

POETICS AND UNDERSTANDING SUGGESTION

Vedika Mati Hurdoyal Chekhori*

Abstract: In the history of Indian literary criticism (alaṅkāraśāstra) two texts have made significant contributions to the Indian Aesthetics; Dhvanyāloka by Ānandavardhana and Locana, a commentary on the first text by Abhinavagupta. Both the texts have influenced all the Indian critics of Sanskrit directly or indirectly. One of the major contributions of Ānandavardhana is that he includes emotive and other associative meanings under linguistic meaning. (Kane, 2015: 154-90) As a result the theories of primary and secondary meaning which were developed by Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas were further developed by the poetics. It is noteworthy that Ānandavardhana was influenced by Bhartr̥hari, the promulgator of the sphoṭa theory, Ānandavardhana therefore emphasized the importance of taking the whole utterance as a significant unitary linguistic symbol. He had also shown that the meaning of an utterance depends on contextual factors, and that the logical interpretation of the sentence-meaning on the basis of the individual word-meanings is defective in many cases. He also advanced that at times the meaning of the whole utterance is different from what the individual words indicate. Influenced by Bhartr̥hari, Ānandavardhana developed his theory of language, however, his attempt was limited to poetic meaning.

I. Concept of Vyañjanā

Ānandavardhana's understanding is an attempt to specify the nature of language and the way it operates. His aim has been to enlighten the aesthetic sense in men, who are open and perceptive to the finer aspects of language. *R̥gveda* (R̥gveda, X.71.4) distinguishes between the man who understands only the literal meaning of a poem and the man who looks more into the deeper significance of the passage than to the meanings of words therein; the former "sees, but does not see;" he hears but does not hear; it is only to the latter that speech "reveals herself completely, like a loving wife to her husband." (Raja, 1963: 278) Yet another example from *R̥gveda* (R̥gveda, X.71.2) states that great poets select their words, winnowing away the chaff from the grain', and only men of equal scholarship and literary taste can fully appreciate their poems. (Gardiner, 1932: 6) Ānandavardhana accepts the standard division of speech utterances into sentences and words, into stems and suffixes, and the distinction between the primary and the transferred or metaphorical sense of words (*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*). (Raja, 1963: 279) In addition to these, he postulates a third potency of language which he calls 'the capacity to suggest a meaning other than its literal meaning. (Borough, 1953: 173) This suggestive power of language is called *vyañjanā*. His main contention is that utterances possess literal meaning, and can also convey a further meaning, the 'socio-cultural meaning,' which includes everything other than the literal meaning. And under the term 'meaning' is included not only the

* VEDIKA MATI HURDOYAL CHEKHORI, Head, School of Indological Studies, MGI, Mauritius, E-mail vedika.hudoyal@gmail.com.

information conveyed, but also the emotion induced; this naturally necessitates the assumption of suggestive power of language. For even the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas cannot argue that the emotions induced by language are brought about by the literal power of the words. Again, he does not confine himself to the words and sentences as indicators of meaning but includes all the contextual factors, the intonation, stress, gestures and even the pure sounds used in the utterance, as well as the literal sense, as indicators of the full meaning of an utterance. Not only the expressive symbols (*vācakas*), but the indicative signs (*bodhakas*) like gestures also form part of language. Ānandavardhana is concerned only with poetic language, and therefore, omits many of these elements of speech from his field of observation. His primary concern is with the suggestion of elements that are of aesthetic value. Though *vyañjanā*, in the broadest sense of the term, embraces all such elements, it is only in its restricted sense as applied to poetry that Ānandavardhana studies this problem. His aim is to establish the doctrine of *dhvani*, which means *vyañjanā* applied to poetry.

II. Concept of Dhvani and Criticisms against the Dhvani Theory

Referring to Bhartṛihari's terminology, it can be said that it is not only the *prākṛta dhvani* or the normal sound patterns which reveal the linguistic sign (*sphoṭa*), but even the *vaiṅṛta dhvani* or the individual modifications of the sound may have an important role in speech activity. Thus, we have to include in language, 'even the set of derivations from the norm of the sound segments that signal the meaning of the speaker is drunk, the whispering of an utterance which signals the meaning that the content of it is secret, and the unusual distribution that is the cue to a metaphor. (Fries, 1954:67) The voice of the speaker can indicate whether it is a man or a woman, a child or a grown up person and can give even the identity of the speaker to those who know the voice of the speaker. He is concerned only with the poetic language, and therefore, omits many of these elements of speech from his field of observation. He is concerned only with the suggestion of elements that are of aesthetic value. Though *vyañjanā*, in the broadest sense of the term, embraces all such elements, it is only in its restricted sense as applied to poetry that Ānandavardhana studies the problem. His aim is to establish the doctrine of *dhvani*, which is referred to as *vyañjanā* applied to poetry. He borrows this term from the grammarians; in the same way as the sounds of utterances (*dhvani*) reveal the integral linguistic sign (*sphoṭa*), so also a good poem with its sound, as well as the literal sense, reveals, over and above the literal sense, a charming sense which has immense aesthetic value. Based on this, the term *dhvani* is applied to suggestive poetry when the suggested sense predominates over the literal sense. The term is also used to denote the suggested sense or the function of suggestion. Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka*, establishes his theory that suggestion is the soul of poetry.¹ According to him, there are two kinds of aesthetic ideas in a poetry; (i) literal (*vācya*) (ii) Implied (*pratīyama*). In the example of a beautiful girl the implied meaning may refer to the charm in a girl which is distinct from the beauty of the various parts of the body; this implied sense is

¹ *kāvyaśāstram dhvaniḥ: Dhvanyāloka*. p.2.

something more than the literal meaning which depends on the whole poem, and not merely on its parts.² The expressed sense is invariably an idea or a figure of speech; but the suggested sense may be of three kinds: an idea, a figure of speech, or an emotion. This suggested sense is not understood by those who merely know grammar and lexicon; it is understood only by men of taste who know the essence of poetry.³ This particular suggested sense is the most important element in poetry; in fact it is the soul of poetry whereby, words and their literal meanings occupy a subordinate position and suggest some charming sense (an idea, a figure of speech or an emotion) and it is called *dhvani*, which is said to be the highest type of poetry. In fact the doctrine of *dhvani* is only an extension of the *rasa* theory propounded by the ancient sage *Bharata*, according to which the main object of the dramatic work is to rouse aesthetic emotion (*rasa*) (Kane, 2015: 350) in the audience. Unlike his predecessors, Ānandavardhana has systematically dealt with the *rasa* theory and also extended it to poetry. He justifies that there is no conflict at all between the theory of *dhvani* and the theory of *rasa*; the former stresses the method of treatment, whereas the latter deals with the ultimate effect. Hence, suggestion by itself is not enough in drama or poetry; what is suggested must be charming, and this charm can come only through *rasa* or emotion. The emotion is not something which can be expressed directly by the words, it can only be suggested. A study of the *rasa* theory will be conducive to a better understanding of poetic language cognition. Basically, the theory of *rasa* emanates from the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. *Rasa* as an aesthetic experience is said to emanate from the combination of permanent and dominant emotional mood (*sthāyibhāva*), with the objects of emotion such as the hero and the heroine, causes such as flowers, moonlight and alike (*vibhāvas*), external manifestations of emotion such as the movement of the eyebrows, glances, smile (*anubhāvas*) and accessory moods (*vyabhicāribhāva*). In the same vein, Bharata mentions eight dominant emotional moods which produce eight different *rasa* namely: 1. Love (*rati*) - *śṛṅgāra*; 2. Laughter (*hāsa*) - *hāsyā*; 3. Sorrow (*śoka*) - *karuṇā*; 4. Anger (*krodha*) - *raudra*; 5. Energy (*utsāha*) - *vīra*; 6. Fear (*bhaya*) - *bhayānaka*; 7. Repugnance (*jugupsā*) - *bībhatsa*, 8. Wonder (*vismaya*) - *adbhuta*, Later the ninth *rasa* was added called *śanta* derived from detachment (*nirveda*).

Interestingly, Bharata's process of *rasa* realization is differently interpreted by different scholars. Naiyāyikas consider *rasa* to be a matter of inference. However, Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of the enjoyment of *rasa* lays stress on the subjective aspect of *rasa* as the aesthetic experience of the spectator. He distinguishes poetic language from ordinary language and postulates for the former two functions (1) *bhāvakatva* and (2) *bhojakatva*, in addition to the primary function *abhidhā* (which includes *lakṣaṇā* also). While *bhāvakatva* is the power of universalization, *bhojakatva* is the power by which the *sthāyibhāva* reaches its climax and is enjoyed by the spectators. Abhinavagupta, following Ānandavardhana, maintains that *rasa* is realized through

² Ibid., p.14: *pratīyamānaṃ punar anyad eva vastv asti vāṇīṣu mahākavīnāmYat tatprasiddhāvayavātiriktaṃ vibhāti lāvānyam ivāṅganāsu.*

³ Ibid., p. 29: *śabdārthaśāsanajñānamātreṇaiva na vedyate Vedyate sa hi kāvyārthatattvajñair eva kevalam.*

suggestion. He contends that *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* are dormant in the minds of the spectators and are roused by the stimulus of *vibhāvas* and finally reach the state of *rasa*.⁴ According to him *rasa* is the suggested power of *vyañjanā* and that *rasa* realization is not indescribable. He lies akin with Bhaṭṭanāyaka for whom *bhojakatva* is nothing but suggestion.⁵ More so, he delineates three different psychological stages in the realization of *rasa*. Firstly, it involves the cognition of the formal or intellectual elements of the poem which serves as a means to the second. Secondly, it consists of the idealization of things in poetry or drama by the power of imagination in the reader or spectator. Thirdly, the climax of the inexpressible affective condition of the reader or spectator. The theory of *dhvani* was vehemently criticized by Ālaṃkārikas. The Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas categorically denied the suggestive powers by words. However, later grammarians accepted it as necessary from the perspective of grammar.⁶ The following is an attempt to bring forth the main criticisms raised against the *dhvani* theory in Jayaratha's commentary of *Alaṃkārasarvasva*. (Raja, 1963: 289)

III. Dhvani, Anumāna and Arthāpatti

In their search for accuracy and precision, Naiyāyikas reject *vyañjanā śakti*. Mahimabhaṭṭa in his *Vyaktiviveka* highlighted that *dhvani* comes under inference (*anumāna*).⁷ He contends that the implied sense in literature is always conveyed by the expressed sense through the process of inference itself and that there is no necessity to accept a new potency for words. Anticipating such an objection, Ānandavardhana in the third chapter of *Dhvanyāloka*,⁸ refuted this argument by stating that inference depends on *vyāpti*, however, in literature there is no relation between the primary sense and the suggested sense, and therefore the latter cannot be inferred from the former. The view that *dhvani* is to be included in postulation (*arthāpatti*) is similar to the previous one; for *arthāpatti* is a kind of immediate inference based on the universal relation between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle terms. This is an attempt to define suggestion as impression through suppression. In every speech activity there are three things to be distinguished: expression, suppression and impression. Expression is what the speaker conveys, suppression is what he does not convey, though he might have given it, and impression is what the hearer receives. It is important to notice that an impression is often produced not only by what is said expressly, but also by what is suppressed. Professor Kuppaswami Shastri recommends that this type of suggestion is to be accepted by all schools and that in the case of ordinary sentences, the individual

⁵ *Bhogas tu vyaktih, bhogakṛttvaṃ tu vyañjanād aviśiṣṭam: Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 25.

⁶ *Vaiyākaraṇām apy etatsvīkāra āvasyakaḥ. Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 160.

⁷ *Vyaktiviveka*, I. I: *Anumāne ntarbhāvam sarvasyāpi dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum vyaktivivekaṃ tanute praṇamya mahimā parāṃ vācam*.

⁸ *Vyañjakatvaṃ śabdānāṃ gamakatvaṃ, tac ca liṅgātvaṃ ataḥ ca vyaṅgyapratītir liṅipratītir eveti liṅgibhāva eva teṣāṃ vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāvo nāparaḥ kaścit, Dhvanyāloka*, p. 201.

words give their isolated meanings, leaving the *samsarga* or the mutual relation of words to be conveyed by suppression or suggestion. The Naiyāyikas call this *samsargamaryādā*, while the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas consider it as based on *lakṣanā*.

IV. Dhvani, Lakṣanā and Abhidhā

Certain *Ālamkārikas* like Mukulabhaṭṭa opined that *vyañjanā* could be included under *lakṣanā* itself. He contends that *lakṣanā* refers to all instances where the expressed sense indicates other ideas are included in it, and he says that *dhvani*, propounded as a new doctrine by some literary critics, actually falls within the sphere of *lakṣanā* itself.⁹ However, Ānandavardhana regards this argument as an anti - *dhvani* theory by stressing that *lakṣanā* and *dhvani* differ from each other with regard to their nature and subject matter. *Lakṣanā* operates when there is some kind of inconsistency in the primary sense; it indicates the secondary metaphorical sense after cancelling its primary sense, but in suggestion the primary sense need not be discarded.¹⁰ The Mīmāṃsakas of the Prābhākara School who follow the *anvitābhidhāna* theory of verbal comprehension consider *dhvani* to be included in the primary function *abhidhā* itself; for according to them the meaning of a word is what is conveyed by it. There is no restriction to the scope of the significative force of a word. In a sentence, a word conveys not only its individual meaning, but also its relation to the other words in the sentence. The *samsarga* or the mutual relation of the word-meanings suggested by their juxtaposition in a sentence is also included in the primary meaning itself. In certain contexts, a word may suggest new ideas beyond its normal sense, but all those come under *abhidhā* itself. Just as the range of an arrow can be extended depending on the force with which it is discharged, the meaning of a word can be extended to any length. However, Ānandavardhana refutes this theory from the standpoint of the *abhihitānvaya* theory. The suggested sense cannot be conveyed by the power of *abhidhā*, for it is only the definite conventional sense, which is directly related to word, that is conveyed by *abhidhā*. The power of the primary function of the word is exhausted when this task is performed. (*Sabara-sūtra*, I.I.25) Another function has to be accepted to explain suggested meanings. The primary sense is directly related to the word, but the suggested sense is, at times, known only indirectly through the expressed sense. Moreover, suggestion need not always depend on words; the melody of music, gestures, etc. is suggestive of sense. (*Dhvanyāloka*, 188) .Primary sense of a word can be objectively learned by any one from the lexicon; but the suggested sense in poetry can be fully appreciated only by men of taste. (Ibid.29)

V. Dhvani, Tātparyavṛṭṭi and Vakrokti

Yet another issue about certain *alamkārikas* like Dhanika and Dhanamjaya include *dhvani* under *tātparyavṛṭṭi*, a function of the sentence postulated to explain the verbal

⁹ *lakṣanāmārgāvaghītvam tu dhvaneḥ sahr̥dayair nutanatayopavarnitasya vidyate.*

¹⁰ *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 192.

comprehension arising from a sentence. The direct relation of the word is to its isolated meaning; in a sentence the primary function of the words is exhausted, when the isolated meanings of the individual words are presented. The mutual relation of the isolated word-meanings or *samsarga* as it is called, is not conveyed by the words directly. It is not expressed, it is only suggested. This is done according to them by the *tātparyavṛtī*. The issue is as to whether poetic suggestion can also be included here. It is postulated that *tātparyavṛtī* is used to explain the literal meaning of a sentence, whereas, *vyañjanā* comes at the next stage. The power of the former is exhausted by establishing the logical connection of the word-meanings, and cannot give further suggestions. Abhinavgupta says that when an expression gives its own literal meaning, and in addition suggests some other sense, we cannot regard both these distinct senses as conveyed by the same power. The former proceeds directly from the words while the latter comes from the literal sense. *Tātparya* pertains to the expressed sense, whereas *dhvani* pertains to non-expressive factors also such as music, gesture, etc. Hence, Dhanamjaya and Dhanika oppose the *dhvani* theory and include it under *tātparya*, as per them the power of *tātparya* is not exhausted in giving the logical connection of the word-meanings, but can extend to any length. However, some of the Alamkārikas have accepted *tātparya* almost as synonymous with suggestion. Kuntaka in *Vakroktijīva*, denied the independent existence of *dhvani* and included it under *vakrokti* or 'a striking mode of speech'. His *vakrokti* is all pervading and is almost analogous to *dhvani* itself. Rhetoricians accept three-fold potency in the words: primary (*abhidhā*), secondary (*lakṣaṇā*) and tertiary (*vyañjanā*) and accordingly they interpret three kinds of meanings literal, figurative and implied. Thus, above are the main arguments advanced against the *dhvani* theory. The Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā, do not recognize the suggestive power of words at all. Later, grammarians, however, accept it as necessary from the standpoint of grammar.

VI. Vyañjanā: An Analysis

It is the meaning that comes out when the third force acts on for it and the literal and figurative meaning are not conducive. It is the capacity of suggestiveness of implication which differs from *abhidhā* and *vyañjanā*.¹¹ Let us interpret the example which is analyzed by poetics, an account of which may be given as follows: *Gangāyām Ghoṣaḥ*: Hamlet in the current of water: This is the literal meaning. This literal meaning is not conducive and then the second power *lakṣaṇā* comes forward to operate for the *lakṣaṇārtha* (suggestive meaning) through which we know the 'Hamlet on the bank of the river'. If this meaning is also not conducive to a context, other tertiary force comes into action. For example: If someone expresses the statement *Gangāyām Ghoṣaḥ* in Mauritius, it means neither the literal nor the suggestive. It refers to the implied meaning. This implication is made on the basis of qualities (some or the other) for which the word is literally used, that is, it means that my house is cool and sacred (*sitatva* and *pāvanatva*). Another instance is given by

¹¹ *Virāt svabhidhādayāsu yathārtho bodhyate paraḥ Sā vṛtīḥ vyanjanā nāma śabdasyārthādhikasyaca - Sahitya Darpana, 2/12.*

scholars to understand *vyañjanā*, *Aṣṭā Calam Gatau Surya*: The Sun has set. The literal meaning of the above is very much clear to all with little variations but the figurative meanings, may mean a glorious man has departed; this is by the secondary force *lakṣyārtha śakti*. But when it is taken to mean, it is the proper time to perform. Here in the case of implied meaning, the meaning abandons the expression. *Vyañjanā* acts on when *lakṣaṇā* and *abhidhā* are not *abhidhārtha* and *lakṣaṇārtha* as conducive. It arises from the implication from the primary meaning of the language. According to poetics, there is an order which means that they firstly accept the literal, suggestive and implied. But the question is: is this order necessary for knowing verbal cognition? As per scholars like D.N Tiwari, there are many examples that shed light that *vyañjanārtha* in some cases functions independently without a consideration of *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*. An example given by him has been explained. (Tiwari, 2014: 218) “A lover is sitting with his beloved on the bank of a river. On seeing a crane, the beloved point out to it and utters: ‘See, the crane is enjoying tranquility.’” Here, the primary and secondary signification of the sentence is not intended in use. However, a different meaning that is a motivation and stimulation to the lover for ‘embracing her without any fear from disturbing elements or ‘time’ or an occasion fit for embracing her’ are directly suggested by it. The example is sufficient to tell that these powers do not act in an order and that more than one tertiary meaning of the sentence is possible because of which arbitrariness in the determination of meaning cannot be overlooked. Unlike, the *Vedāntins* and *Mīmāṃsakas* who accept only two signifying powers; literal power (*abhidhā śakti*) and figurative power (*lakṣaṇā śakti*), Indian rhetoric Mammata and Vishwanātha assume a third one i.e., suggestive power (*vyañjanāśakti*). According to the advocates of *vyañjanā* theory, there are three powers in words because of which different kinds of meanings, namely literal, figurative and implied are known by the use of a word. These powers act on for their meanings in an order, For example, secondary power acts on for figurative where literal meaning is not operating to and the *vyañjanāśakti* acts on for implied meaning if earlier two powers are not conducive to the use. However, this is not fixed in an order. The rhetoricians accept two sorts of *Vyañjanā*: *śābdi* and *ārthi*. *Śābdi vyañjanā*, implicative meaning is taken out from some specific word *śabda viśeṣa*. In *śābdi* implication is caused by the specific word. In *ārthi vyañjanā*, implication arises from the meaning of the complete sentence, unlike, some words carry multiple meaning. It is *ārthi* if implication arises from the meaning of the complete sentence, unlike *śābdi*. It does not arise from specific word. For example, *Kanaka* means gold and *dhatūrā* (poisonous apple) etc. *Bhudhāraḥ* means man and mountain. They carry double meaning: If the expression is *Kanaka* it means intoxication. Then the popular meaning is *dhatūrā* (poisonous apple) is intoxicating. But the implicative meaning does not attach with desire for gold. This is possible only if the word ‘*kanaka*’ is substituted by and thus the meaning of the word “*kanaka*” being equivocal gives rise to another meaning of the word “*kanaka*”(pun).

VII. Śābdivyañjanā, Abhidhamūllā and Lakṣaṇāmūlā

Śābdivyañjanā is of two types. (1) *Abhidhāmūllā* – that which depends on literal primary meaning, Bhudāra and hence *Abhidhamūlā lakṣaṇā*; (2) *Lakṣaṇāmūlā* - that which depends on secondary meaning. In the example, the hamlet in the current of water, suggestiveness comes from figurative meaning.¹² In case the literal meaning (*abhidhā*) serves as the basis of suggestive meaning, the *lakṣaṇā* is called *abhidhāmūlā*. (*Sahitya Darpaṇa* 2/14) For example “*Durataḥ Bhudhāraḥ Ramyā*” which means to live at a respectable distance from the kings. In this example, suggestiveness depends on the literal meaning (*vācyārtha*) meaning of ‘*bhudhārā*’ and for this reason it is known as *abhidhāmūlā*. In case of *lakṣaṇāmūlā suggestiveness* depends on secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*), then the *vyañjanā*: the house being cool and sacred¹³ as *vyañgyārtha* known as *lakṣaṇāmūlā* in which the literal meaning serves only as the base of suggestiveness and by that suggestiveness the *vyañgyārtha* comes forth.

VIII. Ārthi Vyañjanā

In case of *ārthivyañjanā*, the suggestive meaning does not depend on any particular word used for *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā* but on the complete sentence as a whole. In that case, the *vyañjanā* is called *ārthi* for example: The Sun has set. The literal meaning of the sentence is clear to all. This literal meaning serves as the cause of the rise of several suggestive meanings, for example: Night will fall. A cowherd may take it for the right time to herd the cows. A dancer may take it to mean the right time to prepare for the dance performance, while a student may take it as the right time to pack up from school. The neighbor of the ailing great man may take it to mean that the latter has died and so on and so forth. *Vyañjanā* arises from the complete meaning of the sentence. Since its literal meaning is one (sun has set). It can suggest so many implicative meanings. Vishwanatha and Mammatta have mentioned conditions for determining the *ārthivyañjanā*. (*Kavyaprakāśa* 12/16) The implicative meaning of the sentence carried the meaning of sentence may have the condition of the nature of the speaker (*vyakti vaiśiṣṭhya*), nature of the hearer, *bodhavaiśiṣṭhya*, proximity of the sentence, *anyavākya*, *sannidhi*, space and time. These are the factors through which will emerge implicative meaning. They have included in the list the factors like *kāku cestā* for the determination of *ārthivyañjanā*. In the sentence: the sun has set. If it is spoken by a Jaina *sādhaka*, it may mean I shall not eat now (after sunset). If it is uttered by a mother it means that she is fasting (*ekādaśivrata*). For the Muslims, it is the time to start eating if he is keeping roza. Place: Time to stop the journey to the nearby village and start cooking. It seems from the illustration that the condition in which the difference between *vyañgyārtha* are taken out of the suggestive meaning of

¹² *Abhidhā lakṣaṇāmūlā śabdasya vyañjanā dvidhā - Sahitya Darpaṇa* 2/13.

¹³ *Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ saityapavanā’tvādi lakṣaṇāmūlā vyañjanā – Kavyaprakāśa*.

the expression is not exclusive and exhaustive. This is only a helping guide to interpret the intended meaning in different situations.

IX. The Primacy of Vyañjanā in Rhetorics Thought

The question is often asked that *vyañjanā* is not inference but it can be reduced to inference and the possibility of reducing by *Vyakiviveka* of Mahima Bhaṭṭa. But Mammatta in *Kāvya Prakāśa* pleaded against this view because of the reason that *hetu* is necessary. Without *hetu*, inference is impossible. But that is not the case of *vyañjanā* (suggestive meaning). The point that needs to be clarified refers as to why *vyañjanā* has to be accepted at all. What are the differences among *vyañjanā* form *lakṣaṇā* and *abhidhā*? In response to this question, it can be clearly said that literal meaning is popular meaning (*vācyārtha*) and is for all without alteration. *Lakṣaṇārtha* is known by the imposition of popular meaning on another meaning because of the intention of the speaker. But the *vyañjanā* differs according to the intention of the speakers, listeners and the context. For example: *Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*. If the expression: ‘*Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ*’ is uttered to a hearer nearby the sea-shore, it may mean a house-boat or a huge fish. Similarly, the statement *Saindhavam ānaya* (Bring *Saindhava*), if it is expressed by one who has to march onto war, *Saindhava* would mean horse but if in the context of dinner, it would mean salt. Sometimes, *vyañgyārtha* is found to be as different from the literal meaning, that it becomes difficult to relate the two belonging the meaning of the same word. For example: A mother caring for her child forbids the latter to roam around the neighboring enemy’s house. However, the child does not pay heed to the mother and continues and adventuring. In anger, the mother utters: ‘*Visha Khao*’. The meaning is do not take food in others house. The literal meaning is take poison but the *vyañgyārtha* is an emphatic way by *viṣam bhunkta* is for ‘never take food in her house’. The rhetorics posit *vyañjanā* at the center of the verbal cognition and show as to how the literal and the suggestive meanings are limited in themselves in conveying the proper meaning which for them is *vyañgyārtha*.¹⁴ Here, an analogy can be given to shed clear light on their view of verbal cognition. The analogy is that of an arrow piercing a body. To reach the flesh the arrow has to firstly pierce the shirt, the skin and the flesh and then the heart. In the same way, when the literal meaning cannot convey the proper meaning, the next resort is to suggestive meaning and finally the meaning is apprehended through *vyañjanā*.

X. Rhetoric View of Lakṣaṇā.

To better comprehend the poetics’ understanding of *vyañjanā*, it is important to grasp their stand on *lakṣaṇā* as well. *Lakṣaṇā* is the secondary sense and is taken recourse to when the primary meaning is not conducive or is obstructed (*bādhita*), it then gives

¹⁴ The point is made after a discussion in person with Prof. D. N. Tiwari in the Spring 2015 issue of the *Journal of East-West Thought*.

space for figurative meaning, for example the sentence: ‘Mauritius is a wonder.’ The secondary meaning of the word ‘Heaven’ does not fit in because Mauritius is a country having geography, landscape with trees, mountains, river and sea and not a trans-empirical entity like ‘heaven’. Hence, Mauritius cannot be taken literally but only figuratively as being a ‘wonder.’ Thus, we find that in the case of cognizing *vācyārtha* (literal meaning), there is some difficulty and therefore recourse is taken to *lakṣaṇā*. In other words, the question of *lakṣaṇā* arises only when the primary meaning is not construed or obstructed (*mukhyārtha śabda*). Now, if there is some incompatibility to know the literal meaning then in the sentence *lakṣaṇā* is taken recourse to by *lakṣaṇā śakti*. For example, the sentence: ‘The Man is a lion.’ Here the characteristic feature of a lion namely, braveness is taken to resemble in the man. Thus, figurative meaning bears relation with the primary meaning. Acārya Mammaṭṭa describes *lakṣaṇā* according to its three-fold characteristics.¹⁵ (i) *Mukhyārtha bādha* - obstruction of primary meaning. (ii) *Mukhyārtha yuktaḥ* - Substitution of another meaning associated with the primary. (iii) *Ruḍhi and prayojana* - Some convention and purpose. Naiyāyika Varadarāja Acārya in his *Tārṅkikarakṣā* also gives a similar definition of *lakṣaṇā*.¹⁶ Meaning, thus, is that the primary meaning is abandoned and the secondary meaning in the usage is taken by *ruḍhi* (convention) and purpose (*prayojana*). This *lakṣyārtha* is known almost differently from the literal meaning.

XI. Types of Lakṣaṇā, Ruḍha Lakṣaṇā & Prayojanāvati Lakṣaṇā

Rhetoricians broadly classify *lakṣaṇā* into two: (i) conventional (*Ruḍha*) and (ii) Purposive (*Prayojanāvati lakṣaṇā*).¹⁷ When the figurative meaning becomes popular in usage, it is called *ruḍha*. For example, the leg of the table, the eye of the needle etc. such usages of the leg and eye with table and needle have become so conventionally popular as if they are the literal meaning of the words but we know that it is only by the device of *lakṣaṇā* that the word leg, eyes are used with table and needle. In some cases, figurative meaning becomes as fixed as if it gets the force of literal meaning of the word taken purposively. For example, the Sanskrit word ‘*padam*’ means step but in usage it means word. Similarly, the word ‘*kuśal*’ means ‘sharp’, however, its figurative meaning is excellent, intelligent. Let us consider the sentence: *Gangāyām Ghośah*: The literal meaning of the statement is ‘Hamlet in the current of water’ but its figurative (*lakṣaṇārtha*) is purposive ‘Hamlet on the bank of the river.’ It is this meaning for which the expression is popularly used that is it is as popular as if it is the literal power of the word. In precise, the purposive use for a particular purpose is used figuratively for some meaning and the meaning gets the popular force in usage

¹⁵ *Mukhārtha Bāddhe Tadyogo Ruddhito’artha prayojanāta anyahorthaḥ lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitākriyā.*

¹⁶ *Mukhārtha Bāddhe Tadyogo Ruddhitoartha prayojanāta anyahorthaḥ lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitākriyā.*

¹⁷ *Ṇiṛudhāḥ lakṣaṇāḥ kāścita sāmartyādabhidhānavata- vṛṭṭi on Tarkasamgraha by Annam Bhaṭṭa.*

(convention). In the sentence ‘‘Hamlet on the bank of river’’-the purposive meaning of the sentence is known popularly by the sentence ‘*Gangāyām Ghōṣaḥ*.’’¹⁸

XII. Further Classification of Lakṣaṇā & Ajahat Lakṣaṇā

Rhetoricians have further divided *lakṣaṇā*, an account of which follows: Jahat Lakṣaṇā. The statement: *Mañcā Krośanti*: The literal meaning of *mañcā* is stage but the figurative meaning is the man making noise from the *mañcā* the crop field protector of maize, millet makes loud noises, cries to scare away animals like jackals is the meaning of the expression because the *mañcā* is inanimate that cannot cry and therefore with the meaning of a certain person sitting on the *mañcā* is derived by *jahat svārthā*.¹⁹ In that type of figurative meaning, literal meaning is not abandoned, but the figurative meaning widens the literal as well. For example, the following sentence, ‘Protect the curd from the crows.’ The literal meaning is to protect the curd only against crows, however, a cat or other animals can also eat the curd, hence, the literal meaning is not conducive and figurative meaning of the sentence under analysis is to protect the curd from all its destroyers is conducive and that is intended meaning *lakṣaṇā*. Meaning thereby, that curd must be protected from all the destroyers (*upaghātakas*) like crow, cat etc, that may destroy the curd.²⁰ Thus, the primary meaning is partly given up and partly retained. Vedāntins interpret the great sayings using this technique.

XIII. Jahatajahat Lakṣaṇā, Suddhā & Gauṇī

Soyam Devadatta: This is That Devadatta, figuratively by *jahat ajahat lakṣaṇa*. It is also called as *bhāgatyaṅgalakṣaṇā*. In the example *So ’yam Devdattaḥ*, the word Devadatta (who is here) is the same whom I saw in the past. The meaning of the sameness of Devadatta is known by retaining Devadatta of past memory and present experience and giving up the past and present differences of perceiving ‘Devadatta’ The expression partly retains and partly gives up to convey the meaning. *Gauṇī Lakṣaṇā. Sādrśyāt Tu Matā Gauṇī*.²¹ According to this definition of *Sahitya Darpaṇa*, *lakṣaṇā* based on similarity is called *gauṇī*. By some similarity the foolishness/ voraciousness/laziness or any of the qualities inhering in the meaning of the cow that is ‘cowness’ is imposed on the secondary meaning called *gauṇī lakṣaṇā*. For example, the literal meaning of the word ‘cow’ is ‘cowness’ but secondarily it means a lazy innocent boy, in the case of this statement. This man is (a) cow. That man is ox, in this sentence differences of forms etc. are ignored and point of similarity

¹⁸ *Gangāpadsya tatva lakṣaṇyā tirasya bodhaḥ - Siddhānta Muktvāli*, Viśvanātha Pañcānana.

¹⁹ *Mañcāḥ krośanti iti atra vākyārthasya krośana kartṛtvānavyāsambhavāta mancha padam manchasthapuruṣa lakṣanokam: Siddhānta Muktvāli*, Viśvanāthapañcānana.

²⁰ *Atra dadhyupaghātakebhyaḥ dadhi rakṣeṇe tātparyam: Nyāyabodhini Govardhanācārya*

²¹ *sādrśyāt tu matā gauṇī- Sahitya Darpaṇa*, Viśvanātha 2/10.

is focused.²² The specific character of *gauṇi lakṣaṇā* lies in the *upacāra* (figuring of the literal meaning by some device like similarity, resemblance and opposition). The *lakṣaṇā* based on similarity is called *gauṇi*. In the literature, *rupaka alamkāra* is the best example of *Gauṇi lakṣaṇā*. 'Mukha Chandra': 'Your face is moon,' this can be described as a suppressed simile.

XIV. Suddha lakṣaṇā, Upādāna Lakṣaṇā, Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā & Lakṣaṇa Lakṣaṇā

This is based on some relation other than similarity, for example, 'Virtue is Happiness.' Happiness is not similar to virtue but since virtue causes happiness, the relation between the two is established.²³ 'This girl is fiery,' a girl cannot be fire but it is by figuration of some qualities (aggressiveness etc) of girl identical to the nature of fire that the sentence intends to the meaning 'keep away' from the girl. *Suddha lakṣaṇā* can also be seen in the form of *kārya kāraṇa sambandha* for example: *Ghṛtam āyuhḥ*: Ghee is life 'ghee is glow, health and life giving, in other words ghee is identified with life because of its life-giving relation. Mammaṭṭa in *Kavya Prakāśa* defines *upādāna lakṣaṇā* as an imposition of some other word for making its own meaning clear. For example,²⁴ *Kuntāḥ praviśyanti Bhale aa rahe hain* (spears are entering) *śveto dhāvataḥ* (the white runs). Spears (*kuntāḥ*) being inert do not enter into palace themselves. The other word 'spearmen' is imposed to make the meaning of the other clear. In the example 'śvetodhāvati': The word 'horse' is imposed to make the meaning of the word 'white' *sveta* clear. In precise, the white (color) has no fitness to run, therefore to make the meaning of the expresser *aśvodhāvati*, the word horse by *ākeṣpa* or *ādhyā* (rope) is brought into and that is necessary for the rendering of the meaning of the expresser intelligible.²⁵ *Sahitya Darpaṇa* defines *lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* as that whose case, the original meaning of the expression is given up. The words give up their original sense of conveying intelligibility to another word²⁶ for example: 'Mauritius is alive' - the word 'Mauritius' gives up original meaning 'island' and assumes another meaning 'alive, the quality of being animated'. This giving up of the meaning is necessary to make the meaning of the word 'alive' intelligible. (*Sahitya Darpaṇa* 2/7) Mādhavācārya in *Sarvadarśansamgraha*²⁷ has made a distinction between *upādāna* and *lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* with the reference of *śvetodhāvati*. In which the word 'white' retains its original meaning and only its operation is made possible by bringing up the other word which makes this sentence meaningful. But in

²² *Gaurvāhikaḥ atra gavā budhimāndyādau sādrśyātjada ityārthaḥ lakṣayate – Sahitya Darpaṇa.*

²³ *Sādrśyetara sabandhaḥ suddhāstāḥ sakatā'pi, Ibid. 2/9.*

²⁴ *Atra Kūntānām śāstraviśeṣaṇām acetanānām praveśanakriyā kartṛtvāsambhavāta – Kavya prakāśa, 2/10.*

²⁵ *Mukhyārthasye tarākṣepo vākyārthanvaya siddhaye syādātmāno'pyupādānāt eṣopādānat lakṣaṇā, Sāhitya – Darpaṇa, 2/10.*

²⁶ *Arpaṇam svasya vakyārtha parasyānavayāsiddhaye upalakṣaṇa hetutvāt eṣa lakṣaṇa. lakṣaṇā – Sahitya Darpaṇa 2/7.*

²⁷ *Svārthāparityāgenaiva parārthe grahaṇam upādādānam svārthāparityāgena parārtha grahaṇam lakṣaṇam iti – Sarvadarshan samgraha.*

case of *lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* it takes that the literal meaning of the word is abandoned to make the meaning of the word “alive” that is “fall of liveliness” clear. The difference between the *upādāna lakṣaṇā* and *lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā* is that the former is a case of *Ajahat svārtha lakṣaṇā* while the latter is an instance of *Jahat lakṣaṇā*.

XV. Saropā (By imposition), Sādhyā Vasāna Lakṣaṇā & Sādhyavasānā

Mammatta defines *saropā lakṣaṇā* in terms of the identity of the subject on which the *āropa* (imposition) is being made but is not swallowed up by that which is imposed.²⁸ For example: *Annam Vai Brahman*: Food is Brahman. The subject (food) on which the imposition of Brahman is made is not swallowed up by that Brahman which is imposed. The *sādhyavasānā* is defined by Mādhavācārya in *Sarvadarśansamgraha* as that in which the imposition is made completely swallowed up by that which is imposed on it. For example, ‘Destroy the thorns’ means destroy the enemies. The word enemy is the subject of imposition is not mentioned here. It is swallowed up by the *viśaya* (subject), thorn which is imposed on the enemy this is called *sādhyavasānā lakṣaṇā*.²⁹ Vedantins do not accept *vyañjanā* but they give importance to *lakṣaṇā* as much as they interpret the meaning of the *mahāvākya*. But for that, they have to accept a number of the types of *lakṣaṇā*.

Conclusion

Ānandavardhana and his followers agreed with the grammarian’s view about the unity of the sentence-meaning. Most of the criticisms raised against the *dhvani* theory are mainly because poets and literary critics did not confine themselves to a relatively small portion of language behavior which is definite, but attempted to extend it to the totality of human experience, including the emotional. (Raja, 1963: 315) Abhinavagupta though agrees with many of the suggestions put forward by *rasa* theory also points at its various limitations. According to him art is not just about evoking certain feelings but a real work of art in addition to possessing emotive charge needs to have a strong sense of suggestion and capacity to produce various meanings. This is where he refers to *Dhvanivāda*. He states that for a work of art it is not enough to be having *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* but it should also possess *vyañjanā*, which has absolutely nothing to do with the other two levels of meaning. Thus, an aesthetic experience cannot be experienced like any ordinary mundane experience. Abhinavagupta turned his attention away from the linguistic and related abstractions which had preoccupied even Ānandavardhana, focusing his attention instead on the human mind, specifically the mind of a reader or viewer of a literary work.

²⁸Viśayasyanigirṇasyānyatādātmya pratitīkṛta sārōpā syāt nigirṇasyamatā sādhyāvasānikā - Sarvadarśana samgraha.

²⁹Sārōpānyā tu kvo viśayaḥ viśayitathā viśayāntaḥ kṛte’nyasmina sa syāt sādhyāvasānikā - kavya prakasha 2/14.

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