negative as well as positive, of previous socialist agricultural policies have been studied and taken to heart (Morton, 1979:84-86).

Families are aided in moving in and adjusting ot the new conditions, and urged to participate in the life of the town. The last stage of the study is evaluative, where the progress made is measured statistically and also in terms of changed attitudes, outlooks and values.

Various governmental agencies and ministries cooperate with one another to plan the economic and social life of the communities. Modern techniques of cultivation, scientific placement of crops and livestock on appropriate lands, and the use of machinery and fertilizers have all been introduced. The decisions that are made as to the specialties for each town or region are based on detailed analytical studies of soils, climate, irrigation, and past land use, as well as the spatial relationship between the location of a given enterprise or production unit and where it will be consumed or exported.

These studies are done with a view to implementation and often involve a massive reshuffling of crops, land uses, and people. Added to this is the necessity to construct an adequate network of roads and other transport modes.

New settlement planning in Cuba has changed in various ways in the years of its life. For example, in the early years, housing was initially built in the well-known single-family detached pattern. Now, for economic, ideological, and consumer-preference reasons, housing is now built generally as five-story, low-rise apartment flats surrounded by open spaces held in common. At the beginning there was a degree of private cultivation; now it is generally collective. Settlement sizes have also been adjusted upward and various other changes in design, layout, etc., have been made (Mace, 1979:122; Zeitlin, 1978:28).

During the first thirteen years of the Revolution, some 560,000 new housing units were built, but as a large number were built by workers using the simplest materials, it is estimated that only 295,000 can be considered adequate (Mace, 1979:123). The problem can be seen in the new towns discussed above. Many were not properly designed, and as a result, will have to be redesigned in the next few years (Zeitlin, 1978:28).

Within the national planning framework, priorities in development have gone to irrigation, farm building, port development, transportation, education, health, and industrial growth with housing taking a secondary position. Construction as a whole has been in competition with huge non-capital spending in industry and social services.

In August 1961, Fidel Castro outlined the problem of housing development and spending in other needed areas. He stated that

> . . . priority will have to be given to factories and to other areas of production . . . after factories come other things . . . schools, hospitals, aqueducts. We could produce 100,000 houses . . . but we cannot do it because then we would remain without factories or schools. I have confessed here that I was one of the leading promoters of uncoordinated projects . . . But now I propose to be one of the great defenders of planning. (In Boorstein, 1968:117).

However, by 1971 the housing problem had become one of inadequate numbers of workers in the construction sector. With increases in cement supplies and other materials, Cuban planners, according to Barkin (1977:139) decided to try to increase the labor force available for construction by relating higher productivity in agriculture and industry to an increased supply of housing. Workers in a given center were encouraged to find ways of increasing productivity, and thus free others to form construction *microbrigadas* of thirty to thirty-five workers each to put up new housing units near the plant. About 37,000 units were constructed in this way between 1971 and 1975.

The *microbrigadas*, while presently insufficient to

meet present needs and the historic deficit, are an important feature of Cuba's development program. They reflect the thinking of the Revolution that it is the working people themselves that must share in the solution of their problems (Mace, 1979:126-29).

"Havana will continue to grow, but this growth, in the view of the Cubans, will be seriously planned and managed."

Havana: Toward the Socialist City

The twenty-two years since the seizure of power by Fidel Castro and the revolutionary movement have brought about an "urban renewal"—socialist style—for the city of Havana. Profound changes have occurred, but most of these are not immediately visible to the human eye. Certain physical changes have taken place, most notably several new housing developments, some public buildings, and community service structures.

However, the most immediate changes were economic and social. The urban reform laws of the 1960s granted most tenants the right to ownership of their own houses or apartments, and monthly payments were, and still are, set at no more than six to ten percent of a family's income. Former landlords were allowed to keep the home where they lived, and all but the owners of the worst slums were granted some type of compensation allowance for the rest of their lives. The state also took control of vacant urban lands to prevent speculation which produced highly inflated land prices before the revolutionary triumph.

Country clubs and mansions were converted into schools, dormitories, child care centers, government ministries, and embassies. The worst shanty towns were razed and the former inhabitants were relocated to new housing or to homes vacated by those Cubans who had chosen to leave their country. Often retail stores were converted to other uses, such as community centers or schools. For example, in the downtown areas, shop windows of many former stores have become display cases for graphic arts.

A new political symbolism came to the fore. The old Civic Plaza, former center of the Batista government, was renamed Plaza de la Revolucion, and has been the site of numerous public events such as May Day or the 26th of July. Even billboards took on a new meaning. No longer does one see in Cuba advertisements for products and consumer goods. Instead, the residents are exhorted to educate themselves, to not litter, to do voluntary work, or to support the numerous national liberation struggles around the world. According to Hamburg (1977:12) "even the glitter of neon has been put to good use. During the Cuban chess championship an enormous chessboard in lights was constructed on the side of a high-rise building so that all the people below could follow the progress of the games."

New parks and a functional green belt of open space ring Havana providing it with fresh vegetables, recreation, and definite borders. The old contrast of rich, ostentatious neighborhoods, and poor, marginal sections, are a thing of the past. Social classes, as known in the U.S., have disappeared. Schools, daycare centers, hospitals, and sports events are free or available at minimal cost. Clubs and restaurants are open to all; and it is projected that housing and transportation will eventually be free.

Since a key element in the Cuban Revolution's program is the equalization of the living standards of the city and the countryside, investments in housing, sanitation, schools, and clinics has been more important and more numerous in the rural areas than in the urban metropoli. This explains the relatively shabby appearance and lack of construction in Havana as compared with the outburst of construction of all types in the countryside. Any supporter of the revolution will exhort the foreign visitor wishing to learn about the works of the Revolution to "leave Havana" (or any other city) and go out into the countryside.

Despite the spoken and active commitment of the Cuban leadership to promote rural development, some spectacular public works were achieved in Havana. This was especially true during the first years of the Revolution, but not exclusively so. Some of the early works' design and validity were later criticized. For example, the art schools in Havana, build between 1962 and 1965, were found to be too costly and difficult to maintain.

In the early 1970s, attention was again shifted to Havana. Havana has been and will continue to be the main cultural, administrative, and industrial center. However, its overall share of material goods and people will not be as disproportionate as in the past. "Limiting growth" for Havana in Cuban planning means that it will not grow in population as fast as the rest of the country. Havana will continue to grow, but this growth, in the view of the Cubans, will be seriously planned and managed. Toward that end, a master plan for the city was developed in 1970 (Hamburg, 1977:13).

The problems of "growth" are translated into several serious long-range problems for Cuba's capital. They include, according to Hamburg (1977:13):

- The fact that many Havana residents still live in substandard housing. Because of lack of sufficient maintenance, many buildings have deteriorated to a point where they cannot be saved. Havana is still the scene of much overcrowding. Young couples often have to live with their in-

laws. In fact, many of the well-known neighborhood problems could be resolved if there were more housing and families could "undouble."

- Jobs and housing are often widely separated from each other. Transportation to and from work often requires a long trip. This means that commute times within the metropolitan area are often long and tiresome.

- Havana still lacks an adequate water supply. Sewage and water lines are either old or nonexistent. Twenty percent of the water in Havana is lost before it reaches the consumer because of the state of the water delivery system. Electric services are widespread, but there are still periodic blackouts at planned intervals because of inadequate generating capacities.

- Other problems persist, such as air pollution, an old port structure struggling under the large volume of imports, and insufficient green areas *inside* the city.

Poder Popular

In Cuba, the power of the people is integral to the functioning of the state, which controls resource allocation and planning. Socialist democracy has been instituted in the form of Poder Popular (people's power) (Cannon, 1978:2).

The new political system is part of a series of events occurring in Cuba since 1970 aimed at increasing the strength and role of the mass organizations and further democratizing the administrative structure. The mass organizations encompass the majority of the population in them. They include unions, peasant, women's, youth, and student groups, and the famous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's). The CDR's are the largest of these organizations and are organized on a neighborhood basis throughout Cuba (Siegalbaum, 1977:19-25; Cockburn, 1979:18-35).

Because of these changes in the governance system and in the increased role of the mass organizations, Cuba has created a basis for its people to participate in government. In October 1976, a five-year plan was formulated and elections were held at the regional level. These elections vested local control and responsibility over public services and production within the guidelines articulated in the national plan and production targets established for local work-centers. The local government body now deals with transportation problems, garbage collection, food distribution, hospital-medical services, education, and cultural and sports activities. The local Poder Popular organization works directly with governmental agencies to improve communication and dialogue, and to aid in the design of annual programs to implement locally the national five-year plan.

In general, Cuban physical plans were not, at least up to 1976-77, the subject of much formalized public input. They were generally regarded as one dimension of the realization of national objectives, i.e., the creation of a socialist (and ultimately of a communist) society, the expansion of socialist production relations, the growth of exports, the linking of work and study, and so on.

However, it would be incorrect to see the Cuban planning process as an exclusively top-down system of edicts—even before the advent of Poder Popular.

While an element of this definitely existed structurally, there has always been *in effect* a dynamic dialogue between the top leadership, the various governmental bodies and ministries, the mass organizations, the Party organs, the state enterprises responsible for production and distribution, and the remaining non-state farmers (Guevara, 1967:46-47).

The extent to which spatial/physical planning issues, directions, and decisions have presently become the subject of political discussion in the elected assemblies of Poder Popular is not yet totally understood by this writer. However, it is clear from 1976 on that the mass organizations have been heavily involved in local discussions, decisions, and actions during the implementation phase of these plans. Since 1976-77 the planning system has been changing in accordance with Cuba's new constitution and the generalized "institutionalization" of political, economic, and social life around the new governmental system. From the viewpoint of physical planning, the import of these radical changes lies in the formalized decentralization of control and the development of a new politics of mass participation and decision-making at a popular level.

As the management and governing of locality-serving activities passes to the municipalities and the region-serving activities to the provincial assemblies of the new system, conditions are being created where local populations will be able to bring their desires, innovations, needs, priorities, and views more *formally* to bear on physical as well as other planning decisions.

The strengthening of Cuban socialist democracy will make possible the conscious, organized articulation of local, particular needs not always fully taken into account by more centralized state agencies.

This reconstitution opens up an exciting prospect for the integration of economic, cultural, poiitical, and social development (and its expression in the built environment) under socialist deomcratic control from the neighborhood, to the municipality, the province, and finally the country.

"Social ownership of the means of production has given Cuba the opportunity to scientifically guide its development process."

Conclusion

Even a brief examination of the planning process in Cuba since its 1959 Revolution can show the cardinal lesson of the effectiveness of state action in reordering and reorienting a country's spatial organization and its cities' internal structure. In Cuba's case, it is a reflection of the values of a socialist society bent on creating a fundamentally new type of human being and environment. Social ownership of the means of production has given Cuba the opportunity to scientifically guide its development process.

Cuba has avoided using exclusively economic criteria

in deciding the location of productive activities, although these are obviously important, especially in an economy with severe shortages. Equally important and intimately linked with Cuban physical planning are considerations of the overall social/political goals of the Revolution, such as employment stability, the raising of cultural standards, improvement of the standard of living, limiting the size of Havana, incorporating women into the labor force, and integration of country people into society.

Cuba has effectively shown that physical development cannot be separate from the growth of the social and productive forces. The Cubans attacked this problem from the inception of the Revolution by redistributing scientific, cultural, and economic resources from the urban areas to the countryside, thus harmonizing the process of urbanization.

Cuba has *directed* the seemingly spontaneous process of urbanization so prevalent in Latin America by the conscious de-emphasis of such urban centers as Havana and by the creation of settlements and industries in the countryside.

Cuba has been successful in large degree in opening up the initiative of its people by the creation of Poder Popular, thereby increasing its ability to deal with the problems of socialist development.

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