Philosophy in Practice

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PROFESSOR SPOTLIGHT: RICHARD DEAN

"I can certainly see how someone as charismatic and brilliant as me would be an obvious subject—I am fascinating." After graciously agreeing to participate in this year's Professor Spotlight, this rejoinder foreshadowed a hilarious interview with Professor Richard Dean. Yet in addition to a quick wit, Professor Dean brings a wealth of knowledge and teaching experience to the philosophy department at Cal State L.A.

Admittedly, "getting to the bottom" of Professor Dean was not without retort. In spite of attempts to uncover his history, Professor Dean found opportunities for one-liners such as, "Is this a therapy session or something for your little journal?!" He suggested we begin by telling his story with "Born in humble surroundings…" Indeed, Professor Dean was delivered by a chiropractor in his parents' living room! This was the beginning of Dean's "larger-than-life aura," and while grinning he put things into perspective: "Think of yourselves—but perfected."

After his unorthodox introduction to the world, Professor Dean grew up in Portland before attending the University of Oregon for undergraduate studies. Despite "drifting aimlessly" through school without a particular major to pursue, he graduated cum laude after deciding to major in philosophy. Upon completion of his studies, Professor Dean took a couple of years away from academia to work as a bartender, utilizing his certificate in bartending ("I don't want to brag").

Finding the service sector largely unfulfilling, Professor Dean decided to return to school. When asked where he completed his PhD, he quipped, "My PhD? My PhD is from the School of

Hard Knocks. Look, I'm not book-smart, I'm street-smart. The only arguments I respect are those that come out of the bottom of a whisky bottle or the barrel of a .38." While we might only surmise the sordid details of his graduate school experience, it is certainly clear Professor Dean's time at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill was very productive, including a primary focus on moral theory and ethics.

If graduate school had not panned out, "playing in the NBA or an untimely death" both ranked highly on the list of alternatives. Clearly neither transpired, and upon earning his PhD Professor Dean taught for three years at Rutgers University. However, another offer coupled with his desire to travel brought him to the American University of Beirut for the next seven years. Following this opportunity, he accepted his current faculty position at Cal State L.A; the transition has required a readjustment in his teaching style, yet regardless of the challenges he finds much fulfillment on our campus with his colleagues and students alike.

Professor Dean is especially proud of his writings and the impact he's had over a decade of teaching. Some of his works include *The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory* and a short story entitled "Two-Year in Hell" ("hilarious, yet poignant and deeply moving"). Yet Professor Dean's banter on life and philosophy largely belies his many professional accomplishments including an array of professional articles and presentations demonstrating his acumen in ethics and moral theory. Despite this, Professor Dean feels his works are "underappreciated" in the community, humorously likening himself to Copernicus: "The world's not ready for my ideas!" Yet Professor Dean maintains that publishing work is generally not the most important thing in philosophy. He especially thrives knowing he is able to provide critical thinking tools to students in order to solidify their arguments, adding that "having an opinion is not the end of the story." Your sense of humor and level of achievement is something we students aspire to, Richard Dean!

— Chuck Dishmon & Sasha Gallardo-Fleenor.

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Epistemic Challenges to Cognitive Phenomenology

Melvin J. Freitas

There is a current debate in the philosophy of mind regarding the conceivability and existence of some kind of *cognitive phenomenology*. Is there a distinctive phenomenology (or *what it's like*) for conscious cognition in the same way that there seems to be a phenomenology for conscious visual perception? Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague briefly consider what they call "epistemic challenges" to the existence of cognitive phenomenology borrowed from traditional arguments that have been made on behalf of phenomenology generally (2011, pp. 27–28). There is Joseph Levine's argument for an "explanatory gap" between neural properties and phenomenal properties. There is Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" concerning Mary, the vision scientist, who is locked in a black-and-white room from birth and only later exposed to a colored environment. And there are "zombie intuitions" by way of Robert Kirk and David Chalmers, who consider the conceivability of creatures who lack all qualitative experience but are otherwise just like ourselves.

Many interesting questions arise here. For instance, can such arguments be appropriately applied to the case of cognitive phenomenology? And even if they can be, do their results establish the existence of cognitive phenomenology? Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet claim that arguments from "inverted experiences" show that there can be no cognitive phenomenology, since we have no isolated phenomenal concepts for the conceptual components of our experience. On the other hand, Terry Horgan argues that the "robust conceivability" of what he calls "partial zombies" (who lack cognitive but not other types of phenomenology) provide strong evidence for a full-fledged cognitive

phenomenology.

My thesis is that these epistemic challenges raised on behalf of other forms of phenomenology fail to definitively establish the existence (or nonexistence) of a distinctive kind of cognitive phenomenology. Nonetheless, these epistemic arguments do provide at least some evidence on behalf of cognitive phenomenology. It's just that they are not definitive in the way they are intended, and we'd be better served by arguments which clearly *do* establish the existence (or nonexistence) of cognitive phenomenology.

My argument will be as follows. I will consider epistemic challenges as applied to the case of cognitive phenomenology by examining: (i) Levine's "explanatory gap" as it was originally intended, and as it is deployed by Carruthers and Veillet in arguing from "inverted-experiences" to the *nonexistence* of cognitive phenomenology, and (ii) Chalmers" "zombie intuitions" as an argument for phenomenology generally, and as it is deployed by Horgan in arguing from the conceivability of "partial zombies" to the *existence* of cognitive phenomenology. I will show that these epistemic challenges fail to definitively establish the existence or nonexistence of cognitive phenomenology. Lastly, (iii) I will briefly consider the form of argument that I think is necessary in order to establish cognitive phenomenology's existence one way or the other.

I. THE COGNITIVE GAP AND INVERTED EXPERIENCES

Saul Kripke rejected the mind-brain identity theory espoused by J.J.C. Smart and Herbert Feigl, who had argued that states of the mind are numerically identical with states of the brain. For instance, it was at one time suspected that the experience of pain could be identified with neural C-fiber firing. Kripke famously argued that terms such as "pain" and "C-fiber firing" are *rigid designators* designating the same object in all possible worlds (or scenarios). Therefore, if "pain = C-fiber firing" is true at all,

it must be necessarily true. However, Kripke also argued that one can easily conceive of a possible world (or scenario) where pain is associated with something else entirely (e.g., the firing of some other kind of neuron), which means that the identity statement "pain = C-fiber firing" cannot be necessarily true; therefore, since "pain" and "C-fiber firing" are *rigid designators*, it cannot be true at all. However, Levine countered that psycho-physical identity statements like "pain = C-fiber firing" must be distinguished from physical-physical identity statements such as "heat = the motion of molecules." On the one hand, the explanation of heat in terms of the motion of molecules is "fully explanatory," since explaining heat in terms of "our knowledge of chemistry and physics" tells us the *whole story* about heat (Levine 1983, p. 357). On the other hand, psycho-physical identity statements "seem to leave something crucial unexplained, there is a 'gap' in the explanatory import of these statements" (Levine 1983, p. 357). That is, saying that pain = C-fiber firing leaves open an "explanatory gap" between our experience of pain, and any story we can currently tell in terms of neural processes. This isn't to say that we could never tell such a story for pain in terms of neural processes; rather, it's to say that such a story has so far eluded scientists and philosophers alike. We simply don't know enough about the brain and its connection to our qualitative experiences to come to any such conclusions one way or the other. As Levine aptly puts it, the connection between our qualitative experiences and neural states is so far "completely mysterious" to us (1983, p. 357).

On the other hand, Carruthers and Veillet argue that there can be no such "cognitive gap" between our phenomenal experiences and cognitive experiences that is analogous to Levine's "explanatory gap" between phenomenal experiences and neural processes. Furthermore, they see this fact as sufficient reason to reject cognitive phenomenology outright, since they argue that:

> A property is phenomenal only if it contributes to the hard problem of consciousness, and in particular, only if it gives rise to an explanatory gap,

> A property gives rise to an explanatory gap only if we have a conceptually isolated phenomenal concept for it, and

> We lack conceptually isolated concepts for any cognitive/ conceptual properties of experience (that is to say, for experiences individuated in such a way as to include their cognitive/conceptual components) (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 45).[1]

Therefore, it follows that there can be no cognitive phenomenology since "cognitive/conceptual properties aren't themselves phenomenal ones" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 45). Levine's "gap" is defined by the existence of phenomenology (or qualitative experience) on the one hand and its explanation in terms of neural states on the other. Therefore, without qualitative experience there can be *no* gap. However, Carruthers and Veillet are arguing the converse, that without a corresponding gap, there can be *no* corresponding qualitative experience. And their argument is meant to show that there is no such gap when it comes to any qualitative experience that could be called cognitive phenomenology.

But as we've seen, Levine originally deployed the idea of an explanatory gap to criticize Kripke's argument from the conceivability of pain's not being identical with C-fiber firing, to the metaphysical impossibility of pain's being identical with C-fiber firing. In fact, Levine states that his purpose was "to transform Kripke's argument from a metaphysical one into an epistemological one" (1983, p. 354). Therefore, there is an obvious disanalogy here between Levine's original argument and the strategy being proposed by Carruthers and Veillet. This is an important point and we shall return to it. Nonetheless, despite this difference, there is no *a priori* reason to think that Carruthers and Veillet's own version of the "gap" strategy will not work to show that there can be no distinctive cognitive phenomenology. So for the time being we will accept their strategy as expressed in (1): "A property is phenomenal only if it contributes to the hard problem of consciousness, and in particular, only if it gives rise to an explanatory gap" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 45).

Carruthers and Veillet peg their argument on "phenomenal concepts," since they see the question of cognitive phenomenology as hanging on "whether thoughts and concepts make a *constitutive* contribution to the phenomenal properties of events in which they are embedded" (2011, p. 37). In fact, they emphasize that "the main point at issue … is whether cognition is implicated in phenomenal consciousness *constitutively* or just *causally*" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 35). That is, do our concepts simply stand in some *causal* relation to our phenomenal experiences? Or, do our concepts actually *constitute* our phenomenal experiences in some way? With that in mind, they say that (2) "A property gives rise to an explanatory gap only if we have a conceptually isolated phenomenal concept for it" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 45). For the most part they simply argue that this premise is just "widely agreed" upon given the debates concerning the mind-body problem:

> The dispute between dualists and physicalists is (for the most part) about whether phenomenal concepts can be used to provide an adequate explanation of the gap without appealing to any non-physical properties, not about whether phenomenal concepts are *necessary* for a gap (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 45).

That is, if there is an epistemic gap between mental properties and physical properties, each type of property must be conceptually isolated from the other type of property. "For if our concepts for our experiences weren't conceptually isolated, then it should be possible for us to discern entailment relations from physical and functional descriptions to phenomenal ones, and there would be no gap" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 46).

But the linchpin of Carruthers and Veillet's argument is in their claim that (3) "We lack conceptually isolated concepts for any cognitive/conceptual properties of experience (that is to say, for experiences individuated in such a way as to include their cognitive/conceptual components)" (2011, p. 45). They support this claim by appealing to an "inverted-experience" thought experi-

ment (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, pp. 46–47). Inversion experience thought experiments are well known, but Ned Block pioneered them as an argument against the functionalism and representationalism that typically stand against cognitive phenomenology. Suppose there is another planet that is just like Earth except for the fact that the colors of objects are completely *inverted* in terms of the visual spectrum. "The sky is yellow, grass is red, fire hydrants are green, etc." (Block 1990, p. 60). But the people on Inverted Earth also have an inverted color language so that they say an object is "green" when we say an object is "red" and vice versa. Though the grass *is* red on Inverted Earth from our perspective, the inhabitants there *say* it looks "green" while we *say* it looks "red". The main point for Block is that the inhabitants of Inverted Earth are in fact identical to us in terms of any internal functional or representational processes that we may have. Therefore, functionalism and representationalism cannot by themselves account for our qualitative experiences. Keeping this in mind, Carruthers and Veillet offer the example of being "faced with a particular shade of red" and thinking the thought:

> *This* experience might not have been <u>about red</u>, or might not have had the content *red*—it might not have been a seeming of red (2011, p. 46–47; underscore added).

They then attempt to apply this inverted-experience thought experiment to the case of conceptual (or cognitive) phenomenology by asking us to consider thinking the thought:

> *This* experience might not have been <u>an experience of red</u>, or might not have had the content *red*—it might not have been a seeming of red (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 47; underscore added).

Both of these *thoughts* are obviously peculiar in comparison with each other. However, Carruthers and Veillet explicitly use (A) as an instance of the ordinary inverted-experience thought experiment that "underlies the familiar skeptical question" about our knowledge of other minds (2011, p. 47). On the other hand, (B) is

supposedly something else entirely, since while (A) is a thought about an experience that is *about red*, (B) is a thought about an experience that is *an experience of red.* And while Carruthers and Veillet claim that (A) is "thinkable," they claim that (B) is "unthinkable." Let's see if we can make this out.

Consider first what it would be like for one of us to travel to Inverted Earth and think (A) while gazing at a patch of red grass. Carruthers and Veillet make ample use of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content though they are quite adamant that their arguments are equally applicable for those "who deny the reality of the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction" (2011, p. 47 fn. 8; see also pp. 43–44, p. 50 fn. 9). The nonconceptual content of our visual experience includes a seemingly limitless amount of "analog" information in terms of the various shades of red that may be present before us in a patch of grass on Inverted Earth. While the conceptual content of our experience includes a seemingly finite or discrete amount of "digital" information in terms of our concepts of *red*, which are much coarser than the *fineness of grain* in any particular shade of red (Dretske 1981, Ch. 6). So it appears that Carruthers and Veillet are saying that (A) is "thinkable" since any particular thought whose conceptual content contains *red* might not have picked out the nonconceptual content (i.e., the particular shade of red) that it does pick out. For instance, if an Inverted Earth inhabitant visits real Earth, the conceptual content of their thought about grass will also be *red* (in that they think that our grass is "red" given their inverted color language) but the nonconceptual content of their experience will be something else entirely from our perspective (since grass is green on real Earth).

Consider now what it would be like for one of us to travel to Inverted Earth and think (B) while gazing at a patch of red grass. Following the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, Carruthers and Veillet state that:

> In order for this thought to be thinkable, it appears that the phenomenal concept that one deploys must be picking out

only the nonconceptual content of the experience. For if that concept picked out an experience that contained the concept *red* as a constituent, in such a way as to include immediate reference to the latter, then how could the experience *not* be about red, and how could it *not* be a seeming of red? (2011, p. 47)

That is, it appears that Carruthers and Veillet are saying that if the concept *red* is *constitutive* of the content of our experience of grass on Inverted Earth, then it couldn't fail to be *about* red since it would necessarily include *red* conceptually. "For the concept *red* will be right there in the content of the state that one's phenomenal concept picks out, and it is of the essence of that concept that it should be about red" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 47). They conclude:

> When one refers to an experience in such a way that one's thought designates both its conceptual and its nonconceptual content, one can't entertain the sorts of thought-experiments that figure in the hard problem of consciousness. In which case the right conclusion to draw is that the conceptual content of experience doesn't make a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties that give rise to that problem (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 48).

From this they conclude that (3) "We lack conceptually isolated concepts for any cognitive/conceptual properties of experience" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 45). There can be no "cognitive gap" since on the one side of the hypothetical chasm, we have the concept *red* and on the other side—assuming that cognitive phenomenology really does exist—we have the concept *red* as constitutive of our overall conceptual/nonconceptual experience. But that simply means the conceptual content bridges the "gap" by making a constitutive contribution to our total experience. Therefore, having established (1)–(3), Carruthers and Veillet claim that there can be no cognitive phenomenology *ex hypothesi*.

My contention is that Carruthers and Veillet's argument is

question-begging in that its premises involve the assumption that cognitive concepts *are* constitutive of phenomenal experience. That is, if concepts are already constitutive of phenomenal experience, then one would necessarily expect that the thought (B) "*This* experience might not have been <u>an experience of red</u>, or might not have had the content *red*…" would be "unthinkable" (Carruthers & Veillet 2011, p. 47; underscore added). For if the deployment of a concept constitutes a phenomenal experience, the conceptual content of that concept will necessarily constitute that phenomenal experience (along with any other nonconceptual content that may go with it). Returning to Inverted Earth, if we are deploying the concept *red* as constitutive of our total experience (both conceptual and nonconceptual) when looking at red grass, then one would certainly expect that part of the conceptual content of that experience would be about *red*. But the question concerning cognitive phenomenology lies rather in the cognitive concept itself and not in any relation it has to our total experience. The question is whether or not a cognitive concept has a *sui generis* phenomenology in-and-of-itself that is constitutive of our total experience. For example, David Pitt believes that "the phenomenology of occurrent conscious thought is *proprietary*: it's a *sui generis* sort of phenomenology, as unlike, say, auditory and visual phenomenology as they are unlike each other—a *cognitive* phenomenology" (2011, p. 141). If that's right, then we would expect that cognitive phenomenology would be constitutive of our phenomenal experiences and thereby the determining factor in the content of our experiences *qua* conceptual. In such a case, the thought (B) would certainly be "unthinkable." But then that begs the question entirely in terms of the argument presented by Carruthers and Veillet.

The flaw in Carruthers and Veillet's argument from an explanatory gap comes in no small part from its disanalogy with Levine's original. Levine points to an epistemic gap that exists between our qualitative experiences and the physical processes that underlie them. Carruthers and Veillet attempt to establish a gap between our phenomenal concepts and the conceptual content

of our phenomenal experiences. It is true that some have taken Levine's gap to imply phenomenology generally, since if one concedes a gap between the phenomenal and the physical, then one necessarily concedes the phenomenal. However, Levine was in his own words attempting to "transform" Kripke's *metaphysical* argument into an *epistemic* one. The error that Carruthers and Veillet make is in attempting to draw a metaphysical conclusion from an epistemological argument. Simply put, saying that we can't explain the connection between qualitative experience and physical processes presupposes a belief in the existence of qualitative experience. An inverted-experience thought experiment can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, because inverted-experience thought experiments must assume the existence of the very qualitative experience in question in order to show the possibility of their inversion.

Therefore, I conclude that Carruthers and Veillet have failed to definitively establish the *nonexistence* of cognitive phenomenology based on their use of the traditional epistemic challenge coming by way of the "explanatory gap" argument and, more specifically, by way of inverted-experience thought experiments. Their failure results from a disanalogous use of Levine's explanatory gap and an instance of begging the question in their attempt to show that there can be no isolated phenomenal concepts for the conceptual components of our experience. Furthermore, Carruthers and Veillet do attempt to extend their argument to some of the other epistemic challenges for phenomenology, that is, Mary the vision scientist and the conceivability of philosophical zombies (2011, pp. 50–51). However, my contention is that their failure simply extends into these other cases for similar reasons. Nonetheless, I would now like to specifically consider the epistemic challenge coming by way of zombie intuitions, but from a completely different theoretical position.

II. THE CONCEIVABILITY OF PARTIAL ZOMBIES

Chalmers has argued from the conceivability of philosophical zombies to the rejection of any form of physicalism that is reductionist or denies the existence of qualitative experience generally. A zombie, he says, is "someone or something physically identical to me (or to any other conscious being), but lacking conscious experiences altogether" (Chalmers 1996, p. 94). A philosophical zombie is just like a real human being in all physical (and functional) respects except for having *no* qualitative experience whatsoever. Such creatures walk about doing all the things that we do and are completely indistinguishable from us based on any observable behaviors. Nonetheless, there's *nothing it's like* to be a philosophical zombie, since they have no inner phenomenal experience. Chalmers has argued that the conceivability of such creatures actually entails their logical (or metaphysical) possibility. In which case, all the physical (and functional) facts about us cannot account for our having the qualitative (or phenomenal) experiences that we do have. However, it should be pointed out that Chalmers had several other arguments in this regard, since he saw that "some people find conceivability arguments difficult to adjudicate, particularly where strange ideas such as this one are concerned" (1996, p. 99). Nonetheless, we can immediately see the similarity between zombie arguments and the inverted-experience thought experiment considered by Carruthers and Veillet. Both are instances of an epistemic argument going after a metaphysical conclusion.

In similar fashion to Chalmers, Horgan argues that the conceivability of what he calls "partial zombies" entails the metaphysical existence of cognitive phenomenology. A partial zombie "has *some* phenomenology, but lacks certain kinds of phenomenology that are present in the mental lives of ordinary humans" (Horgan 2011, p. 60). Central to Horgan's argument is what he calls the "robust conceivability" of such zombies. "Robustness" he defines as involving "the persistence of conceivability under

inclusion of arbitrarily greater detail and specificity" (Horgan 2011, p. 60). For instance, although one might well "imagine in a *non-specific* way" that one could prove that elementary number theory is complete, one cannot imagine it "robustly" (i.e., with great specificity) since Gödel has shown that such a proof is impossible (Horgan 2011, p. 60). From this starting point, Horgan argues for the thesis that "*the robust conceivability of certain kinds of zombie scenarios can serve as a criteria for the existence of certain kinds of phenomenal character*" (2011, p. 61). Specifically, he argues for the robust conceivability of zombies who are functional duplicates of normal humans and have all of the uncontested forms of phenomenology, but who nonetheless are missing some kind of cognitive phenomenology. Furthermore, Horgan bases his argument on an interesting appeal to "the phenomenology of agency, as a way to leverage one's way to a recognition of full-fledged cognitive phenomenology" (2011, p. 64). Thus, Horgan walks us through a series of zombie scenarios involving one ordinary human being (Andy$_1$) and four partial zombies (Andy$_2$–Andy$_5$) who are progressively deficient in terms of some aspect of their respective cognitive or agentive phenomenology.

Andy$_1$ acts as a baseline and is a completely normal human being (who, interestingly enough, steadfastly denies the existence of cognitive or agentive phenomenology). All of the other Andys are complete functional duplicates of Andy$_1$ but lack some type of purported cognitive or agentive phenomenology. Furthermore, all of the Andys have the same uncontested types of phenomenological experiences that we do (Horgan 2011, pp. 66–67). Horgan argues that each Andy is "robustly conceivable" and, ultimately, that this provides compelling evidence that cognitive and agentive phenomenology really do exist.

Andy$_2$ is exactly like Andy$_1$ except for the fact that he "has no agentive phenomenology at all—in particular, no experiences as-of certain bodily movements emanating from himself as their source" (Horgan 2011, p. 67). Andy$_2$ has what Horgan calls *agency absence partial-zombie disorder*. Here, Horgan points to a very interesting and important interconnection between our

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purported cognitive phenomenology and our sense of agency. We generally think that our cognitive states (i.e., beliefs and desires) play some role in our actions (i.e., purposeful bodily motions and noises). For instance, it is our beliefs about and desires for a ham sandwich that generally cause us to get a ham sandwich. But not only that, we generally think that we are the *agent cause* of our own actions when voluntarily getting a ham sandwich. Therefore, Horgan argues that there is a distinctive *agentive phenomenology* in addition to a distinctive cognitive phenomenology. But Andy$_2$ lacks this phenomenology of agency and so goes through his day thinking that his bodily movements are "just happening" to him (Horgan 2011, p. 67). When he desires a ham sandwich he sometimes notices that his body spontaneously (and luckily for him) acts in such a way as to get him a ham sandwich, but he never experiences himself as the agent cause of those actions.

Andy$_3$ is exactly like Andy$_1$ except for the fact that "he never experiences his verbal or written squiggle-producing behavior as *speech acts*, nor does he experience his behaviors prompted by others' noises or squiggles as *responses to linguistic communications*" (Horgan 2011, p. 70). Andy$_3$ has what Horgan calls *language-understanding absence partial-zombie disorder*. Andy$_3$ is similar to Andy$_2$ but instead of bodily motions, Andy$_3$ never experiences himself as the agent cause of linguistic acts, nor does he see himself as responding to the linguistic acts of others. While Andy$_1$ can understand the meaning of someone's saying "bring me a ham sandwich," Andy$_3$ simply hears the raw noises produced by that utterance without any corresponding linguistic understanding. But miraculously, Andy$_3$ still acts in exactly the same manner that Andy$_1$ does. And although Andy$_3$ does generally see himself as the agent cause of his actions (unlike Andy$_2$) he never sees his actions as being the result of any linguistic communication.

Andy$_4$ is exactly like Andy$_1$ except for the facts that (i) like Andy$_3$ he suffers from *language-understanding absence partial-zombie disorder* and (ii) "he only experiences himself as moving his body or his body-parts… in thus-and-such way *in order that his body move that way*, and he never experiences any of [these]

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actions as having some further purpose either known or unknown" (Horgan 2011, p. 73).[2] Andy$_4$ has what Horgan calls *ulterior-purpose absence partial-zombie disorder*. So Andy$_4$ is just like the linguistically-deficient Andy$_3$ but is also afflicted with a total lack of any sense of ulterior purpose for his immediate bodily motions and noises. And although Andy$_4$ may ultimately make a ham sandwich as a result of a series of individual bodily actions, he is never aware of having (or acting upon) an ultimate *purpose to* make a ham sandwich. For Andy$_4$, the fact that he sometimes ends up with a ham sandwich while aimlessly moving about the kitchen (this-way-or-that) must be very surprising to him.

Andy$_5$ is exactly like Andy$_1$ except for the startling fact that he has "no agentive phenomenology, and no cognitive phenomenology at all," having only the kinds of phenomenology "that skeptics about cognitive phenomenology are prepared to recognize—sensory phenomenology and other kinds of uncontested phenomenology" (Horgan 2011, p. 75). Andy$_5$ has what Horgan calls *absent cognitive-and-agentive-phenomenology partial-zombie disorder*. "Phenomenologically, Andy$_5$'s mental life is a mere *sequence of raw sensations* (plus perhaps raw emotions, raw sensory images, etc.), utterly untinged by any phenomenological aspects of agency, or purpose, or cognitive states like belief or desire" (Horgan 2011, p. 75). Horgan is understandably reluctant to even call Andy$_5$ a "person" in any meaningful sense since Andy$_5$ appears to be nothing more than some sort of sensory-experiencing automaton. This despite the fact that all of the observable motions and noises that Andy$_5$ makes when making a ham sandwich are perfectly indistinguishable from Andy$_1$'s motions and noises doing the same. Though Andy$_5$ can certainly see and taste ham sandwiches, he has absolutely no *thoughts* about them. Nor does he ever have any sense of his being the *agent cause* of his actions in getting a ham sandwich.

Horgan concludes that "the robust conceivability of these various scenarios constitutes *strong evidence* that ordinary phenomenology comprises not only the uncontested kinds of phenomenal character, but further kinds as well. It includes self-

as-source phenomenology" as well as "full-fledged cognitive phenomenology" (2011, p. 76; emphasis added). Furthermore, he concludes that the burden of proof—"a heavy one"—is now on those who would deny cognitive phenomenology to "find a plausible, well motivated, and non-question begging way of arguing that the robust conceivability of such scenarios is not a suitable test for the existence of cognitive phenomenology" (Horgan 2011, p. 76). Chalmers makes a similar claim when he says that "a certain burden of proof lies on those who claim that a given description is logically *impossible*" (1996, p. 96). Why is it impossible? Why is it inconceivable? Of course, philosophical zombies may be nomologically impossible (given the actual laws of human biology). However, zombie arguments concern only the metaphysical (or logical) possibility of such creatures. And it is not at all obvious that either philosophical or partial zombies are either metaphysically (or logically) impossible.

My contention is that Horgan's argument from the conceivability of "partial zombies" is question-begging in that the given scenarios involve the assumption that cognitive and agentive phenomenology already exist in us. Although it is important to point out that Horgan himself (like Chalmers) is well aware that the mere conceivability of zombies may leave the skeptic unsatisfied. However, Horgan does argue that the rejection of "partial zombies" will "require the biting of some sizeable-looking bullets" (2011, p. 59). And he states that the conceivability of "partial zombies" offers at least "strong evidence" on behalf of the existence of cognitive phenomenology. But there is a sense in which *unconvincing* albeit strong evidence is no evidence at all. That the prime suspect in a homicide is a very mean and vicious person may be compelling evidence to some that he did the deed, but it's certainly not the sort of evidence (by itself) that would be admissible in a court of law. Similarly, the jurists who stand against cognitive phenomenology need not accept any of Horgan's speculative testimony concerning the conceivability of "partial zombies."

First of all, it is unclear that $Andy_2$, $Andy_3$, or $Andy_4$ has any

real bearing on the existence of cognitive phenomenology whatsoever. $Andy_2$ is lacking *agentive phenomenology* which according to Horgan is to be distinguished from cognitive phenomenology. So conceivably, one could lack *agentive phenomenology* but still have cognitive phenomenology. Similarly, $Andy_3$ lacks *language-understanding* but there is an open question as to whether or not thought requires some type of language-understanding. If our thoughts can be distinguished from linguistic acts then one could conceive of $Andy_3$ with or without cognitive phenomenology. $Andy_4$ lacks both *language-understanding* and any self-recognition of *ulterior purposes* in his immediate bodily motions. But like $Andy_3$ it's unclear whether the absence of linguistic understanding implies anything about the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Similarly, it doesn't seem that $Andy_4$ must have some *ulterior purpose* in terms of his bodily motions in order to entertain a thought either with or without cognitive phenomenology. He can certainly still think about ham sandwiches with or without any purposes toward them. And that leaves us with only $Andy_5$.

Andy$_5$ lacks both *agentive* and *cognitive* phenomenology, so that it is explicit that he has no cognitive phenomenology. Remember also that all of the Andys have all of the other "uncontested" types of phenomenology. And in this sense, it is important to point out that $Andy_2$–$Andy_5$ are very unlike Chalmers' zombies, since $Andy_2$–$Andy_5$ lack only *some* kinds of phenomenology while Chalmers' zombies lack *all* kinds of phenomenology. Like Carruthers and Veillet, in Horgan we see a disanalogous (though not *a priori* fatal) use of an original epistemic argument. So the question comes down to whether or not $Andy_5$ is conceivable as lacking cognitive phenomenology but not the other types of phenomenology. And if so, does the conceivability of $Andy_5$ really offer, as Horgan says, "strong evidence" to accept the existence of cognitive phenomenology?

Certainly, I think $Andy_5$ is at the least minimally conceivable in that his story is (at the very least) coherent. However, is it "robustly conceivable" as Horgan's thesis requires? Here there is an honest doubt. Thinking back to Levine's "explanatory gap" it

seems reasonable to say that we just don't have any good explanations about our qualitative experiences. But that doesn't mean that such explanations will not be forthcoming as the cognitive sciences advance in the future. Now think back to Horgan's example of imagining someone's proving the completeness of elementary number theory. It cannot be done *robustly*, thanks to Gödel. But why can't we apply the same analogy to the case of cognitive phenomenology? Maybe someday in the future a Gödel-like figure in the cognitive sciences will finally show us how it all works. Maybe she'll show us exactly how cognitive phenomenology can be explained in terms of neural processes alone. Or, maybe she'll show us that our "zombie intuitions" were perfectly right to begin with. Or, maybe it will turn out that we are all exactly like Andy$_5$ and that any of our intuitions to the contrary have simply misled us. After all, Andy$_5$ is completely indistinguishable from a normal human being from any third-person perspective. These are open questions that seem to deny or at least question the "robust conceivability" of Horgan's "partial zombies" from the point of view of the skeptic. On the other hand, for those who share his intuitions about zombies, Horgan's "partial zombies" may seem very compelling. But this simply begs the question, since Horgan's zombie scenarios begin by simply *asserting* that Andy$_1$ has cognitive phenomenology while the other Andys do not. A zombie scenario (like an inverted-experience thought experiment) can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, because zombie scenarios must assume the existence of the very qualitative experience in question in order to show the possibility of their being missing in a zombie.

Therefore, I conclude that Horgan has failed to definitively establish the *existence* of a distinctive kind of cognitive phenomenology based on his use of the traditional epistemic argument involving "zombie intuitions." His failure results from an instance of question-begging in his attempt to show that "partial zombies" are in fact conceivable and thus metaphysically possible. For those who already advocate (or who are inclined to advocate) the existence of cognitive phenomenology, Horgan may offer very

compelling reasons based on preexisting intuitions. Of course, Horgan does admit that his "partial zombie" scenarios may not satisfy his opponents. But he also claims that "partial zombies" offer at least "strong evidence" for the existence of phenomenology. However, the skeptic need not be compelled in any way by Horgan's "partial zombies" since, as we've seen, they need not be considered "robustly conceivable." We have now seen the same sort of logical flaw permeating both an argument for the *existence* of cognitive phenomenology, and an argument for the *nonexistence* of cognitive phenomenology.

III. The Argument For (or Against) Cognitive Phenomenology

Unfortunately, we have come to no good conclusions regarding the actual existence (or nonexistence) of cognitive phenomenology. But I believe there is a reasonable way forward. In order to establish the definitive existence (or nonexistence) of cognitive phenomenology one must shy away from any of these "epistemic challenges." The epistemological arguments traditionally raised on behalf of phenomenology generally fail to come to the metaphysical conclusions necessary for cognitive phenomenology. They may be enticing for some, but for those who do not already share the intuition that there *is* a cognitive phenomenology, they need not be convincing at all. So what we really need are straightforward metaphysical arguments that either prove (or disprove) the existence of cognitive phenomenology. We need an argument that shows us that there couldn't possibly *not* be a distinctive cognitive phenomenology. For instance, Pitt offers a "transcendental argument" to the effect that "it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them" (2004, p. 1). I will leave it as an open question whether or not such arguments can truly do the deed one way or the other. The purpose here is to merely clear the way forward in an already cluttered battlefield.

In summary, we have seen that the various "epistemic chal-

lenges" raised on behalf of uncontested forms of phenomenology fail to definitively establish the existence (or nonexistence) of a distinctive kind of cognitive phenomenology. This includes, but is not limited to arguments based on Levine's "explanatory gap," Block's "inverted-experiences," and Chalmers' "zombie intuitions." (i) In the case of Carruthers and Veillet, we have seen a disanalogous use of the original "explanatory gap" argument fail to prove the *nonexistence* of cognitive phenomenology. Specifically, there was an instance of question-begging in their attempt to apply an "inverted-experience thought experiment" to show that conceptual phenomenology cannot be constitutive of our total phenomenal experiences. (ii) In the case of Horgan, we have seen that a variation on Chalmers' "zombie" argument fails to prove the *existence* of cognitive phenomenology. Specifically, there was an instance of question-begging in his attempt to show that zombie scenarios provide "strong evidence" for the existence of cognitive or agentive phenomenology. In both cases, the fatal flaw came down to an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a metaphysical conclusion from an epistemological argument. (iii) Finally, the moral of the story has been an *adviso* to stay away from epistemic arguments that aim for metaphysical conclusions in the case of cognitive phenomenology. If any progress is to be made, then we must rely on straightforward *metaphysical arguments* to get us to *metaphysical conclusions* about the existence (or nonexistence) of a distinctive kind of cognitive phenomenology.[3]

Notes

1. These are the most essential points of their argument; however, Carruthers and Veillet actually summarize their argument in the following six steps.

    (1) A property is phenomenal only if it contributes to the hard problem of consciousness, and in particular, only if it gives rise to an explanatory gap.

    (2) A property gives rise to an explanatory gap only if we have a conceptually isolated phenomenal concept for it (such as the concept *these qualities* deployed in the thought ["But all of that might be true while *these* qualities of this experience were different or absent."])

(3) So a property is phenomenal only if we have a conceptually isolated concept for it.

(4) We lack conceptually isolated concepts for any cognitive/conceptual properties of experience (that is to say, for experiences individuated in such a way as to include their cognitive/conceptual components).

(5) So cognitive/conceptual properties don't give rise to an explanatory gap.

(6) Hence cognitive/conceptual properties aren't themselves phenomenal ones. (2011, pp. 44–45)

I am focusing on the key moves made in steps (1), (2), and (4). Steps (3) and (5) are simply logical transitions. Step (6) is the conclusion of the argument and is meant to imply the nonexistence of cognitive phenomenology.

2. Horgan also says that Andy$_4$ "has no other occurrent-belief phenomenology or occurrent-desire phenomenology, apart from the what-it's-like of the ongoing, spontaneous, bodily-motion desires (and accompanying I-can-so-move and I-am-so-moving beliefs) that constantly arise within him and suffuse his agentive phenomenology" (2011, p. 73). I simply omit this further distinction for the simplification of the present argument.

3. I am indebted to David Pitt for his invaluable assistance in reviewing and discussing an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank all of the students in Professor Pitt's recent philosophy of mind seminar for their engaging and insightful discussions.

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CROSS-MODAL BINDING IN OBJECT PERCEPTION

Douglas C. Wadle

To date, studies of perception have been primarily focused on individual sensory modalities. Where such studies have considered cross-modal sensory integration, they have focused on the observation of behavioral correlations between sensory modalities (i.e., apparent information exchange between vision and audition with respect to spatial location tasks). The study of the cognitive foundations of this information exchange has been left almost entirely untouched. Since discrete features across modalities do combine such that we are able to perceive perceptual properties of differing sensory modes as being caused by the same object or objects, we have a "binding problem" for cross-modal perception—that is, we require a mechanism that integrates features of differing sensory modalities as properties of the same object. In this paper I argue that a non-conceptual cross-modal feature integration mechanism is both necessary and sufficient for the task of solving this binding problem—at least with respect to vision and audition. By a non-conceptual cross-modal feature integration mechanism, I mean a means of integrating sensory features in differing sense modalities as features of a single object without recourse to some concept that includes the features to be integrated as a portion of that concept's content. The argument builds upon studies of visual and auditory attention, which I will briefly summarize. I then demonstrate the sufficiency of non-conceptual integration for cross-modal binding and establish its necessity by showing the insufficiency of conceptual integration for the same. From there I will propose desiderata for a full account of cross-modal binding. Finally, I will argue that the primary thesis of the paper entails an intentional (by degrees) view of perception.

1. VISUAL ATTENTION

In the early stages of visual perception—prior to the level of phenomenal visual experience—feature and location information is transformed into a surface representation, a featureless demarcation of surface boundaries and contours in spatial extension. Surface representations form the basic data upon which visual attention works (Nakayama, He, & Shimojo 1995, p. 6, 45; Tipper & Weaver 1998). Nakayama et al., have shown that these surface representations arise prior to the split between the ventral and dorsal cortical pathways (1995, p. 9), which are concerned with object recognition and spatial representations used for motor planning, respectively (Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982). Visual attention has been characterized as a feature integration mechanism for mitigating binding problems in visual object perception (Treisman & Gormican 1988; Treisman 1998). This mechanism is primarily associated with the ventral stream but also encompasses parallel processing between the feature information coded in the ventral stream and the location information coded in the dorsal stream, which Treisman has referred to as "feature maps" and the "location map", respectively (1998, p. 41). A feature map consists of a coarse coding of some feature, or dimension (e.g., color, spatial orientation), by a combination of a few basic values (red, yellow, blue, green, for color, for instance). These are then combined across and within dimensions by cross-referencing with other feature maps and with the "location map" (Treisman 1998, p. 27).

Visual attention uses (at least) two mechanisms to accomplish this feature integration. The first mechanism makes all plausible bindings of coarsely coded features by cross-referencing the various feature maps and the location map. Treisman points out that this "suggests that attention should be needed not only to integrate features across dimensions (e.g. colour with orientation) but also to integrate them within dimensions (blue and red to make purple; vertical and diagonal to make a more steeply tilted orientation)" (Treisman 1998, p. 27). The second mechanism involves

suppressing all but a single integration of features, out of which our visual phenomenal experience emerges (Treisman 1998, pp. 41–42). She calls the output of this feature integration process an "object file":

> […] an object file… specifies the current state of a particular object, and updates it if necessary when the object moves or changes. When attention is focused on a single element in the display, the object file represents that single element. When attention is divided more broadly, the object file creates a global representation with the emergent features that characterize the overall structure of the elements as a group (Treisman 1998, p. 42).

Features integrated by attention are fixed at certain locations on a surface representation and an "object file" is created to partition features as features of discrete objects. Surface representations prove to be essential in amodal completion (Nakayama et al., 1995, pp. 10–15)—completion of surfaces behind occluders (e.g., seeing a whole dog behind a picket fence or experiencing a sheet of paper as rectangular, though a book covers one corner of it)—and for tracking motion (Nakayama et al., 1995, pp. 30–33). Given that surface representations precede the process of feature integration, the integrated features are, once bound, already bound as features of some component of the surface representation; and, so, the surface representation's persistence through time (and motion) ensures the persistence through time of the integrated features (with necessary revisions for perceived continuous motion) as an object file; hence the necessity that the object file be capable of updating. This also solves a second binding problem, that of temporal rather than spatial feature integration.

The inhibition mechanism of attention, when operating on object files, leads to an interesting phenomenon: as attention is directed to the visual scene and objects are discerned, our perception of these objects is unaffected by slight (or, in the case of what Mack and Rock (1998) have called "inattention blindness", not so slight) changes of their features and even location (Luck &

Beach 1998, p. 456). This suggests that only the features considered relevant (those that "characterize the overall structure of the elements as a group") by the heuristics of visual processing—for the discernment of the object as that object—are integrated by attention. The remaining features remain unintegrated, though still available for further processing on their respective feature maps. Unnoted features of a visually perceived object file can come under attention, when attention is addressed to parts of the object, and thus become phenomenally manifested by setting up a new object file. Such a newly formed object file will coincide, spatially and with respect to the underlying surface representation, with the already held object file and should, therefore, integrate as a feature of that object within the new object file.

To summarize, surface representations arising in early vision form the data on which both the ventral and dorsal cortical pathways perform their respective functions. Attention, operating as a part of the ventral pathway's object recognition function, integrates coarsely coded features from feature maps by comparing with other feature maps and the master location map (this location map being accessed from the dorsal pathway). This is accomplished by both a combinational mechanism and a subsequent suppression mechanism that, together, give rise to our visual phenomenology in the form of object files that are integrated sets of elements perceived as structurally unified groups.

2. AUDITORY SCENE ANALYSIS

Bregman has done pioneering work in "auditory scene" analysis—the partitioning of the sonic environment into discrete streams, corresponding to individuated causes. As such, auditory scene analysis is a form of feature integration, grouping sounds based on something very much like Treisman's coarsely coded features. Auditory scene analysis, in other words, is analogous to visual attention. A complex sound, resulting from scene analysis, is a composite of individual waveforms, each with its own frequency and amplitude. The composite waveform of the complex sound is

referred to as its spectrum. Groupings by auditory scene analysis occur through time (sequentially) and simultaneously, according to frequency, loudness, brightness, and, to a small extent, perceived location (Bregman 1990, p. 647).

Sequential grouping occurs along these dimensions with respect to sequential sounds' similarities in terms of "fundamental frequency, their temporal proximity, the shape of their spectra, their intensity, and their apparent spatial origin" (Bregman 1990, p. 649). A Bach cello suite, for instance, exhibits sequential stream segregation. Multiple musical lines seem to emerge from a sequence of single tones, these musical lines being defined by their overall pitch height relative to one another—that is, the pitches of one stream are higher than those of the other stream. Simultaneous segregation occurs primarily on the basis of frequency relations and coordinations of micromodulations (infinitesimal variations occurring so rapidly as to be phenomenally unapparent) of amplitude and frequency. With respect to frequency relations, there is what Bregman calls the "harmonicity principle" (Bregman 1990, p. 656), which holds that simple frequencies tend to integrate as a unified complex spectrum as they approach perfect harmonicity with one another, where harmonicity is just that the relation between the individual components can be represented as simple ratios (e.g., 3:2, 5:4).

Furthermore, Bregman maintains that scene analysis proceeds along two lines, a "primitive" scene analysis of the sort just described, and a schema-based, (partially) consciously controlled attention: "Primitive processes *partition* the sensory evidence whereas schema-based attentional ones *select* from the evidence without partitioning it" (Bregman 1990, p. 669). That is, primitive scene analysis segregates certain auditory features and integrates others, such that a set of simultaneous auditory streams emerges, whereas a conscious attention (on Bregman's use of the word) selects among features for further resolution. This conscious attention might be directed at a given stream, or even some set of components of that stream, to build what Bregman characterizes as "detailed and coherent descriptions of the sound, employing

schemas that incorporate knowledge about specific domains such as speech, music, or environmental sounds" (Bregman 1990, p. 700). Schemas are classifications of signal types that function as "units of mental control" that "select evidence out of a mixture that has not been subdivided by primitive scene analysis" (Bregman 1990, pp. 666–667). I will have more to say about Bregman's "schemas" later. (He speaks of them as a form of "knowledge", but does not use that term with any epistemological rigor. We will see, in dealing with conceptual and non-conceptual integration, to what extent schemas can be considered conceptual and learned and also to what extent they will prove essential to conscious auditory attention.) This conscious attention describes how it is that the "cocktail party phenomenon"—a classic example in the literature on auditory perception—can occur. The cocktail party phenomenon is just that one is able to attentively select, from a complex sea of competing auditory streams (mostly individual conversations happening throughout the room), a single stream as emitted by a particular speaker somewhere in the room. It seems, then, that the analogy between auditory scene analysis and visual attention is borne out. There are preconscious groupings of features based upon a limited number of coarsely coded features (e.g., frequency and amplitude) that become available for further resolution at the conscious level, thus producing what might be called auditory object files. To simplify the presentation, I propose the term "modally specific object file" (MSOF) to designate the class of perceptual "objects" emerging from the application of attention within a given sensory mode.

O'Callaghan argues along similar lines in support of the view that streams are auditory MSOFs. For O'Callaghan the objects of visual and auditory perception are both "mereologically complex individuals that persist through time" (O'Callaghan 2008, p. 805) with auditory streams (again) doing duty as the auditory object (p. 822). His argument for auditory objects is based upon observations from Bregman that show auditory streams functioning in ways analogous to visual scene representations in terms of amodal completion and subjective contours. Bregman delineates

a heuristic for the amodal completion of a stream when some other auditory stream interrupts it. This occurs when the signals on either side of the interrupter are sufficiently similar and seem to have originated from the same source, and the interrupter signal contains all the components one would have expected had the initial signal continued. The result is that the initial signal is perceived as continuing "behind" the interrupter—a continuous signal is heard beginning with the onset of the first signal and ending with the termination of the second (non-interrupter) signal (Bregman 1990, p. 667). An instance of auditory subjective "contour" experience comes in the well-known phenomenon of difference tones: where two or more actually sounding tones stand in a relatively simple harmonic relationship to some (absent) fundamental, that fundamental will be perceived. These examples give credence to O'Callaghan's conclusion that streams constitute auditory objects delineated in time. They also offer further support to my claim that auditory attention produces auditory MSOFs, which behave much like visual MSOFs, though in the auditory realm. Important differences between my and O'Callaghan's views will be examined in section 6, where the discussion turns to the intentionality of perception.

3. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SUFFICIENCY OF NON-CONCEPTUAL CROSS-MODAL BINDING

Having explained the operations of auditory and visual attention as mode-specific feature integration mechanisms, we are in a position to examine the nature of cross-modal feature integration. The discussion rests on the recognition of cross-modal integration as a form of binding problem. This problem has been noted, though not studied, with respect to vision and audition, by Ward, Mcdonald, and Golestani (1998, pp. 237–238) and Bregman (1990, p. 658). Before continuing, I want to clarify just what I mean by a binding problem. So far, I have spoken of a binding problem as one in which separate phenomenal features must be phenomenally integrated as belonging to a single object so as to give a

full phenomenal reckoning of that object. So long as the discussion pertains only to perceptions in a single sensory modality, this characterization does not tend to raise problems. As soon as we broaden the context to consider cross-modal perception, an additional condition must be added to our definition of "binding problem": a binding problem results where phenomenal features must be phenomenally integrated and *experienced* as properties of the same object so as to give a full phenomenal reckoning of that object.

It is obvious that we can recognize that a loud, low-pitched whirring sound and the image of a small oblong shape with a long tail, two skis underneath, and a rotor on top are both caused by the same object—namely, a helicopter. The question is: Do we experience both phenomenologies as deriving from the same object because we have a (non-phenomenal) concept [helicopter] that allows us to connect the two contents, or do we integrate them as a single object non-conceptually? To address this question, I will borrow the distinction between thing-awareness and fact-awareness, or simple seeing and seeing-as (Dretske 1993, 1979). Adapting Dretske's terminology, we can reframe the question as: Is it ever the case that we simply perceive (or are thing-aware of) a single object having both the visual appearance and sound of a helicopter, (i.e., it is not perceived as a token of the concept [helicopter])? More broadly: Is it ever the case that we simply perceive a single object cross-modally constituted? If so, then it follows that such a non-conceptual mechanism is sufficient for cross-modal binding.

Take a visual experience of a misshapen lump of metal, about the size of a small trash can in an otherwise open space. Add to this the auditory experience of a high-pitched, pure tone localized to approximately the same region as the object. It seems that we would identify the source of the sound as being identical with the object giving us the metallic lump visual experience, though I have no object-kind that includes the metal lump as a part of its extension. Even were there multiple objects present, so long as they were not positioned so as to offer equally plau-

sible correspondences with the auditory localization of the high-pitched tone, the attribution of shared objective cause to the visual and auditory phenomenology remains the same. We have, here, a case of simply perceiving a metallic lump that emits a high-pitched noise—that is, a non-conceptual bound cross-modal set of MSOFs is designated. I will call this an "integrated object file" (IOF). The existence of non-conceptual cross-modal integration is thereby established. However, this does not establish that a non-conceptual integration is necessary to solve the cross-modal binding problem. To do this we must also establish that a conceptual integration mechanism is not sufficient for binding.

4. IS A CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION MECHANISM SUFFICIENT FOR CROSS-MODAL BINDING?

A conceptual cross-modal feature integration mechanism will be sufficient to the task of cross-modal binding if and only if (a) we have some concept (of an object-kind) that allows us to experience phenomenal features from differing sensory modalities as originating from a single object (as a token of the object-kind) and (b) there is no concurrent non-conceptual integration mechanism that would, by itself, lead us to experience these same phenomenal features as originating from a single object. Before considering whether or not conditions (a) and (b) can be satisfied, I must refine the definition of IOF given above. An IOF should be construed as any integrated set of MSOFs, *or any single MSOF that is not bound with other MSOFs*, where all the MSOFs of the IOF are experienced as resulting from a single physical object. The importance of this definitional revision will become apparent in section 6.

In order to form a concept of an object-kind, one must have stored representations of members of the extension of that object-kind. We know from studies of visual imagery that memories of images are stored as non-phenomenal feature and feature relation/ location descriptions that can be accessed to produce a mental image (Kosslyn 1995, pp. 290–291). An IOF corresponding to

a visual MSOF, then, will be translated into a set of descriptors regarding its features, their relations to one another, and their locations in a spatial grid, when being stored in memory. I will refer to this set of descriptors as a descriptor set (DS). An object-kind will form where a set of DSs are seen to have shared non-phenomenal descriptors which are partitioned into a generalized descriptor set (GDS) that describes the characteristics of the object-kind, as opposed to one of its tokens. Then to integrate at the level of the object-kind is to integrate MSOFs that would be returned as IOF by simple perceiving as a single IOF whose phenomenal properties match descriptors in some GDS. In being accessed to call forth mental imagery, GDSs may *create* bound cross-modal (mental) IOFs, but it is not at all clear that they can integrate separate, simply perceived IOFs as of a single object. To do this would require that the MSOFs of the IOFs be reintegrated into a new, more inclusive IOF. Consider a case where I am in a canyon when I hear the sound of a helicopter. Looking in the direction suggested by the auditory phenomena, I see no helicopter. Scanning the rest of the sky, I see a helicopter on the other side of the canyon and think, "Ah, the sound has bounced off the canyon wall and so I mislocated it." I have clearly classified the phenomenally distinct IOFs related to the sound of the helicopter and the image of the helicopter as tokens of a single object-kind. What conceptual integration would require is that I recast that sound and that image as MSOFs and integrate them under an IOF, but this is not what happens in a case like this. I do not, in virtue of my concept, *experience* the sound and the image as coming from a single token of the object-kind [helicopter]. I simply attribute the phenomenally distinct (unbound) IOFs related to the same cause (i.e., the same helicopter).

Things may not be so simple for us, though. There is some reason to suspect that schemas, briefly discussed in reference to Bregman's theory of auditory scene analysis, might meet conditions (a) and (b). Schemas, it will be remembered, are classifications of percept types that are used to flag incoming signals for specialized processing by attention. Bregman's examples of

schemas for audition were speech, music, and environmental sounds. These are clearly not so narrowly defined as an object-kind; rather they are classifications of object-kinds, but as such they clearly have an affinity with object-kinds. Remember, too, that Bregman identifies these with conscious control of attention, so presumably, the relevant schemas are activated by our attending to the given MSOF. In this case, we would expect that, for instance, recognizing some auditory stream as music would help us to identify what instrument or instruments were in the mix. The question for us then becomes, would recognizing that two MSOFs from differing sense modalities but belonging to the same cross-modal schema aid binding into a single IOF in cases where non-conceptual binding, alone, failed to do so? Imagine a medium-sized room, empty except for a single speaker. Throughout the room you hear a very low pitch that does not vary in terms of amplitude as you move about. If the schema for music is operative and is construed as covering the visual appearance of things that make music as well as the sound of music, then, if schemas can effect cross-modal binding, you should experience the sound as coming from the speaker, but this is not what will happen. Just as in the case of the helicopter, you attribute the auditory and visual stimuli to the same physical cause without *experiencing* them as of the same cause (i.e., the sensory stimuli do not truly bind).

We might try to tweak our example to make a binding plausible, but on further reflection it seems that any adjustments we make will be unable to satisfy condition (b). We have seen that schemas are able to select but not partition auditory features into streams and that, further, schemas do not integrate across streams with any assurance (Bregman 1990, p. 669), but what we need in order to integrate IOFs as MSOFs of a newly established IOF is precisely that our conceptual integration mechanism *partition* the IOFs into a single unit, otherwise the integration has to work across two distinct streams. So either way, we cannot, on the model of auditory attention, satisfy (b). Given that Bregman borrowed the notion of schemas from cognitive scientists working in all manner of areas of human cognitive processing, it seems very likely that

the results Bregman discusses will generalize, and they certainly do with respect to vision given the fact that visual attention operates on feature maps, the location map, and its own outputs—not on surface representations. However, this still leaves open the possibility that schemas and object-kind ascriptions might be able to *suppress* non-conceptual binding. I will consider this point in the following section.

5. DESIDERATA FOR SUPRA-ATTENTION

A non-conceptual feature integration mechanism will be necessary and sufficient for binding if and only if (i) non-conceptual feature integration is sufficient for cross-modal binding and (ii) conceptual feature integration is insufficient for cross-modal binding. (i) was proved in section 2, as was (ii) in section 3. So, we know this much (and only this much) about cross-modal binding: there is some non-conceptual mechanism by which it is accomplished.

The extent of the evidence from cognitive science for a non-conceptual binding is that our auditory localizations and our visual localizations do exhibit a coordinated inhibiting of the suppression function of attention at corresponding locations in the (distinct) location representations of each modality (Ward et al., 1998, p. 238). However, the localization of sound is not only extraordinarily vague, it is not even necessary for the segregation of the auditory scene into discrete streams (Bregman 1990, p. 659). Consider our experience of monaural musical recordings. We hear different instruments constituting different streams even though they originate from a single physical source. This result obtains whether or not the perceiver is aware that the sounds emanate from a single source and whether or not the sounds themselves are categorized conceptually as sound-kinds. From this it follows that auditory MSOFs do not compete with one another with respect to location. Now consider a surround sound recording. Auditory streams localize to particular regions of a room not occupied by their actual causes. We can imagine a case in which some particular stream localizes to an actual visual MSOF in the

room. One of two possibilities occurs: either we do integrate the auditory and visual MSOFs as a single IOF, or we do not. If we do bind these MSOFs, then we will have an illusory experience of the sonic and visual phenomenology as sharing a cause in a single physical object and perceive it (simply) as such. If we do not, then there must be a top-down feedback from object-kinds (as is suggested by Bregman's schemas) operating in conjunction with non-conceptual cross-modal integration so as to prevent binding (because the MSOFs are not recognized as tokening an IOF that corresponds to some held GDS). Both scenarios strike me as entirely plausible. Our account of the processes involved in cross-modal binding must also include (at least the possibility of) a top-down binding suppression function from GDSs. I will call the complete process "supra-attention."

What, then, are the necessary features of supra-attention? As with any process, it has to have a medium upon which it works. In this case, the medium will be the MSOFs of the various sensory modalities. Note that the medium is the MSOF, not its individual features—supra-attention does not potentially reintegrate features that were previously integrated otherwise in the modally specific domain. In these matters, supra-attention is analogous to visual and auditory attention—attention can be directed at the features of an MSOF in each of these modalities, but cannot rebind features across MSOFs. The output of supra-attention will be one or more IOFS. Following from the fact that there is evidence that spatial coordination between sensory modalities occurs, supra-attention will also require a parsimony principle favoring the identification of the lowest number of possible IOFs in the total perceptual scene that will use the coordination across spatial representations within modes to return the lowest number of physical causes taken as represented by the present MSOFs, but this parsimony principle must be subject to the top-down binding suppression from concepts discussed above. Furthermore, a single MSOF can be (and often is) an IOF. An IOF may be construed simply as the conjunction of MSOFs (this follows from the single medium stipulation). The result is a process that looks very much like atten-

tion in vision and audition. There is a primitive level at which basic entities are delineated and a higher level, partially under conscious control, at which attributes of these basic entities may be singled out and separated from other attributes of the same basic entity. Having thus described supra-attention, I wish to now consider what my view of perception entails with respect to the intentionality of perception.

6. THE INTENTIONALITY OF PERCEPTION

O'Callaghan's analysis of object perception draws a distinction between what he calls the "proper objects" of the given modality (e.g., sounds, colors, and odors for audition, vision, and olfaction, respectively) and the intentional objects of perceptual states—what the proper objects (of the given modality) represent. These intentional objects are the proper object, itself some property of the proper object, or some relation between proper objects of the given modality. He then introduces "perceptual objects," which are taken to be modality specific "mereologically complex individuals" (i.e., they are composed of parts), and "ordinary objects," which are the objects of the physical world (what exists whether or not we perceive them) (O'Callaghan 2008, p. 818). He goes on to claim:

> […] sounds and streams provide fantastically useful information about their *sources*. Such sources are not just ordinary material objects, understood as such, but what such objects do… Auditory objects or streams do not concern the relatively static material objects that exist at a time: they concern the ongoing activities and transactions in which such objects engage (O'Callaghan 2008, p. 824).

There are a few things to note about O'Callaghan's analysis. First, his terminology matches up with mine in the following way (I give his terms first in the following pairings): proper objects = qualia (more or less), perceptual objects = features or MSOFs (O'Callaghan doesn't seem to distinguish the two), ordinary

objects = objects (proper). O'Callaghan does not discuss cross-modally integrated objects and so has no equivalent to my IOF. Nor does he discuss perceiving-as, and so does not name equivalents of my DSs or GDSs. Secondly, he has assigned intentionality to these elements in the following manner: proper objects (qualia) represent themselves, their properties, or their relations to other type-identical proper objects; auditory perceptual objects represent events involving ordinary objects while (it is implied) visual perceptual objects represent ordinary objects. Thirdly, his notion of intentionality for the proper objects (qualia) of a perceptual modality, while not without precedent, does not correspond to our intuitions about what a full-blown intentionality should look like. Do we really want to equate, without qualification, an object (a proper object) being about itself or its own features with some object (perceptual object) being about some other object (ordinary object)?

By contrast, I hold that intentionality emerges in stages—and several more stages than O'Callaghan admits. On my account, modally specific qualia combine, via early attention, into features, which are combined via a partially conscious attention into MSOFs. MSOFs may combine with other MSOFs, of whatever modality, to form IOFs. IOFs are stored in memory by translating their features into DSs. DSs, in turn, can combine and recombine to form GDSs associated with concepts covering object-kinds. Each stage of this hierarchical process (with a slight disconnect for translation between IOFs and DSs) can be thought of as picking out some referent (or extension in the case of GDSs). They may also be thought of as having a mode of presentation, which just is the integrated components of the next level down in the hierarchy out of which the given level is constructed (again, with a disconnect between IOFs and DSs). So, the mode of presentation for a visual MSOF will be the integrated features comprising that MSOF. In other words, each stage in the hierarchy has a sense and a nominatum, in Frege's terminology (Frege 1990 [1892]). Intentionality becomes increasingly full-blooded as the sense (mode of presentation) becomes more causally distant with respect to the

nominatum (reference) (i.e., as the sense becomes less and less determined by the properties of its cause/referent). This elaborates a result from Dretske (1983), in which causation is identified as an early form of intentionality.

Qualia are the results of unconscious perceptual processes presumably caused by external objects, and so they have the proto-intentionality of causation identified by Dretske (i.e., their mode of presentation—combinations of a few basic coarsely coded features—is directly causally linked with their reference—the properties of the external objects that cause them). The intentionality of qualia becomes a more complicated affair when we add in some recent observations by Block regarding shifted spectra (2007) and perception of a Gabor patch—a circular gray-scale image that appears to be of an evenly and diagonally rippled surface—(focally) attended and not attended (or, rather, under divided attention) (2010). Shifted spectra are described in the following:

> […] there is a structured space of color qualia that deter-
> mines the structure of real world colors themselves. Normal
> people have pretty much the same similarity relations in
> these structured spaces… but differ in correspondences
> between that space and colors in the world, probably
> because of variation in the retinal and in pre-retinal struc-
> tures (Block 2007, p. 89).

In other words, individuals have the same range of possible color qualia and the relations between them are the same for everyone, but which area of the structured array of color qualia is excited by a given stimulus varies slightly from person to person. As Block explains, one person's color perception may be yellower than another's—i.e., his/her perception is more centered towards the yellow region of the qualia array than is the other's perception. On this account qualia seem to exhibit a greater disconnect between mode of presentation and reference than first appearances suggested. Here a single reference can have slightly, but distinctly, different modes of presentation inter-subjectively. In the example

of the Gabor patch, Block cites studies showing that an individual's phenomenal experience of the contrast (along the gray-scale) of the Gabor patch differs according to the degree of attention directed towards it. He argues (convincingly) that this is not an optical illusion, concluding that there is no fact of the matter about which perception of contrast in the Gabor patch is a representation of a property actually held by the Gabor patch (Block 2010, p. 46). So, within the reach of this effect, the mode of presentation for qualia is determined by an intra-subjective causal relation between the perceiver and the object itself and to the mediating effects on some qualia (certain visual qualia, at least) of focal attention shifts on the part of the perceiver.

We can, therefore, say that the mode of presentation of perceptual features is constituted by intra-subjectively causally determined coarsely coded features *and* the limits of the qualified variation in qualia resulting from differing degrees of attention. What a feature picks out is some spatio-temporally extended structural arrangement of a subset of the qualia present in the perceptual scene. Here, whatever ambiguity obtains between mode of presentation and reference of the qualia constituting a given feature carries over, and to this is added an additional variability between the mode of presentation and the reference that enters through the integration of qualia in early attention. It is important to note that perception operates as a heuristic (where rules give good-enough analyses of the available data) as opposed to the guaranteed results (but slow processing of) algorithmic-type computation (Dabrowska 2004, pp. 17–18). So, at each stage in the hierarchical account of perception, more possibility for error creeps in and, along with it, the fact that each stage is less causally determined with respect to its reference than its predecessor.

A single feature or some arrangement of features can be selected for consciously directed attention so as to result in an MSOF. The mode of presentation for the MSOF will be the feature(s) by which it is constituted in perception. At this point, I want to return to O'Callaghan's characterization of the intentionality of perceptual objects. For O'Callaghan, auditory MSOFs

(streams) refer to the events that cause them. These may or may not involve ordinary objects. Visual MSOFs, however, are taken to refer to physical objects, directly. I think that this is incorrect and that the referent of a visual MSOF should be construed much more along the lines that O'Callaghan has set forth for auditory MSOFs. Consider the first two (of three) conditions of Tye's causal analysis of seeing: "P sees x = df (i) There is a causal chain of events C which ends with P's having an experience of a visual sensum S; (ii) within C some event involving P's eyes causally intervenes between some event involving x and P's experiencing S…" (Tye 1982, p. 322). So, we have a sequence of events ending in the visual MSOF (S) that involves the causal connection via the perceiver's eyes, between the perceiver (perceiving the MSOF) and the actual object in the world. If one accepts Tye's analysis—and I do—then he cannot say that the visual MSOF straightforwardly refers to the actual object. O'Callaghan's result follows, largely, from the fact that he has no step following the MSOF, whereby we do get reference to the actual object. A characterization of the intentionality of an MSOF, in any modality, should identify its reference with the physical processes that cause that MSOF, not the real object taken to be the source of the perceptions. This reserves the actual object as the referent of the IOF, which makes sense, intuitively. Think of the old adage "If it looks like a duck and sounds like a duck, it's (probably) a duck" restated as "If there is a duck-style visual MSOF bound with a duck-style auditory MSOF, then it's (probably) a duck-style IOF." This captures the idea that MSOFs are the modes of presentation of IOFs and cashes out the need for claiming (as I did in section 4) that an IOF constituted by a single MSOF is still distinct, in virtue of being an IOF, from that MSOF. The MSOF and IOF, in such cases, are the same percept attended to differently. In the case of the MSOF, the percept is attended to (via attention) as a perceptual entity in a given sensory medium. In the case of the IOF, it is attended to (via supra-attention) as a thing in our modally integrated phenomenal experience of the physical world.

In turning to memories of IOFs (DSs) and object-kinds

(GDSs), we begin to get an even more removed causal chain from mode of presentation to reference, and not simply because the referent isn't present. There is also the matter of translation between phenomenally present mental imagery and non-phenomenal descriptions. A DS is formed by coding the features, and feature relations/location of an IOF in a non-phenomenal description, from which a mental image of the original IOF can be compositionally reconstructed. So, the DS's non-phenomenal descriptors constitute its mode of presentation (at this point the term "mode of presentation" is likely to engender confusion, so I will refer instead to "sense"). In order to access the DS, we need to translate its descriptors back into a mental image of some IOF that refers to the original IOF (just as the DS does). This mental image IOF represents the DS that shares its referent. In this way the workings of DS intentionality resembles (in form) Fregean semantics, though the sense of the DS is not an abstract object, but a non-phenomenal mental object. In both cases, one can only get at the sense (of a DS or of a linguistic item) by representing it with some phenomenal item. (How this representation works is a [complex] matter for another time.) A GDS, or object-kind, is constituted by a set of descriptors recombined from multiple DSs, understood as memories of members of the extension of the GDS. The sense of the GDS is, like the DS, a set of descriptors, though these will define a less phenomenally determinant set of properties than does the constituting descriptors of a DS. The GDS's reference is the extension of object-kind. Also like the DS, the GDS must be accessed via a representation, which will be some sort of phenomenally indeterminate (fuzzy) arrangement of features or a determinate representation of indeterminate descriptors constituting an IOF that refers to the extension of the GDS. (Again, an examination of the exact nature of the representation of a GDS, like that of a DS, must be left for another time.)

7. CONCLUSION

I have presented a case for the necessity of a conceptual feature

integration mechanism sufficient to mitigate the binding problem that arises in the ascription of a single, real object, as intentional object of perceptions in differing sensory modalities. This addresses an oversight in the literature. The existence of this binding problem has occasionally been remarked upon, but no significant effort to discern how it is solved in perception has been previously undertaken. In working out the outlines of a solution, I also develop an intentional theory of perception that is hierarchically structured with a proto-intentionality just a bit more intentional (on the intuitive construal) than causation emerging at the lowest level and increasingly abstract and indeterminate relations between the mode of presentation and the referent or extension of the subsequent levels, culminating in a full-blooded intentionality of perceiving-as.

The work on the intentionality of perception holds particular promise for the development of an epistemological theory of perception, which has been characterized by Dretske as a theory in which "one can suppose that the causal relationship is not only useful (indispensable?) in acquiring knowledge about the things we see, hear, and touch, but that such a feature is built into the very meaning of those verbal constructions which entail that we possess knowledge" (1971, p. 590). That is, our knowledge derives from our perceptions, and those perceptions derive from our causal interaction with the world. It might even be found that the intentionality of perception gives a foundation for a wholly empirical account of mind.

Throughout this paper, the discussion has been centered on cross-modal binding (and its results) between auditory and visual phenomenologies. As such, the analysis contained herein applies, definitively, only to these sorts of cases. It will extend to cover cross-modal binding involving other modalities insofar as the empirical evidence supports some form of modally-specific attention mechanism outputting an MSOF. Intuitively, this seems more likely than not, but we must, until all the evidence is in, extend my account to include perceptual modalities other than vision and audition on a provisional basis only.

Notes

1. See, for instance Gottfried et al. (1977), Lyons-Ruth (1977), Mendelson and Ferland (1982), Morrongiello and Rocca (1987), and Walle and Spelke (1996).

2. I suspect that many readers will find the need for a non-conceptual cross-modal binding so intuitively compelling that they see no need for argumentation in its favor. The intuition follows from the idea that we must have some experience of cross-modally bound percepts in order to form the concept in the first place. There are two things to note about this: (i) a cross-modal concept need not be formed from an instance of a bound experience of its cross-modal content (e.g., one could form a cross-modal concept [helicopter] from a photograph of one helicopter and an audio recording of a different helicopter, experienced on different occasion, and this concept would be sufficient for identifying instances of real helicopters as singular objects producing both the visual and auditory phenomena), and (ii) this intuition is a particular form of the principle, argued for by Dretske, that "S is conscious of x [does not entail] S is conscious that x is F." He goes on to say that "Though [this] strikes me as self-evident, I have discovered, over the years, that it does not strike everyone that way" (1993, p. 266). Given these two facts, I consider it prudent to adopt a cautious course, and take nothing as given with respect to the existence or necessity of non-conceptual cross-modal binding.

3. The idea of a featureless surface representation may seem inconceivable. A version of the phenomenon—subjective surface perception—can be experienced, however, using such illusions as the Kanizsa triangle (see Nakayama et al., 1995, pp. 16–22). It is also important to note that, though surface representations are featureless, they are defined by features or, rather, the neurological facts underlying feature perception.

4. Objects files, like feature maps and the location map, can also be objects of attention itself (Tipper & Weaver 1998, p. 79; Treisman 1998, pp. 44–46). In other words, attention can operate upon its own output.

5. "Brightness" is defined as the average frequency of spectral components of a complex sound, weighted for loudness—the brighter the sound, the higher the average with respect to the fundamental frequency or perceived pitch of the sound

6. Bregman uses "attention" only for this later stage of processing. Treisman, too, distinguishes preattentional processing (the approximate visual equivalent to Bregman's primitive scene analysis) from conscious visual attention, though preattention is conceived, by Treisman, as a part of the overall phenomenon of attention as a feature integration mechanism (Treisman 1998, p. 33). For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to use "attention" to refer to the suite of phenomena comprising modally specific feature integration.

7. Indeed, the intuition that auditory streams are some kind of auditory object is widespread among cognitive scientists (see, for instance, Ward et al., 1998, pp. 237–238).

8. See Helmholtz (1954 [1885], pp. 152–159) for a discussion of the psycho-physics of combination tones (including difference and addition tones).

9. This example owes to the fact that frequencies below and above a certain threshold are not localized by the human auditory system.

10. Block characterizes "attention" differently than me: "the effect of attention on phenomenology is to change perceived contrast, perceived size, perceived hue saturation and so on for certain other perceived properties" (Block 2010, p. 31). In Treisman's terms, the phenomenon Block is calling "attention" is the shift from divided to focused attention (Treisman 1998, pp. 33).

11. Block points out that the effects wrought on visual qualia via an increase of focal attention manifest as increased contrast, size, color saturation, spatial frequency, speed and flicker rate (among a few others) (Block 2010, p. 33), but that the effects do not apply to all visual perceptual qualities (e.g., hue shows no such effect). This supports Block's claim that "a difference in attention can produce a difference in phenomenology without any difference in what properties one is directly aware of or what properties one's experi-ence represents" (2010, p. 24).

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HUSSERL, GÖDEL, AND THE EXISTENCE OF MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS

Michael Behrens

Some of the fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics relate to the nature of mathematical objects, such as numbers or geometric figures. Historically, the question as to whether or not these objects exist has captivated the minds of many philosophers. If one answers this question in the affirmative, further questions arise in relation to the nature of this existence. Do mathematical objects exist in the natural world, or are they immaterial, in the sense of Plato's Theory of Forms? Do they exist only within the frame of reference of a particular formal axiomatic system, or do they exist universally independent of such systems? By contrast, if one answers the question in the negative, then an argument must be advanced as to how mathematicians and philosophers are able to reason about such non-existent objects.

Intimately intertwined with these questions is the nature of mathematical truth. As one may argue that the existence of mathematical objects is dependent upon a particular axiomatic system, so too can mathematical truth also be seen as similarly dependent. If this is the case, and the truth of mathematical statements is contingent, doubts are raised as to the validity of mathematical statements outside the realm of mathematics, and the ability of mathematics to describe phenomena in the natural world is undermined. Furthermore, the practice of mathematics in both abstract and applied contexts becomes vulnerable to the criticism that it contains no substantive content, and thus can be dismissed as irrelevant to humanity as a whole.

In this paper, I intend to present a variety of arguments from contemporary philosophy that provide compelling evidence for the existence of mathematical objects. After reviewing some of

the contemporary arguments surrounding mathematical realism, I will focus on arguments advanced by other philosophers regarding the ideas of Edmund Husserl and Kurt Gödel. These ideas form a basis upon which one can understand mathematical objects in a way that allows us to understand these objects as existing within objective reality.

I. Mathematical Realism

In her paper "Mathematical Existence," Penelope Maddy discusses three different schools in the philosophy of mathematics regarding the existence of mathematical entities: Robust Realism, Thin Realism, and Arealism. Maddy begins by introducing a distinction between methodological and metaphysical concerns in the philosophy of mathematics. Broadly, methodological concerns relate to the questions of which axioms to take into consideration, the amount of importance that should be given to physical applications of mathematics, or the interconnections between different branches of mathematics, whereas metaphysical concerns relate to the existence of mathematical entities, the truth of mathematical theorems, and the nature of such truth. Within these metaphysical concerns, Maddy focuses on set theory, as how its underpinning of all of modern mathematics provides an appropriate starting point for a discussion of the truth and existence of mathematical objects.

The first school of thought Maddy addresses is one she terms 'Robust Realism'. She states that "set theory is often regarded as an essentially 'realistic' or 'platonistic' theory, as if a certain metaphysics is straightforwardly presupposed in its axioms and theorems" (Maddy 2005, p. 354). However, Platonistic accounts of mathematics are viewed as problematic, and are vulnerable to the same criticisms leveled at Platonism in traditional metaphysics; namely, that the existence of abstract objects, which are neither physical nor mental, and exist in neither space nor in time, is difficult to reconcile with our theories of knowledge. Under a causal theory of knowledge, it is difficult to see how one can come to have knowledge of such objects, given the lack of any apparent

causal connection. One response to this argument is that the "relevant subject matter is not a far-away world of mathematical things, but the concept of a set" (Maddy 2005, p. 354). Thus, the Robust Realist, in Maddy's view, asserts that sets exist independently in objective reality, and that a set-theoretic statement is true if and only if it is true in relation to this objective reality.

Maddy argues against this view by noting that even though the mathematical entities under consideration are no longer abstract, but treated as real, objective concepts, it fails to adequately address "the equally baffling problem of how we know about objective concepts" (Maddy 2005, p. 355). Maddy illustrates this point by shifting to methodological concerns, and summarizes what is termed the 'maximize' argument, which states that an axiom should be included into a set-theoretic framework if and only if it allows one to discuss more mathematical structures while still allowing one all of the possible discussion from the previous theory. Maddy demonstrates that this argument creates problems for Robust Realism, as there is no real mathematical argument against axiomatic systems that are incompatible. Robust Realism "holds that there is an objective world of sets and that our set theoretic statements aim to assert truths about this world… the axioms of our theory of sets should be true in this objective world, and (given that logic is truth-preserving) our theorems will be, too" (Maddy 2005, p. 356). Thus, the Robust Realist argues not from a metaphysical standpoint, but from a methodological one; the argument admits a certain circularity, in that the objects described by a given set theory are treated as having independent existence, and this existence then informs the development of the theory as to not allow the introduction of new axioms that may contradict the existence of such entities, even if this introduction admits the existence of entirely new mathematical objects.

In contrast to this view, Maddy provides a description of 'Thin Realism', which hinges upon a discussion of the Continuum Hypothesis. The Continuum Hypothesis is a famous conjecture in set theory, which essentially states that there is no set with a cardinality (or size) between the integers and the real numbers. One way

to visualize this hypothesis is to think of the difference between a digital recording and an analog one. The digital recording consists of a finite collection of samples, whereas an analog recording represents the entire waveform of the sound. The samples in the digital recording can be counted; by contrast, the analog recording is played back by the needle continuously moving across the vinyl record, and its "samples" are thus uncountable. This leads to an interesting result from set theory, which is that the size of countable, infinite sets is less than the size of uncountable infinite sets. The Continuum Hypothesis is an assertion that there is no possible set that has a size between these two.

One of the interesting aspects of the Continuum Hypothesis is that it is *undecidable*; in other words, the hypothesis can neither be proved nor disproved using the standard axioms of set theory. This causes discomfort for the Robust Realist, as the indeterminacy of the truth of this statement translates into an indeterminacy of the existence of mathematical entity in an ostensibly objective reality. By contrast, "The Thin Realist will hold… that sets are not created by our thoughts of definitions, that they are acausal and non-spatiotemporal, but he will regard the Robust Realist's further worry over whether or not CH has a determinate truth value as misguided" (Maddy 2005, p. 362). This is due to the fact that, for Thin Realism, sets possess only the properties that set theory defines them as having; if set theory is unable to determine whether sets possess a given property, this is viewed as irrelevant, as it is a question from outside of the framework of set theory.

The final description that Maddy provides is of 'Arealism', which asserts that the truths of pure mathematics are fundamentally different from truths regarding the natural world. Maddy describes the 'Arealist' as coming from the realm of natural science, and that the Arealist, seeing "natural science [as] the final arbiter of what there is… conclude[s] that mathematical things do not exist, that pure mathematics is not in the business of discovering truths" (Maddy 2005, p. 364). Thus, the Arealist does not assert that sets, or the truths of set theory, exist in any meaningful sense. This is described as a result of the differences in methodology

between the natural sciences and mathematics; entities discovered in natural science are implicitly assumed to exist, whereas the existence of entities discovered in pure mathematics is more problematic due to its less empirical nature. However, Maddy notes the similarities between the Arealist and the Thin Realist, stating, "the decision between Thin Realism and Arealism comes down to matters of convenience, taste, and preference in the bestowing of these honorific terms (true, exists, science)" (Maddy 2005, p. 368). The Arealist may stress a more naturalistic bent, whereas the Thin Realist may stress a more formalistic bent, yet both agree in that the concepts of truth and existence are inextricably intertwined with the system utilized to determine such truths, whether set-theoretical or naturally scientific.

However, each of these positions seems open to criticism. The Robust Realist asserts that mathematical objects must exist, as set theoretic frameworks provide arguments that implicitly depend upon their existence; yet, the incompatibility of varying set-theoretic frameworks casts doubts as to which framework reveals the "correct" objects. The Thin Realist asserts that the objects described by set theory have no existence outside of the theory; yet, mathematical objects are discussed in contexts outside of set theory, and even in contexts outside of mathematics, while still retaining the same intrinsic character. The appearance of certain numbers, such as pi, in a wide variety of contexts speaks to something outside of any particular axiomatic system under discussion. And the Arealist argues from a more naturalistic standpoint, in that mathematical objects do not exist in any meaningful sense, as they do not directly relate to the natural world as described by science. This view gives natural science primacy, and views mathematical objects that do not conform to its methods meaningless. However, mathematics is not meaningless; it possesses a substantive content. This argument can be better realized through an analysis of the views of Husserl.

II. Husserl and Free Variation in Imagination

In his paper "Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences: Some Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry," Richard Tieszen advances an argument towards explicating the relationship between Husserl's conception of free variation in imagination and our understanding of modern geometry. The paper begins with a discussion of what, precisely, Husserl's ideas of free variation in imagination involve. Tieszen utilizes the example of transformations (shifting and scaling) on the real line, and asks us to consider what remains unchanged, or invariant, after these transformations are performed. To understand these concepts, it may be easier to envision the graph of an algebraic function on the Cartesian plane, an activity familiar to many who have taken high school algebra. For example, let us consider the graph of the function y = x, which is a line that passes through the origin, or the point (0, 0). The question is what, if anything, remains the same about this graph after it is shifted in a given direction, scaled (or stretched) horizontally or vertically?

If one shifts the graph in a given direction, for example, 4 units to the right, then all points on the graph will move precisely 4 units to the right. The graph of the line will have the same slope as before; only its position and placement on the Cartesian plane has changed. Thus, this transformation (shifting the parabola 4 units to the right) leaves the angle that the line makes with the horizontal axis unchanged. Furthermore, the distance between any two points on this line will also remain unchanged, as each point has moved the same distance. By contrast, consider the changes to the original line if one stretches the graph vertically. The result of this transformation is that the slope of the line increases; in other words, the angle that this line makes with the horizontal axis is greater than it was before. As a result, the distance between any two points on this line will also increase. However, notice that the point (0, 0) remains unchanged by this transformation; it is not affected by the vertical stretching, but instead remains fixed

in place. In other words, this point remains invariant under this transformation.

Tieszen argues that this conception of invariants corresponds to Husserl's method of ideation. He summarizes this method as follows: "(1) one starts with an example or 'model'; (2) one actively produces and runs through a multiplicity of variations of the example; (3) one finds that an overlapping coincidence occurs as a 'synthetic unity' through the formation of the variants; and (4) one actively identifies this synthetic unity as an invariant through the variations" (Tieszen 2005, pp. 155–156). In relation to the previous example of the line in the Cartesian plane, the 'model' would be the line itself, the 'multiplicity of variations' would be the possible transformations (such as shifting, stretching, and reflections) that are performed on the given line, the 'overlapping coincidence' would be the aspects of the line that remain unchanged by the various transformations, and the 'synthetic unity' would be all the aspects of the line that remain unchanged, or invariant, across all the transformations. For example, note that in shifting or stretching the line, one aspect that remains throughout any sequence of transformations is that the line remains a line. It retains its shape, even if its points, or the distance between them, are lost. Thus, "the essence is that which all the variations have in common" (Tieszen 2005, p. 157).

In this way, Tieszen elucidates Husserl's argument as to how intuition of the essences of mathematical objects is possible. He notes that such an essence must be consciously understood as an aspect of a multiplicity of variations that remains the same, and is actively understood as remaining the same, across all the possible variations in this multiplicity. Thus, "an 'essence' is a feature or property that remains the same through many variations. It is something that a multiplicity of particulars has in common and is in this sense a universal" (Tieszen 2005, p. 158). However, this essence is not a universal in the sense that any possible set of transformations (or variations) will always leave it unchanged; rather, the choice of which transformations one chooses to apply affects what, if anything, remains unchanged about the geomet-

rical figure, and so what aspects remain invariant is wholly dependent upon the set of transformations currently under consideration.

However, this dependence does not imply that when one intuits an essence via various transformations of a geometrical figure, that one is doing so erroneously. Indeed, "Husserl says it is an intuition because we are not merely hypothesizing or conjecturing some state of affairs" (Tieszen 2005, p. 159). The geometrical figure is present before us, and we apply possible transformations to it in sequence, noticing aspects of the figure that remain unchanged through them. While one can say that a specific instance of the figure has been "drawn," or otherwise put forward by the individual contemplating it, the aspects of the figure that remain the same across a given transformation are not put forward by that individual, but are instead understood as a necessary consequence of that transformation. Tieszen notes that, "Of course this is not a sensory grasping or intuition. It is a kind of rational intuition" (Tieszen 2005, p. 159). The essence that is intuited is the result of the rational necessity of a particular state of affairs, and not contingent upon our sensory experience.

Tieszen continues by summarizing various developments in modern geometry over the 19th and 20th centuries. This time saw the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, as well as the development of the branch of mathematics known as topology. In a general sense, non-Euclidean geometries result from changing one of the five postulates of Euclidean geometry, which describes geometrical figures on a flat plane. The postulate that is altered is informally called the Parallel Postulate; it states that for any given line, and a point not on that line, there is exactly one line parallel to the first that crosses through the given point. Non-Euclidean geometries alter this postulate in one of two ways. If the postulate is changed to allow no parallel lines, then the resulting geometry is called "elliptical" (or "spherical" in a special case); otherwise, the postulate is changed to allow infinitely many parallel lines, in which case the resulting geometry is called "hyperbolic." Broadly, elliptical geometry results from curving space "inward" (for example, drawing a triangle on the surface of a sphere, rather

than on a flat sheet of paper or chalkboard), whereas hyperbolic geometry results from curving space "outward." Topology extends and generalizes these concepts by considering the class of transformations known as "continuous," which essentially means that one surface is continuously transformed into the other without "ripping" or "tearing" the original surface in any way. For example, a sheet of notebook paper can be rolled up into a cylindrical shape, and thus, the plane can be transformed into the surface of a cylinder "continuously;" by contrast, a ball cannot be "flattened out" without cutting the ball in some places, as evidenced by cartographic maps of the surface of the Earth.

Tieszen argues for a hierarchy of geometries, wherein topology (and topological transformations) is all encompassing, and the more specialized geometries (such as the familiar Euclidean geometry) are treated as subgroups. In this hierarchy, each different geometry admits different invariants, and thus allows one to intuit different mathematical essences. However, the essences intuited via topological transformations remain essences intuited via the more specialized groups of transformations, such as Euclidean geometry. The converse does not hold, and aspects that remain invariant under the transformations of Euclidean geometry may not remain invariant under the broader range of transformations considered in topology. Thus, "we think of each geometry as giving us a different spatial ontology… Each ontology is governed by a set of axioms that express properties that remain invariant (essences) under particular groups of transformations (variations)" (Tieszen 2005, p. 163). The geometry, and by extension the transformations, under consideration determines the essences that are intuited by Husserl's method of free variation in imagination.

This method allows us to obtain a priori knowledge of such essences, since what remains unchanged across a transformation is independent of our sensory experiences. Tieszen states, "with ideation itself, however, we have intuition of the *a priori*. It is a grasp of what must be the case regarding certain essences (invariants) in advance of any sense experience or applications to the

physical world" (Tieszen 2005, p. 164). There is a necessity to what is intuited as an essence, to what remains unchanged across a transformation. One does not determine an aspect to be invariant; rather, that aspect presents itself as invariant across the various transformations. Furthermore, there is a requirement that a given geometry under consideration be logically consistent. Even though higher-dimensional Euclidean geometries, for instance, are difficult to visualize in our traditionally three-dimensional perception of space, the logical consistency of such a theory allows us to intuit essences about mathematical objects that exist beyond our sensory experience. Thus, there are two aspects at work here, the "basic *founding* experience of space… and [the] various *founded* acts of cognition… that make modern geometry possible" (Tieszen 2005, p. 166). The practice of geometry is informed both by one's perception of a sensory experience in space and time, as well as our cognitive ability to idealize or reflect upon these perceptions.

In this way, Euclidean geometry, for instance, can be seen as the result of continued idealization of our perceptions gained via sensory experience. A perfect circle, for instance, may not exist in nature, but through reflection upon one's perceptions of quasi-circular objects, such as the full moon in the night sky, one can idealize the shape of the perfect circle by abstracting away the imperfections that appear in the objects present to us in our sensory experience. Tieszen describes this process as "that in pressing toward the horizons of *conceivable* perfecting certain 'limit shapes' emerge toward which the series of perfecting tends, as toward invariant and never attainable poles. It is these *ideal* shapes that make up the subject matter of pure Euclidean geometry" (Tieszen 2005, p. 167). Thus, Euclidean geometry arises via our idealization of the shapes that are present to us in our everyday sensory experience, and the higher-dimensional Euclidean geometries, as well as the non-Euclidean geometries, arise from our reflection upon these figures and the axioms that are accepted as necessary conditions for their existence. In each case, it is through the method of free variation in imagination, in which one is presented with that which remains the same across various trans-

formations, that allows one to have intuitions of mathematical essences.

These intuitions of mathematical essences thus represent a type of objective reality. While one's intuitions of these essences are dependent upon the types of transformations one performs upon a given geometrical figure in a given geometry, the essence thus intuited is not a product of either the geometry, the axiomatic system, or the individual. That which remains unchanged across the transformations does so by necessity; thus, "invariance and objectivity go hand in hand" (Tieszen 2005, p. 171). However, one may question whether the preceding discussion remains relevant for other areas of mathematics, namely, in algebra or in set theory. These questions may prove less intuitive for which to form a definitive answer; however, a deeper discussion of Husserl's philosophy in relation to mathematics reveals some interesting thoughts.

III. Husserl's Conception of Manifolds

In his paper "Mathematical Form in the World," David Woodruff Smith presents an analysis of Husserl's account of form and its relation to mathematics. Husserl's philosophy moves past mathematical formalism (which posits that all of mathematics can be represented as an axiomatic system), intuitionism (which posits that mathematics is dependent upon properties intrinsic to thought and conscious experience), and logicism (which posits that mathematics is wholly reducible to logic). Smith remarks "Husserl's account of intuition recognized sensory intuition of form in physical objects, 'eidetic' intuition of form in essences (universals), and phenomenlogical intuition of form in conscious experiences" (Smith 2002, p. 103). Thus, our intuitions of form may be divided into different ontological categories. These categories, in turn, will provide us with an ontology by which to form arguments about entities in the world, including mathematical entities: "A rich ontology, then, will distinguish different types of form… a *formal semantics* will analyze correlations among forms of language and

world. And a *formal intentionality* theory will analyze correlations among forms of thought or consciousness and forms of entities in the world" (Smith 2002, p. 104). Thus, there exists one's ontology, a semantics by which the entities represented by language can be related to entities in the world, and an intentionality theory by which the entities represented in consciousness can be related to entities in the world.

Smith argues that, for Husserl, mathematical form exists "in language, in thought, in meaning, and in (other) objective structures of the world including states of affairs" (Smith 2002, p. 105). He continues to state that, "A formal theory of every-thing—a 'universal mathematics'—is then a philosophical theory of the types of form that shape or situate entities of various types or categories" (Smith 2002, p. 105). Thus, form can be seen as being grounded in some objective reality, in as much as it exists in "objective structures of the world". Husserl develops this idea with his conception of a *manifold*. In mathematics, a manifold is a surface (or space) that can be treated as 'locally Euclidean', or in other words, a surface that appears like flat Euclidean space in the immediate vicinity of any particular point on it. The surface of the Earth, for instance, appears flat to an individual standing upon it, even though its shape is roughly spherical. For Husserl, a manifold is something beyond this; it "is that of a formal objec-tive structure corresponding to the formal logical structure of an axiomatic theory" (Smith 2002, p. 105). Thus, Husserl's concep-tion of a manifold goes beyond the mathematical one, and the manifolds discussed in mathematics are viewed as a special case of his more generalized concept.

Smith continues by arguing for a semantics drawn from Husserl's conception of logic. This semantics encompasses sentences, judgments, propositions, and states of affairs; Smith's argument is that these four entities are linked together in sequence, with a sentence expressing a judgment about a proposition that represents a particular state of affairs, real or possible. Smith argues that Husserl's conception of a manifold is the structure of all possible states of affairs; "Manifolds are, then, forms of partial

possible worlds represented by possible theories of appropriate forms" (Smith 2002, p. 119). Thus, the Husserlian manifold, as a formal objective structure, is a possible 'world' in that it is the totality of a collection of states of affairs; since the manifold, as an objective structure, represents the logical structure of a particular axiomatic theory, the forms of mathematical objects can be understood as being part of the 'world' as the totality of these states of affairs.

Thus, mathematical forms have a meaningful existence; they exist within an objective reality. Smith states, "the ontology of this scheme presupposes a robust *formal realism* holding that these types of form are part of the world. Forms are abstract or ideal entities, along with numbers, universals, concepts, etc" (Smith 2002, p. 120). However, this does not mean that Husserl's ontology is purely Platonistic; indeed, "this categorial ontology is Platonistic in that both essences and meanings are there in the world, even if they have no instances or referents. But the ontology is Aristotelian in that essences and meanings have their own categorial niches" (Smith 2002, p. 122). The ontology of form presented by Husserl features an Aristotelian division of forms into categories, although Husserl's ontology is hierarchal, as opposed to Aristotle's. Within this framework, various types of mathematical entities, such as geometric figures, can be seen as a form residing in a particular manifold, and as existing in a formal objective reality, as any manifold is the totality of possible states of affairs in relation to Husserl's ontological categories.

This argument provides an explanation for how Husserl's ideas can be applied outside of the geometric realm. Smith notes: "Geometry and mechanics, both pure and applied, arise out of a sensory perception and perceptual judgment about concrete objects seen in space and time; these theories abstract thus from forms given in sensory intuition. Pure algebras, by contrast, arise out of free mathematical imagination" (Smith 2002, p. 125). As one is capable of contemplating forms not given through sensory intuition, but through intuition as discerned from any possible state of affairs, the non-geometric aspects of mathematics can be

seen as sharing the same objective reality as Euclidean geometry. These conceptions of intuition were further explored by another philosopher, who was influenced by many sources, including Husserl: Kurt Gödel.

IV. Gödel and Mathematical Intuition

In his paper "Platonism and Mathematical Intuition in Kurt Gödel's Thought", Charles Parsons argues that Kurt Gödel's mathematical Platonism, or Robust Realism, is informed by his conception of mathematical intuition. Much of this discussion is drawn from Gödel's view of the question of the independence of mathematical objects; namely, whether such objects exist independently of our constructions of them within a given axiomatic framework. For Parsons, "a Gödelian answer to the question what the 'independence' consists in is… that mathematical objects are independent of our 'constructions' in much the same sense in which the physical world is independent of our sense-experience" (Parsons 1995, p. 47). Thus, mathematical objects have the same validity as physical objects, in that one is implicitly assuming their existence in the process of performing mathematics, just as one is implicitly assuming the existence of the physical world in one's everyday life. The justification for this view is as follows: "When Gödel says that assuming classes and concepts as 'real objects' is 'quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence', his claim is that classical mathematics is committed to such objects and moreover it must be interpreted so that the objects are independent of our constructions" (Parsons 1995, p. 53). Thus, mathematics is implicitly tied to the existence of such mathematical objects in an objective reality; these objects must exist outside of our constructions of them within a given framework.

Gödel's claims hinge on his conception of mathematical intuition. Parsons notes that, "in the philosophical tradition, intuition is spoken of both in relation to objects and in relation to propositions, one might say as a propositional attitude" (Parsons

1995, p. 58). Namely, this draws a distinction between the intuition of an object and the intuition that a predicate related to an object is true. Parsons argues that Gödel uses the term "intuition" in both senses without always clearly delineating which type of intuition he is referring to. Thus, for Gödel, "the deliverances of mathematical intuition are just those mathematical propositions and inferences that we take to be evident on reflection and do not derive from others, or justify on a posteriori grounds" (Parsons 1995, p. 59). In other words, that which is intuited is that which does not require justification; our intuitions are those statements that are true by virtue of themselves.

One concern is the relationship between intuition and knowledge. For Gödel, "Intuition gives knowledge its particular reference, but knowledge is in the end propositional, and something must be predicated of objects. Concepts also have both empirical and a priori dimensions" (Parsons 1995, p. 68). This view is drawn from the philosophy of Kant, for whom knowledge of objects was divided into two types: intuition and concepts. Intuitions are viewed as existing in space or time, although they do not have to come from sensory experience. Thus, our intuitions must be given within space or time and "Gödel's picture seems clearly to be that our conceptions of physical objects have to be constructed from elements, call them primitives, that are given, and that some of them… must be abstract and conceptual" (Parsons 1995, p. 68). Similarly, our conception of mathematical objects also consists of such primitive elements; in contrast to Kant, these pure concepts are given, and our ideas regarding mathematical objects are formed on the basis of these given concepts.

Gödel's overarching idea is that the intuitions we have of mathematical objects affirm their existence by virtue of their veracity. Parsons notes "Gödel would probably argue that unless they reflect an independent reality, we have no explanation of the convergence and the strength of the intuitions we have" (Parsons 1995, p. 71). Thus, mathematical objects must exist in an objective reality, since our intuitions of them exist independently of us and possess an interconnectedness that undermines arguments

against this existence. This is shown in Gödel's remarks on the aforementioned Continuum Hypothesis: "the widespread impression that Gödel is not just affirming… the law of the excluded middle… seems to be correct. The view he is expressing is that even if our grasp of the concept of a set is not sufficiently clear to decide [the Continuum Hypothesis], the concepts themselves form an independent order that, as it were, guides us in developing set theory" (Parsons 1995, p. 71). Thus, even in the case of undecidable statements such as the Continuum Hypothesis, the very concept of a set exists independently from us, and it is merely our inability to confirm or deny the existence of a particular set at work here, independent of the actual existence of such a set.

Husserl proved to be a significant influence on Gödel. In his paper "Kurt Gödel and Phenomenology", Richard Tieszen argues for the influence of Husserl's phenomenology on Gödel's thought. He notes that for Gödel, "concepts are, in effect, abstract objects. They are supposed to exist independently of our perceptions of them" (Tieszen 1992, p. 180). Mathematical concepts are independent of how we perceive them, and Husserl's idea of the phenomenological reduction provides an explanation for how such objects can be intuited. Essentially, phenomenology focuses on the concept of intentionality, which holds that a conscious thought is *about*, or is *directed towards* an object. The phenomenological reduction links the intuition of such an object with a concept of *fulfillment*, wherein the object is intuited if it fulfills the intention of the thought directed towards it; thus, we have an intuition of a mathematical object if that object fulfills the intention of a thought directed towards it.

Tieszen focuses on Gödel's view of the iterative concept of a set in his paper "What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?" Returning to the earlier discussion of free variation in imagination, Gödel felt that "applying the method of free variation to this concept could yield an axiom or axioms that would not be ad hoc or artificial for the concept" (Tieszen 1992, p. 182). Through the use of the concept of free variation in imagination in relation to sets, one can in turn receive intuitions of the invariants of this

concept, thus presenting axioms that would not be arbitrary, but would in a sense be intertwined with the very concept of a set itself. This view may seem problematic when one considers infinite sets, but "Gödel does not say that we are causally or representationally related to transfinite sets but rather that our experience has the phenomenological *character* of being 'about' such objects" (Tieszen 1992, p. 186). Therefore, one does not have to have a direct relation to such sets; only the fact that our experience is 'about' these sets suffices for one to have an intuition of them.

By treating our intuition of mathematical objects similarly to our intuition of objects of the senses, we find that each type of object has the same existential validity. Tieszen notes that with this method, "the question of the objective existence of objects of mathematical intuition would then be an exact replica of the question of the objective existence of the outside world" (Tieszen 1992, p. 186). The question remains, however, as to how one receives such intuitions, given that they are not the objects of sensory experience. Gödel posits the existence of an internal framework, not for intuiting sets as they are, but for constructing our representations of them: "the *character* of our experience of sets may have a coherent casual explanation… what would presumably be needed… is not some kind of mechanism for detecting sets in the external, physical world, but rather an 'internal', intentional mechanism for 'constructing' our awareness of sets" (Tieszen 1992, pp. 189-190). Therefore, one can have intuitions of sets, Gödel argues, via the intentionality of our thoughts directed towards sets, without any need for a causal link between us and the realm in which such mathematical objects reside.

V. THE EXISTENCE OF MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS

The preceding views present compelling evidence for the existence of mathematical objects. Mathematical objects can be viewed to exist, not in a purely Platonistic way, but as objects with as much existential validity as the objects of our sensory expe-

rience. In Platonism, mathematical objects are viewed as purely abstract, neither physical nor mental, existing in neither space nor time, but instead in Platonic Heaven. Instead, these views present the argument that they are intuited through our engagement with mathematical reasoning; their essences are presented to us, not through a causal connection, but as an aspect that remains the same across change.

In contrast to formalism, which asserts that mathematics can be reduced to a formal axiomatic system, and that mathematics consists only in the statements of such axiomatic systems, these views demonstrate that mathematics has a substantive content that exists beyond mathematical statements. The objects of mathematics exist independently of our statements about them; our ability to have intuitions of such objects through the process of free variation in imagination exists independently of any particular statements about these objects.

In contrast to empiricism, which asserts that mathematical objects cannot be known *a priori*, these arguments demonstrate that while our intuition of such objects resembles our intuition of the objects of the physical world, mathematical objects do not have to exist in physical reality. While one may obtain the figures of Euclidean geometry, for instance, through idealization of shapes found in nature, these figures can then be manipulated, analyzed, and reflected upon in order to have intuitions of geometric spaces, and mathematic entities within them, that exist beyond our immediate methods of perceiving and understanding the physical world. Thus, mathematical objects do not have to be grounded in the physical world, and one can still have knowledge of them despite this fact.

These views do leave some questions, such as the nature of the mathematical objects under consideration. While these objects are not mental constructions (since, as Gödel argues, these objects exist independently of such constructions), there is still ambiguity in the exact nature of these objects' existence. The views of Husserl are more satisfying than the traditional Platonistic account, and of the more contemporary accounts of mathematical realism, in that

there is a clear description of how an individual can have intuitions of these objects; yet the true nature of these objects remains distanced from the individual, and one is compelled to assert their existence without the ability to explicitly state where, exactly, such objects exist.

VI. CONCLUSION

The ideas of Husserl and Gödel provide an interesting argument for the existence of mathematical objects. Husserl's method of free variation in imagination demonstrates how one can have intuitions of the essences of mathematical objects as invariants across transformations. His conception of a manifold extends these ideas past the purely geometric realm and into other branches of mathematics. Gödel's arguments regarding mathematical intuition demonstrate how one is able to argue for the existence of mathematical objects in an objective reality. Taken together, one is able to argue for the existence of such objects, and to argue that mathematics has a substantive content and is thus relevant to humanity's understanding of both the natural world and of itself. In contrast to some alternative views in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics, these arguments allow one to engage in mathematical reasoning towards improving our understanding of the world and our place within it.

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"ANATOMIZING THE INVISIBLE PART OF MAN": MANDEVILLE, ROUSSEAU AND THE ECONOMY OF THE EGO

Nathanael Green

> *"Society must be studied by means of men, and men by means of society. Those who want to treat politics and morals separately will never understand either."*
> — Rousseau (1979, p. 235)

I. INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of the human condition might be described as a kind of perennial philosophy, in that it tends to draw, depending on the historical age in which it occurs, on a number of different strands—be they moral, political, or metaphysical—from previous ages, and to work out the question of what unifies human experience.[1] In the eighteenth century, it has been suggested that, "the *Philosophes* demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials" (Becker 1932, p. 31), but it would perhaps be more accurate, given especially the material emphasis of such Enlightenment thinkers as Bayle, D'Holbach, Helvetius and La Mettrie, to say that the city that was rebuilt was simply the human city. While the model for the ideal polis or virtuous city may have continued to reflect the philosophy of antiquity,[2] there was a new found sense among even the most utopian thinkers that something like a speculative *social psychology or material anthropology* was necessary to understand how any city, whether virtuous or corrupt, comes to reflect the morality of its inhabitants. No two thinkers better exemplify this shift of emphasis than do Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733)

and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), since taken together their thought represents a radical attempt to re-conceptualize the origins of culture and human social life along more material lines.[3] Though they drew utterly antithetical conclusions about the nature of the human condition, Mandeville and Rousseau nevertheless shared a remarkable number of premises (a similarity noted at the time by both Voltaire and Adam Smith).[4] In their speculative anthropologies each traced out an origin story rooted in the material conditions and socio-economic relations of early human societies to explain how inequality, hypocrisy, greed, and injustice (all of which Rousseau saw as reprehensible, and Mandeville saw as necessary conditions of progress) become gradually embedded in the psyche, behavior and function of society as a whole. Central to this account of social machinations was the role each gave to the ego's self-love, pride, vanity, and desire for self-esteem. For both Mandeville and Rousseau, the modern economy was essentially an economy designed to fulfill the artificial desires of the ego's self-gratification. Thus, the central question for Rousseau became how it was that humans, born essentially good and prone to self-reliance, had over time become morally corrupted, self-alienated and ensnared in webs of inter-dependence; while the question for Mandeville became how it was that the illusion of "virtue" came to mask those natural inclinations which had so clearly shaped society and had now found their fullest expression in the commercial enterprise of the modern economy.

In what follows Mandeville's rejection of virtue as duplicity (for him it was a trick foisted by the aristocracy to monopolize luxury), his materialist emphasis on the role of instinct and the passions in human agency, his bourgeois urbanism and anti-utopian economics of the ego are to be contrasted with Rousseau's moral emphasis on pity and empathy as seeds of virtue, his Stoic idealism, classical agrarianism, educational philosophy, and even his melancholy. By closely reading each writer against the other (particularly Rousseau's two discourses and Mandeville's *The Fable of the Bees*), my aim is to trace the ways in which their ideas converge and diverge, particularly as concerns the central position

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each gives to the self-interest of the ego as the locus of socially conditioned identity. By highlighting their views on such topics as virtue and luxury there emerges a dialectic about the upheaval that capitalism brings to traditional modes of life, and a sense that the difference between these figures is finally about the expectations each has for humanity: Rousseau, as a nostalgic radical who saw culture as de-evolving into inauthentic forms of social bondage, and who sought the means of emancipation from this moral decline, held expectations for humanity that were (and are) exceedingly high; while Mandeville, as capitalism's first nihilist, felt that appeals to human virtue were at best a kind of self-deception meant to deny our intrinsic selfishness, and thus held expectations for humanity that were (and are) exceedingly low.

II. The Problem of Virtue

Given its prominence in the debates of the time, in what sense is virtue real? For Rousseau, pity and compassion were the *natural* origins of the cultivation of virtue, since pity served causally as a motivational force to "temper [one's] ardor for well-being with an innate repugnance to see [one's] kind suffer" (Rousseau 1997a, p. 152), and was not obviously in any way a force of self-interest:

> Pity…[is] a disposition suited to beings as weak and as subject to so many ills as we are; a virtue all the more universal and useful to man as it precedes the exercise of reflection in him, and so natural that even the Beasts sometimes show evident signs of it (Rousseau 1997a, p. 152).

Rousseau argued that Mandeville's denial of virtue (his insistence that virtue was only a social fiction and form of concealment, self-deception or manipulation) required a denial of compassion or of conscience, and consequently attacked his view as not just morally deficient but deficient on natural (psychological) grounds:

> Mandeville clearly sensed that, for all their morality, men would never have been anything but monsters if Nature had not given them pity in support of reason: but he did not see

that from this single attribute flow all the social virtues he wants to deny men (Rousseau 1997a, p. 153).

For his part, Mandeville found little in the occasional outward sign of pity among animals—and presumably that included the maternal love in humans Rousseau also made note of "the tenderness Mothers feel for their young and…the dangers they brave to protect them," (Rousseau 1997a, p. 152)—to justify an entire edifice on which to build natural morals. Instead, for him the question of morality is as misapplied to the animal kingdom as it is to humans:

> All untaught animals are only solicitous of pleasing themselves, and naturally follow the bent of their inclinations, without considering the good or harm that from their being pleased will accrue to others (Mandeville 1997, p. 36).

The word "untaught" is meant by Mandeville to signify that humans are, by their reluctant sociability and customs, taught animals:

> […] no species of animals is, without the curb of government, less capable of agreeing long together in multitudes than that of man. Yet such are his qualities, whether good or bad, I shall not determine, that no creature besides himself can ever be made sociable: but being extraordinary selfish and headstrong, as well as cunning animal, however he may be subdued by superior strength, it is impossible by force alone to make him tractable, and receive the improvements he is capable of (Mandeville 1997, p. 36).

For Mandeville, the process of socialization and enculturation necessary "to civilize" (Mandeville 1997, p. 37) humans is akin to a very sophisticated form of animal breeding. Those "lawgivers and other wise men" who "labored" to establish society (Mandeville 1997, p. 36) found it necessary "to make the people they were to govern believe that it was more beneficial… to conquer [rather than] indulge [their] appetites, and much better to mind the public

than what seemed his private interest" (Mandeville 1997, p. 36). In order to get people to act against their own natural inclinations, it was necessary "to contrive an imaginary [reward]" for their efforts, and for this "the bewitching engine" of flattery was used to insinuate "the notions of honor and shame" (Mandeville 1997, p. 36). By then dividing people into two classes—those who in their lowness sought only the immediate pleasures of their inclinations, and those who, like a priestly class "of lofty high-spirited creatures" presented themselves in their moralistic self-consciousness as "the true representatives of their sublime species"—the original ruling elites cemented their power through a kind of moral one-upmanship, and divided themselves in the minds of their "inferiors" much the way, Mandeville notes, as humans have divided themselves from animals. As such, "the notions of good and evil, and the distinction of virtue and vice, were never the contrivance of politicians, but the pure effect of religion" (Mandeville 1997, p. 40). Yet even among the Greek and Roman empires, the wellsprings of so much moral philosophy, "their religion, far from teaching… conquest of… passions and the way to virtue, seemed rather contrived to justify… appetites, and encourage… vices" (Mandeville 1997, p. 40). For Mandeville then politics naturally replaces religion as the means to manipulate human self-regard, and his dismissal of virtues as "the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride" (Mandeville 1997, p. 40) is based on his insistence—as already mentioned—that pride, as the natural weakness and inclination of humans, was used skillfully by just rulers and tyrants alike to motivate people to certain ends (such as soldiers led to war, according to Mandeville).

Needless to say, Rousseau found Mandeville's wholesale rejection of virtue untenable, since it refused the natural role of conscience in human affairs, but he did not deny the value of the passions or inclinations in human understanding (Rousseau 1997a, p. 142). Nor did he deny the significance of manipulation in the founding of society; on the contrary, manipulation of the rich played a central role for Rousseau in the founding of society:

> After exhibiting to his neighbors the horror of a situation that armed all of them against one another, that made their possessions as burdensome to them as their needs, and in which no one found safety in either poverty or wealth, he [the rich manipulator] easily invented specious reasons to bring them around to his goal (Rousseau 1997a, p. 173).

Rousseau thus saw the foundations of society and law as a scheme or end-run by the wealthy to manipulate the fears and insecurities of others, and thus establish a permanent class below them:

> Such was, or must have been, the origin of Society and of Laws, which gave the weak new fetters and the rich new forces, irreversibly destroyed natural freedom, forever fixed the Law of property and inequality, transformed a skillful usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjugated the whole of Mankind to labor, servitude and misery (Rousseau 1997a, p. 173).

Commenting on this theme of *original manipulation* in the founding of society that was shared by Mandeville and Rousseau, Adam Smith, as quoted by M. Jack, wrote how for both men, "Those laws of justice which maintain the present inequality among mankind were originally the inventions of the cunning and powerful in order to maintain or acquire an unnatural an unjust superiority over the rest of their fellow creatures" (Jack 1978, p. 123).

Against the Hobbesian notion that humans are naturally warlike, Rousseau insisted, "man is naturally peaceable and timorous…[and] becomes warlike only by dint of habit and experience" (Rousseau 1997b, p. 166), and argued that reason was less important to virtue than were the sentiments through which it was felt:

> If natural law were inscribed only in human reason, it would have little capacity to guide most of our actions, but it is also engraved in the human heart in indelible char-

acters, and it is from the heart that it speaks to him more forcefully than do all the precepts of the Philosophers (Rousseau 1997b, p. 166).

In this sense virtue also had a situational character, and as such was contrary to wisdom: "virtue is nothing but the force to do one's duty in difficult situations; and wisdom, on the contrary, is to dispel the difficulty of our duties" (Horowitz 1987, p. 163). Yet given Rousseau's insistence in the *First Discourse* that a corrupted society can never return to virtue (Todorov 2001, p. 10), and given his understanding of virtue as partly stemming from our natural inclination to pity, how is one to understand the relationship between virtue and reason? The answer would seem to lie both in his notion of perfectibility and in his conception of conscience as duty (just as freedom for him is also a kind of duty; Rousseau 1997b, p. 44). As Schneewind puts it, for Rousseau, "reason may teach us to know good and evil, but only conscience makes us love the one and hate the other" (Schneewind 1998, p. 476).

III. THE PROBLEM OF LUXURY

One way to understand both their differences and the historical background that Mandeville and Rousseau were responding to is to consider their views in what is often called the 'luxury debate' (Hont 2006, p. 379; Schneewind 1998, p. 415). In this debate, which had historical context through Sumptuary Laws (which sought to restrict conspicuous consumption, but perversely strengthened class divisions), Mandeville would argue that luxury could only be understood in relativistic terms, since one man's luxury was another man's frugality (Mandeville 1997, pp. 65–6). Voltaire, in his *Philosophical Dictionary* (1762), would later make the same point (referring to the first scissors as an instance of luxury), and also noting "the luxury of Athens produced great men in every sphere; Sparta had a few captains" (Voltaire 1962, p. 368)—the implication being (as it is in Rousseau's *First Discourse*, though he saw it as positive) that pursuit of virtue at the expense of luxury results in cultural impoverishment.[5] That progress in the arts and

sciences caused moral decline, and that the virtuous city and the prosperous city cannot be reconciled, were views Rousseau had controversially defended, but he was not alone in his sentiments: the most successful French book of the entire eighteenth century (*The Adventures of Telemachus, Son of Ulysses* by Fenelon) had argued much the same thing, and the story it tells so helps illustrate what was at stake in the debate about luxury that I offer a brief excursus on it here.

A reformist and utopian attack on what the author (an Archbishop who wrote *Telemachus* while serving in the court of Louis XIV as tutor to the king's grandson) saw as France's slide toward despotism and decadence, and described by Fenelon himself as "a fabulous narration in the form of an heroic poem like those of Homer and of Virgil, into which I have put the main instructions which are suitable for a young prince whose birth destines him to rule" (Fenelon 1994, p. xviii), *Telemachus* was couched as an educational fable, yet rooted as much in *The Republic* of Plato as it was in Homer. Specifically, Fenelon depicted several imaginary polities, which a recent commentator described as "a pre-luxury community (Boetica), a luxurious and warlike state (Salentum unreformed), and a post-luxury society (Salentum reformed)."[6] To arrive at the third community (understood as reformed France) was Fenelon's aim, but this future kingdom, conceived of as agrarian and deprived of all luxury, was notable for its rejection of cosmopolitan modernity and its return to Stoic models (of communal frugality and simplicity) derived from antiquity.[7] Readers of Rousseau would come to recognize Fenelon's fable from *Emile or On Education* (1762), where Rousseau referred to *Telemachus* in several places and had the book serve as the capstone to Emile's education. Careful readers of Mandeville may have recognized that an earlier book by Fenelon that argued against luxury and was entitled simply *The Bees* (1689) possibly served (it is not clear) as partial target of Mandeville's attack in his notorious polemic *The Fable of the Bees* (1723). More importantly, what one critic has called the "Fenelonian themes"[8] of Rousseau's early work were offered in part as a critique of those thinkers like Mandeville who

saw worldly goods and appetites as ends in themselves.

For Mandeville progress was necessarily a function of material acquisition applied to the pride and vanity of our egos, a perspective summarized by his maxim "private vices, public benefits," and thus luxury and vanity were motivating forces:

> There are…many who will allow that among the sinful nations of the times, pride and luxury are the great promoters of trade. But they refuse to own the necessity there is that in a more virtuous age (such as one should be free from pride) trade would in great measure decay (Mandeville 1997, p. 74).

Though luxury, as has been said, was for him a notion that could not be defined to anyone's satisfaction—"in one sense everything may be called [luxury], and in another sense there is no such thing" (Mandeville 1997, p. 73)—Mandeville linked luxury through vanity to clothes. Though clothes were originally made to hide our nakedness and make us warm, "to these our boundless pride has added…ornament" (Mandeville 1997, p. 75). Where Mandeville saw skillful politicians manipulating people's passions (a point he returns to again and again in *The Fable*), particularly as regarded pride and envy, he saw in the outward show of appearance and fashion how pride was transferred to vanity and the industriousness of trade: "Envy itself, and Vanity / Were Ministers of Industry" (Mandeville 1997, p. 80). Thus, in Mandeville's vision of culture as both a social hive of self-interest and a social mirror of self-regard, commerce and mercantilism reflect an ideal union in which the vanity and pride of the ego's inclinations, desires and strivings may be, if not ultimately satisfied, then at least sufficiently directed or externalized.

Mandeville's argument for the centrality of pride in human behavior was meant to give a naturalistic account of psychological motivation, and as such was accompanied by a critique of traditional explanations of morality. This critique had at least two specific targets, Shaftesbury's moral philosophy and the Stoic philosophy of frugality (Mandeville 1997, pp. 88–9), but in both

cases they bear relevance to Rousseau. Indeed, in his opening salvo against Shaftesbury from *A Search into the Nature of Society* (from *The Fable of the Bees*) is a critique that he might well have applied to Rousseau:

> The generality of moralists and philosophers have hitherto agreed that there could be no virtue without self-denial. But a late author [Shaftesbury]…is of contrary opinion, and imagines that men without any trouble or violence upon themselves may be naturally virtuous. He seems to require and expect goodness in his species, as we do a sweet taste in grapes and China oranges, of which, if any of them are sour, we boldly pronounce that they are not come to that perfection their nature is capable of (Mandeville 1997, p. 131).

Mandeville then states that his target "fancies, that as man is made for society, so he ought to be born with a kind of affection to the whole, of which he is a part, and a propensity to seek the welfare of it" (Mandeville 1997, p. 131). One is reminded here of Rousseau's concept of the General Will (Rousseau 1997b, p. 50), which Rousseau understands as essential to any functioning Body Politic, and also of Rousseau's argument that man is born essentially good.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF PROPERTY

In his denial of virtue and his emphasis on understanding man as an animal conditioned by the manipulation of his pride and vanity, Mandeville's vision of society is thus deterministic in a way that Rousseau's is not, and there can be no free exercise of the general will (in any full sense) for Mandeville:

> […] by society I understand a body politic, in which man either subdued by superior force, or by persuasion drawn from his savage state, is become a disciplined creature, that can find his own ends in laboring for others, and where under one head or other form of government each member is rendered subservient to the whole, and all of them by

cunning management are made to act as one (Mandeville 1997, p. 137).

The question of freedom seems moot for Mandeville, since for him society is only the alignment of self-interest, where freedom is by contrast paramount for Rousseau. For the former, society is understood in terms of trade and property relations, but for the latter, property (as a social artifact) and freedom (as an innate gift of nature) are in some sense at odds:

> […] since the right of Property is only by convention and human institution, every man can dispose of what he possesses as he pleases: but the same does not hold for the essential Gifts of Nature, such as life and freedom (Rousseau 1997a, p. 179).

Anything that acts to constrict man's natural freedom, independence and self-sufficiency was for Rousseau subject to critical examination or outright condemnation, and property (along with agriculture and metallurgy) represents for him an historical development in which man further enslaved and alienated himself according to an inauthentic and artificial system of economic relations.

V. THE PROBLEM OF EGOISM (OR SELF-LOVE)

In both Mandeville and Rousseau the ego develops over historical time from a state of natural self-interest or self-reliance, to an initial state of self-esteem or desire for honor, and finally to a modern state of fully en-cultured and socially dependent vanity or borderline narcissism. This final stage of egoism is intolerable to Rousseau, but is perfectly suited to Mandeville's pessimistic (some might say fatalistic; he would say realistic) estimation of the human condition as naturally and primarily shaped by the ego's pride, envy and vanity (yet Mandeville also argued that charity is a virtue motivated by self-interest: "pride and vanity have built more hospitals than all the virtues together" (Mandeville 1997, p. 114). Of course, the original state of self-interest is, for Rousseau,

critically moderated in its inclinations by pity:

> […] pity is the natural sentiment which, by moderating in every individual the activity of self-love, contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species. It is pity that carries us without reflection to the assistance of those we see suffer; pity that, in the state of Nature, takes the place of Laws, morals, and virtue (Rousseau 1997a, p. 154).

Though some critics have arguably over-interpreted Rousseau's conception of self-love, as a first approximation the transition (in the ego's development) from the first stage of self-interest to the final stage of self-love was characterized by Rousseau as a distinction between *amour de soi-meme* [natural self-love or self-interest] and *amour-propre* [en-cultured self-love, which can be understood both negatively as a source of evil and vanity or positively as a source of honor]. Thus it is my interpretation that the middle stage (of the ego's development) is the stage that is most ambiguous in this regard for Rousseau: the ego is clearly no longer merely primitive, solitary and self-reliant, but so too is it not yet utterly spoiled by the privations of modern economy. While the fully en-cultured ego of the final stage still presumably retains some degree both of *amour de soi-meme* and the "good" kind of *amour-propre* it would also seem that for Rousseau there were some egos so fully en-cultured (such artificial animals) as to have sloughed off the *natural* side of their self-love completely. Either way, Rousseau offered his distinction this way:

> *Amour-propre* [vanity] and *Amour de soi-meme* [self-love], two very different passions in their nature and their effects, should not be confused. Self-love is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and which, guided in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour proper is only a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone else, inspires men with all the evils they do

one another, and is the genuine source of honor (Rousseau 1997a, p. 218).

Once again the centrality Rousseau places on the ego's self-love corresponds to Mandeville's emphasis on the centrality of pride to the constitution of human nature:

> Pride is that natural faculty by which every mortal that has any understanding overvalues and imagines better things of himself than any impartial judge, thoroughly acquainted with all his qualities and circumstances, could allow him. We are possessed of no other quality so beneficial to society, and so necessary to render it wealthy and flourishing as this, yet is that which is most generally detested (Mandeville 1997, p. 73).

Like most vices, pride for Mandeville must hide itself under the fictional guise of virtue. His larger project, of "pull[ing] off the disguises of artful men" (Hundert 1994, p. 16), is simply to hold a mirror up to the ego's true motivational machinations—and virtue is for him only a disguise: "selfishness is so riveted in our nature, that who can but any ways conquer it shall have the applause of the public, and all the encouragement imaginable to conceal his frailty and soothe any other appetite he shall have a mind to indulge" (Mandeville 1997, p. 114).

VI. Conclusion

The sum of Mandeville's withering criticism of morality as a clever way to deflect the self-interested motives of our persons, and the frequent linkage he makes to capitalism as the best expression of the artificial ego's desires, is made explicit when he condemns all attempts to conceive of a world not naturally dishonest as vain "eutopia" (Mandeville 1997, p. 34). Many other themes suggest themselves in comparing Mandeville's anti-utopianism to Rousseau's more or less utopian framework, and given more space I would proceed to develop them. Yet even in what has been written so far it is hoped that the reader catches some sense of the ways

in which the works of these two thinkers converge and diverge.

It is not surprising, given that he trained as a physician, that Mandeville should seek by "anatomizing the invisible part of man" (Mandeville 1997, p. 85; where "invisible part" refers specifically in the context of the original quote to lust but more generally to be the ego's inclinations) to reveal how:

> By flattering our pride and still increasing the good opinion
> we have of ourselves on the one hand, and inspiring us
> on the other with a superlative dread and mortal aversion
> against shame, the artful moralists have taught us cheer-
> fully to encounter ourselves, and if not subdue, at least so
> to conceal and disguise our darling passion, lust, that we
> scare know it when we meet with it in our own breasts
> (Mandeville 1997, p. 85).

Yet Mandeville's assertion—that *all* morality is as transparently meant to tame our passions as is the specific morality related to sexual desire—seems too reductive. Rousseau, for one, was no ordinary moralist; his critique of society was no simple sermon-izing about the evils of the body or the world:

> Let us [distinguish] the moral from the Physical in the
> sentiment of love. The Physical is the general desire that
> moves one sex to unite with the other; the moral is what
> gives the desire its distinctive character… Now it is easy to
> see that the moral aspect of love is a factitious sentiment;
> born of social practice, and extolled with much skill and
> care by women to establish their rule and to make dominant
> the sex that should obey. This sentiment, since it is based
> on certain notions of merit or of beauty which a Savage is
> not in a position to make, must be almost nonexistent for
> him […] Limited to the Physical aspect of love alone, and
> fortunate enough not to know preferences that exacerbate
> its sentiment and increase its difficulties, men must feel
> the ardors of temperament less frequently and less vividly,
> and hence fewer and less cruel quarrels among themselves

(Rousseau 1997a, p. 155).

I have chosen to end on "the problem of love/lust," and to quote Rousseau at such length, in order to highlight a central difference between Mandeville and Rousseau. For the former, envy and jealousy are contained by sexual morality, but for the latter envy and jealousy are actually created by sexual morality. Thus, while Rousseau is sometimes caricatured as a neo-primitivist romantic, it is more accurate to say that—like those masters of "suspicion" Freud, Nietzsche or Marx—he takes seriously the injunction to critically examine how the social psychology of modern humans is layered in repressed artifice. By contrast, where Mandeville is in many ways a critical thinker about the ego's material conditions, his psychology seems too one-dimensional, reductive and ideologically driven to explain the variety of human experience: he is a one-note thinker. While I would not go so far as to say Rousseau explains the whole of human experience either, there is a depth to his critical thought that is missing from Mandeville.

In conclusion, for Rousseau, the further society becomes removed from its origination (in the material self-sufficiency and self-reliance of the more or less solitary individual), the more that natural self-interest becomes warped by artificial desires. By contrast, for Mandeville, society's artificiality is in some sense there from the beginning, though he too clearly understands how modern, commercial society multiplies the outlets for the desires of the en-cultured ego (indeed, he celebrates this aspect of commercial society above all else). That these two thinkers shared a number of premises about the centrality of the ego in human development is clear enough, and that where Rousseau saw moral decline Mandeville saw the progress and triumph of capitalist psychology, is also clear. What is less clear is whether or not the dialectic that their polar attitudes about the human condition represent is any way, three centuries later, resolved.

Notes

1. Hannah Arendt distinguishes between the human condition and the question of human nature (Arendt 1958, p. 10), but for my purposes such a distinction

is less important than the sense in which the related notion (derived from Aristotle) of man as a Political Animal takes on a new material emphasis in the thought of Mandeville and Rousseau.

2. Rousseau himself says in a footnote in the *Social Contract*, "The true sense of this word [city] is almost entirely effaced among the moderns; most take a city for a City, and a bourgeois for a Citizen. They do not know that houses make the city but Citizens make the City" (Rousseau 1997b, p. 51). Though now dated, for background on the city in Graeco-Roman antiquity, see De Coulanges, (1864).

3. The scholarship comparing Mandeville and Rousseau is very small: only Jack (1978) and Hundert (1994) take up the comparison in any extended way. For recent scholarship on Rousseau's critical use of amour-propre, see McLendon (2009).

4. See Hundert (1994, p. 113); Jack (1978, p. 123); Rosenblatt (1997, p. 77); and Schneewind (1998, p. 474).

5. One is reminded of the famous quote from the film *The Third Man* (1949), where the character Harry Lime (played by Orson Wells) says: "In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed— but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love, 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock." Of course, Lime neglected to mention that Geneva is the birthplace of Rousseau.

6. See Hont (2006, p. 384).

7. In *The Republic* Plato presents Kallipolis, his ideal city, as a post-luxury city in which the guardian classes are restricted from having property, and in Seneca (whom Rousseau cited at the beginning of *Emile*) one finds the familiar stoic indifference to worldly goods: "Necessities are procured with little pains; it is the luxuries that require labor. Seek not out the makers of artificial things, but follow Nature. Nature did not wish us to be distracted over many things" (Lovejoy & Boas 1965, p. 270). Rousseau cannot be seen simply as a neo-stoic thinker, however, since he says that "the stoics… [conflate] happiness with virtue" (Horowitz 1987, p. 144). For another discussion of Fenelon, see Highet (1949, pp. 336–40).

8. See Riley (2001, p. 86).

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THE OCCUPY MOVEMENT AND THE RELEVANCE OF MARXISM

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"All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind"
— Karl Marx (1994, p. 161)

The past several years have been economically turbulent for a majority of U.S. residents. A combination of volatile factors—including astronomical unemployment rates, an unsurpassed amount of debt and foreclosures, and a virtually absent increase in wages—have concocted a state of national financial anxiety and stagnation that economists and theorists have labeled "The Great Recession". This downward spiral was further catalyzed by the bailout of corporate and financial entities by the Bush Administration from 2008 through 2009, which much of the country's population opposed as a solution to the financial tribulation ("Most Americans Against" 2008, para. 1 & 2). The controversy here is not simply over a matter of a favored handout, though; despite the overall fiscal stress, a small percentage of citizens have managed to not only avoid the crunch that the average person could not, but sustain an increasingly ample salary. Corporate profits are the highest they have ever been in history, and CEO salaries have risen nearly 300% since 1990 (Institute for Policy Studies 2006). When contrasted with a menial 4% increase in worker wages after accounting for inflation in the same time period (Institute for Policy Studies 2006), the gap between the elite and the average worker could not be more substantial or salient. Factor in the government assistance provided by the bailout, and we delineate both a sordid conspiracy between government and corporations, as well as a clear neglect by the government of growing class divisions.

Fueled by frustration and the virtual ignorance of these issues by the government, and with the encouragement of Canadian activist group Adbusters, a small group of demonstrators gathered in Zuccotti Park in New York on September 17th in 2011 in an attempt to bring attention to this discrepancy. Labeled "Occupy Wall Street," the group peacefully protested against the government and corporations as bedfellows, denouncing the benefits provided to wealthy CEOs of the country rather than to the majority, as illustrated with chants of "we are the 99%". Although the event was planned for only a day, and initial news coverage was delayed at best, its significance and fervor quickly echoed both nationally and internationally through emulations of the peaceful protest. Ultimately generalized as the "Occupy movement," its main theme was simple: economic equality for all levels of society (Occupy Together 2012, para. 1; Occupy Wall Street 2011, para. 2). As it gained momentum, however, the intended message expanded to represent various injustices as well as populations, from school budget cuts in the U.S. to calls for government reform in Malaysia.

Of course, the idea of protest is not a recent development. Many characteristics of the Occupy movement and the conditions in which it thrived bear a striking resemblance to a particular theory that most would not hesitate to label archaic: Marxism advanced from a formal critique of popular philosophers of the late 19th century to a full scholarship, when wars brimmed and many Europeans suffered from low wages and all that these entail, while an elite class maintained nearly impenetrable power. Since then, though, Marxism has lost its momentum due to waning influence as wells as questions about its credibility and relevance. Public sentiment as a result of the Cold War regards anything remotely communist as pejorative or even "Anti-American". Failed Marxist projects over the century, ones that collapsed or evolved into oppressive dictatorships (including the Soviet Union), catalyzed this and offered a major counterpoint to a practical implementation of Marxism. As a result of its inability to handle different populations, geographies, and the unpredictability of people in general,

the theory was viewed as anachronistic and Eurocentric. With the rise in postcolonial theory, moreover, the shift from Marxism to a school of thought that focused on identity, knowledge, and power and theorized outside of an economic lens was considered to be more fruitful and rational.

Despite the passage of more than a century since its birth, and the significant impact of criticisms directed against the entire doctrine, the analysis and method of Marxism may seem to offer more to promoters of the Occupy movement than they might assume. More specifically, some of the main themes of Marxism recur in the Occupy movement. If strong similarities can indeed be found between Marxism and the Occupy movement, the relevance of the former would be evinced, and the theory can provide direction to Occupiers on the next step of action. It is for such relevance of Marxism that I wish to argue. I proceed by briefly explaining the main ideas of Marxism in section I. The Occupy movement will be discussed and integrated with Marxian interpretations in the second section, "The Occupy Movement and Traces of Marxism." In the third section, "Correlating Marxism with the Occupy Movement," I propose some conceptual similarities that might not seem immediately obvious and discuss the advantages of a Marxian outlook. Admittedly an ambitious project, my ultimate hope is to demonstrate that a study and application of key notions of Marxism can be enlightening and conducive to a more permanent outcome for the Occupy movement.

I. A Brief Introduction to Marxism

Developed both as a collaborative project between Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and by the independent writings of Marx, Marxism introduced a theory that analyzed the axes between politics, economy, and society. Because it focused on observations of human practice rather than something devout or otherwise abstract as a necessary precursor for developing a theory of humans, Marxism's methodology contrasted with that of popular theorists and philosophers of Marx's and Engel's time, particu-

larly Hegel and Feuerbach. The emergence of Marxism may be heavily attributed as an effect of the Industrial Revolution, when the growing demand for work and production had a noticeably negative qualitative effect on the lives of workers and the world overall.

Marxism is economically centered and hence focuses on the relation of work or labor to the worker and his/her world, where the nature of the former determines the nature of the latter two. Because of the energy and time necessary to devote to labor, a world of genuine human activity such as creativity diminishes and becomes preoccupied with production, material worth, and opportunities to increase both: "The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and extent. The worker becomes a cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces. The *increase in value* of the world of things is directly proportional to the *decrease in value* of the human world" (Marx 1994, p. 59; italics his). The dedication given to labor, or, more generally, the material forces of the world, directly shapes the ideologies and values practiced by persons in a given slice of history. Marx and Engels ultimately argue that human conditions were connected to what humans produced so that *what* we do creates *who* we become, captured gracefully in the oft-quoted statement, "Consciousness does not determine life, but life determines consciousness" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 112).

Marxism argues that the growth of production and a resulting antagonized binary class system are necessary consequences of—and, indeed, enabled by—the nature of capital, "i.e., that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 170). The population divides into two groups or classes as defined by their involvement with labor and wealth and hence power, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Each class is characterized by their possession (or lack) of wealth and hence power. The proletariat (wage-laborers, or industrial or free workers in Marx's text) includes a majority of citizens "who live only so long as they find work, and who

find work only so long as their labour increases capital" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 164). They are the property-less masses, whose labor creates oppression for themselves through exploitation by the bourgeoisie—or, in more descriptive terms, they are "an appendage of the machine" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 164). The distance created between the laborer, his/her labor, and the product created, allows the bourgeoisie (in a word, the oppressor) to control the product, the profit gained, and even of the labor itself involved (Marx 1994, p. 281). The private ownership of the entire production process constitutes capital, qualifying the owners as capitalists. Unlike the proletariat, the bourgeoisie contains few members, and with deliberate intention. Economic power equates to political power, and hence the bourgeoisie control governmental laws, tax regulations, and even interests: "The necessary consequence of [agglomerating population towards modern industry, centralizing meanings of production, and concentrating property] was political centralization" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 161). By constantly evolving the modes of production, the bourgeoisie maintains capital as well as political control, and the proletariat is merely at the mercy of forces they cannot impede or command.

The eventual disruption of political economy and increasing exploitation of the proletariat increases the level of class antagonism and provides an opportunity for collaborative rebellion against their living conditions, which will lead to revolution and ultimately a property-less, classless communist society (Marx & Engels 1994, pp. 166-9). Marx observed that bourgeois economy requires geographical growth and technological development in the conquest for capital but will reach a point when "there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce," and the requirements to maintain a capitalist economy and "bourgeois conditions of property" cannot be met (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 164). The spread of capitalism both weakens the centralization of bourgeois power and increases the population, enlightenment, and fervor for equality of the proletariat. In other words, the nature of capitalism ultimately contributes to its own demise. Marx and Engels assert

that only the proletariat "is really a revolutionary class" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 164) because of its unique predisposition to revolutionize. Only through revolution can the proletariat reach autonomy and liberation, and only with global revolution can capitalist oppression be thoroughly disintegrated. Hence, Marxism contends that revolution and the growth of the proletariat must be a world-historical fact, i.e., "world historical existence of individuals means existence of individuals which is directly bound up with world history"(Marx & Engels 1994, p. 121). Though the ousting of the bourgeoisie might seem to simply replace one class with another class, class antagonism and the class system as a whole will dissolve as social redevelopment dissolves economical forces and corresponding ideologies and replaces them globally with communist ones, which include economic equality through the elimination of free market; labor as a source of enrichment and not existence or subsistence; and a citizen-ruled system of the state.

Though not a comprehensive introduction to Marxism, the overview here is intended to provide the relevant Marxist concepts for a comparison and elaboration of the ideology and refutation of the Occupy movement, which will be introduced in the following section.

II. THE OCCUPY MOVEMENT AND TRACES OF MARXISM

The Occupy movement quickly gained momentum nationally and internationally and continues to make appearances in media even now. With a modest objective of increasing awareness of the growing economic gap and observable political favoritism, the initial few who refused an idle role swelled into thousands who agreed on some level that raising awareness of these biases is the first step in addressing them.

A question that many Occupiers were and are confronted with is, "why are you doing this?" While there can be—and indeed are—many responses to this, they all revolve around one essential

observation, as explained by one Occupier: "They can do these things because they have the money, and they have the money because they do these things. Money is power and a disparity of money means a disparity of power: our ability to influence them is greatly outweighed by their ability to influence us. Their resources mean that they can operate with next to no account-ability to the people who are affected by their quest for more" (Key n.d., para. 4). The "they" that Key speaks of here is corpora-tions and big businesses, and the "things" they do that solicit the apparent disgust here involves the imbalance of power and lack of consequences for those who "seem to believe that the rest of the world exists to service them" (Key n.d., para. 3). Occupiers describe it as "a people's movement. It is party-less, leaderless, by the people and for the people. It is not a business, a political party, an advertising campaign or a brand" (Occupy Wall Street 2012, para. 1). Occupy Together further concurs with this view when they state that the "greed and corruption of the 1%" is a central motivation to the call for change by the movement (Occupy Together 2012, para. 1). Because "money is power," corporations and CEOs wield a large amount of political power, attempting—often successfully—to alleviate or dispel the policies that regulate their profit, lawmaking, or, ironically, power. In shaping politics in a favorable fashion, the ones disadvantaged are those whom the government was actually intended to serve and who actually assist in maintaining corporations' operation through employ-ment and consumerism: the general public, or the average resi-dent. According to Occupiers, the imbalance of power results in a stifling list of struggles, frustrations, and ignored efforts that, more importantly, do not bother executives to even a minute degree. From student loans and home loans to unemployment and Medi-care cuts, Occupiers assert that laws and policies that, despite an original intention to regulate business, are now being amended *for* the benefit of corporations and CEOs, thereby jeopardizing the desires and efforts of ordinary persons and preventing them from advancing in or pursuing new careers, obtaining generally valued achievements (e.g., home ownership), or even starting a family

(We Are the 99 Percent 2012).

The relationship of money with centralized power and the presence of a class system make use of Marxist observations. Let us consider these in reverse order. In Marxist literature, one powerful group oppresses another to maintain its power, i.e., to expand both profit and domain. In doing so, the oppressing group, the bourgeoisie, also maintains the disparity between classes. In determining the cause of their hardships, Occupiers allude to such a description of class systems. Utilizing a binary system—the 99% and the 1%—allows recognition that some persons not only do not experience the same turmoil but that they benefit from others having endured it. Moreover, this advantaged group protects this division by lobbying Congress for legislation amendment, exercising their financial brawn at the same time. Their attempts thus far have been successful because many people still suffer as a result of financial regulations customized for the extremely wealthy.

Hence, we have arrived at a Marxian explanation. Both the relationship of the economic with the social and the concentrated power of one group over another based on financial ownership demonstrate a Marxian understanding of living conditions as manifest from economic practices. For Marx, the economic and the social are bound together (Marx 1994, pp. 60–4), and changing one necessarily changes the other. By acknowledging a need to thoroughly redesign the process of enactment and reiterate the purpose of regulations, Occupiers exhibit an understanding of this: a change in social conditions accompany a change to our economic practices. This is not to say, however, that Occupiers advocate a total reconstruction of our financial system or even that Occupiers and Marx desire the same changes. Marxism entails a dismantling of both the capitalist system and the government (as described heavily in *The Communist Manifesto*), and clearly that is not what Occupiers call for (though, at a later point in this essay, I will discuss how Occupiers should find more direction in Marxism in regards to change). Rather, they demand stricter governmental regulations over the operations of and acquisition of profit by corporations *within* the present democratic system,

indicating no significant change to our subscription to capitalism. Still, the movement regards the living conditions of individuals as necessarily coinciding with economic standards, and the spirit of this is reminiscent of Marxist interpretation.

Focusing again on the Occupy movement, the issue's proximity to the average person was emphasized by drawing a distinction between the miniscule percentage of citizens with consistently lavish salaries—identified as "the 1%"—and everyone else who fell in "the 99%". To maintain its populist appeal, the movement excluded an officially appointed leader, which impacted demographical characteristics of participants, as concluded from statistics on participants' various ethnicities, ages, genders, and education levels (Statistic Brain 2011). Without a representative face, the movement was free to include basically anyone who identified with the economic turmoil indifferent of personal, political, or social ideologies. Moreover, the Occupy movement refused endorsement of any exclusive or otherwise unrelated agenda, maintaining a focus on economic inequality.

In addition to multiple occurrences of protests across the U.S., the Occupy movement proved fruitful in resonating with populations worldwide. Occupy demonstrations have been reported on almost every continent on the globe, with the latest demonstrations being in Nigeria (Rawlings 2012, p. 24). What is significant about the spread of the movement is the cohesion through familiar struggle and identification with economically induced inequalities, regardless of individual distinctions or circumstances, and whether minute or overwhelming.

Consider now the global influence of the Occupy movement and its potential to qualify as a world-historical event. The term "world-historical" requires "worldwide interaction" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 121), and although it has been linked with communist actualization, evidence for the movement as a world-historical event has already been alluded to and suggests the appropriateness of this label. This does not assert an inevitability of communism based on these circumstances; rather, this illuminates the relevance of the notion of the world-historical in

Marxism. In "The German Ideology," Marx and Engels argue that abolishing oppressive economic practices and realizing communism presupposes two historical facts: 1) most of the world's population must be "propertyless workers—labor power on a mass scale cut off from capital or even limited satisfaction [with the nature of work]" while 2) "at the same time in contradiction to an existing world of wealth and culture" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 121). Subtracting the communist component, we notice that the current world economy embodies these conditions and justifies the movement as a global phenomenon versus an isolated one. Most of the world's economy coheres to a capitalist operation, where either a country or nation itself is capitalist, is pressured into becoming one, or is made dependent on one by a more powerful capitalist entity itself. While this is a sweeping generalization, this is primarily the reason for the initial attraction and additions of the Occupy movement. Most of the world's workers or laborers are property-less. Many people found a connection with the economic exploitation and oppression condemned by the movement, and the rapid spread of the movement succeeds at evincing this. That current world economic and social conditions as highlighted by the Occupy movement accord with Marxist clarifications of what it is to be world-historical suffice for the proposed efficacy of a world-historical application.

Although various demonstrations have adopted a different or more precise agenda or goal (such as the aforementioned protests against school budget cuts), the urgency of change worldwide began with a recognition of intrinsically oppressive economic practices and bias, not surprisingly capitalist—and which also, as I will argue in the following section, coalesce with Marxism on more than a superficial level.

III. Correlating Marxism with the Occupy Movement

Marxism and the Occupy movement are roughly a century apart, but this section, the nucleus of this project, will compare the

Occupy movement to Marxism and ultimately suggest that the movement can significantly benefit from looking to Marxism as a model for active change.

Replicated Concepts

The simultaneous swelling of wealth and political power of the few in Marxist is made clear by the Occupy movement. In Marxism, a division of classes necessitates a previous division of labor in the accumulation of wealth. In buying the labor of others, capitalists become the owners of both the commodity produced in virtue of controlling its allocation and acquiring its profit, and the labor of others through the creation of dependency on labor for their own sustenance and, eventually, existence. With every new development in production, wage-laborers retain less and less of the fruits of their labor while the bourgeoisie inherits it and increases its political sway with every addition of wealth (Marx & Engels 1994, pp. 160–163). It is this combination that the Occupy movement calls to change. The wealth owned by CEOs in our country amounts to political power, which we can confidently force tax laws and regulations that favor the extremely wealthy. Recall the statistical gap between the salaries of workers and CEOs as well as high unemployment and foreclosure rates for workers. Put together, we can see an obvious disparity in both wealth and political power for each group, one that has been increasing with the development of production and technology. By denouncing the collusion between the moneyed elite and political policy makers, which legitimizes the conditions that subjugate the average worker, the Occupy movement illustrates the dominance of private property over political policy. It entails a tacit understanding of the potency of private property and its relationship with political economy.

The singularity of the economic and social, a very distinct Marxist concept, resonates with the intention of the movement. We have already become familiar with this point, but we will now discuss it in greater detail. Recall that, for Marx and Engels, nothing is a coincidence: "Elements which appear accidental to

a later age in comparison with an earlier one, including those handed down by the earlier age, constitute a form of interaction which corresponded to a particular state of productive forces" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 147). In other words, human life conditions do not unfold independently of us; rather, they are direct and necessary consequences of economic forces before us, and each slice of history emanates from the particular level of production preceding and during that slice. The division of labor and interaction with production shape the nature and living conditions of the individual (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 108): the greater the amount of involvement with production, the higher the degree of existential dependency of the worker on labor. In context, those at or near the top of the corporate ladder are nearly if not completely uninvolved in production, from the packaging of a product to the sometimes repetitive office work involved—that is, aside from the acquisition of increasing profit as statistically demonstrated earlier.

While this may seem hasty, the Occupy movement manifested from and thrived in this observation. The ambition of the Occupy movement utilizes and simultaneously corroborates this primacy of material forces. The change to which the movement aspires requires a reevaluation of the efficacy and relationship of our economic practices and their social outcomes. In acknowledging that the cost of living illicitly corresponds to the effort expended in labor by the average worker, the goal of the movement necessitates an understanding of the influential control that our economic system has on our living conditions. For Occupiers, rectifying the social conditions of workers is contingent on a change in the ethics of political practice, regulating tax laws and closing loopholes—which itself, to incorporate a Marxist understanding, relies on an amendment to economic practices and the influence it has come to manipulate.

Contemporary Critique of Capitalism

The Occupy movement recognizes the oppressive effects of such an economy and unintentionally invokes Marxian critiques

of capitalism. However, Occupiers have not explicitly integrated a Marxist approach towards the object of their criticisms. I propose that a Marxist approach would help unveil the opponents of the movement for what they are and shape a better program for a more enlightened activism. To demonstrate this, we must revisit at greater length a Marxist discussion of the nature of capitalism and the inevitable revolution that threatens its continuous existence, from which we can then offer more relative suggestions to the Occupy movement.

As expounded earlier, capitalism entails the oppression of the masses while contributing to its own end. Although some have defended the efficacy of capitalism, Marx asserts that this view understates the obvious while ignoring that, "in actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part" (Marx 1994, p. 295). Eventually, though, these living conditions agitate the workers enough to unite them against these repressions, and we arrive at the beginning of a proletarian movement. In creating insatiability from an advanced development of production, capitalism contributes to its own demise. Capitalism can no longer sustain itself because the productive forces conflict with the social forces it itself has created. The ammunition for revolution as provided by the bourgeoisie, e.g., intellectual development through a bourgeois education, means the proletariat has both the ambition and tools to proceed with active revolution: "Liberation is a historical and not a mental act" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 129).

Although perhaps not immediately obvious, a gradual comparison between the Marxist material in the previous paragraph and the Occupy movement will reveal a strong qualification of the latter as a possible contextually appropriate manifestation of Marxism. We have already apprehended that a capitalist economy has seized most of the globe. The fact that the critique of demonstrations—e.g., "We are getting nothing while the other 1 percent is getting everything" (We Are the 99 Percent, 2012); "End Corporate Personhood" (Thompson 2011); and "Greed is the Greatest Form of Terrorism" (Occupy Los Angeles 2012)—

centers primarily on the relationship of CEOs and other elites to politics and the living conditions—wages, tax refunds, etc.—in coordination with an explicit distinction between the victors here and everyone else—the 1% and 99%—employ a Marxist understanding of the social degradation emanating from capitalist expansion. Factor in the effects of corporate globalization, which displaced jobs overseas, creating competition for jobs and instability for those with jobs here, and the rise in the cost of living and the decreasing value of the dollar, and we can see how the spread of capitalism worldwide has created conditions that restrict the movement of general persons while maintaining the status of a few elite individuals. The undeviating increase in salaries of CEOs and the other elites coupled with the simultaneous decrease in worker wages suggest an increasingly parasitic reliance the vanishing earnings of the workers, contributing to their enslavement. The epidemic of capitalism, the dependency of the average worker on work, a criminal ratio of work to pay, the loss of self from exploitation through work—all of these as highlighted by the Occupy movement indicate an allusion to Marxist critiques of capitalism. That this awareness and clarity through the movement are even possible evince both the lurking influence and value of Marxism.

At the same time, however, Occupiers have misidentified what needs to be changed. As previously stated, many call for stricter government regulations of corporations, citing that corporate responsibility and retribution from a failure to adhere to these would prompt corporations to operate in a manner fairer and more beneficial to the general public (Occupy Wall Street 2011, para. 1). Although progressive, it does little to prevent corporate corruption in the future. Occupiers direct their frustrations at the corporate-government alliance, but they fail to realize that this is allowed—indeed, entailed—by our economic system. Certainly, the awareness brought forth by the movement is a start, but, as we will see in the following section, it is not enough.

Marxian Insights for the Future of the Movement

Now that the Occupy movement has accentuated the deep class difference in our political economy, the time is ripe for a conscientious and, indeed, imminent plan of action. Although Marxism contends that the struggle between classes is and always has been a world-historical fact (Marx 1994, p. 158), one should not feel dissuaded in attempting to change the course of history: "The question whether human thinking can reach objective truth— is not a question of theory but a practical question… The coincidence of the change of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be comprehended and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice*" (Marx 1994, p. 99; italics his). Active retaliation is the only method to eliminate the atrocity created by capitalism. Because the "existing world of wealth and culture" (as quoted earlier) and the archetype of success derive from the practices of the current ruling class, replacing its corresponding ideologies with more inclusive and impartial ones entails first that the elite or bourgeoisie be completely dethroned: "the class overthrowing [the ruling class] can succeed only by revolution in getting rid of all the traditional muck and become capable of establishing society anew" (Marx & Engels 1994, p. 124; italics theirs). Recall as well that Marxism asserts that the material and intellectual tools for complete social transformation are inherent in the current economic stage, and by this we can deduce the capacity of the Occupy movement as an initiation of sociopolitical evolution and revolution.

To reiterate, the Occupy movement called for awareness of the issues responsible for the frustrations and tribulations experienced by the average person. Active rebellion was not included in the movement's agenda, and the activity that was encouraged— organizing, protests, and petitions—is insufficient to rouse more permanent changes in our political policies. It is true that we as a less powerful class can only do so much, and the steps taken thus far are indeed positive ones. Without a plan to proceed with, though, we cannot see the movement as a beginning of something more meaningful rather than as a brief moment of group

cognizance.

By incorporating a Marxist approach to change, the Occupy movement and Occupiers will be a stronger force of opposition. Occupiers recognize the oppression experienced and its initial cause, and the solidarity with the movement worldwide evinces the urgency of solving the issues. Maintaining the momentum requires a definition of the next step, which itself should include a more concrete agenda and unified organization, and ultimately a revisit of the origin of our oppressive social conditions. Because the movement has become diluted for various aims (such as the previously mentioned protests against school budget cuts), it loses focus on the heart of the problem—tougher government restrictions on institutions or, ultimately, capitalism—and how to dismantle it. Occupiers have organized locally; however, with different aims, strategies, and strengths, only contained victories can be proclaimed. In other words, the lack of cohesion in both definite aims and directed effort is not enough to enact the sort of change that the movement recognizes is needed. Although this was not an explicit goal of the movement, it is certainly one of its shortcomings. Integrating some components of Marxist revolution may assist in closing these gaps. For Marx, revolution necessitates organization of the proletariat as a global class and an "abolishing [of] their previous mode of appropriation" to obtain liberation (Marx & Engels 1994, pp. 167–8). If Occupiers used the level of organization and focus in Marxism as a model for the movement, it might have more success in influencing desirable political changes. I am not suggesting that Occupiers constitute a revolutionary class like Marx described or even that the nature of a Marx-infused Occupy will compare to the violent revolution that Marx and Engels propose is necessary (Marx & Engels 1994, pp. 167–8). Indeed, Occupiers thus far have strictly encouraged only peaceful protests (Occupy Together 2012, para. 1). The spirit of change, desire for equality and a higher quality of life found in Marxism, are rekindled by the Occupy movement. Marxism asserts that recognition of a problem only occurs when the tools necessary for solving it are available: "Mankind thus inevitably

sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation" (Marx 1994, p. 211). If Occupiers look to this and Marxism as a source of inspiration, they can not only develop a more concrete vision of organization and goals but also obtain an affirmed sense of purpose.

More importantly, though, Occupiers must remove the Western-capitalist veil that shields a clear understanding of what even allowed these conditions to exist in the first place. Capitalism requires the oppression that a lower class experiences from a lack of ownership, wealth, and the corresponding lack of power. It also requires that the elite conspire with the government to both secure their power and political say, *and* subjugate those excluded from the group. Occupiers must redirect their focus towards these consequences as originating from *capitalism* in order to initiate the change they see as urgent and necessary. Adopting a Marxian approach to the ideology of the movement will reveal that their criticisms need to be expanded. Ultimately, then, Marxism can provide both direction and revelation to Occupiers who, very likely, seek more substantial, pervasive, and global changes. Unless they can integrate these into either what loose agenda they employ or their ideology, the movement can only hope to achieve a temporary or stunted intervention.

IV. CONCLUSION

We have revisited a theory that some argue should be read only respective of the historical epoch from which it emerged. Dusting off the debris and misconceptions, we have aligned Marxism and some of its core concepts with that of the Occupy movement. We have seen how the political critique of Marxism can inform the philosophy and arguments of Occupy protestors, and we have discovered how Marxism can offer direction towards a more significant, enduring result of the movement. Whether we ultimately decide to actively stage a more cohesive and forceful opposition

or acquiesce to this force greater than our will remains to be seen. Regardless of the unfolding of these events, the Occupy movement is identifiable as a pivot for social and economic enlightenment, and an integration of Marxism can elucidate not only the issues presented and their origins but also a level of collaboration and activity necessary for the next stage towards sociopolitical progress.

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PHENOMENALITY IN A PHYSICAL WORLD

Carey White

In this paper I would like to address the following question: What does it mean to be a physicalist? More specifically, given the ontological commitments that a physicalist claims to have, what kind of relationship can be said to hold between the physical and the mental? Physicalism[1] is simply the view that everything that exists is physical. There are primarily two broad versions of physicalism to be found in the literature, namely non-reductive and reductive physicalism. Non-reductive physicalism is the view that mental properties are grounded in, but not reducible to, physical properties. Reductive physicalism, on the other hand, is the view that mental properties *can* be reduced to physical properties. Intuitively, it seems as if one of these views has to be right, if one wants to be a physicalist. The problem is that both views have what seem to be insurmountable difficulties when it comes to accounting for the causal relationship between mental and physical properties; I will discuss these difficulties in the next section. In this paper, I will argue the reason why these problems arise for the physicalist of either variety is because of a carryover of Cartesian metaphysics into the physicalist's discourse; i.e., the concepts of 'mental' and 'physical' which frame the discourse of physicalism are essentially Cartesian in nature. This carrying over of concepts brings with it a set of problems that make any kind of causal explanation between the mental and the physical no less problematic than it was for Descartes. I will also argue that a physicalist view, like Galen Strawson's real materialism, would be a better way to go if someone wants to be a physicalist. Strawson's view, or at least one way of interpreting Strawson's view, allows one to (a) give a coherent account of mental causation, while (b) retaining phenom-

enality. I will argue that a view like real materialism can at least in principle have both (a) and (b) while reductive and non-reductive physicalism are able to have at most one of these, but not both.

Physicalists of all stripes share a common goal; that is, physicalists wish to *naturalize* the mind. In other words, it seems to most that our scientific knowledge of the world is working toward explaining how the universe is what it is, at least to some degree. The problem is that the mind, particularly the phenomenal[2] aspects of the mind (Kriegel forthcoming, p. 25), seem to be quite inexplicable within this scientific/physicalist framework. Physicalists want to be able to provide some kind of naturalistic explanation for phenomenal experience. If such an explanation proves to not be possible, it would follow that either physicalism is essentially radically incomplete, since there would remain a large domain of the world that would remain unaccounted for, or physicalism would simply be false. Both non-reductive and reductive physicalisms attempt to provide a framework within which such an explanation could be given.

There is also another common feature that both varieties of physicalism share. This commonality may seem so intuitively true, so attuned to common sense, that it may seem odd to even mention; however, I do think that this commonality is the very reason why both views run into such dire problems when it come to physical-phenomenal causation. The commonality is this: both take the terms 'physical' and 'mental' to refer to properties that are construed as radically, i.e., diametrically different from each other. The way in which these two terms are typically understood is a carryover from the Cartesian concepts of the mental and the physical. That is to say that most physicalists seem to hold that the phrases 'physical property' and 'mental property' should be understood in the following ways, let us call this the *classical view*:

> Physical properties: For any property X, X is a *physical property* if and only if it is a property whose existence is empirically established by means of the natural sciences.[3]

> Phenomenal properties: For any Y, Y is a *phenomenal prop-erty* if and only if there is a what-it's-like kind of experi-ence to have such a Y.[4]

I would like to mention that these two ways of thinking about the mental and the physical might certainly be correct. After all, this way of talking about things seems entirely intuitive. However, as I will argue, if one wants to be a physicalist, the terms should not be understood in this way.

One of the outstanding problems in mind-body metaphysics, that both reductive and non-reductive physicalists have attempted to address, is the problem known as the explanatory gap (Levine 1983, p. 355). The explanatory gap points out that we are unable to explain any kind of relationship between our phenomenal experi-ence and our knowledge of the physical, i.e., the non-phenomenal. When one speaks of a lack of explanation here, what seems to be of utmost importance is a *causal* explanation. There seems to be no conceivable way for even our most fine tuned theories of neuro-biology, neuropsychology, or any other science for that matter, to provide an account of *what-it's*-like to have any experience what-soever. In another paper, Levine summarizes the physicalist's anxiety in the following way: "That subjectivity should exist in the world is, to my mind, itself a major puzzle, independently of the puzzles that surround the particular features presented to us as phenomenal characters" (Levine 2011, p. 1). So for Levine, as is the case for most physicalists, given the ontology of physicalism, it is utterly puzzling why the world should contain things like subjectivity, phenomenality, or experience. But, of course, these things are in the world and any ontology will have to be able to account for them.

There seems to be at least two different ways to think about the explanatory gap. On the one hand, one could attempt to find some bridge laws that would somehow connect the physical with the phenomenal. On the other hand, one might attempt to provide a more direct causal chain sort of relationship between the physical and the phenomenal. Both approaches seem like

possible points of departure. The problem is that no one seems to know how to get started. A bridge law between the physical and the phenomenal might be able to tell us that when some physical state, e.g., a neural state, is in some particular configuration N, one experiences some phenomenal character P. Our bridge law would then say that, if N then P. In fact, neurobiology is able to determine such correlations. However, a correlation is not an explanation, but rather a precondition for an explanation. In other words, the correlation does not tell us *how* or *why* N causes P. We could compile a near infinite list of such correlations and still have no idea how or why a causal relation holds. Additionally, both approaches seem to face the following problem: if phenomenal properties and physical properties are such radically different kinds of things, then it is not even clear what it means for there to be a causal relation between the two properties. Causal relationships only have sense in the physical domain; it is a relation that can only hold between physical objects, properties, states, events, etc. To this point, a physicalist might retort that this kind of argument only holds when we take a *substance* dualism approach, not a property dualism approach. But, even if we are only concerned with properties, it still seems to be the case that properties have to be caused by, hence ground in (or however else one would like to say it) their physical substrate. Properties do not just pop in and out of existence without reason. And if we adhere to the ancient dictum that an effect must resemble its cause, then one could not maintain that phenomenal properties are radically different from the physical substrate that produces them. If this is correct, then the property dualist inherits the same problem of causality as the substance dualist. In other words, to speak of the causality between two radically different things (properties, entities, events or anything else) is inexplicable. I would now like to consider in detail why the classical views of the mental and physical are the root cause of this problem.

As I mentioned above, non-reductive physicalism is the view that everything that exists is physical; however, there are some properties, namely, phenomenal properties, that are grounded

in, but not reducible to, their physical substrate. It should be mentioned that there are many varieties of non-reductive physicalism, but I do think it is safe to say that all (or almost all) non-reductive physicalists would agree to this baseline articulation of the view. Some have argued that if one is a physicalist then one cannot be a non-reductionist (Kim 2000, p. 78). But such a claim seems to me to be far too strong. Surely, one can be a non-reductive physicalist; however, any conceivable explanation regarding the causal relation between physical and phenomenal properties is going to be hard to come by. As I mentioned above, any theory of mind must, at least in principle, be able to provide us with a workable model regarding physical/phenomenal property interaction. So, one can be a non-reductive physicalist, if one disagrees with this, and thinks that physical/phenomenal causality is not a necessary condition for physicalism.

Non-reductive physicalism does not seem to be able to provide a satisfactory account of how (a) physical states could possibly cause phenomenal states, and (b) phenomenal states could possibly cause physical states. Although many attempts have been made to try to account for causality here,[5] there is a fundamental reason why no such answer could be given in this context. It does not seem to matter if we are talking about properties, substances, functional roles or anything else. As was mentioned above, causality is a concept that is only properly applicable to relations holding between physical states, properties or anything else that is physical. If one is going to be a physicalist, then this should be a fundamental truism. If this is the case, then it's not that it is *wrong* to say that physical states cause phenomenal states *per se,* rather it is not even clear as to what such a claim could amount. There seems to be an analogous kind of confusion when it comes to our idea of the Big Bang. If we take the Big Bang to be the beginning of not just our universe, but rather the beginning of the only, or first, universe, then asking a question such as "Well, what *caused* the Big Bang?" is entirely misguided. This question is clearly posed by our intuition that *everything* has a cause, but we must remember that our idea of causality is only applicable to physical

things that exist in the universe. To assume that there is an answer to the question posed above is to assume that causes exist outside of the physical domain. Similarly, to ask how physical states or properties cause phenomenal states or properties is misguided since phenomenality is assumed to be non-physical.

One has to either give up the idea that phenomenality is non-physical or greatly expand our notion of causality.[6] If one opts to give up the idea that phenomenality is non-physical, then it follows that there is only one kind of property, namely physical properties, in which case this version of physicalism is no longer a property dualism and the question of reduction becomes irrelevant. To say that phenomenal properties are, strictly speaking, purely physical properties, is to give up the idea that mental properties are radically different from physical properties. This is a lot to give up, but it seems to be the best option, if one wants to be a physicalist and if one wants to be able to, at least in principle, offer a causal explanation that is a naturalistic explanation of phenomenality. In short, if one wants to be a physicalist then, as Kim argued, one cannot be a non-reductionist.

Another popular option for the physicalist is to subscribe to the reductive version of physicalism. But, if phenomenal properties and physical properties are classically understood, that is, if they are understood in the way I originally articulated, then to what does the reduction claim actually amount? In other words, what would it mean to reduce one kind of thing to a radically different kind of thing? This would be like trying to reduce circles to lines. Let's assume that such a reduction could be done. What would follow? If the phenomenal could be reduced to the purely physical, then the phenomenal could be fully articulated in the language of physicalism. That is, of course, the goal. Since it is assumed that the physical and the phenomenal are diametrically opposed to each other, this would simply entail the elimination of the phenomenal, i.e., eliminativism. There is, however, a second option here, and it is the same option that the non-reductive physicalist encountered above. One could say that phenomenal properties just are physical properties. That is, some physical states just

have a special kind of physical property, namely, phenomenality.

If I have successfully made my point here, then what has hitherto been said can be summarized in the following way:

(1) If one wants to properly consider oneself a physicalist, i.e., if one is committed to the view that everything that exists is physical, and

(2) If one also believes that phenomenality is a real part of the world, and

(3) If one also believes that causality is only properly understood as a relation between physical properties, states, etc., and

(4) If one also believes that physical properties need to be causally accounted for, then,

(5) The classical conception of the mental and the physical has to be wrong, in other words,

(6) Phenomenality is a purely physical property.

This may seem like an odd conclusion indeed, but the oddness only occurs if we assume the classical view. This conclusion is not saying that the non-physical is physical, but rather it is saying, what we once thought to be non-physical actually turns out to be physical. The physical, that is, the set of all physical things, properties etc., has to include the phenomenal, if one wishes to be a physicalist.

Galen Strawson made this point in his essay "Real Materialism," and I agree with this point (Strawson 2008, p. 19). According to Strawson, or at least according to a way in which Strawson could be interpreted, the relation between phenomenal and physical properties is this: the set of all phenomenal properties are just a proper subset of all physical properties.

As I argued above, it seems to me that any theory of the mind has to be able to do at least two things: (I) be able to, at least in principle, provide some kind of causal account between the phys-

ical and the phenomenal, and (II) do so without minimizing the robust nature of phenomenality. Non-reductive physicalism can satisfy (II), but not (I). Reductive physicalism can satisfy (I), but not (II). Real materialism, or at least something like real materialism, that is some view which takes the phenomenal to be wholly physical in nature, can satisfy both (I) and (II). In short, the only viable way for one to be a physicalist is to embrace the phenomenal *qua* physical.

Even if all of this is granted, one could still ask *how* is it that some physical properties are phenomenal while others are not? In other words, even if phenomenal properties are physical properties, how could non-phenomenal, physical properties ever cause something as strange as phenomenality to occur in a physical state? In a sense, it seems that Strawson's view once again just moves the "hard problem" of consciousness up one level. The problem could be stated this way: It seems clear how phenomenal states could cause physical states, and physical states could cause phenomenal states, given that we are taking phenomenal states to just be a subset of all physical states, but from where does phenomenality itself come? Why would the physical have such a peculiar property? But wouldn't this question just amount to the following question: Where do physical objects come from? Although this may very well be one of the deepest of all philosophical questions, no one should expect a theory of mind, or any theory for that matter, to be able to even approach this question. This just seems to be one of those untouchable questions.

We could ask, however, in what sort of way phenomenal properties are related to non-phenomenal properties, even if phenomenal properties are taken to be physical properties. After all, there is no problem in asking how two physical properties are related. Strawson also does address this question, but here I think he falls into the same trap of thinking of phenomenality and physicality in the classical way. Strawson argues that phenomenal properties cannot be produced by non-phenomenal properties (Strawson 2008, p. 70). He says, "The intuition that drives people to dualism (and eliminativism, and all other crazy attempts at

wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction) is correct in holding that you can't get experiential [phenomenal] phenomena from [non-phenomenal phenomena]" (Strawson 2008, p. 68). Even though Strawson is not talking about phenomenal properties *per se,* if it is the case, which I think it is, that the problematic part of experiential properties is that they are inherently phenomenal, then it seems legitimate to interpret him in this way. If this is so, then Strawson's argument is essentially this:

(1) The intuition that phenomenal properties cannot come from non-phenomenal properties is correct. However,

(2) Both phenomenal and non-phenomenal properties exist.

(3) If there are, ontologically speaking, basic constituents of matter, then some of these constituents would have to be essentially phenomenal while others would have to be essentially non-phenomenal. Such a view is what is referred to as panpsychism.

(4) There are such ontologically basic entities, therefore,

(5) Physicalism, i.e., real materialism, entails panpsychism.

Premise (1) of Strawson's argument seems to be conceding the point that phenomenal and non-phenomenal properties are radically different kinds of things. The denial of this point was the very reason why he was led to posit the thesis that phenomenal properties are a proper subset of all physical properties. The intuition that leads one to say that phenomenal properties cannot come from non-phenomenal properties is motivated by the intuition that phenomenal properties and non-phenomenal properties are radically different kinds of things. If it is correct to reject this way of construing phenomenal and non-phenomenal properties, which seems to be necessary if one wants to say that phenomenal properties just are a proper subset of the totality of physical properties, then (1) cannot be right.

Let us assume for the moment that Strawson's panpsychism argument is true. If it is the case that (1) is motivated by the clas-

sical conception of phenomenality and physicality, which I think it is, then it follows that the reason why phenomenal properties cannot come from physical properties is because they are radically different kinds of things. As radically different kinds of things, the problem of phenomenal/physical causality once again creeps in. In other words, real materialism, like non-reductive physicalism, could clearly retain the phenomenal but would be hard pressed to, in principle, be able to provide a causal account of the phenomenal and non-phenomenal. If, as Strawson claims, physicalism entails panpsychism, and, as I am trying to say, panpsychism is a version, a strong version, of property dualism, then real materialism will not be able to provide a complete account of the physical world for the same reasons that non-reductive physicalism cannot provide a complete account of the physical world. That is, what it means for two things to be radically different kinds of things just is to say that they are causally inert. Perhaps this is not the reason why Strawson holds (1), but I do not see any other reason why one would hold it.

It seems to me that if one wants to be a physicalist, then one needs to hold one of the two following views. Either phenomenal properties somehow emerge from non-phenomenal properties or everything, that is, every state, property, and entity that exists is inherently physical *and* phenomenal, or at least proto-phenomenal. In other words, phenomenality, or at least something like proto-phenomenality, is an inherent characteristic of all physical matter. As Hobbes famously states in his criticism of Descartes:

> Descartes is identifying the thing that understands with thinking, which is something that the thing *does*. Or at least he is identifying the thing that understands with intellect, which is a power, or faculty, that the thing *has*. Yet all philosophers distinguish a subject from its acts and faculties, i.e. distinguish a subject from its properties and its essences: an entity is one thing, its essence is another; the entity *has* the essence. Hence it may be that the thing that thinks—the subject that *has* mind, reason or intellect – is

something corporeal (Hobbes 1674, p. 43).

Although Hobbes is speaking about "mind, reason or intellect" here, it seems that, in a modern context, one would also be compelled to add phenomenality to this list. So, if Hobbes were a real materialist, it seems as if he might say something like this: It may be that phenomenality, as something which is had by a purely physical thing, is likewise purely physical itself. And, it seems to me that any physicalist would have to hold such a view, since minds, phenomenality, experience, etc., all exist in the world and anything that exists is purely physical.

Notes

1. The primary importance of physicalism, and the reason why it has had such widespread support over the past century, is because it is supposed to be the ontology of the natural sciences. The primary reason that it has been of philosophical interest is that mental properties such as experience and phenomenality have been difficult to incorporate into this ontology and thus stand as a kind of threat to the physicalist's project.

2. Uriah Kriegel argues that the primary properties which cause such difficulty in mind-body metaphysics are phenomenal properties. I think this is right so, for the remainder of this paper, I will restrict my discussion to phenomenal properties in particular.

3. There might be some controversy regarding this definition of physical properties. But, given that it would be hard to come by a definition which is universally consented to, I think this definition is pretty close to what most people mean by the phrase. Of course, there most likely are many physical properties which have not been discovered by science, but since no one knows anything about these properties, I am not interested in them here.

4. Again, any definition of a phenomenal property is going to be even more problematic than a physical property. But, then again, I do think that this is what most people have in mind when they use the phrase.

5. For example supervenience, emergentism, anomalous monism, epiphenomenalism (if this could count as a "causal" theory).

6. Given that there are already so many problems surrounding causation, this does not seem like a viable option.

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CONSISTENCY IN KILLING

Chuck Dishmon

INTRODUCTION

The pervasive violence imposed upon nonhuman animals remains the most systemic and deleterious abuses of sentient beings in the world. Notwithstanding this treatment, ethical arguments have provided the impetus for sweeping welfare reforms. While these changes have resulted in alleviating the suffering of countless beings, a new challenge has emerged in its wake; namely, increasing consumer awareness has spurred producers to supply "humane meat" in their commoditization of animals. Ultimately, I hope to show this emerging practice is morally problematic by exposing an inconsistency in killing amongst beings with analogous morally relevant properties. Specifically, I will conclude that in making normative judgments concerning killing, a being's faculty to plan for the future is not morally relevant.

In setting the framework for my argument, I will summarize contemporary work on the moral considerability of nonhuman animals, relative to their treatment. Moreover, I will devote a portion of the discussion to cognitive capacities, and the role these faculties play in informing our analysis. Next, I will move to discussing why the issue of killing has been neglected in the literature, suggesting philosophical work on the topic is more relevant than ever. Having put the issue into context, and highlighting its relevance to current practices, I will put forth a thought experiment informed by case studies in order to develop my claim of inconsistency in moral judgments. Lastly, I will return to the discussion on nonhuman animals, fleshing out the inconsistency in current practices relative to killing beings with analogous morally relevant properties.

CONSISTENCY IN TREATMENT

There has been a great deal of philosophical work on the treatment of nonhuman animals, and a push among eminent contemporary ethicists to include these beings within the scope of moral consideration. One such philosopher is Peter Singer, who argues nonhuman animals deserve equal consideration of interests. Singer utilizes a twofold approach, first appealing to preference satisfaction under a consequentialist framework, then arguing for consistent treatment of beings with morally relevant properties; the latter being most pertinent to the scope of my inquiry, and the one on which I will focus.

In doing so, Singer uses consistency-based arguments to expose an incongruous consideration of interests applied over species membership at large. Singer refers to this as speciesism, "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species" (Singer 2009, p. 9). Subsequently, Singer draws the analogy between other "isms" to elucidate the morally arbitrary notion of species membership. For instance, a racist might claim s/he is correct in favoring the interests of his/her own race over others; while similarly, a sexist may claim legitimacy in favoring members of his/her own sex. Yet to avoid bigotry, one must discern a relevant moral property all members of his/her race, or sex, possess to a greater degree than another.

Singer suggests one might erroneously claim there is a difference in intellect or physical ability between the two aforementioned groups; yet after a cursory glance it is clear not all members of one race, or sex, possesses either property to a greater degree than any member of another. As Singer points out, there are members in the purportedly superior groups that possess the morally relevant property to a lesser degree than at least one member of those groups facing subjugation. This descriptive fact, in and of itself, requires a repudiation of the prejudice, or consequent amendment of group constitution; since for a morally relevant property to be used in a non-arbitrary manner, *all* members of

one group must possess it to a greater degree than any member of another group. In short, acceptance of this principle guards against biases, and prevents an arbitrary indulgence in the interests of one group over another.

Similarly, Singer uses this same distinction to inform our moral outlook on the treatment of nonhuman animals. Before embracing a bias in favor of human interests, one is obliged to pick out a morally relevant property all humans possess over other species. To do otherwise would be as prejudicial as the racist or sexist who bestows greater moral consideration based solely on group membership. Yet in examining contenders for a morally relevant property, consistent with current practices, none can be applied across the barrier of species membership. In solidifying this claim, Singer invites the reader to consider properties which all humans possess to a greater degree than any nonhuman animal. Singer argues intellect isn't a contender, as humans who are severely cognitively impaired possess less intellect than a chimpanzee. Similarly, in examining the capacity for language across the species barrier it is clear parrots are more adept than some Homo sapiens. In total, not *all* humans possess these morally relevant properties to a greater degree than *all* nonhuman animals.

Yet even without applicable morally relevant properties applied consistently across species membership, humans enjoy greater moral consideration based on the morally arbitrary notion of species membership. Singer concludes this is prejudicial, further arguing that the only relevant moral property is sentience, the capacity for suffering and enjoyment. Sentience serves as a "prerequisite for having interests at all," and humans and nonhuman animals share it equally, consolidating its moral relevance across species membership (Singer 2009, p. 7).

Another philosopher working on the moral status of nonhuman animals is Robert Jones, whose primary interest lies in the motivations behind the asymmetry in the treatment we see between humans and nonhuman animals. Jones believes species membership is an arbitrary moral distinction, and also focuses on sentience as a morally relevant property. Yet Jones goes a step

further in illuminating the discussion, arguing cognitive properties of individual organisms can successfully underpin moral arguments. Jones suggests being consistent, and thus rational, requires treating beings with analogous morally relevant properties the same. Insofar as they share the same faculties, nonhuman animals should receive the same treatment as cognitively impaired humans, or conversely, cognitively impaired humans should receive the same treatment as nonhuman animals (Jones 2005).

Jones utilizes biological studies in determining the cognitive properties of different species. In doing so, deductions can be made on whether or not a being is sentient, providing an empirical grounding to guard against arbitrary moral distinctions. In turn, this experimental data alleviates speculation on a being's capacity to experience pleasure or pain, providing foundational support for subsequent ethical arguments. Most important to my discussion is the cognitive capacity of autonoetic memory, namely the ability to conceptualize oneself in the past and future. Clearly this capacity impinges on a being's ability to plan for the future, and includes the faculty to store past and future events. As Jones rightly states, autonoetic memory, or the lack thereof, should inform normative judgments on a being's *treatment*. For instance, those possessing this capacity may conceptualize themselves facing past or future harm, creating the potential to manifest psychological distress in situations similar to the conceptualization. Conversely, beings that "live in the moment" would be subject to the pain at hand, yet free from anticipatory psychological affliction. However, as I shall argue later, while autonoetic memory is clearly relevant to the *treatment* of a being, it becomes irrelevant in issues of *killing*.

In the end, Singer and Jones both appeal to consistency, a hallmark of most major moral theories. Yet in doing so, they concede their arguments cut both ways; in order to bring one's views into congruity, one must amend the treatment of some humans or at least some sentient nonhuman animals. Both would be equally consistent, and for the scope of my subsequent arguments, I will leave it to the reader to decide. However, it is helpful to consider conventions implemented in the subjugation of nonhuman

animals including forced insemination, castration without anesthesia, electrocution, and slaughter. In avoiding bigotry akin to racism or sexism, I will show consistency dictates *some humans* may be subjected to this abuse or *at least some sentient nonhuman animals* are spared this torment. Suffice it to say, most find it morally repugnant to consider exposing cognitively impaired humans to the aforementioned practices, and therefore the same treatment must be conferred to beings with analogous morally relevant properties.

SKIRTING THE ISSUE OF KILLING

The preceding arguments, based on the consistent application of morally relevant properties, have primarily focused on the treatment of nonhuman animals; the issue of killing has been largely avoided out of practicality. Given the tremendous suffering caused by our treatment of nonhuman animals, a near exclusive focus on their welfare was the preferred approach:

> So far I have said a lot about inflicting suffering on animals, but nothing about killing them. This omission has been deliberate. I have kept, and shall continue to keep, the question of killing in the background because in the present state of human tyranny over other species the more simple, straightforward principle of equal consideration of pain or pleasure is a sufficient basis for identifying and protesting against all the major abuses of animals that human beings produce (Singer 1993, p. 114).

To a large extent this is still applicable, yet in the decades since Singer's book *Animal Liberation*, "humane meat" has been growing in popularity amongst an otherwise socially conscious demographic. The "humane meat" movement aims to quell the cognitive dissonance produced through factory farming's gratuitous cruelty, and producers purport to allow nonhuman animals a relatively comfortable existence preceding their violent demise. Even so, their final moments remain unfettered by decency, and

typically come by means of a knife to their throats. In light of this respondent treatment to consumer demand, I believe a deeper examination into the killing of beings is both warranted and relevant.

With respect to killing, there may be morally relevant properties normal humans possess over nonhuman animals. More specifically, beings possessing the faculty to plan for the future have another interest, and would therefore require consideration of this interest.[1]

> We could still hold, for instance, that it is worse to kill a normal adult human, with a capacity for self-awareness and the ability to plan for the future and have meaningful relations with others, than it is to kill a mouse, which presumably does not share all of these characteristics (Singer 2009, p. 19).

> This does not mean that to avoid speciesism we must hold that it is as wrong to kill a dog as it is to kill a human being in full possession of his or her faculties (Singer 2009, p. 18).

I think Singer is correct about this, as normal human beings possess certain morally relevant cognitive capacities, which nonhuman animals lack. However, it is important to note that while we may judge something not "as wrong," it may still be found to be inconsistent.

Singer argues that the ability to plan for the future in normal humans is morally relevant, since killing a normal human would thwart his/her future plans. Namely, the wrong would *not* be dispossessing a being of his/her potential future; the wrong would occur *through* thwarting his/her presumed future, thus rendering his/her present actions futile. For instance, imagine a person were to study French each day in anticipation of a Parisian vacation. Should this person be killed before her trip comes to fruition, the wrong would *not* have been dispossessing her of potential travel. The wrong would be stymieing future plans, insofar as had the

pupil been apprised of her untimely demise she might have spent her time pursuing more immediate ends. This seems generally plausible; as once a being ceases cognitive functioning it simultaneously loses any experiential capacity.

Given this framework, it would not be as wrong to kill a nonhuman animal, or cognitively impaired human, as it would be to kill a normal human being. Both the nonhuman animal and cognitively impaired human lack the cognitive capacity for future plans, while the additional faculty extant in normal humans deserves moral consideration. I believe this is correct, yet I hope to elucidate the issue with a divergent focus. Although killing a being living in the moment might not be "as wrong," I will argue it remains morally impermissible through a clear inconsistency discernible in parceling out the morally arbitrary notion of species membership.

KILLING THE COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED

With a foundation defending the consistent *treatment* of beings possessing analogous morally relevant properties, I aim to extend the argument applying consistent moral treatment to the *killing* of beings. In doing so, I offer a distinction between a normally functioning human and a human global amnesiac, a being which lives in the moment. In doing so, I hope to parcel out the morally arbitrary notion of species membership, in turn illuminating the inconsistency in normative judgments concerning killing beings with analogous morally relevant capacities. From here I invite the reader to consider making normative judgments regarding the actions of two physicians.

First, imagine a doctor is conducting a yearly physical on one of his patients. After a thorough examination the doctor informs the man he has a clean bill of health, yet requires an inoculation. However, as the doctor is preparing the dosage, he realizes he has a burning desire to experience the taste of human flesh. When a glance at the medical chart reveals the patient has no family, the physician begins salivating at the thought of his next meal, all the

while filling the purported inoculation with a lethal dose of chemicals to affect a painless death. Might it be morally permissible to painlessly kill his cognitively functioning patient in order to taste his flesh?

Next imagine a slightly different scenario. Another doctor happens upon a reclusive man who doesn't seem to be functioning in a normal manner. Worried for the man, the doctor introduces himself and begins to conduct an examination, questioning the patient on his family history and previous medical conditions. Strangely, the man is unable to recollect any information about his past, and the doctor successfully diagnoses him as suffering from retrograde amnesia. Yet to his astonishment, the man continues to ask the doctor's name as if they'd never met. Each time the doctor politely responds with his name, telling him he's here to help, and like clockwork the man repeats his inquiry shortly thereafter. Astonished, the doctor diagnoses the man with anterograde amnesia, and given both diagnoses, concludes the man is a global amnesiac, one who suffers from simultaneous retrograde and anterograde amnesia (Kritchevsky 1993, p. 327).[2] Although the unfortunate man has no other signs of impaired cognitive functioning, he retains no memory of his past and lacks the faculty to create new memories. Extremely concerned for the man, the doctor escorts him to his office where he conducts a battery of tests to determine the man's prognosis. Unfortunately, the tests conclusively demonstrate the man is suffering from permanent global amnesia; there will never be an improvement in his condition.

Almost immediately thereafter the doctor is overcome with a curiosity he cannot shake. Wanting to experience all the culinary delights life has to offer, he's always dreamed of trying human flesh. Moreover, after rooting through his medical supplies, he is elated to find he has the perfect mixture of chemicals to painlessly end his patient's life. Since his potential meal is one who lives in the moment, and lacks the faculty to plan for the future, is it permissible for the doctor to satisfy his own desires by painlessly ending the man's life?

I would argue the vast majority of moral agents would find

it morally reprehensible for the doctors to end either patient's life for such trivialities. Yet, should this be true, this offers us some important insight into the moral relevance of the ability to plan for the future, in regards to killing. It is often helpful to isolate variables we aim to examine; yet in holding Homo sapiens constant, with variable faculties to plan for the future, we see equally strong normative judgments that either doctor's behavior is impermissible. This suggests the faculty to plan for the future, in and of itself, is not a morally relevant property, when considering the *killing* of a being.

CONSISTENCY APPLIED TO KILLING

Returning to discussion on the killing of nonhuman animals, informed by the thought experiment, a solution may be developed. Insofar as we adopt a non-arbitrary approach to solving the inconsistency, we must focus on the relevant cognitive capacities without the prejudicial notion of species membership. Clearly, a speciesist position would be indefensible in according current practices with the normative judgments produced in response to the doctors' actions; once cognitive properties are isolated across a constant species, the ability to plan for the future appears to be morally irrelevant. In turn, given the consistency requirement, there are two means by which we may bring current practices and consistency into congruity; accordingly, these solutions reflect the approaches in Singer's and Jones' theories, and may also cut both ways.

The first would retract current benefits conferred to cognitively impaired humans, and permit a *human* living in the moment, with no faculty to make future plans, to be killed painlessly for the trivial pleasures of another. To accept this solution, one must claim the second doctor is morally justified in painlessly killing the global amnesiac, and making a meal of "humane meat." Since his former patient, turned into dinner, lacked the capacity to make future plans, there was no harm done in thwarting present endeavors. Moreover, since the painless inoculation proved harm-

less, there only remains the benefit the doctor gleans in enjoying his meal. While I believe affirming this position is morally repugnant, I will concede its adoption would allow one to remain consistent while supporting the "humane meat" industry. Consequently, it would be morally permissible to raise and slaughter nonhuman animals in order to enjoy pleasurable taste bud sensations.

Alternatively, we might extend increased benefits to nonhuman animals, elevating their current treatment to baseline considerations afforded to the cognitively impaired, thereby disavowing the moral permissibility of killing analogous beings for trivialities. In supporting this resolution, one would claim neither doctor's actions are morally permissible, thereby rejecting the killing of a global amnesiac for the trivial satisfaction of the physician's palate. Should one hold this position, and value consistency in his/her moral theory, then the implication to other beings with analogous morally relevant properties becomes clear. Barring an appeal to the morally arbitrary notion of species membership, if we do not accept the patient's death we cannot accept the death of a nonhuman animal with analogous morally relevant impairment, namely the inability to plan for the future.

In short, while I suggest many hold an intuition that both doctors' actions are morally reprehensible, I have not attempted to show they are wrong in and of themselves. Given the argument presented, I have utilized consistency to help inform our current practices toward nonhuman animals. In doing so, I have exposed the moral irrelevance of the capacity to plan for the future, as it relates to the killing of beings. Yet my argument cuts both ways with its extension to killing; supposing one values the consistent application of morally relevant properties it would either permit killing a global amnesiac and nonhuman animal for trivial reasons, or require that sentient beings possessing analogous morally relevant properties be freed from the caprice of an executioner.

CONCLUSION

There have been tremendous advances in animal welfare

practices stemming from consistency-based arguments centered on the treatment of nonhuman animals. Yet the advent of the "humane meat" movement presents new concerns by sweeping socially conscious consumers into unbeknownst incongruity. In light of this, I have endeavored to extend a consistency requirement to the killing of beings by parceling out the morally arbitrary notion of species membership. In advancing my call for consistent application of analogous morally relevant properties I have revisited contemporary work arguing that nonhuman animals, relative to their treatment, should fall within the scope of moral considerability. In turn, I summarized work applying cognitive capacities to ethics, focusing on the role these faculties play in informing our analysis. Next, I moved to discussing how the issue of killing has been largely avoided in contemporary ethical arguments concerning nonhuman animals. After summarizing this previous philosophical work, I began extending a consistency-based argument to killing in response to the emerging "humane meat" movement. In doing so, I created a thought experiment informed by case studies to expose the inconsistency between normative judgments and current farming practices. Following this, I returned to the discussion of nonhuman animals in order to highlight the inconsistency in killing beings with analogous morally relevant properties. Ultimately, I believe I have been successful in exposing an inconsistency in killing amongst beings with analogous morally relevant properties, specifically in regards to a being's cognitive capacity to plan for the future. In closing, should consistency be of value in moral theory, and the actions of the physicians deemed morally repugnant, one should not support the execution of nonhuman animals based on their cognitive deficiency in planning for the future.

Notes

1. The scope of my inquiry rests in arguing for the moral irrelevance of a being's ability to plan for the future, as it stands in relation to killing. This is a first step toward amalgamating a comprehensive examination to determine whether there are *any* morally relevant properties applicable to killing. Prop-

erties and topics for subsequent examination include the capacity for self-awareness, relational value claims, potentiality, and reciprocal relationships.

2. It is important to note this isn't a strange metaphysical exercise. This thought experiment has been informed by case studies of patients suffering from global amnesia. Consequently, in applying a practical moral theory, some of the most interesting and illuminating examples come from cases of outliers. Furthermore, since a theory should inform normative judgments for all within its scope, I believe the example is highly relevant.

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NARRATIVE IDENTITY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Maricela Rodriguez

"Who am I?" "Who are you?" "You're not the person I once knew." "I'm not who I once was." In American society today, many people have heard one or more utterances of this sort or perhaps have uttered them themselves. How are we to understand these questions and statements in terms of personal identity? Often, the underlying sense of personal identity that is of concern here is not that of trans-temporal sameness. That is, we are not questioning our identity or the identity of others in terms of the existence of the same physical being over time. Instead, our concern is regarding identity as *ipse*, as selfhood.[1] Here, selfhood is understood as self-knowledge and self-understanding that allows one to express his or her identity or who s/he is in a way that goes beyond trans-temporal sameness. In this sense, selfhood situates identity in terms of values and character.

In this paper, I will examine narratives or narrative identity as the means of expressing and establishing selfhood. This focus lends itself to the notion that "we are more than the sum of our actions (identity as sameness), and this is the selfhood we are seeking through the telling of our stories" (Masterton et al. 2010, p. 341). Our narratives help convey who we are in a sense that goes beyond trans-temporal sameness and beyond biographical facts. Narratives express information that relates to values and character, which help constitute selfhood. And this leads to narratives playing a significant role in happiness or living a happy life. The narratives we tell others and ourselves in expressing who we are can be seen as an expression of how we perceive ourselves or perhaps how we *want* to perceive ourselves. Regarding the latter, I will examine the notions of self-deception and false narra-

tives. People may tell narratives that are not accurate reflections of reality—often with the intent to feel happier about their lives. Although self-deception and false narratives can be viewed as beneficial in attaining certain goals, I will argue that self-deception and false narratives are a hindrance to the pursuit of happiness.

One goal of this paper is thus to synthesize narrative identity theory with arguments against self-deception. This in turn will establish an argument against false narratives with happiness or the pursuit of happiness as its basis. In Part I of what follows, I will further explicate the notion of narratives and narrative identity as the method of establishing selfhood, and will refer to the ideas of Malin Masterton et al. and Lisa Jones (as will be seen, their work is explicitly informed by that of Paul Ricoeur). In Part II, I will discuss happiness or living a happy life as conveyed by Mike W. Martin. I will then express my own views concerning narrative identity and its relation to happiness. In Part III, I will examine self-deception (in reference to the views of Martin and D.S. Neil Van Leeuwen) in order to draw a correlation between self-deception and false narratives. With this correlation, self-deception and false narratives will be analyzed as both beneficial and as detrimental to the pursuit of happiness. In Part IV, I will argue that if we have a general moral duty to tell the truth then we have a moral duty to tell true narratives. With this, I will conclude in Part V that self-deception and false narratives are detrimental to achieving *true* self-understanding, our goals, what we value and, ultimately, authentic happiness.

I. NARRATIVE IDENTITY

As previously alluded to, there are two senses of identity that can be differentiated, "Identity as *idem* and identity as *ipse*. The English equivalents would roughly be 'sameness' and 'selfhood'" (Masterton et al. 2010, p. 341). In answering the question "Who am I?" there exists factual evidence that can begin to describe who we are and establish our identity in terms of sameness. For example, reference to a particular material body persisting through

time with certain physical features of height, weight, hair color, eye color, etc. We can further establish identity in terms of sameness through biographical facts such as the person born and raised in a particular city, who attended a particular college, and who currently has a particular occupation. "Traditionally the concept of identity has been understood as sameness only, with the result of making identity impersonal" (Masterton et al. 2010, p. 341). We thus turn to identity in terms of selfhood to establish a more personal notion of identity.

In understanding ourselves, and understanding others, often what is of interest goes beyond trans-temporal sameness and beyond biographical facts. Especially in interpersonal relations, we want to know about values, whether one is honest, wise, trustworthy, motivated, goal-oriented, inspirational, or a good friend, spouse, employee, etc. Such qualities are perhaps best summarized as *the content of one's character*. A person's character involves qualities that do not necessarily have a one-to-one correlation with concrete factual evidence. Instead, knowledge of these qualities is built up over time through interacting with others and through our narratives (i.e., the stories told about our lives and our experiences). Narratives, or narrative identities, are thus a method of expressing selfhood. They convey who we are on a more personal level than facts related to identity as sameness. As Lisa Jones states in "Oneself as an Author" (building on the ideas of Paul Ricoeur), "narrative is that which lies at the heart of our self-understanding, insofar as it is both the fundamental structure of our human experience of time and the dimension of our personal identity which perfectly expresses the dialectic of the self" (2010, p. 50).

It is important to note that we are not the sole authors of our narratives: "Real life is elusive; we cannot pinpoint a beginning to the narrative that is our life, nor can we ever hope to grasp this narrative's end, since the event of our deaths can only be incorporated into others' life stories, not our own" (Jones 2010, p. 53). Most people would not claim to remember the events surrounding their birth or the first few years of life, yet many will still have

stories told by others incorporated into their narrative. Moreover, the stories of others are not always limited to the beginning or end of our own narratives. After a night of heavy drinking, we may not remember the events that occurred, but we can often count on others to retell those events and perhaps embarrassingly so. Our narratives thus contain events and information that we do not have full control over (e.g., our birth) or full remembrance of. As Jones states, "while it is true that we can play a part in shaping our inter-actions with others, at the same time there is an extent to which these interactions are beyond our control" (2010, p. 54). This is not only in the retelling of stories we do not remember, but also in the complexities of our relationships with others. For example, a person's identity as a brother depends on his relationships with his siblings. "Within these relationships we develop and form as people, and we take on responsibilities, which affect our actions and make us who we are" (Masterton et al., 2010, p. 342).

In summary, if we understand identity as something more than sameness—as a combination of sameness and selfhood, where selfhood is expressed through a narrative, then narra-tives are imperative in conveying who we are to ourselves and to others. Our narrative identities are not fixed identities, but are essentially fluid; they can change depending upon what stories we decide to tell about ourselves and/or what stories others tell about us. "By telling our story, our identity is created and re-created," and selfhood begins to depend upon "the narrative in the creation and maintenance of personal identity" (Masterton et al. 2010, p. 342). Thus, when someone says "you're not the person I once knew" or "I'm not who I once was," identity in terms of sameness remains intact while something has changed in terms of selfhood. A different story is being told that perhaps does not correlate with a story that was told in the past. This can be due to a genuine change in selfhood, where values and character have changed or evolved over time. Or, it can be the result of self-deception or false narratives, which will be explored in Part III.

II. Narrative Identity and Happiness

Narrative identity plays a significant role in happiness and living a happy life.2 To begin, I think most would readily accept that people aim to live a life that they are happy with. "Happiness is among our most basic motives, and as a dimension of good lives it is interwoven with meaning, moral decency, authenticity, and self-fulfillment" (Martin 2009, p. 29). In "Happily Self-Deceived," Mike W. Martin establishes the notion of a genuinely valuable life as one that reflects happiness based on rationality, moral decency, and is rooted in honesty. The happiness we seek is a reflection of our values and desires, and conversely, our values and desires are a reflection of what makes us happy. This all becomes actualized through narrative identity and expression of a narrative. Of course not every component of one's narrative is "happy" or "good," but when we assess whether we are living a happy life, "it involves evaluating and valuing (affirming) our lives—in their entirety or in large segments" (Martin 2009, p. 33).

Let us consider an example of narrative identity to see its relation to happiness and values. In expressing a narrative that includes being a student pursuing a graduate degree in Philosophy, I am expressing more than mere biographical facts; I am conveying to myself and to others that I am a person who values knowledge and education. I believe achieving a graduate degree will contribute to my life in a positive manner despite any challenges it may pose. Essentially, it will contribute to what I believe constitutes a happy life for me in the grand scheme of things. Otherwise, it would be self-defeating to pursue a goal that does not contribute to my overall well-being. My narrative thus reflects who I am in terms of particular values that I find important (e.g., knowledge, education, intelligence, etc.) and, subsequently, what I believe will make me happy.

In a different (perhaps more simplistic) sense, we also tell narratives that directly or indirectly imply how good we are at something, how strong we are, how smart we are, etc. If I say I can run a mile in less than six minutes, I am conveying that I am

a person who believes running a mile in less than six minutes is a good thing and perhaps that I value being physically fit. I have gone to certain lengths to train and to be capable of running a mile in less than six minutes. Again, it would be self-defeating to pursue a goal that does not contribute to my overall well-being. So, I must believe that running a mile in less than six minutes will contribute to my happiness in some way, even if it's merely for bragging rights. What if I can't really run a mile in less than six minutes? Is there any harm in falsely believing or expressing to others that I am more physically fit than I truly am? I have expressed a particular achievement (running a mile in less than six minutes) via my narrative, yet I have not truly attained this achievement nor am I the physically fit individual I claim to be.

Returning to the prior example, what if I were pursuing a graduate degree in Philosophy merely because I think it will make my parents proud? I express a narrative that implies achieving a graduate degree in Philosophy is what *I* want and is *my* desire, but in reality my desire is merely to make my parents proud. In this case, I am falsely expressing that the values motivating me to achieve a graduate degree are that of knowledge, education, intelligence, etc., when in actuality I am motivated by making my parents proud. I still find happiness in making my parents proud, but am I being true to who I am and what I want and desire? Perhaps there exists some other goal that would bring me greater happiness. If happiness is achieved in either case and it is merely a difference in the degree of happiness, is there any harm in continuing to pursue a graduate degree in Philosophy to make my parents proud? To answer these questions, I will now examine the notions of self-deception and false narratives.

III. Self-Deception and False Narratives

In "Identity, Self-Awareness, and Self-Deception: Ethical Implications for Leaders and Organizations," Cam Caldwell claims (without argument) that we often engage in self-deception *unknowingly* and *unintentionally*. However, I would assert that when

people engage in self-deception it is *knowingly* and *intentionally* because of the relation between narrative identity and happiness. I think people generally want to believe that they are happy with their lives or that they are at least on the path to happiness. As mentioned in Part II, happiness is one of our most basic motives and this motive to attain happiness would then lead some people to commit "purposeful evasion in the form of willful ignorance, self-pretense, selectively highlighting and downplaying evidence according to what [they] want to believe, and relying on others to support [their] hopes and favored self-image" (Martin 2009, p. 30). Now, despite this point of disagreement, Caldwell mentions an amenable description of self-deception "as one of many ego defense mechanisms that enable[s] one to maintain self-esteem and the continuity of one's identity… Self-deception is a warping of perception that elevates a distorted view of reality and self-interest above the desire for truth" (2009, pp. 396–397).

Given this notion of self-deception, we can see how it correlates to false narratives in the sense that people not only become self-deceived, but in turn express false narratives to themselves and to others. False narratives are expressed in order to gain or maintain an idea of happiness and, ultimately, a positive conception of the self. Self-deception and false narratives can be common occurrences in everyday life, as isolated incidents or as a habit that carries on for a period of time. We are currently living in a generation where social media and networking via the internet are at the forefront of daily interactions for many people. How often do you log into something like Facebook to find status updates reflecting how perfect and happy everyone's life seems to be? Perfect family, perfect spouse, perfect job, entirely self-confident and living a happy life each and everyday for 1,500 friends to see. In American society today, "people are pressured to be upbeat, optimistic, and happy" because "overt displays of anxiety project weakness and vulnerability" (Martin 2009, pp. 34-35). So, self-deception and false narratives become the mechanisms employed to support each individual's idea of happiness and positive conception of the self. False narratives are thus an expression of how some want

to perceive themselves and/or how they want others to perceive them, with the underlying motivation being happiness.

Some may lie about where they grew up, how much money they earn, how strong they are, how intelligent they are, etc. Some may tell narratives that falsely reflect how generous, compassionate, or dedicated they are. In this latter sense, we get a false understanding of who they are in relation to other people or organizations. As mentioned in Part I, we are not the sole authors of our narratives and some facets of our identity depend on interpersonal relations. Generosity, compassion, and dedication are often connected to actions performed toward others. Take for example donating to charity or commitment to one's spouse. A person may be applauded by an organization for large donations, but would we say s/he is truly a generous person if we knew s/he donates merely for a tax break? Another person may be esteemed as a devoted spouse, but would we say s/he is truly a dedicated person if we knew s/he had been unfaithful? In both cases, narratives may be told that generate happiness and reflect positive conceptions of the self—e.g., happiness in being admired as a generous person or happiness in being viewed as a dedicated spouse. Yet, any evidence that falsifies these conceptions would result in narratives becoming expressions of how a person *wants* to perceive her/himself and/or how s/he wants others to perceive her/him.

Now, are there situations in which self-deception and false narratives can be viewed as beneficial? Could we arguably say that self-deception and false narratives "contribute to the production of better mood, better popularity, better ability to care for others, creativity, productivity, resilience from stress, and ultimately happiness"? (Van Leeuwen 2009, p. 107). If someone expresses that they are better, stronger, smarter, financially successful, etc., when there is evidence to the contrary, they can still benefit from these false expressions. Take for example someone interviewing for a job he wishes to obtain. During the interview he presents or tells a narrative that reflects himself as someone more intelligent and experienced than he truly is. He is able to convince the interviewer of this and is hired for the job. Despite there having

been more qualified applicants, the newly hired employee is still capable of performing his job functions to a certain extent. He has thus benefited from self-deception and/or a false narrative in that he secured the position he wanted and the job will provide him with financial security. At what point do self-deception and false narratives become detrimental to the pursuit of happiness?

In the aforementioned example, the interviewee lied (or perhaps *believed*) that he was more qualified and experienced than he truly is. It's highly probable that he will be given a task that he cannot complete. Potential employers ask about knowledge and experience that they know will be required of the position they are seeking to fill. For example, if an employer requires knowledge of Microsoft Excel, it is very likely that the employee will be given a task involving Microsoft Excel. So, if the interviewee is lacking in knowledge or experience, the odds of encountering a job duty he cannot perform will increase depending on the degree to which he is self-deceived and/or has expressed a false narrative. Once presented with the task, it will likely result in a feeling of personal failure and disappointment. The happiness previously achieved will have been in vain. Moreover, the new employer will discover the truth and feel betrayed, losing trust in the newly hired employee, and potentially terminate his employment. Again, this would result in a feeling of disappointment and failure while affecting interpersonal relations. As Caldwell states, "the consequence of self-deception is to deny truth and create a reality that masks one's identity, destroys trust, erodes relationships, and ultimately diminishes the quality of one's life" (2009, pp. 397–398).

What if the self-deception or false narrative is never exposed for the newly hired employee? It seems that the employer required knowledge and experience that must not have been applicable to the position. However, there is still a sense in which the employee's self-deception and false narrative will have an effect on his happiness. By not being realistic about his knowledge and experience, the employee does not allow himself to make an honest assessment of his abilities and attempt to achieve the greater sense of knowledge and experience he knows is valuable. This point

is made more explicit when considering self-deception and false narratives concerning a child's intellectual abilities. A parent may be self-deceived or express a false narrative for their child that implies the child is smarter than he truly is. As Van Leeuwen states in "Self-Deception Won't Make You Happy," "although one can't change a person's native intellectual gifts, having an accurate assessment of the intellectual abilities of a child is needed for finding him the kind of help needed for his fullest possible development" (2009, pp. 122–123). In both cases, the employee and the parent are aware of a level of knowledge and intelligence that is valuable, yet self-deception and false narratives prevent the employee and the child from reaching that level. Arguably, a greater sense of happiness could be achieved through attaining greater knowledge and intelligence than what is currently possessed by the employee or the child. Self-deception and false narratives have become an expression of how the employee wants to perceive himself and how the parent wants to perceive his/her child, but neither is an accurate reflection of reality.

Returning to the examples in Part II, my pursuit of a graduate degree in Philosophy seems that it will result in happiness regardless, and any self-deception or false narrative would merely impact the degree of happiness. Either, I achieve a goal I truly want or I achieve a goal I know will make my parents proud. Although self-deception and false narratives can bring positive or beneficial results, they ultimately block a sense of reality that prevents us from finding true happiness. If I am pursuing a graduate degree in Philosophy merely to make my parents proud, I am not allowing myself to pursue and achieve a goal that could bring about greater happiness. We may not be the sole authors of our narratives, but we are the supreme benefactors. Yes, the narrative identities of others may be interwoven with ours, but who benefits most from our individual narratives than ourselves? I would benefit more from a narrative that reflects the greatest amount of happiness for me, as well as the strongest values and desires I hold. I value making my parents proud, but a genuinely valuable life will reflect happiness and values that have the strongest and

greatest impact on my own well-being.

With the more simplistic example in Part II, I falsely believe or assert that I can run a mile in less than six minutes. I believe this feat is in some way good and contributes to my happiness. However, this does not change the facts (that I cannot run a mile in less than six minutes) nor does it allow me to accept reality and attempt to achieve a greater level of physical fitness. My bragging rights are not rooted in truth and will come crumbling down with a simple stopwatch challenge, leaving me with a feeling of failure and disappointment. Even if no one were to ever challenge my assertion, have I truly achieved happiness? Martin would say I have not achieved happiness because my assertion is not authentic in terms of accurate information about the world (2009, p. 42). I may say that I can run a mile in less than six minutes, but if in actuality I can't, any happiness derived from my false assertion is inauthentic. As Martin states, "most of us want happiness that is authentic and rooted in a sense of meaning that is authentic" (2009, p. 41).

The notion of inauthentic happiness can also apply to more meaningful cases in which self-deception and false narratives have been employed. Although we may feel happy by engaging in self-deception or presenting false narratives, we have not truly achieved those things we falsely assert and cannot be said to have achieved authentic happiness. At most, we have achieved a psychological state or feeling of happiness, but most people desire happiness that accurately reflects values and desires. Inauthentic happiness derived from self-deception and false narratives could be equated to "permanently enter[ing] an experience machine by becoming blobs attached to neuron-stimulating electrodes" (Martin 2009, p. 42). The machine, like self-deception and false narratives, may be able to convince us that we *feel* happy and are happy with our lives, but this would not be authentic happiness derived from real-life, lived experiences.

IV. The Ethics of Narratives

We have a general moral duty to be honest and tell the truth to ourselves and to others in interpersonal relations. In regards to the latter, truth is what allows for successful and effective communication. A great example of this is education. We make the assumption that a teacher or professor is well-versed in the subject s/he teaches and that s/he presents information and ideas in a truthful and honest manner. As Louis M. Guenin states in "Intellectual Honesty," "Scholarship is one of our most sophisticated arenas of trusting public communication" (2005, p. 184). Education and genuine knowledge are only possible when there exists a dimension of truth. "It is overwhelmingly clear that what is false cannot be known" (Steup 2008, para. 2).

The notion of honesty as a general moral duty can be further developed in terms of self-respect and respect for others. As Guenin writes, "that we humans are all free and equal beings places upon everyone the demand that, when professing, they accord respect to everyone else" (2005, p. 188). We must not misuse our capacity to communicate and must therefore be honest in *all* communications, toward the self and toward others. Guenin makes this point clear by considering a particular formulation of Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative.[3] Guenin writes:

> The second form of the categorical imperative commands thus: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.'… To lie is to violate this formula of humanity. In lying, an agent misuses the agent's human capacity to communicate, employing that capacity for an end other than the capacity's natural truthful purpose. Lying also renders an agent an object of contempt in the eyes of others. In both these respects, the agent violates what Kant asserts as a duty to respect oneself. The agent veritably throws away the dignity of humanity in the agent's own person (Guenin 2005, pp. 184–185).

Given the general moral duty of honesty or truthfulness, expression of our individual narrative identities should align with this duty. That is, if we have a general moral duty to tell the truth, abiding by this duty would require that we be honest in all facets of life and should thus tell true narratives concerning who we are. Moreover, there is an obligation to tell true stories that impact the narratives of others. "Since the stories we tell create identities, we are also responsible for these stories. We are all bound by the duty to tell 'what actually happened'" (Masterton et al. 2010, p. 344). Again, this can be taken under the notion of truthfulness involving respect for the self and respect for others. We are not the sole authors of our narratives, so our goal is to maintain respect for the self and for others while establishing authentic identities for all.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In telling our own narratives, we aim for an authentic sense of self-knowledge. To know who we truly are and to achieve goals that reflect our strongest values, desires, and greatest sense of happiness, we need to believe and express narratives that are accurate reflections of reality (i.e., narratives that are true). Likewise, in order for others to know who we truly are and to establish and maintain interpersonal relationships, it is imperative that we convey true narratives. Granted, people change over time, not only physically, but in terms of selfhood as well. Our values and character may change or evolve throughout life creating a different sense of selfhood and, therefore, different narratives. As mentioned in Part I, our narrative identities are not fixed identities, but are essentially fluid. However, any changes to our narratives must be rooted in truth for ourselves and for others to continue to learn and know who we truly are.

Discovering our true selves sometimes requires that we accept information that seems to detract from happiness. However, in recognizing and accepting reality for what it is, we can move forward to achieve a greater sense of happiness; to achieve the individual narrative that conveys how we *want* to perceive

ourselves and how we want others to perceive us. "Making the commitment to explore the inner reaches of our hearts and minds allows us to be true to ourselves and enables us to honor the duties we owe to self, others, and the society in which we live" (Caldwell 2009, p. 403).

In the end, self-deception or false narratives are not beneficial in getting to know who we truly are nor do they help us in achieving our goals, what we value, and ultimately, authentic happiness. Just as we are the supreme benefactors of our narratives, we also stand to lose the most by being self-deceived and/ or in conveying false narratives. When we finally choose to face reality, or reality inadvertently confronts us with the facts, self-deception and false narratives will likely result in feelings of disappointment or failure. This feeling of disappointment could stem from a mere realization that a greater amount of happiness could have been achieved throughout one's life by being honest. Self-deception and false narratives should be taken as fictional stories, detached from reality and incapable of telling the *true* story of who we are. Rather than engaging in self-deception, false narratives, and merely telling a fictional story, why not make those stories a reality? As the saying goes, don't just talk about it, be about it. Although reality may limit what we are capable of achieving and thus limits the identity we can establish for ourselves, what we do achieve will be authentic and rooted in truth.

Notes

1. The notions of identity as *idem* and as *ipse* are further explicated in Part I. For more, see Dauenhauer and Pellauer (2011).

2. This paper focuses on "happiness" as a value term rather than a description of a psychological state. Happiness in this sense is considered subjective where each individual pursues different things in life that s/he believes will make him or her happy or constitute living a happy life.

3. For more on Immanuel Kant and his Categorical Imperative, see Johnson (2010).

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THE NORMATIVE QUESTION: WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL?

Samuel Chen

Morality is often seen as a universally prescriptive code of conduct; while there is much deliberation about what form this code of conduct should take, a philosophical consideration not nearly entertained as much is what would *motivate* us to follow this code of conduct. Why should I be moral? This meta-ethical question arises without needing to necessarily refer to any normative ethical theory. That is, in the same way we don't need to necessarily discuss the merits of utilitarianism versus Kantianism when critically evaluating meta-ethical considerations of moral realism, the same applies for the question of normativity in morality. What makes normative motivation so intriguing, and in particular *moral* motivation, is that there seems to be something either innate or closely bound with normative judgments in comparison to mathematical or empirical judgments. I can confidently ascertain the capabilities of a newly created poison, but what I decide to do (i.e., what I am motivated to do) is in some significant sense distinct from the initial judgment I made. What, then, could account for the glaring explanatory gap for why we ought to be moral? The philosopher Christine Korsgaard undertook the task of answering this question from a Kantian slant, and dubbed the problem as "the normative question," (Korsgaard 1996, p. 10) which I will be using as a reference. In her book *The Sources of Normativity*, she uses a finely written example of an evolutionary theory of morality as an explanation of what the normative question is truly asking of us. I quote at length:

> To see this, consider a nice stark example. Suppose someone proposes a moral theory which gives morality a genetic basis… [now] this theory, if it could be proved,

would give an account of our moral motives which was adequate from the point of view of explanation. Our moral instincts would have the same basis and so the same kind of power as the sexual drive and the urge to care for and defend our children… [but] now ask yourself whether, if *you* believed this theory, it would be adequate from *your own* point of view. Suppose morality demands that you yourself make a serious sacrifice like giving up your life, or hurting someone that you love (Korsgaard 1996, pp. 14–15).

That, in essence, is the normative question. While explanations of morality from a second or third-person perspective are probably insightful (perhaps in ways more relevant than simply being tangential), the crux of the issue is the *first-person justification*. I am concerned with the moral psychology behind the normative question—what could motivate us to abide by morality when at times it calls on us to go through torturous circumstances? If any moral system wants to be at least reasonably effective, it would need to be accompanied by a grounded moral motivator or it would lose most of its practical grip on actual human affairs.

The first task is to dissect the normative question and be precise with what it specifically means. A literal reading of the question may betray some of the hidden intent, albeit in a somewhat fuzzy manner for the sake of simplicity and catchiness. A clearer phrasing is "why should I be moral in every situation possible?" This brings up the crucial concepts and conditions of "should" and "every situation reasonably possible." The latter condition of "every situation reasonably possible" implies that a moral agent can physically bring about the appropriate events to satisfy whatever moral obligations they hold, given that if an agent can't physically do X it would be peculiar to find him guilty of not doing X. As for the condition of "every," it may be more controversial, but there does seem to be a sense in which most, if not all, moral theories have the hidden premise of suggesting that the morally ideal agent would consistently abide by the rules.

Whether or not the premise requiring consistent fulfillment be without exception, at the very least, a weakened form of reasonable possibility remains intact. Concerning the former condition of "should," it seems blatantly obvious that a moral reason can't be substituted in the formula to answer the proposed problem, as this would be circular. If one were to analyze this from a morally normative viewpoint, the sentence would be translated to be asking, "Morally, why should I be moral?" and that seems to be trivial. Commonly it is said that acting morally would bring about the 'good life,' and result in equality and justice for generations of humans. Yet, flowery descriptions such as these serve as nothing more than red herrings since the terms "equality," "justice," and even "good life," are morally impregnated concepts. In what sense of equality do we mean that is in non-moral terms, and if we have one in mind would that even be relevant? What could a non-moral conception of justice possibly be? And what in the world could the "good life" mean, beyond a vague description of a positive aggregate of happiness in one's life, or simply a cryptic rewording of a "morally virtuous life." It's apparent this frame of reference is incoherent.

The alternative that seems sensible to many would take into account the reasons for one's own interests—in other words, *prudential reasons*. It is clear that there is a plethora of prudential reasons that can be proposed to explain why one ought to be moral in certain situations, for these reasons often coincide. If I am morally obligated to help my fellow citizen who happens to be homeless by working my free hours at the soup kitchen, there wouldn't be any problem of justification if I have a coincidental prudential reason of wanting to feel a sense of accomplishment when I hand out the free food (or more shamelessly, to impress my female coworker who just so happens to be incredibly attractive). The issue materializes when we consider cases where a moral obligation is *without a coincidental prudential one*—there is a lack of harmony. Plato's famous tale of the Ring of Gyges represents a quintessential allegory in the relevant philosophical literature, in which the basic question is what one would do if they

not only didn't have a reason to act morally in a specific situation, but if they actually had independent prudential reasons to commit unjust acts and reap the benefits.

The example of business ethics plays a relevant part in this part of the discussion, as many corporations conveniently represent a modern day Gyges as they get away with morally ambiguous and nefarious deeds through various administrative tactics for a great economic benefit. The challenge of the practical moral skeptic becomes illuminated; as businesses can steadfastly challenge any necessary moral binding, as history has shown prudential reasons that act in conflict with moral reasons can still result in economic benefits. Some have argued that morality pays, and businesses ought to conduct their operations morally since there are even prudential reasons to—namely ensuring consumer confidence and healthy business/community relationships. Virtue ethics-esque approaches that incorporate a broad, general character solution to answering the problem found in business ethics (and analogously the general moral question initially posed) go to some lengths in answering some situations that initially seem to be empty of any prudential reason. Considerations along the lines of focusing on the intentions and not on goals manifest in several ways, one of the notable ways being the supposed "hedonistic paradox," (Corvino 2006, p. 3) which states, "the more people consciously seek pleasure the less likely they are to find it. Instead, pleasure is best achieved as the effect of other things consciously sought… to put more generally, there are some goals that are best achieved by not focusing on the goal itself" (Corvino 2006, p. 3). And indeed, there is some truth to this from a brute, folk psychological point of view (though no doubt there is grounding empirical data to show the same conclusion as well).

Somewhat along the same lines comes the philosopher David Gauthier, whose contribution in political theory culminates in his neo-Hobbesian contractarianism that champions the premise that everyone is better off if everyone acts morally (a contractarian system). An enlightened form of self-interest grounds his ethical position, in which he argues we ought to give up straight-

forward maximization and instead adopt constrained maximization of prudential values. Straightforward maximization is what it sounds like, an attitude of disregarding the preferences of others and solely acting in a narrow self-interest. Constrained maximization is restrained and restricted in accommodation to the subjective preferences of others. His end conception is that we endorse a form of means-end reasoning. He bases this off game theory, and we can see where Hobbes' tale of the state of nature becomes applicable. He appeals to the famous Prisoner Dilemma, a staple of game theory, to represent his idea of morality by agreement. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides a succinct summary:

> According to the story of the Prisoner's Dilemma, two people have been brought in for questioning, conducted separately, about a crime they are suspected to have committed. The police have solid evidence of a lesser crime that they committed, but need confessions in order to convict them on more serious charges. Each prisoner is told that if she cooperates with the police by informing on the other prisoner, then she will be rewarded by receiving a relatively light sentence of one year in prison, whereas her cohort will go to prison for ten years. If they both remain silent, then there will be no such rewards, and they can each expect to receive moderate sentences of two years. And if they both cooperate with police by informing on each other, then the police will have enough to send each to prison for five years. The dilemma then is this: in order to serve her own interests as well as possible, each prisoner reasons that no matter what the other does she is better off cooperating with the police by confessing. Each reasons: "If she confesses, then I should confess, thereby being sentenced to five years instead of ten. And if she does not confess, then I should confess, thereby being sentenced to one year instead of two. So, no matter what she does, I should confess."
> The problem is that when each reason this way, they each

confess, and each goes to prison for five years. However, had they each remained silent, thereby cooperating with each other rather than with the police, they would have spent only two years in prison (Friend 2004).

Gauthier claims that we ought to be constrained maximizers, based on the notion that if we aim to serve our self-interest, one does better if he cooperates with others. This provides the theoretical groundwork for Gauthier's brand of contractarianism. He believes that both agents would rationally come to the conclusion that they both ought not to confess, and do so by attempting to reach the optimal benefit from cooperation. For Gauthier, there is no sovereign or Leviathan as Hobbes would believe, but rather we would have internalized the rules of rationality to sustain the social contract in lieu of a Leviathan.

However, where overarching approaches such as this may go to large lengths in answering most dilemmas, it doesn't resolve the hard cases in which a particular act at a particular moment can be easily argued in favor of prudential, morally conflicting reasons. The businessman can confide in his wife that he has run his operations to the highest moral standards for several decades, but argue that in this one instance he had overriding reasons to commit a single morally unjust act for unusually robust profits. Thus, behind the screen of a business ethics strategy that "morality pays," or a Gauthier-style contractarian ideal that morality and prudence have an intimate relationship, the businessman wouldn't ultimately be concerned.

That is how an issue emerges for a general trend among certain ethical proposals that attempt to deal with the problem of what necessary reason there can be to always act morally. It may be empirically true that adopting a quasi-Aristotelian character is conductive of prudential reasons as well, or following the neo-Hobbesian contractarian position of Gauthier is most prudent if we have constrained maximization most of the time. The glaring problem is that this can't account for every empirically possible case, and it isn't as if such occurrences were uncommon in the

actual world. Rule bending and rule benders have continued to exist without a clear prudential solution. This isn't to say that the problem of practical moral skepticism can't be solved definitely, but it would seem rather bleak to attempt to meet this issue with a prudentially inspired approach.

The last broad approach to answering the normative question stems from a Kantian tradition of constructing morality from reason. Kantians such as Alan Gewirth and Christine Korsgaard uphold the common interpretation of Kant as supposedly demonstrating that everyone has a reason to be moral, and to be immoral would be *rationally inconsistent*. Something about our nature as rational agents binds us, and commits us, to be morally motivated. In particular, according to this line of thinking the source of normativity can be found "in the agent's own will" (Shaver 2006, p. 335)—even Kant seems to suggest that reflection and conquering our animalistic inclinations by choosing reason allows us to discover and be reinforced with the voice of reason.

But as to what has been hinted at before, the Kantian approach fails on the condition of motivation. This is where Kant fails and neo-Hobbesianism excels, as the latter relies on a thoroughly (though not necessarily) naturalistic outlook. The constructivist meta-ethical picture is appealing as a potential candidate for the normative question, as it doesn't rely on queer notions of platonic moral values or issues of moral properties being reducible to natural properties. Rather, its ontological status is much more believable, being nothing more than "a biologically and culturally transmitted set of behavioral constraints" (Campbell 1988, p. 344). Brian K. Powell's criticism of Korsgaard's Kantian formulation presses the issue of what is required to be an adequate answer on the normative question. Powell is apt to drive the point about logical consistency being an inadequate moral motivator—it's too rigid and more akin to a "requirement of inescapability" (Powell 2006, p. 543) rather than substantive motivation.

> If our answer to the normative question is going to be more than an intellectual exercise, then it needs to provide a

reason to be moral that is could motivate a person to do the right thing even at the price of significant hardship… [can] you imagine a person who risks losing his job, or house, or life, because he does not want to be inconsistent? A person who suffers great hardship for the sake of consistency is likely to look like a mentally deranged person more than a moral exemplar (Powell 2006, p. 543).

The normative question is in many respects a deeply intimate question when properly understood. As discussed, attempts to disregard it by referring to moralistic terms commit a category mistake. Relying on game theoretic, neo-Hobbesianism is motivated by a strict prisoner dilemma setup, but such ideal conditions aren't always the case in reality. Finally, solutions meant to resolve it by relying on Kantian logical consistency blindly misses the heart of the puzzle—we can't have a proposed solution that is devoid of psychological underpinnings as there is a plethora of people who can disregard the supposed grandeur Kantians place on logical consistency in grounding moral normativity. A sufficient answer to the normative question seems currently out of grasp, and while I ultimately conclude that none of the proposals are satisfactory, they do present interesting approaches to solving the problem. Notably, Gauthier's neo-Hobbesianism extends a convincing advancement by acknowledging the existential nature of the normative question. If the answer can be reduced to a basic motive to fulfill one's desires, the aforementioned constrained maximization, then there is something undeniably appealing about that on more than intuitive grounds. Granted the end result would not likely be as reduced and atomic as stated, but the spirit of the idea remains promising.

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MASTER OF THE ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY
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Each of the student contributors was specially selected to submit a paper for this issue of *Philosophy in Practice* by one or more faculty members in the Department of Philosophy at California State University, Los Angeles. All writers are currently either students in the master's program of philosophy or undergraduate majors in philosophy. All philosophy students at California State University, Los Angeles are eligible for nomination, and those who were chosen to contribute have demonstrated a superior ability to develop and compose works of advanced philosophical writing.

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